Edith Cowan University

Research Online
Theses: Doctorates and Masters

Theses

1-1-1999

Man makes man : a study of uplifting and upbuilding in the novels
of Joseph Furphy
Raymond Driehuis
Edith Cowan University

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses
Part of the English Language and Literature Commons

Recommended Citation
Driehuis, R. (1999). Man makes man : a study of uplifting and upbuilding in the novels of Joseph Furphy.
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses/1226

This Thesis is posted at Research Online.
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses/1226

Edith Cowan University
Copyright Warning
You may print or download ONE copy of this document for the purpose
of your own research or study.
The University does not authorize you to copy, communicate or
otherwise make available electronically to any other person any
copyright material contained on this site.
You are reminded of the following:
 Copyright owners are entitled to take legal action against persons
who infringe their copyright.
 A reproduction of material that is protected by copyright may be a
copyright infringement. Where the reproduction of such material is
done without attribution of authorship, with false attribution of
authorship or the authorship is treated in a derogatory manner,
this may be a breach of the author’s moral rights contained in Part
IX of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).
 Courts have the power to impose a wide range of civil and criminal
sanctions for infringement of copyright, infringement of moral
rights and other offences under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).
Higher penalties may apply, and higher damages may be awarded,
for offences and infringements involving the conversion of material
into digital or electronic form.

USE OF THESIS

The Use of Thesis statement is not included in this version of the thesis.

'
i.~,,,. , .....,.

..... .,.~ "'"-'"

~,

·~.---...-

~,.,.._._..~ ...........y

• •. . _

-

--

I

Man Makes Man:
A Study of Uplifting and Upbuilding
in the Novels of Joseph Furphy.
by
Raymond Driehuis, B.A. (Hons).

A Thesis submitted for the Award of
Doctor of Philosophy
in English Studies.
at the Faculty of Community Services,
Education and Social Sciences.
Mt. Lawley Campus,
Edith Cowan University.
Perth, Western Australia.
Date of Submission: 28th of May, 1999.

Abstract.

In a letter to Kate Baker, circa November 1910, Furphy wrote,
'[b)ut ain't it anomalous that the erratic G.H [Grant Hervey], the
saintly Dr. Strong, and the perverse T.C. [Tom Collins] should be
working strenuously toward the same goal, namely, the uplifting and
upbulldtng qf Australia' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:259. My
italics). This thesis is an investigation of the ideas of uplifting and
upbutldtng, and their relevance to Tom Collins and his concerns. The
reason for Furphy waiting so long to lay bare his designs can only be
speculated. Rather than accepting the general critical stance that
Collins is unreliable, and that Furphy meticulously sets out to
expose his flaws, this thesis argues that this is not the case. Since
he distanced himself publicly from his own novels, refusing to have
authorship credited to his name, Furphy wanted his readers to
respond to Collins not as his literary creation, but as a fully
developed and self-reliant identity capable of setting an example of
what it means to uplift and upbuild a national community.
The ideas of uplifting and upbuilding are simple enough to
comprehend. Yet a proper appreciation of their scope in the novels
requires a careful consideration of the historical context which links
Collins to many issues of the 1880s. The chief issue is the textual
construction of an Australian identity vis-a-vis an Anglo-Australian
identity, and the influence literature has on the common mind.
Because of his involvement with uplifting, upbuilding and selfreliance, there is a complexity to Tom Collins that is the result of his
being the implied author, controlling the selection of characters and
their narratives, as well as his own self-image, in the novels. The
thesis argues that Collins' representation of "Collins", and other
characters in the Riverina, is designed to represent the "right"
qualities for an Australian character or type, which is consistent
with uplifting and upbuilding. For these reasons, the novels are
considered as Collins' strategic response to the contemporary
representations of life in terms of their value to the search for
meaning, and to ways of seeing and responding to the good of an
Australian life.
iii.

Indeed, the character of Tom Collins is very much concerned
with personal and communal well-being in an environment of
colonial loyalties, rivalry and division, and a landscape often
categorized as exotically cruel or dangerous. Because this is so,
Collins is concerned with the value of education, with the value of
notable Western thinkers and artists, and with the shifting of
ignorance for better judgment. He is also concerned with the benefits
of democracy and the democratic temper over aristocracy and its
emphasis on class and station. Collins is quite a modem thinker,
deeply concerned with actions and consequences in art and life. He is
a modern thinker because he believes, as Paine, Emerson and
Whitman do, that the idea of natural rights is the cornerstone of
moral progress for civilization, but only if men and women accept
and practise the civil rights that necessarily come with the pursuit of
liberty, fraternity, equality and happiness.
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Introduction: remarks on unreliable narration and the
direction of the thesis.

Since this thesis investigates what Furphy meant by the
nationalist ideas of uplifting and upbuilding, one of the key aims is to
tease out the complexity of Furphy's creation, Tom Collins. During
my research, I became increasingly dissatisfied with the traditional
view that Tom Collins is simply an unreliable narrator, and that
Furphy intervenes in the novels quite regularly in order to foreground
the blindness of his narrator to the actual state of affairs in the
"world" around him. Simply put, Furphy shows his readers that Tom
Collins is an inept chronicler of life by providing the clues which
Collins does not notice during his observations, despite the fact that
these clues occur rtght before his eyes. Collins is an observer, but he
is not observant, and by aligning ourselves with Furphy we are privy
to Collins' inadequacies and mistakes, making the necessary
connections Collins fails to make.
There are two important points underpinning this view, namely
Furphy's 1903 review of the novel and Wayne Booth's idea of the
unreliable narrator. In the last paragraph of the review, Furphy
states that '[u]nderneath this obvious dislocation of anything
resembling continuous narrative run several undercurrents of plot,
manifest to the reader, though ostensibly unnoticed by the author'
(1969:130). According to Booth's (1983:158-159) view, an unreliable
narrator is a main character whose observations and opinions of the
world run contrary to the observations and opinions expressed by the
implied author, who represents the core values of the text. The idea
of the implied author, for Booth (1983:73-75), is the result of a need
to distance the real author from his or her text, and therefore avoid
the issue of having to determine whether or not the core values of
the text are, for proper appreciation, sincere or insincere with the
real author's life.
Because of this idea of the unreliable narrator, critical opinion
has generally taken the last paragraph of the 1903 review to be
Furphy's way of making his readers aware that there are things they
should notice which Collins does not. In this sense, critics have
1.

implicitly identified Collins with Booth's idea of the unreliable
narrator, while Furphy is identified with both the real and implied
author. There are, however, problems with this view. Firstly, as I will
discuss in my thesis, Furphy, in light of A.G. Stephens and William
Cathels' perplexity with Such ts Life, wrote the review in order to alert
future readers to be observant rather than expect a traditional
narrative structure in which they could relax and enjoy the ride.
Also, it is important to bear in mind that Stephens had asked
Furphy to write a synopsis of Such ts Life, which would be published
in The Bulletin, but he instead wrote a review. I do not think that
Furphy could not distinguish the meaning of these two words, and it
is for this reason that I believe the review to be a carefully designed
piece of insight into his creation, Tom Collins, and the core values
he represents.
Secondly, despite being the author, Furphy wrote his review as
a reviewer of Such ts Life, making no mention of his being either the
real or implied author. Furphy did not write that there were several
undercurrents of plot ostensibly unnoticed by the narrator. In other
words, Furphy is determined to manufacture a distance between
himself and his creation. He is careful to attribute authorship to
Tom Collins, and he makes this clear several times in the review.
Indeed, the situation is such that it seems more than likely that
Furphy intended readers to accept Collins as the real author. The
1903 review strongly supports this situation, as does the textual fact
that Such ts Life is penned by Collins from his supposedly real life
observations in a contemporary brand of pocket diaries, namely Letts.
Although I do look at the issue of distance between Furphy and
Collins towards the close of chapter two, my main concern is to
examine Collins' status as the implied author of the novels, rather
than the intended real author.
Thirdly, if Furphy is taken to be the implied author, then how
do these critics explain Collins' many discussions of his own
authorship in the novels? To say that the implied authorial voice
belongs to Furphy while the narratorial voice belongs to Collins is to
make a rather odd distinction between the "I" of the implied author
and the "I" of the narrator, especially since the texts give us no
necessary indication of such a distinction within their first-person
structure. Booth states that 'Flaubert is right in saying that
2.

Shakespeare does not barge clumsily into his works' (1983:75), and
readers need to apply the same observation to Furphy. In short,
Furphy wanted readers to see Collins as the implied author.
As I will show in my thesis, Furphy refused to have authorship
attributed to him, even though A.G. Stephens had made this request.
With the exception of the short story, 'O'Flaherty's Troubles',
Furphy's name did not appear on any of his work until 1916, four
years after his death, when Kate Baker edited a book of his poetry,
which was published by the Lothian Book Publishing Company and
had been subtitled '"Tom Collins, author of Such is Life"' (Croft,
1991:265). But this subtitle is much more indicative of Baker's desire
to have Furphy publicly recognised as an author rather than fulfil
what Furphy would have actually wanted himself. By placing
Furphy's name on the cover of each novel, as publishers have done
With modem versions. Collins' significance is over-looked.
The fact that Furphy readily attributed authorship to Tom
Collins is rather interesting in light of the last paragraph of the 1903
review. To say that there are 'several undercurrents of plot. manifest
to the reader, though ostensibly unnoticed by the author', does not
necessarily mean that the author, namely Tom Collins, fails to
notice the undercurrents of plot in his own narrative strategies. This
is simply absurd. What this suggests is that the author either
pretends not to notice these undercurrents or has no intention of
foregrounding them to his readers in the traditionally expected sense.
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines 'ostensible' as
something that is '[ d]eclared, avowed, professed; put forth as actual
or genuine; often [opposed] to "actual", "real", and so [equals] merely
professed, pretended' ( 1933: 1390). This definition first came into use
circa 1771, becoming only recently obsolete, and is more than likely
the one used by Furphy in his 1903 review. In short, Furphy uses the
adverbial form of "ostensible" to modify the verb "unnoticed" in order
to indicate that Collins' not noticing the undercurrents of plot is
merely professed or pretended.
Collins is not an unreliable narrator in Booth's sense of the
term; nor is he a reliable narrator in the traditional sense of overtl.y
showing what needs to be shown in terms of plot or character
development. Equally, Collins is not a reliable author in the
traditional sense of overtly guiding the reader through the tWists and
3.

turns of his narratives. Either of these two views runs contrary to
the stress placed on observant reading. Though he reads the novels
in the traditional way, Croft's idea of 'Tom's ... cunning concealment'
(1991:36) offers an excellent insight into Collins' self-professed
tactics as the implied author and narrator. According to Collins, '[i]n
the race of life, my son, you must run cunning, reserving your sprint
for the tactical moment' (SiL, 215. My italics).
This leads me to clarify another important point. Where do we
locate Tom Collins as a narrator? Do we locate him inside the
narrative world of the Rivertna and its characters or outside with the
implied author? Although there are many literary examples where the
'"[n]arrator"' or '"I" of the work ... is seldom if ever identical with the
implied image of the artist' (Booth, 1983:73), Furphy's novels, like
Defoe's MollFlanders or Sterne's Tristram Shandy, do not conform to
this state of affairs. When Collins narrates, we are confronted with a
complexity in the novels where it becomes difficult, if not impossible,
to dissociate the implied author who is outside the narrative world of
the Rivertna and comments on that world from the Tom Collins who
is within the narrative world of the Riverina. In short, the term
"narrator", although fruitful to some extent, seems to me to be an
insufficient categorisation which does nothing more than confuse an
already complicated issue.
In order to establish what I consider to be greater clarity, I
have chosen to use the term "hero" in this thesis, and to discuss
Collins in light of his status as implied author and hero. Because it
automatically invokes the idea of the role model, the term "hero" is
quite consistent with Collins' preoccupation with the moral
consequences of roleplay and with the overall issue of identity in the
novels. To all intents and purposes, I intend to show, in this thesis,
that Collins, as implied author, articulates an heroic image of
himself within the narrative world of the Riverina, and that this
image of himself, as the hero, naturally suits the many issues which
occur as a result of the thematic preoccupation with uplifting and
upbutldtng.

Before the issue of the unreliable narrator and the implied
author could be addressed properly, I felt that it was necessary to
place the novels firmly in context. The reason for this has to do with
4.

establishing the core values of the novels, namely uplifting and
upbuilding, which underpin Collins' status as implied author, and
his representation of himself as the hero. For this reason, chapter
one focuses on the socio-historical context of the 1890s, and looks
at a select number of reasons for the colonial division and rivalry
which plagued the federation movement. A section is devoted to
exploring some of Furphy' s views of the world and sets out to
establish him as an enlightened thinker, a phUosophe, rather than a
socialist. Furthermore, Chapter one examines the characterisation of
the bullockies and looks at the story of the Penguin and the Man-0'War Hawk as a parable of the opportunism which was widespread in
colonial Australia. Furphy's other main character, Jefferson Rigby, is
also discussed, and the view that Rigby's socialism is the epitome of
Furphy's own views is challenged. Finally, chapter one ends with a
discussion of Collins' view on uplifting and upbuilding through
democracy and rights, comparing this view with that of Thomas
Paine.

In addition to the implied author and hero discussion
mentioned above, chapter two establishes Furphy's views on art in
light of the socio-historical context discussed in chapter one.
Chapter two sets out to show that Furphy's views on art are
intimately related to the value and function of art in society. In this
sense, a major concern underpinning Collins' view of authorship is
the need to tackle the ignorance, rivalry and division so peivasive in
colonial Australia, and to stress the importance of education and
right judgment through literature in lieu of the popular debate
concerning democracy, national identity and federation tn literature.
This is no different from A.G. Stephens' notion of seeing Australia
'through clear Australian eyes, not through bias-bleared English
spectacles' ([ 1901] 1973:ix. My italics). The chapter also explores
Collins' preoccupation with roleplay within this context. In short,
Furphy's creation, Tom Collins, is preoccupied artistically with social
architecture, as stated in the opening paragraphs of Such ts Life, and
it is within this context that the relevance of the ethical theory of
the controlling alternatives is developed.
Chapter three connects the preceding topics of discussion to
the idea of guardianship. Furphy's idea that life's purpose can be
discovered through calm courage, clear intellect and high moral
5.

standards is explored in light of Tom Collins as implied author and
hero. The chapter connects Furphy's tripartite idea with Plato's idea
of the Guardians and the three elements needed for justice in
society, arguing that any image of the national type, for Furphy, had
to embody these qualities. Furphy's idea of the national type is
developed as a Half Bushman and Half Bookworm, and the chapter
puts forth the notion that Tom Collins, as implied author,
articulates his own heroic image within that context. The chapter
also discusses Plato's idea that women can be Guardians if they have
the aptitude for calm courage, clear intellect and high moral
standards, and explores Collins' preoccupation with the
"Australienne" in this light. Finally, chapter three looks at the
function of the many marriages in the three novels, finishing with
the Falkland-Pritchard marrtage in light of Fred Falkland-Prttchard's
capacity for tall stories about himself as an heroic Australian, and
Lillian Falkland-Pritchard as the epitome of the Australienne. The
chapter ends with a discussion of the romance plot and its
philosophical issue of induction.

6.

1. Man and Nation: towards an understanding of the
ideas of uplifting and upbuilding.

... every avenue to distinction is not closed ... We're
knocking at the gates of Futurity for the Australian
pioneer of poetry -fiction -philosophy -what not?
-Such is Life, 1903/1991:224-

1.1. Furphy's 1880s: a searchfor meaning in the public domain.

In a recent essay, John Barnes states that 'Such is Life was
written by an autodidact working in isolation in a late nineteenthcentury country town, and in my view that profoundly affects both
its form and substance. I should like to see future studies of
Furphy's book look more closely at Such is Life as a cultural creation'
(1993:48). It is a view shared by Wieland (1985) who argues that Such
is Life is both a product of and an experience in the past. Or. as
MacKenzie explains, 'Such is Life can be said to be cultural business
arising' (1993:534). But what is this cultural business that supports
a reading of Such is Life as a cultural creation? Barnes (1993) and
Wieland (1985), like Gilding (1967:201) almost thirty years earlier, do
not raise any specific points, preferring instead to emphasize the
necessity of a socio-historical approach to curb potential misreadings
of the novel. MacKenzie is more specific, arguing that 'identity in
Australia is fundamentally controversial as a result of an old/new
double bind, and is even a matter of imposture' (1993:534). In
comparing Furphy with Marcus Clarke on the issue of imposture in
Australian cultural business, MacKenzie argues that 'Furphy
foregrounds the idea of imposture to a degree that surpasses even
Clarke' (1993:534).
The question of imposture in Australian cultural business, or
culture building, is a tricky one. It seems to suggest that, more than
anywhere else, Australian culture is the product of an illegal theft.
MacKenzie seems to reinforce this idea when he states that 'an
7.

Australian cultural nationalist not only shares identity with a
European bookworm, but also competes with him for this identity,
imitates and impersonates him and so to an extent robs him of it'
(1993:535. My italics). It is in this way that MacKenzie describes Tom
Collins as 'a phantom identity' and 'a trickster' (1993:540). In my
opinion, such a view of Furphy's novel, as well as Australian culture
building generally, tends to dismiss the complex reasons for the
cultural process that works with the old/ new double bind.
Furthermore, the notion of imposture also seems to suggest that
Australian cultural identity is an elegant forgery vts-a-vts the genuine
European article.
Nevertheless, MacKenzie is correct in observing that Such ts
Life is concerned with cultural business. Readers ought to bear in
mind Barnes' advice for the direction of Furphy studies, for the social
and political horizon of the 1890s provides signposts for a greater
understanding and appreciation of the structure and themes of the
novels. The fact that Collins is so obviously concerned with 'a fair
picture of Life' (SlL, 2) should be sufficient to direct the reader's
attention to the historical period about which it is written. Equally,
the fact that Collins is concerned with a fair picture, rather than a
true picture, should also indicate that cultural business is never a
clear or easily resolved issue, and yet must, to some extent, have
clarity and resolution.
A fair picture of life makes cultural business an ethical and
moral issue so that life ts selectively represented in order to inform
human judgment about necessary courses of action in light of the
good. Contrary to this, a true picture of life seeks to represent life as
it ts. True pictures do not, properly speaking, concern themselves
with the good. In this sense, Furphy's novels and Collins' narratives
do not just set out to mimic life in all its looseness and adversity,
but to provide a solution to 'that engaging problem' (SlL, 2) of human
affairs in nineteenth-century colonial Australia.
In light of this focus on cultural business, Indyk points out
that '[i]nstead of a sense of national identity, there is the constant
assertion of national differences. The characters are English first or
Irish, Scottish, Cornish, Chinese, Dutch, German, French, or
Aboriginal -with each group having its own distinguishing dialect'
(1986:305). According to Indyk's observations, '[e]ven where two
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bullockies belong to the same group, it will nevertheless make a great
deal of difference if one of them comes from Victoria, the other from
NSW' (1986:305). Thus, '[i]n a novel which was acclaimed as an
Australian classic in the years folloWing [f]ederation, there isn't a
character who thinks of himself or herself as Australian' (lndyk,
1986:305). Indeed, the social, historical and political "world" of 1880s
Australia is marked by an intercolonial rivalry which threatened to
keep the colonies separated due to ethnic loyalties. According to
Manning Clark,
[a]s early as 1842, when the agitation to divide the old
New South Wales into two or three separate colonies
first got under way, the far-sighted presented the case
for some central government on the grounds of
convenience; but their counsel fell on the deaf ears of
men bent on the tri-section of New South Wales, or
those even deafer ears in South Australia that
confounded all central government or federation
proposals with domination by New South Wales
(l 995a:201).
In the words of the historian, David Day, 'it was a time for
jealousies and protecting one's individual interests' (1996:195). As
Gibb explains,
[f]or colonists, identifying with their colony was
always a substitute for identifying with their
continent. Rivalry between Sydney and Melbourne,
and between New South Wales and Victoria, was
endemic. Tasmanians were suspicious of and resented
their 'mainland'. Sou th Australians were proud of
their freedom from the convict 'taint'. The Western
Australians and Northern Queenslanders felt that they
were 'a thousand miles away'. Governments promoted
rivalry in numbers of ways, for example by tariffs and
extending railways into other colonies. The difficulties
of getting united action on defence and immigration
questions were reasons why politicians became active
9.

in the federation movement (1982:78).
Historically, socially and politically, this scenario forms the
basic structure of chapter one in Such ts Life, and it is interesting to
note that one of the first social issues with which readers are
confronted, besides the squattocratic monopoly on grass, is the
rivahy among the colonies, especially Victoria and New South Wales.
Evidence of this rivalry is implied by the terms 'Port Phillip' and 'the
mother colony' (SiL, 3), or in Mosey's retort to Cooper, the New
South Welshman: '[r]oll up Port Phillipers! the Sydney man's goin' to
strike a match!' (SiL, 5). Or Cooper's remark to Mosey on 'Port Phillip
ignorance' (SiL, 26). Rivalry is also foregrounded by Collins in his
pointing out that '[t]he Victorian carrier, formidable by his lack of
professional etiquette and his extreme thrift, is neither admired nor
caressed by the somewhat select practitioners of Riverina' (SiL, 7).
And one can equally find this rivalry in the volley of terms like
'Cabbage Garden', 'a 'Sucker' or 'a Port Philliper' for Victoria and the
Victorian, and 'Cornstalk' for the New South Welshman (SiL, 35).
Indeed, it is within this last context that 'the Separation' of
1851 is invoked, when Victoria ceased to be called 'the District of
Port Phillip' and ceased to be a 'Colony of New South Wales' (SiL,
35). According to Serle, '[m]any New South Welshman, clutching at
pretensions of historical dignity, found it difficult to look calmly on
upstart breakaway Victoria whose astonishing progress had rested on
the chance presence of gold deposits' (1969: 13). There are, of course,
other examples in chapter one of the division among colonial
Australians. But these tend to unveil this colonial rivalry in an
indirect manner through economic opportunism among the men in
Riverina. For example, one can see this rivalry and opportunism in
the clues to Dixon and Bum's attempted theft of Collins' horse,
Cleopatra, especially with Collins' sudden acquisition of a new
saddle on his horse which he had left unsaddled overnight (SiL, 39,
41 ). This incident stands directly opposed to the egalitarianism
usually associated with Furphy's rendition of the bullockies and
Riverina society. According to Furphy, this episode is '[n)ot only true
to nature, but true to fact', for '[t]he plot wouldn't be obscure to
straight-ahead reader -particularly bushman' (in Barnes and
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:92).
10.

Devlin-Glass, Eaden, Hoffmann and G. W. Turner, the Furphy
scholars who worked on The Annotated Such ts Life, (1991:322)
explain that parts of the novel allude to the battle for economic
control of Rivertna between Victoria and New South Wales: a battle
that was very topical in 1883, the year in which the novels are set.
Gibb states that '[c]ompetition between rival economic interests for
the Riverina had brought bitterness between New South Wales and
Victoria. Victoria's protection policies and practices and her stock
tax infuriated free trade New South Wales' (1982:78-79). Serle
(1969: 15) also points out that the Riverina became the economic
battleground for Victoria and New South Wales because each
thought that the control of trade in the Riverina meant greater
status and prosperity for their own colony.
From the 1860s to the 1890s, when economic ventures became
more uniform for the Australian colonies, both Victoria and New
South Wales each set out to claim Riverina economically, imposing
eccentric standards that can be seen as an expression of this rivalry.
For example, Victorians constructed 'a Victorian-gauge' railway,
'both colonies adopted a policy of differential freight rates', and 'New
South Wales began running early newspaper-trains to the Riverina at
considerable financial loss to combat the insidious influence of the
Melbourne papers' (Serle, 1969: 15). Evans et al state '[t]hat the
parochialism which characterized life in nineteenth-century
Australia was not simply the product of a narrowness of vision or a
preference for the local and the limited' (1997:92). Indeed, '[g]iven the
separate development of each of the colonies, and their primary
identification with a power base in London rather than with other
colonial capitals, the process to achieve any form of union would be
necessarily slow' (Evans et al, 1997:93).
Gibb explains that '[c]olonial governments competed with one
another for loans on the London money market and for immigrants
in Britain generally' (1982:78). As Serle indicates, '[t]he colonial
economies were largely insulated from each other; the nationalising
of the Australian economy in the eighties and nineties greatly
smoothed the path to federation as the hindrances of colonial
barriers to day-to-day business became increasingly irritating'
(1969: 12). According to Cantrell, '[ t]h ough the economic and
industrial upheavals of the time made progress slow, they also
11.

underlined some of the disadvantages of the present state of disunity'
(1977:84).
In view of this disunity and rivalry, we should consider what
Collins is doing in the Riverina. If. as Croft believes, 'the time of
composition of Tom's memoirs is ... some time after the shearer's
strike of 1891' (1991:91), then why focus spec!Jlcally on the years
1883 to 1884? I place emphasis on spec!Jlcally because one cannot,
after almost a century of criticism, appeal to Collins' claim that he
opened a Lett's Pocket Diary 'at random', and it Just happened 'to be
the edition of 1883' (SiL, 2). As readers now know, Collins repeatedly
and overtly refutes his claim to sketching random selections of life.
The answer, I believe, lies in a letter to Kate Baker, circa November
1910, when Furphy wrote, '[b]ut ain't it anomalous that the erratic
G.H [Grant Hervey], the saintly Dr. Strong, and the perverse T.C.
[ Tom Collins] should be working strenuously toward the same goal,
namely, the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia' (in Barnes and
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:259. My italics).
The English novelist, Anthony Trollope, visiting the colonies in
the early 1870s, noted that '[a]n Englishman cannot be month in
Australia without finding himself driven to speculate -almost driven
to come to some conclusion- as to the future destinies of the
colonies', since 'they are loyal to England with an expressive and
almost violent loyalty of which we hear and see little at home' ([ 1873]
1968:52). Trollope explains that '[a]n Australian of the present day
does not like to be told of the future independence of Australia', and
that he had 'met no instance where the proposition on [his] part was
met with an unqualified assent' ([ 1873] 1968:52). This is despite his
steady belief that 'the independence of Australia will come in due
time' (Trollope, [ 1873] 1968:52). But, '[b]efore that day shall arrive
the bone and sinews of the colonies must be of colonial produce' and
'[t]he leading men must not only have lived but have been born in
Australia, so as to have grown up into life without the still existing
feeling that England is their veritable "home"' (Trollope, [ 1873]
1968:52-53).
According to Trollope's observations, '[t]he Australian colonies
are very Jealous of each other, and in their present moods are by no
means ready to unite' ( [1873] 1968:53). Indeed, 'the divisions already
made, and any new divisions which may be made, are not
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incompatible with national unity', but they 'certainly need not be
accompanied by the all but hostile feeling, by the unloving and
unbrotherly condition, which is inseparable from custom-houses
between the one and the other [New South Wales and Victoria]'
(Trollope, [1873] 1968:337-338). In a chapter devoted wholly to life in
the Riverina, Trollope states that 'she is terribly hindered' because
'every article carried across the Murray is subject to the interference
of the custom-house', and '[t]he Riverina and Victoria, instead of
being to each other as are Lancashire and Yorkshire, or as are New
York and New Jersey, are in reference to their custom-house laws as
are France and Germany' ([ 1873] 1968:334).
It is interesting to note that Furphy, during the rewrite of Such
is Life, shifted the scene from the settled areas around the Murray to
the vast space of Rivertna, as pointed out by Croft (1989:10). Why did
Furphy make such a dramatic change? In part, this question has
already been answered. If Riverina is the place where New Sou th
Wales and Victoria express their rivalry to the fullest, then it also
stresses the need for a unity of vision in Australian society. Perhaps
this is what Collins means when he states that, '[i]t is not in our
cities or townships, it is not in our agricultural or mining areas, that
the Australian attains full consciousness of his own nationality; it is
in places like this [Riverina], and as clearly here as at the centre of
the continent' (SiL, 65. My italics). In view of the political and social
climate I have just sketched, it is my contention that the shift to the
Riverina marks a thematically mature investigation into the uplifting
and up building of a "nation", foregrounding the 'wasteful
competition' (Serle, 1969: 15) so prominent in colonial Australia.
Given that Victoria and New South Wales both engaged in a
"thirty-year war" over the economic control of Riverina, and that this
issue was very topical in 1883, what other historical events underpin
Collins' uplifting and upbuilding in the 1883-84 diary narrative?
Collins states that 'the subject of grass' was 'a vital question in '83,
as you may remember' (SiL, 4). As Croft explains, '[t]hings are worse
than usual in September of 1883, because of a prolonged dry spell
during winter -the spring rains have not yet arrived and the signs of
over-grazing are evident' (1991: 129). According to Croft, '[i]t is
interesting to see that Tom assumes the reader would be aware as
any bullocky of the condition of grass in the Riverina in 1883. It is as
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if the issue of land and its alienation is assumed to be the common
denominator of all social reality in Australia' (1991:129). While I
agree with Croft's notion that land is an important denominator in
Australian social reality, as the battle for Riverina indicates, I do not
think that a reader's familiarity with the grass issue automatically
concludes a link between landscape and alienation.
It might be better to consider the grass question in light of the
prevailing rivalries between New South Wales and Victoria, and to
say that the rivalry between squatter and bullocky is just one more
example of the division in colonial Australia. Speaking from personal
experience, perhaps Furphy wanted to point out that the effects of a
prolonged dry spell for the people of Rivertna is not made any easier
by the discord between Sydney and Melbourne. Indeed, the subject of
grass is immediately punctuated by a remark on the '[d]ivision of
labour' as 'the secret of success': a practice which Dixon considers to
be the '[s]ecret of England's greatness' (StL, 4), rather than
Australia's. Willoughby's rejoinder to Dixon that '[t]he true secret of
England's greatness lies in her dependencies' (StL, 4) hints that the
success of a division of labour depends on unity, something which is
lacking in Australia. It is interesting to note that the aforementioned
colonial rivalry in chapter one is woven into this 'committee on the
subject of grass' (StL,4). All in all, the opening dialogue of chapter
one gives much information to 'the observant reader' on the 'fair
picture of Life' (StL, 2 ). Since Collins asks observant readers to
remember the importance of the grass question in 1883, it is also
possible that he wants readers to remember that the grass question
was but one issue of a much more divided political climate.
One such important issue can be seen as a first move towards
economic and political unity. Clark (1995a: 178), Gibb (1982: 79) and
Serle (1969:1) note that on the 14th of June 1883, many New South
Welsh and Victorian members of the public joined notables at Albury
to toast the railway link between their respective colonies. According
to Serle, '[ e]lectric light dispelled the wintry gloom, flowers covered
the pillars and tables, and on high an allegorical painting showed
Victoria and New South Wales clasping hands in unity, while behind
them an engine was crossing a bridge' ( 1969: 1). More important than
this festive coming together was Victoria's 'confidence that the
inevitable result of the rail union would be the union of the colonies
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themselves' (Clark, 1995a: 178). Indeed, the Premier of Victoria, James
Service, publicly announced that
[w)e have been long separated, and rivalries and
jealousies and ignorance of each other have sprung up
in consequence; but now we are looped together with
bands of iron ... Gentlemen, we want federation and we
want it now .. .l decline to subscribe to the doctrine
that I am to die before the grand federation of the
Australian colonies. There ts no earthly reason why it
should not be achieved .. .I tell my honourable friend,
the Premier of New South Wales, that at a very early
opportunity... we intend to test this question. The
Government of Victoria have determined to send a
message to New South Wales asking them what are
the obstacles that stand in the way? (in Serle, 1969:12).

On the 23rd of June 1883, the Bulletin wrote that
[t}here's been a big drink on at Albury. It was a Federal
affair. Away down here in the country, where
thousands have watched for twenty years or more the
outcome of a bitter rivalry between people of kindred
blood, and in reality, common interests, -down here
on a spot for ever rendered historic by the enterprise of
bold prisoners, though afterwards 'utilized' by political
charlatanism as a starting point of tntercolonial
rancour -down here at Albury, where the Murray flows
between the shores of New South Wales and Victoria,
there's been a big drink! The influence of trade has
done what so-called statesmanship failed to effect. The
railway systems of the two colonies are united! And
over the union there's been a great shtvoo (in Ward
and Robertson, eds, 1980:208).
The Bulletin's sceptical tone mirrors the scepticism prevalent in
New South Wales at the time. As Serle explains, 'at the 1880-1
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Intercolonial Conference, the Victorians brushed aside Parkes's
proposal for a Federal Council', thus 'there was some reason why
many in Sydney reacted with surprise and suspicion to the Victorian
initiative of 1883' (1969:15). Indeed, '1884 was to be a bad year for
the cause' (Serle, 1969: 17). Furthermore, Serle (1969:49-50) explains
it was not until 1888-9 that some reconciliation on the issue of
federation occurred when New South Wales and Victoria were both
delighted by the South Australian decision to join the Federal
Council. All in all, 'the extent of opposition to federation, the lack of
desire to co-operate with other colonies, the strength of New South
Wales provincialism and the weakness there of a sense of Australian
identity remain baffling' (Serle, 1969:55). As Gibb points out, '[p]ride
in colony always remained a difficulty and New Sou th Wales was the
most vacillating of the major colonies on federation' (1982:79). This
colonial pride was so strong that '(i]n 1887 Parkes enthusiastically
commended to the New South Wales Legislative Assembly the
provocative proposal to rename New South Wales as Australia' (Gibb,
1982:79).
Serle indicates that '(i]n view of the lack of national feeling,
Service's campaign of 1883 was obviously premature and ill-prepared'
(1969: 12). If Furphy wanted to draw the observant reader's attention
to this ill-prepared and premature push for unity, then his many
remarks on ignorance shifting, in his novels and letters, certainly
cuts to the heart of the matter. Shifting ignorance has the capacity
to resolve colonial jealousies and rivalries. Of further interest to
Furphy's observant reader is the following. Gibb (1982:79) and Serle
(1969: 12) both note 1883 was the first year that the two most
prominent Victorians, the Premier James Service and the Victorian
chief justice George Higinbotham, had set foot in New Sou th Wales
with the specific intention of "uplifting and upbuilding Australia".
Given the deep-seated and extensive rivalry between the two colonies,
as well as the 1880s New South Welsh view that 'Victorians were
"people to be mistrusted"' (Sir Robert Garran cited in Serle, 1969: 13),
it is rather interesting that Collins, the native-born Victorian, works
for 'the New South Wales Civil Service' (Croft, 1991:91, 1986:155157).
It seems that Furphy wanted readers to see Tom Collins as a
key figure in the public domain of meaning, federation and
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nationalism, for the clues to his narratorial identity are equally clues
to the social and political climate in which he exists. Perhaps it is
for this reason that Collins' narrative begins almost three months
after Service's proposal at Albury. According to Ward, the 'internal
and external conditions [of the 1880s and 1890s] enabled Australians
to pause, to look inward on themselves, to take stock as it were, and
to indulge in what their predecessors in the land might have called a
"dreaming"' (1966:208). In my view, Collins' uplifting and upbuilding
is also an attempt to address and solve the problems 'of an old/ new
double bind' and, in this sense, 'can be said to be cultural business
arising· (MacKenzie, 1993:534). In short, colonial rivalry is as
anachronistic to Australia's future as the colonial romance to which
Collins is so vehemently opposed. Although problematic, Vance
Palmer speaks some truth when he states that '[t]he notion of a
national dream-time is not at all a myth. The forward-looking spirits
of those days really did find a stimulus in their isolation; vague,
creative impulses germinated in their minds' (1963:14).
Perhaps what Palmer should have said is that the national
dream-time is not Just a myth, for the creative idealism of
intellectuals and artists is an ostensive phenomenon. As Ward
explains, '[m]en sought, partly by looking for those things which
distinguished them from their British fathers and congeners, to know
themselves and their country better, and at the same time they saw
utopian visions of a national future in which Australia, unsullied by
the wars and wrongs of the old world, would be a light to less happy
lands' (1966:208). This seems to be also Turner's view, who states
that 'the Lawson-Furphy brand of nationalism in fiction includes not
only a set of definitions of Australian cultural identity, but also a
major strategy for measuring that identity against the English, and
valorising those aspects of our national character which depart from
English values and loyalties' (1993: 114). While this is true, there are
also problems in neatly conflating Furphy with Lawson and speaking
about a "Lawson-Furphy" brand of nationalism.
As Ozolins explains, 'a glance backwards reveals that in the
second half of the 19th century, Australia experienced a period of
considerable cultural and linguistic diversity, with a huge influx of
population during the gold rushes of thel850s from Europe, Asia and
the Americas' (1993:3). If, as Ozolins argues, language is 'one of the
17.

clearest and most evident manifestations of cultural diversity'
(1993:2), then Furphy and Lawson are miles apart in their respective
renditions of the 1890s in narrative. In his 1903 review of Such is
Life, Furphy states that Collins is, '[b]eyond all other Australian
writers, ... a master of idiom', for 'the education of each speaker is
denoted by his phraseology; the dialect of each European bespeaks
his native locality; and, above all, the language of the most
unbookish bushman never degenerates into "caster"' (1969:129). Not
only does Furphy demonstrate 'a brilliant use of the strategy of codeswitching·, but his 'employment of language variance represents a
stage of "becoming" which exists between [a sense of diversity and a
sense of unity]' (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, 1989:73).
One should not be deceived in to thinking that the germination
of nationalist ideas or the pursuit of meaning for "Australia" was
homogeneous. Neither Furphy nor Lawson shared the same vision for
Australia, as I will show in appropriate parts of the thesis. As
Stewart states, '[t)he "1890s debate" is not a simple dialogue directed
by unchanging assumptions and goals, or fixed questions and
answers. It is usually perceived today as a dynamic of interactions
amongst contending discourses' (1996:10). For example, commenting
on Australia's cultural obsession with Youth, Stewart points out
that
[i)n the 1890s Australia could be represented as a
beautiful and athletic young woman, her torch lighting
the future; or a young bushman or axeman, an
allegorical emblem of industry or pioneering; or a baby
blowing bubbles, naive, lovable, immature; or a little
boy, often from Manly. The metaphor might be
simultaneously a metonymy: the young person is an
Australian; Australians are "young and free", as
Advance Australia Fair decreed. You might easily feel
that Australians were not actually, and certainly not
typically, old; and that a young country had "more"
future, and more opportunity with a longer life to
come, than an "old" country (1996:1-2).
According to Stewart, '[t]he Young Country provided an
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important, perhaps dominant code, which was almost universally
employed; but it was not the only code. Its power in the 1890s
created a context for the inevitable articulation of disappointment,
one for use of an alternative "Australian" code of stoicism,
iconoclasm and scepticism. You do not feel young and free in a
depression, a drought, or a strike; some writers felt, in the 1890s and
later, robbed' (1996:6). The meaning and vitality of Youth can be
rather problematic, not only for one's expectations of the local
milieu, but also for one's position among the nations and empires of
the world. Docker's notion that '[t]he very confidence and elan of the
Nineties' literary and intellectual communities presented them with
dilemmas in terms of the inherited British-Australian cultural
relationship' ( 1991 :238) is fitting.
According to Evans et al, '[t)he position of British-Australians,
who composed the vast bulk of the colonial population, was also
somewhat ambiguous, for not only were they the citizens of a potent
new nation, but also the subjects of a far mightier Empire' (1997:24).
As Evans et al explain, '[t]o many, Britain was still "home" rather
than the suburban villa, worker's cottage or selector's hut they now
inhabited on the opposite side of the world. For an expatriate people,
the British connection remained a guarantee of their essential
kinship, even though the British themselves tended to regard
colonials more as embarrassing country cousins than as warmly
recognized brothers and sisters' (1997:24). Rather than a ·great age of
literary and cultural nationalism', the 1890s 'was a varied and
exciting scene, full of drama and conflict and contradiction' where
'its actors had to contend with more than just each other'
(Docker, 1991 :238).
It is, therefore, difficult to swallow Ward's notion that '[w]hen
the dreaming was over the values and attitudes of the nomad tribe
[or pastoral workers] had been largely adopted by the whole nation'
(1966:208). Such values and attitudes may have been adopted by
some of the nation, but even here the degree to which such an
adoption occurred depends greatly on being able to smooth over a
variety of contending discourses. As McCauley explains, 'Ward is not
concerned with what Australians are really like, but with the myth or
stereotype, the idealized self-portrait representing a particular set of
demands and approvals' (1962:124). Ward may be rtght in stating
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that, after the influential decades of the 1880s and 1890s, 'the "noble
bushman" was already firmly enshrined in both the popular and the
literary imagination' (1966:212). But this does not answer the
question as to which image dominated the nationalist outlook.
Given the poor public response to Such ts Life, one may say that it is
not Furphy's "Tom Collins", but what of Lawson's "Joe Wilson" or
Paterson's "Clancy of the Overflow"?
Palmer's 'forward looking-spirits' may have had 'a deep sense of
responsibility to the country they were making their own' (1963:14),
but the cultural obsession with Youth does not necessarily mean
that such an obsession created a unity of meaning, vision or
purpose. Nor does it guarantee a safe haven from Western Europe's
'fatal nest' to which O'Dowd alluded (in Cantrell, ed, 1977:86). The
'new settler' may have wanted 'as few links as possible with the
Europe he had left behind' (Palmer, 1963:15), but the new world is
not so new as to be wholly independent, for ideas and evils migrate
with people. Come an Australian dusk, Collins may state that 'the
sun went on its way to make a futile attempt at purifying the
microbe-laden atmosphere of Europe' (SiL, 11). But the thematic
preoccupations of chapter one with the duffing of grass, opportunism
and the intercolonial rivalries seem to suggest that Australia's
atmosphere is currently as equally "microbe-laden" as Europe's.
In the search for "new" meaning in the new world, individual or
group optimisms can easily turn into pessimism. And it is this
conflict, this tension between optimism and pessimism that marks
1880s andl890s nationalism primarily as a search for meaning, or a
desire to build meaning vis-a-vis the dynamic conflicts of contending
discourses. Barnes' notion that 'future studies of Furphy's book
[should] look more closely at Such ts Life as a cultural creation'
(1993:48) is important. Such ts Life is not, as Green would argue, 'a
formless slab' (1930: 12 7). Furthermore, one should equally consider
both Rtgby's Romance and The Buln-Buln and the Brolga in the same
light. Again, readers should ask themselves the question "what is
Collins doing in the Riverina?" In conjunction with this question, I
think it is also important to consider why Furphy has Collins
present a diary narrative to the public.
Both of these questions are important in terms of the search
for human meaning, and the "Australia" of the late nineteenth
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centuiy is an excellent example of the need for this search. According
to McLaren, '[t]he characters of Such is Life are trapped in lives of
search and pursuit. The search varies from Tom Collins' pursuit of
meaning to the teamster's constant quest for grass' (1989:58). Or, as
Henricksen notes, Furphy's 'fiction becomes not art for didacticism's
or nationalism's sake, but art which tries to find a solution, if not
an answer, to the riddles of human existence' (1985: 10). And, in this
sense, 'Furphy's fiction ... meditates and speculates on the role of man
in the cosmos, on God, on the cosmic order of things, and on man's
response to the cosmic reality' (Henricksen, 1985: 157. My italics).
It may be true, as Henricksen notes, that '[t]he closer Furphy
approaches his monastic truth, the more pluralistic does his universe
become, and the more unschematizable does truth become'
(1985: 166). However, one should not take this view, as Armbruster
does, to the extreme and conclude that Such is Life is 'a veritable
hotch-potch of meaning' (1991:85). In light of the novels' historical
background, as well as Furphy's own reference to Collins' concern
with the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia, I disagree with
Armbruster's view that Furphy's 'self-referential mode of writing' and
'deliberate self-contradiction and ambiguity avoids any mimetic
commitment' (1991:121. My italics). Nor do I agree with Armbruster's
notion that this artistic approach 'reduces the need for definite
meaning' (1991:121).
Although the self-referentiality and pluralism in Such is Life
·greatly enhances the text's affirmative potential', it is fallacious to
assume that '[t]he reader may construct an almost infinite number of
meanings' (Armbruster, 1991:121). As Wieland states, 'thematically,
Furphy is concerned with life lived and life speculated about, he is
not, as many twentieth-centuiy writers are, affronted by the
possibility of a meaningless reality, even as he recognizes its
relativity and complexity' (1985: 24). If we are to approach Furphy's
novels as cultural creations, as art and meaning in the public
domain, then we must acknowledge that this artistic selfreferentiality and pluralism in his narratives are meant to serve as
evidence for the mimetic commitment to "life".
Within this mimetic commitment, there is the more important
thematic concern with the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia,
which is not just mentioned in the letter to Kate Baker, but also
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alluded to in Furphy's 1903 review of Such ts Life. Croft may state
that '[t]he complexity of the first and the final versions of Such ts Life
(and its offsprings) arose from a mind which attempted to bring
together a series of vinegar and oil opposites, at one time giving more
oil, at others more vinegar' (1991:10). But one should not just look
for '[t]he key to Furphy's mind and art' in 'the division between the
male and female worlds of his family' (Croft, 1991:11). Although it is
difficult to ascertain Just exactly what Furphy knew and considered
important in the 1880s and 1890s socio-cultural climate, one can
safely assume that the key to the pluralism in the novels ls found in
the division of society, politics and culture.
For this reason I must disagree with Partington, who states
that the 'contemporary political system, like political history, had
only marginal interest for Furphy .... [The] political parties and
political issues being contested in Australia during the 1880s do not
directly feature in the Furphy novels' (1993:170). Perhaps
Partington's statement builds on Barnes' (1990:145) observation
that, although Furphy had an interest in State Socialism, he
belonged to no particular political group nor partook in any political
activities while working and writing in Shepparton. But Partington
takes this a step further by concluding that Furphy's lack of political
involvement is a direct result of a lack of interest in the 1890s sociopolitical scene. This is a hasty generalisation, for Furphy, in a letter
to Cathels dated the 14th of July, 1901, spoke of 'the cares of Art
and the deceitfulness of Politics' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds,
1995:69). As Gilding states, 'Furphy's novels are themselves
perceptive comments on political notions, and his realism and
romanticism add up to a personal search and vision which signify a
great deal more than nothing' (1967:202).
Wallace-Crabbe (1962: 144-145), Kiernan (197la:19, 197lb:148,
1964), and Barnes (1968:vi) all state that the emphasis of Such ts Life
lies not in a distinctive core or philosophy, for the novel is more
concerned with Collins' response to life than with a theoretical
orientation to life. As Collins states, '[n]o one except the anchorite
lives to himself; and he is merely a person who evades his
responsibilities' (SIL, 71 ). In this sense, Collins is extremely
interested in 'Happenology' (RR, 30) and in 'the marvellous tactics of
Destiny' (RR, 235. My italics). But, although Wallace-Crabbe,
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Kiernan, and Barnes each points out valid readings of the novel, it is
my contention that the novel has a philosophical 'core', namely the
ideas of uplifting and upbuilding. Also, Collins' response to life
incorporates a theoretical orientation to life because of the search for
meaning through art, as I will discuss in the next chapter. Of further
importance to the novels' philosophical core is Gilding' notion that
'the novels are a "way of seeing'" (1967:201). This point is also made
by Barnes, who states that the novels 'offer a way of seeing which
illuminates the experience of living' (1979:27).
For these reasons, I disagree with Barnes' earlier notion that,
'[because] Furphy's "philosophy" seems rather nebulous, and because
there is no core to Such ts Life, no human situation which contains
in itself the central theme, the novel Jails to give a sense of life
developing' (1971:131. My italics). Central to the development of the
novel's narrative is the issue of identity. Thematically, both the
socio-historical concerns of the narrative and Collins' identity exist
in a symbiotic relationship. One cannot but note that Collins'
identity develops in conjunction with his response to life, his search
for meaning and his way of seeing. When investigating the persona of
Tom Collins, one should note that his articulating an identity is
meant to be a culturally ostensive phenomenon. On a personal and
national level, one can say that identity, like '[e]ach undertaking,
great or small, of our lives has one controlling alternative, and no
more' (StL, 68). Although I will investigate the notion of identity as a
controlling alternative in chapter two, it can be said for now that the
themy of the controlling alternative is part of Furphy's attempt to
address the division and rivahy in colonial Australia.
As Gilding notes, 'behind the philosophy of the controlling
alternative lies an awareness of the complexity of human experience'
(1967:97). Although D'Alton and Bittman do not in any way discuss
Such ts Life, their sociological explanation of an individual's position
in the world is indirectly a rather revealing explanation of Furphy's
thematic aim and the novel's "core":
[e]ach individual in society must order his world so
that it has meaning for him or else there is no reason
for action at all. A choice must be made. Even a choice
not to act is still a choice, as it is a denial (a chosen
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denial) of the alternatives of action which are open
and it is an active denial of the alternatives to the
extent that the alternatives of action are repudiated.
Consequently most people ... have a theory about the
world. In a sense, everyone's knowledge of the world is
a 'theory' in that 'knowledge of the world' refers to that
world order which different individuals identify. There
may be as many world orders as there are individuals
but nevertheless each person, simply to act in the
world, must have some way of ordering, of
understanding, that world so that courses of action
can be decided upon and so that courses of action can
be carried out (1972:98-99).

1.2. A Philosophe: some historical and epistemologi.cal orientations
of Joseph Furphy.
Barnes (1990: 170-2) postulates that Furphy, circa 1890, may
have encouraged the Mechanics Institute at Shepparton to purchase
both the Encyclopedia Britannica and the Chambers' Encyclopedia,
which he constantly used as his reference during the writing of Such
is Life. While it is only an hypothesis, Barnes' comment sits well with
a man whose primary concern appeared to be the eradication of
ignorance. In a letter to Stephens, Furphy states that 'I find myself
continually blocked by my own infernal ignorance, so that I have
worn a pad from my sanctum to the Ency.Brit., at the Mechanics' (in
Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:68). One might say that Furphy's
love for the Mechanics Institute at Shepparton is indicative of his
love for knowledge, since the Mechanics Institute could be neatly
described as the bricks-and-mortar symbol for those seeking
enlightenment. To Cathels, Furphy declared that he had 'to shift a
bit of [his] fearful burden of congenital ignorance by reading any new
scientific book that finds its way into our local Mech.Inst.,' (in
Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:119).
And, to Cecil Winter, Furphy wrote that, '[d]uring the spell I
had in Melb., 12 years ago, a few weeks at a time, I wore a cattletrack from the West End Hotel to the Public Library .... Now, artisans
are, as a rule, more bookish and better informed than clerks,
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shopmen &c., and yet of the 16 or 18 hands at the Foundry, only 3
besides myself are members of the Mechanics Institute -though
subscription is only 2 / 6 a quarter' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds,
1995: 168). One can do no worse than to see Furphy, as well as
Collins, as a Phllosophe. But what does it mean to be a PhRosophe?
Zeitlin explains that 'the PhRosophes investigated all aspects of social
life; they studied and analysed political, religious, social, and moral
institutions, subjected them to merciless criticism from the
standpoint of reason, and demanded to change the unreasonable
ones' (1968:3).
According to Zeitlin, '[m]ore often than not, traditional
institutions were found to be irrational', thus proving the point that
these 'institutions were contrary to man's nature and thus inhibitive
of his growth and development' ( 1968:3). Kramnick states that
·unassisted human reason, not faith or tradition, was the principal
guide to human conduct. ... Everything, including political and
religious authority, must be subject to a critique of reason if it were
to commend itself to the respect of humanity' (1995:xi). In light of
1890s division and rivalry, this need for reason is very applicable to
Furphy, for Franklin, when she spoke of Furphy's relationship to
knowledge, wrote that '[h]e took nothing on authority' (1944:9). As
Collins proudly states, 'a revolt undreamt of by your forefathers is in
progress now -a revolt of enlightenment against ignorance; of justice
and reason against the domination of the manifestly unworthy' (SU,,
90).
In The Life and Opinions of Tom Collins, Croft states that
[t]o me, Joseph Furphy himself is just not there in the
record we have of him, nor is he clearly present in
what has survived of what he has written. The man is
like his fictions, layers of oil and vinegar, each
separate from the other. Perhaps that was a product of
the time: Protestant Christians with the vestiges of
Calvin and Puritanism in them, living in a world of
scientific determinism modelled on the laws of
thermodynamics and the laws of natural selection.
One could believe in Christ, but only as a prophet of
the major intellectual movement of the late
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nineteenth- century -socialism. The individual was not
important in this system, hence Furphy's deep
attraction to classical Stoicism. An individual was
important only as an agent of change directed by
inescapable historical processes. Thus Furphy's view of
human affairs is summed up in the famous metaphor
of the railway tracks: the way is laid out before us,
accept it and do not whine; but there are choices to be
made at certain points ... and that is where individual
courage and volition come in. The historical process is
bigger than any individual, but each individual has an
opportunity to influence the unfolding of that process.
We should submit; but we should also strive (1991:1920).

Indeed, Croft, in his conclusions to this major study, repeats
this view by stating that '[Furphy] believed in individual choice,
individual responsibility, and the redemptive power of human love;
but he also believed in a divine love and purpose which shaped in
mysterious ways the progress of human affairs' (1991 :275). If what
Croft says is true, then what do we make of Furphy's artistic
conviction that 'Man, in this vocation [of creative art], is a god, a
creator, and cannot create but in his own image· (in Barnes and
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:137). I think Croft makes too much of the
tension in the novels as a direct manifestation of Furphy's own "oil
and vinegar" mind. In my view, there is a consistent view in the
novels which can be attributed to Furphy, and that view is the view
of the Phtlosophe. However, Croft is correct in pointing out the
importance of historical processes to the novels, but I must disagree
with his notion that the individual's importance stems from his or
her being just a subordinate agency to that historical process.
Such a view personifies the historical process to the status of
God and belittles the emphasis on the theory of the controlling
alternatives. As Collins states, '[w]hether there's a Divinity that
afterwards shapes [the chosen alternative] is a question which each
inquirer may decide for himself (SiL, 70). What is important is the
fact that '(a] Divine Idea points the way, clearly apparent to any
vision not warped by interest or prejudice, nor darkened by
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ignorance; but the work is man's alone, and its period rests with
man' (SlL, 95). Furphy and his hero stand true to the Ph.ilosophe's
primary concerns. The uplifting and upbuilding of Australia is
equally an uplifting and upbuilding of the human being and his or
her experience in the world. As I hope to show in the next section,
readers should see Furphy's orientations to socialism within the
context of the PhUosophe.
The "order of things" does not refer to some mysterious or
divine force in the universal scheme of things, but to that historical
power or force which directly emanates from individuals acting in the
world. The order of things is a human order and, within the context
of Furphy's views on art, should be equally seen as the public
domain of meaning. Furphy seems to be saying that progress or
tension in the unfolding historical processes is a direct product of
human interaction and human expression in the history of ideas. If
this is the case, as I think it is, then Furphy's constant emphasis on
ignorance-shifting, in both the novels and the letters, is an appeal to
informed action rather than an ignorant exercising of one's agency in
the controlling alternatives. As Collins explains, '[t)he major
alternative is the Shakespearian "tide in the affairs of men," often
recognized, though not formulated' (SlL, 69). According to Collins,
'how often do we accept a major-alternative, whilst innocently
oblivious to its gravity!' (SlL, 69). But, as Collins' warns, '(i]sn't
history a mere record of blundering option, followed by iron servitude
to the irremediable suffering thereby entailed?' (SlL, 73)
In Furphy, the individual and his or her agency is the
historical process, and one can see that the rivalry between the
colonies is a direct manifestation of a series of blundering options
rather than strategic moves and countermoves. Although the novels
are thematically rooted in nineteenth-century Australian history,
Furphy's views are surprisingly modem. Discussing the relationship
between 'the philosophy of history' and 'man as a historical being',
Levy states that 'the process of human history' is 'the record and
adventure of an ontologically finite being striving to realise his no
less finite potential upon a cosmic stage whose limits, though always
incompletely unknown, constitute the absolute frontiers of possible
human achievement and thus of what we commonly mean by history'
(1993:66). According to Levy, 'man must be conceived as something
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more than a self-constituting being' (1993:~4). But, although the
human being is bound by .. the limits of history", one 'should not
underestimate the degree of free, self-constituting activity which is
possible in this space', just as one should not 'ignore the limits to
which it is subject' (1993:75).
With this in mind, one should see that there is a profoundly
humanist dimension in the symbiosis between the historical process,
the controlling alternatives and the order of things, for the order of
things is a human order. Barnes (1990:243) validates this notion by
noting that the order of things is also a synonymous term for reality.
As Collins argues, 'each alternative brings into immediate play a
flash of Free-will, pure and simple, which instantly gives place -as far
as a particular section of life is concerned- to the dominion of what
we call Destiny' (SiL, 69. My italics). And, according to Collins, freewill and destiny 'should never be confounded' (SiL, 69). In the
oscillating ideas and tensions of human history. destiny and freewill, or consequences and choices, creatively give form to the complex
dialectic called .. life" or reality. This ties in directly with the emphasis
on the response to life, the way of seeing, and the search for meaning
discussed in the previous section, for these things can seen to
constitute the content of "life" or reality.
In the human order of things, a controlling alternative is best
seen as the creative choice through which one makes a response to
life in the search for meaning. Once made, the choice engages a way
of seeing and a series of options generally labelled as destiny. Or, as
Collins puts it, 'Destiny puts in her spoke, bringing such vicissitudes
as are inevitable on the initial option' (SiL, 70). In my view, the way
in which Furphy sees this symbiosis between human beings and
history works on all levels of human affairs from art to politics. One
can see the human order of controlling alternatives operating on a
small scale in the many episodes throughout the novels, hence
Collins' claim that he is commissioned 'to use [his] own judgment,
and take [his] own risks, like any other unit of humanity' (SiL, 1).
Equally, one can see the aggregation of these episodes, or these units
of humanity, as the evidence for the ignorant actions that lead to
irrelevant and irrational consequences in the 1890s order of things.
This is a particularly revealing way of seeing Furphy's own
orientations to 1880s and 1890s rivalry. Readers could say that the
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theory of the controlling alternatives is Furphy's response to life,
depicting the human being as a unit of measure in history and the
search for meaning. In the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia, one
should not just submit to history or tradition. Rather, one should
critique that which is irrelevant and irrational and strive to make
history, for history is the direct result of measurable human affairs.
Again, as Collins argues,
[w]hether there's a Divinity that afterwards shapes
[the chosen alternative] is a question which each
inquirer may decide for himself. Say, however, that
this postulated Divinity consists of the Universal mind,
and that the Universal Mind comprises the aggregate
Human Intelligence, co-operating with some Moral
centre beyond. And that the spontaneous sway of this
Influence is toward harmony -toward the smoothing qf
obstacles, the healing qf wounds (SiL, 70. My italics).
Or, as Furphy explained to Cecil Winter in a letter dated the
23rd of September, 1903;
Now, a man doesn't need to be a psalm-singing sneak
to admit that beyond the material elements of life,
beyond the minerals, plants and animals, beyond the
changing seasons, and so forth, there lies a purpose.
We don't know definitely what this purpose may be;
but I don't think it is fulfilled by plethoric banking
accounts. Same time, I believe it is fulfilled by the
production of men and women of high moral standard,
calm courage, and clear intellect (in Barnes and
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124. My italics).
Let us now turn to the issue of historical narrative, veracity
and identity. In her discussion of the importance of "history" to
nineteenth-century Victorian thought, Crosby states that '(h]istory is
a regime of truth to which knowledge in general is subject, which
governs philosophy and philosophical novels; historical novels and
history "proper"; melodrama and social studies; theology, aesthetics,
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and autobiographical fiction' (1991: 10-11 ). In terms of this 'regime of
truth', Crosby further explains that
"man," in the nineteenth century... is distinguished by
his historicity, and can be understood fully only in the
context of historical realities which are the
preconditions of the present, the necessary foundation
of both social and individual life. The priority accorded
to the past, then, and to the forces of history, means
that history is divided; "history" is both the general
ground of human life and also an empirical science of
events, the study and representation of the
past. ... History must be purged of fiction, must be
objective and scientific in order to be truthful, for
science, as the knowledge of positive realities, is the
modem discourse of truth. The opposition of "history"
to "fiction" is that of truth to falsehood, the exclusion
of the latter guaranteeing the scientificity of the
former .... However, the objects of history ensure that
the discipline of history can never successfully
foreclose fiction, for fiction is the place not of
falsehood, but of questions about the conditions of
representation, the processes of signification, the
constitution of the subject .... "Fiction," then, always
returns to haunt history, although the discipline has
been largely successful in repressing the problems with
which fiction engages. Fiction is thus imagined as
other than -indeed, the opposite of- history (1991 :4546).
Reading Furphy's novels, one finds that the discipline of
"history" is equally important to nineteenth-century Australian
thought. Furphy is not, as Brady erroneously argues, 'ignorant of, or
at least indifferent to, history' (1981 :65). Nor is he boasting that
'Australia somehow stands outside the course of history' (Brady,
1981:65). In Furphy's novels, the importance of history is primarily
asserted through the pursuit of Australianness in opposition to an
established sense of Britishness. Indeed, the difference between
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Australian history and British history is simply that British history
does not begin with an exact point of origin in historically-recorded
time. In this sense, what is written as the facts of British history,
and the facts of the British national consciousness or character,
stretches far back into an antiquity of myth and legend.
Although this is not in accordance with the scientific veracity
of history, there is a "dreaming" from which the British can establish
a positive sense of personal and national identity without having to
fear the needle of fact. From Antiquity to Empire, one could say that
British history can rationally accommodate historical fact, historical
fiction and fiction per se. Through these distinctions, British history
can comfortably pursue its celebration of national "truth" and
character on many factual and fictional levels. As White points out,
'[t]he concept of national types fitted snugly into the nineteenthcentury intellectual landscape, a central feature of liberal, national
and racial ideology. It was the product of an obsession for
categorisation which dominated the science of the day' (1981 :64 ).
"Australia", on the other hand, was more or less born into the
modern science of history, and the facts surrounding her birth
cannot be effaced. Historically, she is a convict colony, which is a
rather unsavoury fact for contemporary views of the national type. As
Turner states, '[i]n the relationship between the structures of social
order and the "normal" in Australian society, we can sense the
traumatic condition of subjection into which the first [white]
inhabitants of Australia were thrust' (1993:76). According to Turner,
'(i]t seems inevitable that this would have a profound effect on the
myths and meanings articulated within the culture then and since'
( 1993:76). This is an important point to remember when reading
Furphy, for the Victorian emphasis on the truth-function of history,
in conjunction with a popular interest in eugenics, means that an
"Australian" nation-state and the unique Australian type are forever
marked by the history of convictism.
Boehm states that 'from whatever perspective they viewed the
new world, the one constant concern of writers on all levels, official,
experiential and fictional, bond and free, was with convictism'
(1973:ix). For example, according to Palmer, '(o]ne of the chief things
the Bulletin had set out to destroy was the tradition of the convict
system that still, in its view, cast an ugly shadow over the life of the
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country' (1963:95). This leads me to ask the following question. If
Furphy created a hero who was concerned with the uplifting and
upbuilding of Australia, and colonial ..Australia" was in the grips of
an ongoing but messy debate concerning both federation and
national identity, then what does one do with ..Australia's" convict
history? Hughes (1987:158-159) points out that, until the 1960s,
Australia's convict history was the cultural stain on the national
consciousness, and much of convict history was mythologized to
avoid having to deal with skeletons in the closet.
In Such ts Life, reference to Australia's convict origins ls
expressed stylistically like a footnote. This sits nicely with Collins'
stress on observant reading in light of Hughes' point about convict
skeletons in the closet. After his authorial introduction, Collins
begins his narrative with the statement that '[t]his record transports
you (saving reverence of our "birth stain") something more than a
hundred miles northward .. .' (SiL, 52). He then proceeds to describe
the scene at the Willandra Billabong, and makes no more mention of
transportation or the birth stain. Yet, if we ask ourselves what the
function of a footnote is, then we would at least answer that its
purpose is to direct readers to research and think more about a
particular topic or issue. Having said this, the value of this
"footnote" in Such ts Life can be explained by Furphy's advice to Cecil
Winter, '[a]ttend well to details, without making them prominent' (in
Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:146). In short, the "footnote" in the
narrative was, according to Furphy's artistic style, sufficient enough
to engage 'the observant reader' (SiL, 2). As G. W. Turner notes,
'ls]ometimes it is the esoteric nature of a scrap of knowledge that is
valued most in Furphy's writing' (1986: 179). What was it that
Furphy, as well as Collins, sought to communicate?
In my view, the message readers receive from this .. footnote"
has much to do with the uneasiness of the convict legacy to
nineteenth-century Australian society. Although the "footnote" ls
short, an investigation of its semantic allusions reveals a rich source
of meaning. Semantically, "birth stain" suggests a "birthmark", or
something which one has for 'life', supposedly making one's origins
and one's status in the world ideologically and biologically black and
white. This accommodates the nineteenth-century interest in
eugenics, perhaps justifying the binary view of England's ·good stock'
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versus Australia's 'bad stock'. Eugenics has some very interesting
implications for the concept of a national type. White argues that
'lt)he idea that it was possible to isolate national "types" was the
most important intellectual pillar supporting the complex structure
of ideas about national character which developed in the nineteenth
century. The national type was given not only physical and racial
characteristics, but also a moral, social and psychological identity'
(1981:64). As Willoughby states, 'high breeding and training are
conditions of superiority in the human as well as in the equine and
canine races; pedigree being, of course, the primary desideratum' (SiL,
26).
Of interest to this view, expressed by White, Hughes states
that 'lu]ntil well into the 1820s, the word "Australian" was a term of
abuse, or at best of condescension; it carried an air of seediness on
the rim of the Pacific' (1987:325). This air of condescension towards
the term "Australian" did not entirely end with the 1820s, for it is
still apparent in the contradictory views of the national type in the
1890s. This can be further qualified by the fact that "stain" suggests
something that can be cleaned up with hard work, or "elbow-grease",
but never removed entirely. Or "birth stain" suggests that it is
something which can be aesthetically covered up to hide
unpleasantries, despite the fact that it can always be seen if one
looks in the right places. Perhaps the greatest problem for
nineteenth-century "Australians" was the fact that their emerging
national type was quite capable of both veiling and unveiling their
origins. Readers should note that both "birth stain" and "transports"
generate a metonymic allusion to the convict system and indicate,
through Collins' offhand remarks, the social and cultural uneasiness
to the system's shadows 1 •
Although Shaw is correct in stating that 'le]conomically
[transportation) had greatly helped Australian development' because
'it had provided a labour force, which if less efficient than free
workers was far better than no workers at all', I disagree with his
notion that 'ls]ocially it did no great harm' (1966:358). Hughes
points out that 'lt)he basic class division of early colonial Australia guards versus prisoners- lived on as a metaphor of future disputes'
1

It is also interesting to note that these "transports" and "birth stain" should directly follow chapter
one, where readers have become intimately acquainted with some of 'the Lower Orders' (SiL, 34) of
the Riverina. One wonders how many Furphian heroes are ticket-of-leave men.
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(1987:158). In short, the convict system can be seen as an important
background to the search for meaning, a way of seeing and the
response to life in Australian history. Indeed, not only was there
rivalry between the newly-formed states to the penal colony of New
South Wales throughout the nineteenth century, but there was also
the animosity of the Australian born to a British judicial and
cultural system, which had transported and wanted to continue
transporting felons to his or her home. As Palmer notes,
The freed community could begin to build up a selfsufficient Australia if it had the will .... But memories
of the convict era remained .... At the time of [Sir
Charles] Dilke's visit [in 1866] the shadow of the penal
system still clouded the eastern colonies. A jealous
watch was kept on immigrants, and a fine of £100
could be inflicted upon captains of ships bringing
convicts into Melbourne. Cases of crime or lawlessness
on the mainland were invariably attributed to
Tasmanian "bolters" ... ( 1963: 15 ).
Furphy, who was born in 1843, must have had, at the age of
eight, some understanding of the ideological rivalry that surrounded
the stigma of the convict system and the breaking away of new
colonies, especially since, in 1851, he was no longer a native-born of
New South Wales, but one of "Victoria". It is quite probable that
these experiences shaped the novels and his views of the colonial
rivahy surrounding the Federal movement. When the Furphys arrived
in the colony of New South Wales, landing at 'Port Phillip on 1
March 1841', the 'Argyle', the barque on which they had arrived, 'was
one of the first ships to come under the bounty system in what was
to be a bumper year for immigrants' (Barnes, 1990:6). This bumper
year brought '7000 assisted immigrants' (Barnes, 1990:6) into the
Port Phillip district. But what Barnes does not mention is the fact
that Samuel and Judith Furphy essentially arrived in a convict
colony. According to Brian Pilbeam ( 1973:4), Samuel and Judith
Furphy were employed by a squatter named Anderson before they had
even left the ship, and both were the only free employees amongst the
ticket-of-leave men on his station, which lay twenty miles outside of
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Melbourne. Barnes (1990:8) also notes this fact.
What they thought of this situation is not documented, but it
is quite probable that, once settled, they would come to share the
views of the majority of free settlers. According to J. M. Ward, 'the
rapid increase of free immigrants in the thirties coincided with the
heaviest period of convict arrivals' and '[b)y the end of the decade free
immigrants were much more than balancing the growing number of
convict arrivals' (1966:37). Because '[t)he free population observed
and resented the horrors of convict life', they 'helped to bring the
system under severe scrutiny in both colony and homeland' (J. M.
Ward, 1966:37). A great stigma of convictry was the belief 'that
convicts depressed wages and produced social and moral standards
that were detrimental to nearly all working people' (J. M. Ward,
1966:42). As Collins states, '[t)he folklore of Riverina is rich in
variations of a mythus, pointing to the David-and-Goliath combat
between a quiet wage-slave and the domineering squatter, in the
brave days of old' (SiL, 204). Indeed,
.... The squatter of half-a-century ago dominated
his immigrant servants by moral force -no
difficult matter, with a ·gentleman' on one side
and a squad of hereditary grovellers on the other.
He dominated his convict servants by physical
force -an equally easy task. But now the old
squatter has gone to the mansions above; the
immigrant and old hand to the kitchen below;
and between the self-valuation of the latter-day
squatter and that of his contemporary wage slave,
there is very little to choose .... Either the
anachronistic tradition must make suicidal
concessions, or the better class people must
drown all plebeian Australian males in infancy,
and fill the vacancy with Asiatics (SiL, 205-206).
The labour question in Such ts Life is not just a question
governed by socialist views on class and exploitation, but also a
question richly shaped by the convict presence that represented a
threat to the livelihood of free settlers who had initially nothing
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more to offer than their labour. Hughes states that, by 1838, 'nativeborn Australians had come to hate the stigma of convictry -and the
competition from assigned convict labour. In 1840, all
transportations to New South Wales ceased' (1987: 162). But, one
needs to remember that 'Transportation to Van Demon's Land was
not abolished until 1853' and that the last transport ship brought 'a
group of Irish Fenians' to Western Australia in 1868 (Hughes,
1987: 162). Nor should one think that this was the end of
transportation, for '[t]hey were to come, not as convicts, but as
"exiles" bound not to return to Britain until the expiration of their
sentences' (J.M. Ward, 1966:39).
Here we see one of the variations of the mythus to which
Collins alluded, for '[s]ome of the pastoralists, avid for cheap labour,
welcomed the suggestion' (J. M. Ward, 1966: 39). Three years after
Samuel and Judith Furphy, these exiles arrived '[i]n 1844', when 'the
transport vessel Royal George had landed twenty-one convicts at Port
Phillip Bay, the first felons to arrive in the future state of Victoria
since the abortive attempts at a convict settlement there back in
1803' (Hughes, 1987:553). With these alterations to transportation
in place, 'the lines of class conflict over the arrival of Exiles were
drawn. It was city versus country, worker versus squatter' (Hughes,
1987:554). However, the plan was later modified so that '[instead of
sending exiles to the colonies', Britain 'would send men on ticketsof-leave at the expiration of half their sentences' (J. M. Ward,
1966:41). Or, as Shaw explains, 'the convict would have to undergo
"separate" imprisonment and then labour on the public works in
England; only after that would he be sent to Australia, where there
was a great demand for his labour' ( 1966:320).
Even though, as Hughes (1987:346) explains, New South Wales
was not a Jail, for Norfolk Island filled that role, it was nevertheless a
colony of free settlers with a large proportion of convicts. Indeed,
Hughes (1987:367) points out that by 1840, forty-five per cent of the
population were convicts: a number which decreased to twelve per
cent in 1842 when the remaining percentage obtained their ticket-ofleave. According to J. M. Ward, though '[t]icket-of-leave men were
not road-gang convicts or assigned servants, ... they were obviously
convicts in the eyes of the colonists and the law' (1966:41). One can
imagine that an ever-increasing influx of free settlers into a colony,
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which had only recently ceased receiving transported felons, could
not but lead to an ideological conflict between the notions of free
and bond. J. M. Ward states that '[h)ostility to transportation was
not the preserve of any single class or district .... Most emancipists
opposed the system, believing that so long as it existed, the shameful
distinction between bond and free would continue' (1966:42). Indeed,
'[a)ntl-transportation views, by the late 1840s, were a commonplace
of every pulpit sermon and most political meetings' (Hughes,
1987:559).
And yet, 'for all the protests, the meetings and the airing of
grievances at the enforced Stain, there was never any question of
secession' (Hughes, 1987:560). Loyalty to the Empire remained strong
for a variety of reasons. Hughes argues that this view was due to the
notion that 'the stereotype of convict evil was fixed beyond the power
of any individual's experience to alter it. Get rid of convictry, keep
the imperial attachment -such was the local reformer's tune'
(1987:559). Perhaps loyalty to the Empire was seen by some reformers
as a safeguard to stop the fatal shore from turning into the fatal
nest. As Evans et al explain, Anglo-Australian loyalism should also
be seen within the context of Western notions of good citizenship;
[i)n the Australian colonies, as elsewhere in the
Western world at this time, respectability and rightliving were seen to be consistent With such personal
virtues as thrift, industriousness, purity and Christian
sanctity. Idleness, on the other hand, led directly to
temptation, and temptation to profligacy, overindulgence and the abandonment of all sensual
restraints. By various moral arbiters, especially from
the middle class, it was viewed as a titanic struggle to
convince citizens -and especially working class men- to
forgo instant sensory gratification for the more delayed
and less tangible pleasures which hard work, saving
money, monogamy and family devotion promised to
bring. The struggle in Australia was seen to be more
vital and difficult than in Britain, largely because of
the former's convict origins. Morally shameful
beginnings and the heritage of a 'convict taint' made
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the need for respectable behaviour all the more
pressing in Australia (1997:83-84).
Within the context of good citizenship and the convict taint,
Manning Clark has made some interesting observations on the
historical tension between labour and capital in 1883:
Iti hroughou t the whole civilized world the labouring
millions were in revolt against the organized army of
capitalists. Labour was becoming militant and
aggressive; capital was stolid and defiant. In Australia
the struggle was complicated by a legacy from the past.
In Sydney and Melbourne an 'irruption of barbarians'
was threatening the very foundations of society. The
old convict strain had inoculated the working classes
with the virus of destruction. The question was
whether civilisation could find the right varnish with
which to coat the underlying barbarism .... In Victoria
by 1883 40 per cent of the population were citydwellers. The problem was to find in this ancient,
barren land the roots that would clutch, branches that
would grow out of the stony rubbish and prevent
Australian society from degenerating into barbarism
(1995b:416).
It is interesting to note that the flavour of Clark's narrative

brings new light to the city-bush dichotomy. One could argue that
the rivalry between a militant labouring class and a defiant capitalist
class, as well as the emphasis on good citizenship, finds its
immediate expression in the city-bush debate. The bush can be both
the moral saviour and the militant agitator. This is not because the
bush is janus-faced, but because the bush comes to serve the
political ends of a way of seeing and a response to life in the search
for meaning. But, while the emphasis on good citizenship is meant
to efface convictism and barbarism, it equally lends support to
jingoism, thereby reinforcing the rivalrous barbarism loyalists hoped
to overcome. As Collins states, 'le)ighteen-and-a-half centuries of
purblind groping for the Kingdom of God finds an idealized Messiah
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shrined in the modern Pantheon, and yourselves .. a chosen
generation," leprous with the sin of usury; "a royal priesthood,"
paralysed with the cant of hireling clergy; .. a holy nation," rotten
with the luxury of wealth, or embittered by the sting of poverty; "a
peculiar people," deformed to Lucifer's own pleasure by the curse of
caste .. .' (SiL, 89).
This is important, for an appreciation of Furphy's art must
include an understanding of the history of colonial rivalry in order to
understand his emphasis on ignorance shifting to overcome these
divisions. Collins states that '[i]n our democracy, the sum of
cultivated intelligence, and corresponding sensitiveness to affront, is
dangerously high, and becoming higher' (SiL, 205). It appears Furphy
wants to stress that an uplifting and upbuilding of Australia must be
an informed and enlightened programme, rather than just a set of
traditionally learned guidelines to good conduct, a fervent
parochialism or jingoism and a series of suspicious accusations
about the intentions of colonial neighbours. In an essay supporting
the concept of "world federation", Furphy argues that
[o Jurs is pre-eminently the age of goodwill; it is the age
of goodwill because it is the age of enlightenment; it is
the age of enlightenment because throughout the
civilized world a thousand pens, such as petrified
prejudice and vested interests can never hire, are
writing in varied style and phrase the unchallengeable
charter of human brotherhood, and the whole world,
being kin, responds gallantly to the touch of nature
(1890:54. My italics).
Under the influence of the Meerschaum pipe, that 'storagebattery, or accumulator, of such truths as ministers of the Gospel
cannot afford to preach' (SiL, 85), Collins claims that '(t]he world's
brightest intellects are answering one by one to the roll-call of the
New Order, and falling into line on the side championed by every
prophet, from Moses to the .. agitator" that died o' Wednesday' (SiL,
90). Furthermore, Collins is convinced that 'the soul-slaying loyalty
to error draws near its close; for the whole armoury of the Father of
Lies can furnish no shield to turn aside the point of the tireless and
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terrible PEN -that Ithuriel spear which, in these latter days,
scornfully touches the mail-clad demon of Privilege, and discloses a
swelling frog' (SiL, 90). And, in this sense, 'I c]ontemperaneous
literature .. .is our surest register of advance or retrogression; and,
with few exceptions indeed, the prevailing and conspicuous element
in all publications of more than a century ago is a tacit acceptance
of irresponsible lordship and abject inferiority as Divine ordinances'
(SiL, 90. My italics).
In what can best be described as the "self-evident truths" of an
enlightenment thinker, Furphy argues home the point that 'la]n
enlightened age repudiates the blunders and concessions of an
ignorant age; it is a self-appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober'
(1890:54-55). Or, as Collins claims, 'John Knox's wildest travesty of
eternal justice never rivalled in flagrancy the moving principle of a
civilisation which exists merely to build on extrinsic bases an
impracticable barrier between class and class: on one side, the
redemption of life, education, refinement, leisure, comfort; on the
other side, want, toil, anxiety, and an open path to the Gehenna of
ignorance, baseness and brutality' (SiL, 88. My italics). According to
Collins, 'ly]our conception of heavenly justice is found in the
concession of equal spiritual birthright, based on the broad charter
of common humanity, and forfeitable only by individual
worthlessness or deliberate refusal' (SiL, 88). Driving the point home,
Collins asks a choice question to his readers: 'lw]hy is your idea of
earthly justice so widely different -since the principle of justice must
be absolute and immutable' (SiL, 88).
In the human order of things, 'lt]he mustard seed has become
a great tree, but the unclean fowls lodge in its branches' (SiL, 89).
But, rather than taking the axe literally to the tree, Furphy took the
pen. One could say that the pen is only mightier than the sword
because the former is the symbol of he or she who thinks. According
to Collins, 'le]rudition, even in the humblest sphere of life, is the
sweetest solace, the unfailing refuge, of the restless mind; but if the
bearer thereof be not able to do something well enough to make a
living by it, his education is simply outclassed, overborne, and
crushed by his own superior ignorance' (SiL, 34). In short, 'lilt is
such men's ignorance -their technical ignorance- that is their curse.
Education of any kind never was, and never can be, a curse to its
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possessor; it is a curse only to the person whose interest lies in
exploiting its possessor' (SIL, 34).
It will be of further interest to the reader to note that the latter
half of the nineteenth century marked an intense debate on the
status of education in Australia. Clark points out that
[t]he need was great. In the cities the men with
education were conscious ... that here in Australia
everything was 'anti-podean'. In Europe there was
enlightenment; here there was semi-barbarism. In
Europe and North America there were expensive
schemes for the education of all children; here the
wealthy alone could enjoy the highest branches of
knowledge. In Europe and North America many
countries had already introduced free education for all;
here narrow-minded class legislation and sectarian
animosity thwarted all such attempts.
Bedevilled by sectarian suspicion and bitterness,
and despairing of Protestants and Catholics ever
reaching agreement on a general system of education,
the colonies of New South Wales, Victoria and
Queensland had introduced a dual system of national
schools and denominational schools (1995b:366).
Ignorance, as Furphy sees it, is inseparable from a complex
and deeply-ingrained social and cultural rivalry, and so long as it
remains inseparable, education and federation will suffer. This is
particularly important to 'the Lower Orders' (SIL, 34) because they
make up the largest portion of the Australian population and appear
to be the most susceptible to ignorance. In the letter to Cecil Winter,
dated the 23rd of September, 1903, Furphy declares that '(t]here is
much in your suggestion respecting the causes of pessimism in the
Out-back man (who is the real Australian); but, as you say,
Ignorance is at the root of it. Does anyone suppose that unbroken
prosperity is good for a man or a nation? No one, I think; and the
inability to apply the rule to one's self personally is one
manifestation of Ignorance' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124.
My italics).
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Indeed, Collins argues that 'there is a time to be born, and a
time to die; a time to mourn and a time to dance. Alternate sunshine
and rain is the law of Nature; alternate smiles and tears is the law of
human life; and this rhythmic reaction is as necessary to healthy
moral being as the tide to the sea, or the wind to the atmosphere'
(BBB, 23). In short, one must accept and work with life's lessons,
rather than suspiciously reject or hastily build barriers to that which
"appears" to be a threat. As Ralph Waldo Emerson argued in
'Nature', '(s]pace, time, society, labor, climate, food, locomotion, the
animals, the mechanical forces, give us sincerest lessons, day by day,
whose meaning is unlimited. They educate both the Understanding
and the Reason' ([ 1836) 1985:55). It is interesting to examine the
connection between Furphy's novels and some of the ideas espoused
by Emerson. In their respective biographies, both Franklin (1944:6)
and Barnes (1990:56) note that amongst the many books on the shelf
in the Furphy household at Corop was a copy of Emerson's essays.
Barnes (1990:243) also notes that Furphy's use of the phrase
"the order of things" may have been a borrowing from Emerson's
essay 'Nature'. This is rather interesting, for Emerson's essay maps
out the basic intellectual concerns which underpin Furphy's novels
and their theme of uplifting and upbuilding Australia. Furthermore,
a comparative reading of Furphy's novels and Emerson's essays
reveals not only a similarity of theme, but also a similarity in style,
especially with Collins' meditations. Perhaps Furphy saw himself as
an Australian version of Emerson, seeking to communicate to his
bush-born readers the universal values of reason and understanding.
Although he does not discuss the connection between Furphy and
Emerson, Barnes points out that
[t]he bushman is at the centre of Furphy's world; it is
as a bushman that he writes for a local audience,
quite free of the notion of colonial inferiority .... Not
that Furphy wished to cut himself off from the English
culture. Quite the reverse. He tries to link his own
writing to the English tradition by constant allusion.
The Bible and Shakespeare are never far from
conscious recall, offering phrases which embody rich
insights into the permanent in human life (1979:36).
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Green (1961:613) and Hope (1971:112) have both noted that
Furphy's active accumulation of knowledge resembles that of the
magpie, insinuating that Such is Life is an undisciplined nest of
items collected through desire and greed. While I do not disagree with
the analogy of the magpie, I should like to affirm that the published
version of the novel is highly disciplined, for this scholarly
eclecticism is primary to Collins' presentation of his identity as an
enlightened and educated thinker. One should not forget that Collins
himself comes from 'the Lower Orders' (SiL, 34) and that he is
concerned with 'the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia' (in Barnes
and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:259). Indeed, one only needs to think of the
'ten masterpieces of poetry' (RR, 53) with which Collins tries to
educate other Furphian heroes to see that the notion of
enlightenment is one crucial factor of the novels' thematic
momentum.
Richters states that '[i]t ls, incidentally, not the least of
Furphy's achievements to suggest an immemorial tradition peivading
an order of things of such very recent historical origin' (1979:259).
But this immemorial tradition serves a purpose. As Partington
(1993:147, 208) explains, Furphy saw the need to align the great
cultural traditions of Britain and Europe with the Australian
experience because such an alignment would have a liberating effect
on the individual and social groups. G. W. Turner points out that
'[s]ometimes a European expression is acclimatized by expressing an
Australia experience, sometimes Australian idiom expresses moral or
philosophical truths from a European tradition or simply expresses
well a subtle or complex idea. There ls a constant bringing together
of the two traditions. Both are respected' (1986: 173). Or, as
Henricksen explains, '[p)olitical philosophies, ideas, arguments,
propagandist techniques, set mythological or historical or Biblical
exempla, single allegorical images: all were transplanted in the
amalgam of Australian idiom and English literature, and directed to
healing Australian ills' (1985: 127).
In this sense, one should see Such is Life as a book that 'is
meant to educate its readers in various ways' (Pons, 1979: 119). But I
would extend this qualification equally to Rigby's Romance and The
Buln-Buln and the Brolga, for all three novels are 'an educational
game of the first order rather than a fireworks display testifying to
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the author's cleverness' (Pons, 1979:120). If, as Pons rightly states,
'education means the development of one's intellectual capacities,
one's ability to interpret correctly the various events to which one is
a witness' (1979:120), then the educational quality of the novels is
rather pertinent in light of the pervasive but unnecessary ignorance
and rivalry in nineteenth-century Australia. As Collins states,
'[h]uman ignorance is, after all, more variable in character than in
extent. Each sphere of life, each occupation, is burdened with its
own special brand of this unhappy heritage. To remove one small
section of inborn ignorance is a life-work for any man' (SiL, 32).
This applies equally well to Furphy, who wrote to Stephens
that 'another ray of light has tended to dissipate that midnight
darkness of ignorance with which Nature somewhat unjustly started
me on the pilgrimage of life' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds,
1995: 118). And, to Miles Franklin, Furphy stated that '[i]n the
matter of Education, I am confronted, whichever way I turn, by my
own fearful and wonderful Ignorance' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds
1995: 174). This is an interesting use of two opposed adjectives, for
ignorance is fearful when it breeds rivalry and division. Perhaps
Furphy was much influenced in his views by Emerson's notion that
'(f]ear always springs from ignorance' (( 1837)1985:97). But ignorance
can also be wonderful in the sense that it can encourage one to
accept one's shortcomings and to search for knowledge. As Collins
states, '(t]hose who are personally acquainted with me will readily
believe that the most difficult self-disciplinary lesson of my life has
been obtaining a practical mastery of that fine Rabbinical precept,
"Learn to say, I do not know"' (BBB, 121 ). One is reminded of
Socrates and his investigations into the knowledge and ignorance of
his fellow Athenians.
It would seem that, for Furphy, nation-building is a universal
concern, and cannot be conducted under the pretext of exclusivity.
Nor can nation be built in an era of rivalry over education. Furphy
wanted to point out that one cannot uplift nor upbuild a nation by
remaining ignorant of, and closed to, other cultural traditions and
other expressions of universal concerns. Equally, one cannot upbuild
or uplift a nation in an air of suspicion and rivalry. In fact, Furphy
stands opposed to the popular discourse of an Australian type that
has evolved from a narrow stance to a rtvalrous history. According to
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Palmer, the type was 'a laconic but sociable fellow with his own
idiom and his own way of looking at things. He had humour of a dry
sardonic kind, a sensitive spirit with a tough covering, initiative and
capacity that were qualified by "near enough" standards of
achievement' (1963:169). Ward also points out these qualities in the
Australian type, with the added observations that '[h]e swears hard
and consistently gambles heavily and often, and drinks deeply on
occasion' (1966:2). Furthermore, Ward notes that the Australian type
is strongly anti-authoritarian, 'a "knocker" of eminent people',
strongly egalitarian, for he will 'stick to his mates through thick and
thin' and 'a great improviser' (1966:2).
As Harris explains, '[l)ife was a matter of rough and ready
adaptation to the environment. Self-reliance of this kind, allied to a
dislike of the boss-cocky, is recorded as far back as the first
generation of currency lads and lasses' (1962:54). While I am of the
opinion that Furphy did not disagree with some of these qualities of
the national type, the extent to which they became the norm struck
a dissonant chord in him, especially given his passion for learning.
What Furphy stood most opposed to in the popular discourse of the
Australian type, most notably the prose sketches of Lawson, was the
fact that the Australian type's 'mental horizons were comparatively
narrow', for this overturns, as I have tried to show, the notion that
'his sympathies were broad' (Palmer, 1963: 169). Indeed, Furphy
desires to overturn the notion that the Australian type 'is a "hard
case", sceptical about the value of religion and of intellectual and
cultural pursuits generally' (Ward, 1966:2).
Ward states that 'all these characteristics were widely
attributed to the bushmen of the last century', particularly 'the
outback employees, the semi-nomadic drovers, shepherds, shearers,
bullock-drivers, stockmen, boundary-riders, station-hands and
others of the pastoral industry' (1966:2). It is rather interesting to
note that, within the opposition of ignorance and knowledge, Furphy
wrote a novel focussing on many of the aforementioned occupations
and created a hero who has worked extensively in the bush without
succumbing to the narrow outlook of the Australian type. It is also
interesting to note that the people who filled these occupations were
avid readers of the Bulletin: a popular newspaper that perpetuated
and thrived on rivalry, contradiction, suspicion and fear. Furphy may
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have written for the Bulletin, but his eclectic and scholarly style
ensured that he was not published often. Furphy's writings were not
as saleable as Lawson's or Paterson's writings. This is evident by the
sheer length of time it took to publish Such is Life.
Indeed, if we consider the Bulletin as the major shaper of a
national identity and all things Australian, then it might be said
that its readership was getting an education equivalent to that of
modern tabloid press. In a letter to Kate Baker, Furphy wrote, '[t]hat
idolatrous red-covered journal hasn't yet printed our remarks of
Tennyson. I have a par[agraph] in its columns now and then, but
only something trijling ....Also I [will] send [you a] duplicate of a yam
which that immoral rag fired into its basket with contumely. But
"they are an ignorant lot"' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 100.
My italics). Perhaps Furphy's attitude is adequately surmized by
Collins, who states that
the censorious reader may have already noticed [my]
habit of airing some scrap of unhackneyed
information, apparently, though not actually, with a
view to effect. Immoral as the practice is, and pert as it
may seem to the unbookish critic, I hold it to be far
less reprehensible than the converse impropriety of
writing for full-grown people in the painfully simple
manner so often affected in literature intended for the
"masses" (BBB, 88).
One could say that the Bulletin, although Furphy's only literacy
outlet, eventually fell prey to the same scorn that was normally
reseived for the romance novelist. Again, it is important to note that
the Bulletin, like the colonial romance, had a wide readership, which
makes it very influential in terms of a popular way of seeing and
responding to life in Australia. Furphy wanted to educate, as well as
entertain this mass readership. He wanted to address the ignorance
that divided Australian society and plagued the fledgling national
movement. Nowhere is this more prevalent than in the 1903 review
Furphy wrote for his own novel, where he points out that
[t]he corresponding penalty of this National
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consciousness is a certain narrowness of outlook, a
spontaneous impression that the sun rises over the
Barrier Reef and sets behind the Leeuwin. When
darkened by Stolidity, such focalized regard is
sometimes amusing, sometimes regrettable -which,
however, doesn't signify much, as it seldom reaches
the dignity of print. Shrivelling into provincialism, it
becomes contemptible; and, festering into the
imperical-cum-provincial sentiment, it becomes
obscene.
But when illuminated by intelligence, the same
insular survey ccystallizes into far-sighted patriotism.
When further reinforced by acute observation, and cast
into literacy form, it invests with interest the minutest
details of National life (1969:128-129).
Turner states that '[i]f... our nationalist myths are not
unmediated reflections of histoiy but transformations of it, then they
must work to construct a very specific way of seeing the
nation .... This way of seeing the nation is dependent upon a relatively
narrow range of myths -primarily those attached to the radical
nationalists icons of bushman and the digger' (Turner, 1993: 107).
Furphy understood this too, and found the myth much too narrow.
Thus, within the context of the Federal push, jingoism, the convict
taint and colonial rivalries, Furphy's consistent but eclectic use of
the European cultural canon and his focus on ignorance shifting
suggests his pledge to an Australian programme of enlightenment,
through an Australian programme of education. Furphy was
dissatisfied with the ignorance that became so much a part of an
anti-intellectual stance in the national type. Indeed, if we consider
how other Furphian heroes reflect the Australian type more
accurately than Collins, then we can see that Furphy desires to
encourage a healthy intellectualism in this "type".
To return to Crosby's discussion on the tension between fact
and fiction in the discipline of history, it can be said that the
colonial sense of Australian history has utilized this tension to the
fullest in order to mythologise a grand, national life rather quickly. If
histoiy cannot be effaced, then the next alternative is to examine
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history's status as fiction, smoothing over the obstacles and healing
the wounds of colonial Australia. To stress Crosby's previous points,
such an examination does not mean a preoccupation with history as
a falsehood, but with 'the conditions of representation, the processes
of signification [and] the constitution of the subject' (1991:45). This
accords with Furphy's views on art. But, since ignorance seems to be,
for Furphy, at the root of the problem, it must also be said that the
uplifting and upbuilding of Australia, or the art of nation, besides
being concerned with representation, signification and the
constitution of identity, must also consider the dangers of ignorance,
sophistry and rivalry that can result from a particular way of seeing
and a particular response to life.
Consider the following enthusiastic excerpts from a speech
entitled 'The Mind of a Nationalist' by R. Thomson:
... [l]et the critic sneer at 1788. It shall yet be a date
that the wide world shall honour. What though our
land was born in sorrow and shame; yet out of the
cradles of poverty and sin, empires have emerged and
the regenerators of mankind have arisen.
When we think of the teachings of history we can
well believe that in the time to come -it may be before
this generation has passed away- 1788 will be a date
that will be classed in the world's history with the
founding of Rome, the landing of the Pilgrim Fathers,
or the storming of the Bastille. There will be but one
greater day in our own Australia's annals, and that
will be the anniversary of the Declaration of her
Independence. For that great date ... it is the duty of
our countrymen to make preparation. It will be a
fateful event, and epochs of that character are slow in
coming and are not the progeny of chance. Work,
earnest work, must smooth the way, and the more the
labourers and the more earnest their labour, the
sooner and the better will the triumph be achieved.
Too many of my countrymen give no thought to the
morrow. It suffices them that they eat, drink, and be
merry. But empires are not built by muscles and
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bodies alone. Brains must also be exerted. There must
be they who will plan and work for other ends than
those which are demanded to obtain the wherewithal
to eat and drink {in Clark, 1955:792).
Furphy seems to share the flavour of Thomson's concerns. If,
historically speaking, convictism is one of the most prominent
factors in the shaping of a national type, and the once negative
qualities of the convict type are appropriated by the rural and urban
masses as a celebration of a society and culture, then it can be said
that the emerging national type ignorantly celebrates the very thing
that has perpetuated rivalry and consistently divided the people.
Indeed, Ward argues that the qualities of the Australian type were
not just shaped by 'the material conditions of outback life', but also
by the fact that 'the first and most influential bush-workers were
convicts or ex-convicts, the conditions of whose lives were such that
they brought with them to the bush the same, or very similar,
attitudes' (1966:2). This is reminiscent of Hughes' aforementioned
notion that '[t]he basic class division of early colonial Australia guards versus prisoners- lived on as a metaphor of future disputes'
(1987: 158).
Perhaps this link between the convict stereotype and the antiintellectualism of the newly-emerging national type is just one of the
reasons why 'the coming Australian is a problem' {SiL, 144) for the
scholarly Furphy. Indeed, it may have even been one of the primary
reasons for his pessimism in the last two years of his life, for he
wrote to his mother that 'all my interminable reading has the effect
only of impressing me with the vast extent of my own present
ignorance. Yes, there is another effect, namely, a realisation of the
similar ignorance of all our leading men of letters. There is hardly a
book worth reading' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:253). The
letter was written ten years after federation on the 1st of April, 1910.
But even in this letter there is present an undeniable and deepseated optimism, for Furphy wrote
[and] yet, running beneath all the "personal equation",
prejudice, and general trashiness of our best literature
there is a blind, half-futile aspiration toward
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something better; and this aspiration is not without
its effect (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:253).
At the time when the Furphys arrived, colonial society had
begun to feel the birthpangs of federation, and one can only imagine
the impact it had on the free settlers, emancipated convicts and their
native-born children who, like Furphy, represented an "Australian"
socio-cultural future. As a writer who sought to write about an
Australia for Australians, it is obvious that Furphy sought to bring
Australia to its full potential as a nation amongst nations. But the
manner in which he undertook this strategy was to emphasize the
importance of a commitment to education, for education would, in
turn, emphasize the importance of that which is other to the self. In
short, education takes the people out of the microcosm of ignorance
in to the macrocosm of knowledge and understanding.
Perhaps the events of 1883 in the Rivertna brought Furphy to
an understanding that the success of Australia as a nation amongst
nations depended on a common 'smoothing of obstacles' and a
common 'healing of wounds' (SiL, 70) in the human order of things.
But the turn of events in nineteenth-century colonial Australia
perhaps suggested to Furphy that the removal of obstacles and the
healing of wounds can only occur by epistemologically eradicating
the sophistry that perpetuates the problem of colonial rivalry and the
stigma of convictism. As Collins states,
[h]istory marks a point of time when first the
Humanity of God touched the divine aspiration in
man, fulfilling, under the skies of Palestine, the dim,
yet infallible instinct of every race from eastern Mongol
to western Aztec. "The Soul, naturally Christian,"
responds to this touch, even though blindly and
erratically, and so from generation to generation the
multitudes stand waiting to welcome the Gospel of
Humanity with psalms and hosannas, as of old; while
from generation to generation phylactered
exclusiveness takes counsel against the revolution
which is to make all things new. And shall this
opposition -the opposition by slander, conspiracy,
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bribery, and force- prevail till the fatal line is once
more passed, and you await the Titus sword to drown
your land in blood, and the Hadrian-plough to furrow
your Temple-site? (SiL, 90).
This cannot be if, as Collins believes, one takes part in the
'revolt of enlightenment against ignorance' (SiL, 90).
1.3. The Penguin and the Man-0'-War Hawk: a parable on
opportunism.

In a letter to his mother, Judith Furphy, dated the 10th of
April, 1910, Furphy wrote,
Though I have learned something of the history of the
human race, I am only on the fringe of knowledge.
Beyond Rome lies in rotation Palestine, Greece,
Babylon, Assyria, with Egypt, India & China, all to be
inquired into. But the Siege of Troy and the episode of
Jepthah (about the same date) are matters of
yesterday. Beyond History lies Tradition, then Legend;
and beyond this stands the Cave Man, clamoring for
recognition .... But the main interest of Science lies far
beyond the earliest of those early times, and extends
onward through the Future to a time when our
descendants will be as superior to ourselves as we are
to those evil-smelling ancestors of ours. And to this
end Socialism expects every man to do his duty
(Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:253-254).
Given our knowledge of Furphy's interest in history and his
support for education, Green is correct to state that Furphy had a
keen 'desire to understand the nature and history of the evolution of
man' (1961:613). But how does this relate to Furphy's socialist
concerns? What does Furphy mean when he states that "to this end
Socialism expects every man to do his duty"? There is no denying
that Furphy keenly expressed his concerns for the social. But was
Furphy a committed socialist? In a letter to Cathels, discussing the
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'Darwinist' and 'Antinomian' climate of Victorian industry, Furphy
voices hls opinion that he has little 'hope' for 'the consummation of
the social economic ideal' in 'Victoria' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds,
1995:20). But, in the self-same letter, Furphy also writes,
(y]ou'll think by all this that I've been reading myself
stupid ln the literature of Socialism. Not so, my last
exercise has been Fielding and Smollett, both of whom
I had partly read long ago .... By the way what a rotten
world lt was before Paine preached and Bums sang
and Byron scoffed and Carlyle snarled. I find great
comfort ln the ferment of society ln these our days,
but Gude save us! What a lot of suffering lt takes to
earn a little progress (ln Barnes and Hoffmann, eds,
1995:20)2 •
The letter was dated January, 1894. But, ln a letter to Mlles
Franklin, written on the 31st of July, 1904, Furphy explains that
'being a State Socialist, I am not under the Dlvlne malison, and am
consequently able to see things as they are -chiefly the great fact
that my own private interests are not worthy to count for -/2 against
the public welfare' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 174). This ls
interesting, for one could argue that, by the time Furphy had written
the aforementioned letter to hls mother on the 10th of April, 1910,
he had converted fully to socialism. But I do not think so. While lt ls
an undeniable fact that Furphy had social concerns, I think lt ls
necessary to approach this wlthln the context of the phllosophe's
concern for rational human progress. As Furphy had stated to
Cathels, 'I am about the busiest man in Shep., for when the Adamlc
penalty of each day has been duly paid, my labour of love -ignorance
shifting- Just begins' (ln Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:23). It ls
this labour of love which probably led hlm to adopt some socialist
ideas. But, unlike Barnes (1990:145), Croft (1991:86; 1996:215) or
Ewers (1943), I would not classify Furphy as a socialist. Perhaps
Henrlcksen's notion that Furphy articulated a 'reasoned socialism'
(1985: 175) comes closest to the truth.
Furphy ls a phllosophe and hls socialist ideas, Just as hls
2

l will discuss Paine's relevance to Furphy more fully in the last section.
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nationalist ideas, should be seen within this context. Thus, it is the
object of this section to show some of the reasons why I think this is
the case. In the words of that other phllosophe, Tom Collins,
if the censorious reader has detected here and there in

these pages a tendency toward the Higher Criticism, or
a leaning to State Socialism, or any passage that
seemed to indicate a familiarity with cuneiform
inscriptions, or with the history and habits of PreAdamite Man, he may be assured that, at the time of
writing such passage, I had been smoking the mighty
pipe -or rather, the mighty pipe had been smoking me and the unlawful erudition had effeivesced per motion
of my scholastic ally (SiL, 272).
Firstly, Furphy's own interests in individual and social
circumstances are too complex and variform to be simply pinned
down to one political view of the world. Indeed, Furphy wrote in his
essay on world federation that '[t]here are stupendous industries
awaiting development; there are untrodden labyrinths of science lying
beyond the vestibule where we stand to-day; there are artistic and
literary possibilities to which present attainments are the mere
alphabet; there are ten thousand beneficient outlets for the inborn
combativeness and effeivescent energy and limitless aspiration of
enfranchized humanity' (1890:55). Although socialist ideas can be
identified in this essay by choice words such as proletartat or class, I
do not agree with Barnes' notion that, '[a]lthough the term is never
used, "Socialism" ... is clearly the philosophy which is being espoused'
(1990:157). Though Barnes is correct in noting that Furphy's
'personal philosophy... was a mixture of Protestantism, Stoicism and
Socialism' (1990:148), one ought to subordinate this mixture of ideas
to the enlightenment programme of shifting the ignorance that
jeopardises human progress and the ·gospel of equal rights' (Furphy,
1890:55)3.
What, then, do we make of Furphy's socialist ideas in his
narratives? Though Croft classifies Furphy as a socialist, he points
out that 'what we get is not a comprehensive picture of life in the
3

I will discuss the importance of rights in more detail in the next section.
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Rivertna in the 1880s. Instead, there is an absence, a silence, which
must worry those readers who turn to the text as an example of
socialist propaganda in the 1890s' ( 1991: 17). According to Croft,
'[t]hat Furphy should attempt to write an epic of socialism without
ever showing unionists and in particular the shearers, the historical
agents of socialism, is explicable only in terms of the confusion of
Furphy's mind when he came to deal with life in the Riverlna in the
1880s' (1991:18). But in a recent essay, Croft states that 'Such is Life,
Rtgby's Romance and The Buln-Buln and the Brolga certainly put the
case for socialism and egalitarianism but an analysis of the ideas in
the novels, and their method of presentation through a conservative
narrator [Tom Collins] and a flawed spokesman for state socialism
[Jtef{ersonRlgby] compromise those ideas, and confuse the readership
of the novels' ( 1996:226).
If one considers that Rtgby's Romance is the most consistent
expression of State Socialism of the three novels, one really ought to
reevaluate just what Furphy intended in regards to socialism. The
socialist issue is only marginally present in Such is Life and virtually
non-existent in The Buln-Buln and The Brolga. Toward the close of
the latter narrative, however, Collins has this to say to his readers:
[Barefooted] Bob was a bushman by nature, as well as
by compulsion. His individuality was clear-cut as a
cameo. Faithful and single-hearted, he was sternly
honest in his criminality, and pious in his
acknowledged wrong-doing. For instance, his sympathy
with bushrangers and horse-stealers was as
magnanimous as your own tenderness for usurers,
profit-mongers, nobleman, etc. In a word, he walked
conscientiously in a light that was extremely dim.
Every unselfish man is loyal to something extraneous;
at that date Bob was loyal to capitalism and M'Gregor;
a few years later, he was still more loyal to the
Queensland strike leaders and Socialism-in-our-time
(BBB, 140-141).
Is Collins not hinting at Barefooted Bob's opportunism? Is
Furphy suggesting that the desire, or human spirit for opportunism
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is as prevalent as ignorance? If so, then could we not argue that the
rivahy and contradictions of the 1890s are due to the prevalence of
ignorance and opportunism? If egalitarianism and socialism in the
novels are not what they seem, then perhaps one to ought consider
Furphy's narratives as suggesting something other than the run-ofthe-mill themes through which we see the 1890s and its literature.
Of particular interest to my view is Jack the Shellback's account of
the "Penguin and the man-o'-war Hawk".
The account is an interesting one because of its central theme
of hunger. Indeed, this theme of hunger is introduced through the
voracious appetite of Collins' kangaroo-dog, Pup. Readers of the
three novels are well informed of Pup's entertaining antics in his
quest for food. According to Collins, '[o]ne peculiarity of the
kangaroo-dog is ... that he can smell food through half-inch
boilerplate; and he rivals Trenck or Monte Cristo in making way
through any obstacle which may stand between him and the object of
his desires' (SIL, 274). This is important, for it is through Pup that
Furphy alludes to the themes of desire and opportunism, and it is
because of Pup's hunger that Jack the Shellback gives his account of
the man-o'-war hawk. Collins may state that '[t]he kangaroo-dog is
the hungriest subject in the animal kingdom' (SIL, 274), but,
according to Jack the Shellback, 'he ain't in it with the man-o'-war
hawk' (SIL, 274). Furphy is surely alluding to an even hungrier
subject in the animal kingdom than either the kangaroo-dog or the
man-o'-war hawk, and that is Man.
Because of Jack the Shellback's profanity, Collins paraphrases
the account:
[t]he man-o'-war hawk, it appears, utters a thrilling
squeal of hunger the moment his beak emerges from
the shell; and his hunger dogs him -kangaroo-dogs
him, you might say- through life. At adult age, he
consists chiefly of wings; but, in addition to these, he
has a pair of eager, sleepless eyes, endowed with a
power of something like 200 diameters; and he has
also a perenially empty stomach -the sort of vacuum,
by the way, which Nature particularly abhors. He can
eat nothing but fish; and, since he suffers under the
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disadvantage of being unable to dive, wade, or swim,
someone else must catch the fish for him. The penguin
does this, and does it with a listless ease which would
excite the envy of the man-o'-war hawk if the
unceasing anguish of hunger allowed the latter any
respite for thought (SiL, 275).
In contrast, the penguin 'presents a pointed antithesis to the
man-o'-war hawk' (SiL, 275). The penguin's 'life is unadventurous;
some might call it monotonous' (SiL, 275). Indeed, the penguin is
never required 'to act either on reason or impulse', for he 'has few
wants, and no ambition. Dreaming the happy hours away -that is his
idea' (SiL, 275). The small bird 'knows barely enough to be aware that
with much wisdom cometh much sorrow' (SiL, 275). And, [o)nce a
day, he experiences a crisp, triumphant appetite, which differs from
hunger as melody differs from discord' and he 'selects a fish as for
size, flavour, and general applicability [that) will best administer to
his bodily requirements, and gratify his epicurean taste' (SiL, 275). In
short, while the penguin's desires are well-fed, the man-o' -war hawk
must use strategy in order to live by the principle that 'the most
important of all economies is the economy of time' (SiL, 276).
From a socialist perspective, one could say that the man-o' war hawk represents the maxim that "time is money" and the social
Darwinist notion of the survival of the stronger. Indeed, one could
conclude, as Croft (1991:205) and Henricksen (1985:135) do, that the
account is a parable of nineteenth-century laissez-faire capitalism,
and that the man-o'war hawk represents the exploiter and the
penguin the exploited. But readers should note that the manner in
which Collins paraphrases the account has much to do with
attributing human qualities to both the penguin and the man-o' -war
hawk. Effectively, this makes the two birds the measure of how one
desires to exist in the world. Indeed, according to Collins, '[a)fter
listening with much interest to the description here loosely
paraphrased, I fell asleep with the half-formed longing to be a
penguin, and the liveliest gratitude that I was not a man-o'-war
hawk' (SiL, 277. My italics).
In short, the man-o'-war hawk must suffer in his labours for
his fleeting moment of happiness, while the penguin appears to have
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the perfect life. As Croft notes, 'this is a curious inversion of the
usual socialist picture of the economic problem' (1991:206). But I
disagree with Croft's notion that the parable 'is no answer to the
great problems of social inequality in the late nineteenth century'
(1991:206). Sharkey is correct in noting that the parable is 'a subtle
analogy for the reader's interpretation of the plot' (1984:23). But I
think that the parable foregrounds more than just 'the relationship
between narrator and audience' (1984:23). Is Furphy suggesting that,
while human beings desire to be like the penguin, perhaps even
obtaining a degree of bliss in the pursuit of happiness, they are more
than likely to act and interact in the manner of the man-o'-war
hawk? Is the desire to live like the penguin more a case of
opportunism than an honest expression of socialism, mateship or
working class solidarity? Indeed, Ward points out a rather humorous
but 'well known story' where 'a socialist orator promised his audience
that there would be strawberries and cream for all after the
revolution' (1966: 181).
Though earlier than Manning Clark, was Furphy already
pointing to the fact that the labour movement 'was corrupt,
opportunist' and 'riddled with bourgeois prejudices', showing 'no
intention of working for the regeneration of mankind' (1980: 14). If
this is the case, as I think it is, then Partington is quite right in
concluding that 'Jack the Shellback's parable of the man-o'-war
hawk and the penguin suggests there are basic differences between
individuals or groups which may persist through all social
arrangements' (1993: 176). As she points out,
the theme of class-conflict by no means constitutes
the whole of Such ts Life. Indeed, it is difficult to
recognise the naive antithesis of wicked squatter and
worthy plebeian as even a defensible reading. There
seems little reason to suspect that selectors,
bullockies, or stationhands, although they have little
enough to show for their efforts, are any less 'landhungry' than the squatters (1993: 172).
To put it simply, '[m]en and women in the Riverina lie and
steal in similar ways to the rest of humanity' (Partington, 1993: 123).
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One only needs to remember Dixon and Bum's attempt to steal
Collins' horse, Cleopatra, or the impounding of Warrigal Alfs
bullocks while he is sick to note the widespread opportunism in the
Rivertna. From this, one could say that the account is a parable of
the opportunism that turns the individual longing for happiness into
the individual pursuit of happiness, with little regard for society or
ideology. This is interesting in light of a neat little remark made by
Collins and our previous investigation of the importance of ignorance
to the narrative. If people long to be like the penguin, and the
penguin lives 'in total ignorance of the man-o'-war hawk' (SiL, 276),
then people long to be ignorant of the internal and external factors
that affect and determine their positions in the world. Although, as
Collins states to Warrtgal Alf, 'one must love something' and 'one
must hate something' (SiL, 135), one must also be aware of why one
loves or why one hates and what effect one's hatred or love has on
one's response to life.
To live in the penguin's blissful ignorance does not necessarily
mean that one's happiness is of benefit to self or society. Indeed,
Sam Brackenbridge's conversion to socialism and his belief that 'us
Socialists is no more responsible for the comin' revolution than the
mere petrel is for the storm it prognosticates' (RR, 255) is one
example of the penguin's blissful ignorance as well as the man-o'hawk's opportunism. Socialism is not a '[m]ere matter of evolution'
(RR, 255), but a purposeful strategy executed by people in the human
order of things. And it is a strategy with major and minor
alternatives. In this sense, one could consider the parable of the
penguin and the man-o' -war hawk as a further illustration of the
theory of the controlling alternatives and the need for education.
This applies equally to Furphy's earlier views towards ignoranceshifting and human progress. It also allows Furphy to use the
parable to indicate further the damaging attitudes and orientations
of colonial Australians toward the uplifting and upbuilding of
Australia. Thus, while the account of the penguin and the man-o' war hawk can be read as a parable of economic conditions, its
designs are better seen as a study of desire and interaction in human
nature.
One must remember that neither the penguin nor the man-o' war hawk is unduly disadvantaged by the economics of their
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relationship in the order of things. Both live in a state of
opportunism relative to their desire or epicurean taste. In light of
this, I would like to tum to a letter that Keats wrote to his brother
and sister, George and Georgiana, for it brings some interesting
points to the discussion at hand. In this letter, dated the 19th of
March, 1819, Keats wrote that
[i]n wild nature the Hawk would lose his Breakfast of
Robins and the Robin his of Worms. The Lion must
starve as well as the swallow -The greater part of Men
make their way with the same instinctiveness, the
same unwandering eye from their purposes, the same
animal eagerness as the Hawk -The Hawk wan ts a
Mate, so does the Man -look at them both, they set
about it and procure one in the same manner -They
want both a nest and they both set about one in the
same manner -they get their food in the same manner
-The noble animal Man for his amusement smokes his
pipe -the Hawk balances about the Clouds -that is the
only difference of their leisures. This it ls that makes
the Amusement of Life -to a speculative Mind. I go
among the Fields and catch a glimpse of a stoat or a
fleldmouse peeping out of the withered grass -the
creature hath a purpose and its eyes are bright with it
-I go amongst the buildings of a city and I see a Man
hurrying along -to what? The Creature has a purpose
and his eyes are bright with it (in Rollins, ed, 1958:7980. My italics).
Thematically, the flavour of Jack the Shellback's account is
very similar to Keats' letter. Considering that Keats' letter had been
originally published in 1848, it ls quite possible that Furphy had
read the letter. Indeed, Keats' letter foregrounds not just the issue of
hunger, but also the issue of purpose in the account of the hawk and
the penguin. This ls important, for we are already familiar with
Furphy's belief that 'beyond the changing seasons ... there lies a
purpose' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 124). But, while Keats'
letter speaks generally about the presence of purpose in hawk and
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man, I find lt interesting that Furphy's parable should focus on a
particular type of hawk associated with tmages of the 'high seas' (SiL,
274), with "treasure", "heroism" and "opportunism" in the human
order of things. This has some rather interesting ramifications for
Keats' analogy on purpose, the ramifications of which he seems to be
aware. Indeed, Keats wrote that '[t]here is an electric fire in human
nature, tending to purify; so that, among these human creatures,
there is continually some birth of new heroism; the plty ls, that we
must wonder at lt, as we should at finding a pearl in rubbish' (in
Houghton, ed, [ 1848) 1927: 158).
Referring to the Australian type, Palmer states that 'there was
a streak of idealism in his nature that expressed itself in his
sentiment about mateship and in the political movements that made
for equality' (1963:170). Indeed, according to Ward, '[t]he later
bushman exhibited, perhaps even more clearly than hls fore-runners,
that "manly independence" whose obverse side was a levelling,
egalitarian collectivism, and whose sum was comprised ln the
concept of mateship' (1966:180). This may be true for some 1890s
writers and their depletion of the type, but not Furphy. While Furphy
considered the bushmen to be indicative of the real Australian type,
one should not forget their opportunist nature, their willing
participation in some form of colonial rivalry and their tendency for
overhasty and ignorant actions.
As Clark (1980:12-17) has pointed out, egalitarianism, or the
belief that brotherhood, equality and mateshlp were universally
extended to all ls a fallacy, for such a view was much more
prominently a front for anti-loyalist sentiments. Clark argues that
'[m]ateship was the product of a way of life: a mate was a bulwark
against loneliness, a help in time of sickness and accident' (1980: 16).
This is what Furphy's narratives indicate, for there are numerous
examples of this kind of "mateship" which in no way espouse true
equality, brotherhood or egalitarianism, as Ward or Palmer describe.
For example, one could consider Collins' tending to Warrigal Alfs
sickness and his retrieval of Alf s impounded bullocks within Clark's
description of mateship. Likewise, one could also see Clark's
description of mateship operating in chapter one of Such ls Life, when
the bullockies help Cooper to tow his wagon out of the bog, despite
the fact that there is a deep colonial rivalry between the men.
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According to Kiernan, Collins' 'digressions may present us with the
ideals of Australian democratic socialism but, when we glance at the
characters and situations in the novel, society is seen as far from
ideal.. .. Society is seen as absurd in its pretensions, and corrupt
behind its facade of respectability' (197lb:143). I think Collins'
digressions are designed to direct our attention to this fact.
Douglas places much of Such is Llfe firmly in the picaresque
tradition, arguing that '[t]heft and deception are the stock-in-trade of
the picaresque tradition' and that '[t]he picaro .... sets out to rise in
the world by skills picked up from bandits, toughs, card-sharpers,
pimps, burglars, pickpockets and confidence men' (1978:19). While
such a variety of characters do not grace Furphy's pages, it is rather
interesting that the bullocky, like the plcaro, 'has cruelties inflicted
on him, and returns them with interest', for '[h]e practices the trades
of the world to which he belongs' and 'engages in a battle of wits to
see who will emerge the deceiver and who the deceived' ( 1978: 19).
Indeed, '[t]he picaresque "hero" shows no consciousness of wrongdoings except in so far as he reveals some of his misdemeanours by
accident rather than design' (Douglas, 1978:21). One could do no
worse than to remember the manner in which Dixon tries to pass off
his bad back to Collins after he and Bum tried to thieve Collins'
horse during the night. For this reason, I must disagree with Brady,
who claims that Furphy's 'bullock-drivers ... are the equivalent of
O'Reilly's Aborigines, noble savages unspoiled by the corruptions of
civilization' (1981 :52).
This directly affects the manner in which socialism, mateship
or egalitarianism are practised in the world of Furphy's three novels.
The picaresque tradition also ostensively directs readers to consider
further the actual status quo of "life" in the 1890s. Of equal
importance to this and to the picaro's plying the skills of his trade is
occupation. According to Croft, '[i]f we look at the range of
occupations of the characters in Furphy's work, it is apparent that
most of them are of [the class of journeymen, skilled workers and
minor entrepreneurs], or of higher class allegiances' (1996:211). And,
for Croft, Furphy's bullockies are 'minor entrepreneurs in the sense
that present day "truckles" are minor capitalists' (1996:211). Barnes
states that '[t]he Riverina carriers were an unusual group: capitalists
of a sort, their capital being invested in their carrying plant and
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teams, they were individualists with strong group loyalties'
(1990:125). This is important, for one could do no worse than to see
the bullockies as subcontractors who, even to this day, are a problem
for the success of socialist or unionist movements.
As Docker points out, '[t]he men work largely for themselves,
although always in danger of commercial failure, and [al return to a
working-class wage existence' (1991: 113). Furphy wished to show
that the bullockies were one group of minor entrepreneurs who
desired to live like penguins but acted as man-o'-war hawks to
achieve their aims. Thus, I agree with Docker that '[i]t is, not
surprisingly, individualism we see them attracted to, not co-operative
socialism' (1991: 113). In terms of their occupation, one could argue
that it is the environment in which they ply their trade that makes
them so. But I am of the view that while this is not false, it is
neither entirely true, for the parable of the penguin and the man-o'war hawk indicates that hunger, or desire, plays a great role in the
major or minor alternatives of one's purpose.
In short, Furphy's observations on the 1890s environment
equally take into account that rather complex and persistent "thing"
called human nature. In this sense, does environment dictate
"human nature", or does human nature dictate "environment"?
Given the theory of the controlling alternatives, it is my contention
that Furphy thought the latter to be the case without totally
discrediting the former. Again, one must remember that, according to
Collins, 'the coming Australian is a problem' (SiL, 144). This is
equally so in light of our previous discussion on convictism and the
pervasiveness of the convict stereotype in many of the power
struggles of nineteenth-century Australia. After reading Furphy's
novels, readers should come to some understanding that the
celebrated ideals of 1890s egalitarianism or mateship are, in the
words of Keats, pearls in rubbish. Yet, according to Collins, 'if we
decline a brotherhood of mutual blessing and honour, we
alternatively accept one of mutual injury and ignominy' (SiL, 95).
Or, as Furphy wrote in his essay supporting world federation,
'[i]ntelligent co-operation and mutual goodwill are the only necessary
conditions to organisation; loyalty is the sole condition to stability;
and loyalty is the central instinct of humanity -good night, indeed,
to civilisation if it were not so!' ( 1890:55). This may be taken to be
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socialist, but it could just as easily be understood to mean
enlightenment humanism, for one could see Furphy as having the
philosophe's rational passion for the uplifting and upbuilding of
Australia and Australians. To recall Furphy's belief in purpose, he
wrote that 'we don't know definitely what this purpose may be; but I
don't think it is fulfilled by plethoric banking accounts. Same time, I
believe it is fulfilled by the production of men and women of high
moral standard, calm courage, and clear intellect' (in Barnes and
Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 124).
Neither the opportunism of the man-o' -war hawk nor the
blissful ignorance of the penguin will clarify the purpose of men and
women in the human order of things. As Dorothy Green notes,
Furphy does not 'deny that one's neighbour has needs', but he does
much 'to refine the perception of what those needs are and to admit
that there are a genuine scale of priorities' (1980:33-34). Or, as Indyk
states, '[i]t is not the fact of diversity but the failure to acknowledge
reciprocity and equality that prevents the development of a binding
sense of community' (1986:307). But it is not socialism alone that
can bind the community, for one needs a much broader education
than just the socialist message. Perhaps one could say that the
uplifting and upbuilding of Australia is worth ·a great deal more to
one who has been nourishing a youth sublime with the curious facts
of Science and the thousand-and-one items of general information
necessary to any person who ... above all other strife contends
especially to know himself; and that physically, as well as morally'
(SiL, 280. My italics).
It is well documented in Barnes' biography (1990:123) and
Barnes and Hoffmann's collection of Furphy's letters (1995:1) that
Furphy had camped with Charlie Sullivan one night in the Rivertna,
and that the pair had discussed the content of many literary and
philosophical works. One of these was Plato's Republic. According to
Sullivan, Furphy was 'the most learned bushman' he had 'ever met, a
real bushman', leading him to conclude that 'Furphy was of us, but
not one of us'. With regard to that famous maxim of the Delphian
oracle, Furphy seems to share Plato's notion that 'the just man is
wise and good and the unjust man bad and ignorant' (bk. l.350e).
Because of this, 'just men are more intelligent and more truly
effective in action, and ... unjust men are incapable of any joint action
63.

at all' (Rep. bk. l .352b). I think Furphy supported Plato's idea that
society 'must look for the Guardians who will stick most firmly to
the principle that they must always do what they think best for the
community' (Rep. bk.3.413c). Also, Furphy appears to believe that 'it
is ... in education that our Guardians must build their main defences'
(Rep. bk.4.424d), for it is 'the direction given by education that ls
likely to determine all that follows' (Rep. bk.4.425b-c).
Socrates' argument 'is not a trivial one', for he states that 'our
whole way of life ... is at issue' (Rep. bk. l.352d). Furphy places similar
emphasis on the art of living, for one of the main themes in his
novels, as in Republic, is that of justice and injustice in light of
ignorance, education and conduct in life. Key ideas from Plato's text
echo profoundly throughout Furphy's novels. As Partington points
out, '[t]he force and passion of Furphy's affection for literature and
history make it difficult to think of him as a naively exclusive
admirer of wisdom derived directly from everyday experience in the
working world' (1993:64-65). Although she discusses Furphy's
affinities with Plato's concern for epistemology, Partington does not
discuss Plato's continually stressing the need for knowledge and
education in political science and justice, since, in Plato's view,
Athenian democracy was prone to the manipulation and
opportunism of the sophists. This is important, for Furphy's novels
also expand on this philosophical theme in light of the colonial
rivalries of the Federal movement, as I have attempted to show.
Indeed, Thrasymachus· notion that 'justice or right is simply what ls
in the interest of the stronger party' (Rep. bk. l.338c) is a particularly
apt description of the oscillating moods in 1890s Australia.
What, then, of Jefferson Rigby? Firstly, there is much that can
be said about Rigby and his sermon, and no critic, to my knowledge,
has taken a detailed approach in the spirit of the obseivant reader to
this rather interesting character. To some greater or lesser degree,
critics such as Croft (1996:215) or Barnes (1990:205-206) are content
to say that Rigby ls a manifestation of Furphy's socialist views vts-avis Collins' declaring that he is a 'Conseivative' (RR, 12). As Furphy
had stated to Cathels in 1898,
[lit may be worth while to remark that the uncritical
public, as represented by Jim Gourley, et hoc genus
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(adj.) omnes, look on that pedant [Rigby] as the pillar
which supports the book. Sam Brackenbridge's
admiration for the man is a common complaint. 80 per
cent of masculine readers will long to be like Rigby;
and that feeling will disarm criticism. I deliberately
intended Rigby as a man of offensively large
information, one who knows more than any person is
justified in knowing' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds,
1995:44-45).
However, approximately four years later in a letter to Cecil
Winter, Furphy states that he 'noticed an unconscious plan in the
story. Every other character is a foil to the Commodore [Rigby] Dixon, in his good-natured but brutal worldliness -Thompson, in his
dense but generous Individualism -Furlong, in his docile devotion to
revelation as popularly accepted -and so on through the company' (in
Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:147-148). This "unconscious plan"
changed Furphy's designs for the novel. As Partington points out,
'[a]t the end of rugby's lengthy discourses we are little the wiser as to
just what policies "State Socialism" would entail if [Rigby] had his
way. rugby's social and political program, in a curiously similar way
to the religious sermons he ridicules, never comes alive' ( 1993: 161 ).
To some extent, readers should approach the novel as 'menippean
satire' (G.W. Turner, 1971:lx-x; Docker, 1991:119-120).
Alluding to the work of Northrop Frye, G.W. Turner explains
that '"Menippean satire" deals less with people as such than with
mental attitudes, and is especially likely to present the phllosophus
glortosus, the learned crank or obsessed philosopher' (1971:x). From a
Bakhtinian perspective, Docker states, 'Rtgby's Romance incorporates
the Menippean ... mode of parody where the parody is not necessarily a
rejection of the parodied object, but rather represents an argument
between different positions, different philosophies' (1991:120). In
short, 'ideas are more important than manners and psychological
analysis in Furphy's world, and the people in his stories, though so
"real" ... are primarily mouthpieces for ideas and points of view,
especially particular ideas about Providence and free will and human
responsibility' (G.W.Turner, 1971:xi). But, one wonders if this is
because of the stylistic rules of the menippean genre or because
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Furphy's novels investigate the heady pluralism of 1890s culture and
ideology?
In light of Furphy's comment on the "unconscious plan" of
Rigby's Romance, one wonders if Docker is correct in stating that 'the
parody of Rigby as an ideologue doesn't mean his particular socialist
ideas are not to be taken seriously' (1991:120). To turn to the issue
of Collins' conservatism, readers ought to note the explanation he
gives for its use vis-a-vis state socialism. According to Collins, 'I
adapt myself to the times and the seasons, whilst he [Rigby, or the
state socialist) thinks the conformity ought to be on the other side'
(RR, 12). In other words, Collins' conservatism indicates that, '[i)n
occupation, I change involuntarily, like the chameleon, according to
my surroundings· (RR, 15). Interestingly enough, the explanation
Collins gives for state socialism is surely much more suited to a
traditional and popular understanding of conservatism, and I think
readers are meant to query this inversion of meaning. More
importantly, Collins' explanation of the conservative and the state
socialist, in the spirit of the penguin and the man-o' -war hawk
parable, also unveils how much two diametrically opposed identities
depend on desire and strategy.
According to Docker, '[t]here is a particular rivalry between
Collins and Rigby, a rivalry that is both personal and ideological'
(1991: 110). Whatever support Furphy had originally intended for
Rigby and state socialism in Rigby's Romance, the final version
serialized in the socialist newspaper, The Barrier Truth, is far from a
welcome celebration of this 1890s ideological movement. With this in
mind, Collins' function in the narrative should be reevaluated. He is
not just a hero who ls 'unable to find any coherent pattern in the
events that he describes' nor a hero who 'cannot learn' (G.W.
Turner,1971:x). Nor does Docker's view that Collins 'is pessimistic
about human nature' (1991: 111) seem plausible, simply because he
points out that, rather than the pursuit of knowledge, '[a)ny sensible
bloke. if he were restricted to one course, would select damper and
bacon, as being both wholesome and filling' (RR, 164). Collins is
quite rightly pointing to the fact that 'if you could take statistics of
the whole human race I fancy you would find a very large number
who never trouble themselves over any other consideration' (RR, 164).
In light of the penguin and the man-o'-war hawk parable, the issue
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of desire and strategy permeates and shapes many ideologies
concerned with human purpose and progress.
Given his explanation of conseivatism, Collins' status in
Rtgby's Romance is an important one, for he is not Just 'a figure of
fun' (Croft, 1996:215). As Collins had stated in Such ts Life, '(i]n the
race of life, my son, you must run cunning, reserving your sprint for
the tactical moment' (215. My italics). Or, as Collins points out in
the proem to Rtgby's Romance, '[y]ou must take me as a hard-working
and ordinary actor on this great stage of fools; but one who,
nevertheless, finds a wholesome recreation in observing the parts
played by his fellow-hypocrites. (The Greek hupokrtsts, I find,
signifies, indifferently, "actor" and "hypocrite".)' (xviii). In this sense,
Collins acts as chameleon-like foll for Rigby's sermon, strategically
directing the reader to obseive the flaws in the socialist order of
things. What hypocrisies, therefore, can we obseive and are meant to
obseive in Jefferson Rigby? Although there are many obseivations
which are interesting and pertinent to the points I have made, I will
select a sample of evidence which strongly supports my case.
Firstly, it is fair to say that not all of Rigby's polemic is
hypocritical. Nor is Rigby's sermon without its pertinent points,
despite the fact that Rigby ls, I believe, drawn as a sophist. One of
the main propositions of state socialism, the notion that 'Jack is as
good as his master' (RR, 215), is important to Furphy's way of seeing
because such a proposition shows some concern for the uplifting and
upbuilding of Australian society, culture and nation vts-a-vts British
empiricism. But Rigby's sermon is not without its problems.
Consider the following dialogue between Collins and Rigby:
"Persuade Jack to the contrary, and his master will
clothe you in a belltopper, and make you the third
ruler in the kingdom," replied the Sheriff [Rigby].
"Individualism has helped the lower dog to the great
discovery you mention; therefore, we have at last
reached the time -the first time in history, mark youwhen a man's foes are they of his own household. And
'household', in the English of James I, doesn't mean
'family'; it means 'holders of the house· - formerly
chattel-slaves, now wage-slaves. The house is divided
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against itself, and the breach is widening perceptibly
year by year- day by day, for that matter. But for any
possible disorder of the body politic there is, in the
veiy nature of things, an accessible, appropriate, and
infallible remedy. In this case ours is State Socialism.
What is yours?"
"But is Socialism a remedy?" I asked querulously.
"If you divide everything today, how long will it be
before you require another division, and another, and
so on?"
"Let some advocate of Individualism answer that
question, since it concerns him alone," replied the
Major. "For this ebb and flow in private fortune, this
rhythmic accumulation, confiscation and redistribution of property confront us as the most
conspicuous feature in the working of our present
system, and one of the most disastrous and
demoralising. This perpetual division and re-division of
wealth is the distinctive outcome, and the just and
certain curse of Individualism ... (RR, 215).
This is despite the fact that Rigby had 'led Binney to believe
that Socialism meant the abrupt confiscation of farms, and the
degradation of farmers to the ticket-of-leave level' (RR, 231). Indeed,
Collins' question to Rigby concerning Socialism and social divisions
is an excellent example of reductto ad absurdum, for rugby's answer
is both lame and ignorant of the many reasons for rivalry and
division in colonial Australia. Furthermore, Rigby is ignorant of the
fact that, economically speaking, socialism is as responsible for the
growing economic division in society as the man-o'-war-hawk tactics
of industrialism and capitalism. Again, Sam Brackenbridge's belief
that 'us Socialists is no more responsible for the comin' revolution
than the mere petrel is for the storm it prognosticates' (RR, 255) is
an ignorant conclusion. Socialism, like capitalism or industrialism,
is built on the notion that 'one must love something' and 'one must
hate something' (SlL, 135). In other words, one lives and responds to
life and the human order of things in much the same manner as the
man-o'-war hawk and the penguin in their order of things.
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Of further interest to rugby's proposition that 'Jack ls as good
as his master' (RR, 215) ls Plato's notion that such a way of seeing
creates rivalry and division between rich and poor, promoting an
ignorant but popular concept of liberty that leads to tyranny.
According to Plato, '(t]he extreme of popular liberty ls reached [ln
democracy] when slaves ... have the same liberty as their owners -not
to mention the complete equality and liberty in the relations between
the sexes' (Rep. bk.8.563b). From this, Plato argues that 'the minds
of the citizens become so sensitive that the least vestige of restraint
ls resented as intolerable, till finally, ... in their determination to have
no master they disregard all laws, written or unwritten' (Rep. bk.8.
563d). In other words, 'from an extreme of liberty one is likely to get,
ln the individual and ln society, a reaction to an extreme of
subjection' (Rep. bk.8.564a). But this is the least of Plato's problems,
for this extreme of popular liberty in a democratic society does not
necessarily mean that a society cannot function as a democracy,
even though Plato does not consider lt to be an ideal form of
government. What concerns Plato ls his expectation for 'tyranny to
result from democracy' because of this tension between 'the most
savage subjection' and 'an excess of liberty' (Rep. bk.8.564a).
In books eight and nine of Republic, Plato spends some time
formulating a theory of political psychology. This ls most important,
for Plato wants to show Adelmantus, as well as his readers, that
certain types of societies and their political systems are the direct
result of a certain type of human character. Given the climate of
extreme and popular liberty, Plato expects a tyrannical character to
grow naturally within the larger democratic character of politics and
society. Employing the analogy of bees, Plato directs his argument to
a certain type of character: 'a class of thriftless idlers, whom [he
compares] to drones, their energetic leaders to drones with stings,
the more inert mass of followers to drones without stings· (Rep.
bk.8.564b). This ls important for understanding the potency of
Colllns' attack on Rlgby's proposition that 'Jack ls as good as his
master', as well as the notion that socialism is an 'infallible remedy'
(RR, 215) for the ills of industrialism and capitalism. Speaking of the
drones, Plato states that, in a democratic society,
[e]veryone's on the make, but the steadiest characters
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will generally be most successful in making
money ...And the drones find them a plentiful and most
convenient source to extract honey from ... And so this
group, on which the drones batten, are called the rich
(Rep. bk.8.564e).
Or, as Furphy, writing under the nom de plume of Warrigal
Jack, stated in the article, 'The Mythical Sundowner',
while human nature sports into so many varieties and
degrees of laziness, the sundowner proper will never
fail; men may come and men may go, but he goes on
for ever. Pastoral interests may wax and wane:
stations may be incorporated, divided, sold, or
foreclosed; managers may die, resign, be sacked, or
received into partnership; the Mantchoorian boundary
man may supersede the Inda-Germanic, but while
there exists a circuit of stations as a basis of
operations the phoenix-like sundowner shall flourish
in immortal youth ([ 1889] 1981: 396).
While the sundowner may not have a sting, he is nevertheless
an opportunistic drone, for he forms part of what Rigby calls the
'helpless minority' (RR, 186). The problem, however, is not so much
this stingless drone, but the 'single popular leader', the drone with
the sting, 'whom [the stingless drones] nurse to greatness' (Rep.
bk.8.565c). According to Plato, '(i]t is he who. leads the class war
against the owners of property' (Rep. bk.8.566a). And, as Collins so
poignantly asks Rigby, 'If you divide everything today, how long will it
be before you require another division, and another, and so on?' (RR,
215). Or, as Plato states, 'when [the owners of property] see the
people trying to wrong them, not with intent, but out of ignorance
and because they've been misled by the slanders spread by their
leaders, why then they've no choice but to turn oligarchs in earnest,
not because they want to, but again because the drones' stings have
poisoned them' (Rep. bk.8.565b-c). Thus, a popular but reactionary
concept of liberty and equality leads to further rivalry and division in
an already reactionary society. As Plato sombrely states,
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[t)he mob will do anything [the popular leader) tells
them, and the temptation to shed a brother's blood is
too strong. He [the popular leader] brings the usual
unjust charges against him [his brother], takes him to
court and murders him, thus destroying a human life,
and getting an unholy taste of blood of his fellows.
Exiles, executions, hints of cancellation of debts and
redistribution of land follow, till their instigator [the
popular leader) is inevitably and finally bound either
to be destroyed by his enemies, or to change from man
to wolf and make himself tyrant (Rep. bk.8.565e-566a).
Furphy is actually much more concerned with studying and
understanding human nature, in relation to a particular belief or
tsm, than advocating a reactionary way of seeing and responding to
life. If one were to classify theoretically Furphy's concern for the
social, I think it is more appropiate to say that Furphy advocated
humanitarianism and education rather than the politically and
economically reactionary views of the socialists. For Jack to be as
good as his master, Jack must be shifted out of his ignorance, since
an educated individual is understood to know what is best for
himself, his political system, and his society. In light of Plato's views,
consider the following revealing comment by Collins, who states that
'[w)ithout vassal loyalty, or abject vassal fear, the monopolist's sleep
can never be secure. Domination, to be unassailable, must have
overwhelming force in reserve -moral force, as in the feudal system,
or physical force, as in our police system. The labour leader, of
accredited integrity and capability, though (so to speak) ducally
weedy, has moral force in reserve; and we all know how he controls
the many-headed' (SiL, 205. My italics).
Or, as Plato explains in his analogy of the sophist and his
"science" of sophistry:
Suppose a man was in charge of a large and powerful
animal, and made a study of its moods and wants;
why it was especially savage or gentle, what the
different noises it made meant, and what tone of voice
to use to soothe or annoy it. All this he might learn by
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long experience and familiarity, and then call it a
science, and reduce it to a system and set up to teach
it. But he would not really know which of the
creature's tastes and desires was admirable or
shameful, good or bad, rtght or wrong; he would simply
use the terms on the basis of its reactions, calling
what pleased it good, what annoyed it bad. He would
have no rational account to give of them, but would
call the inevitable demands of the animal's nature
right and admirable, remaining quite blind to the real
nature of and difference between inevitability and
goodness, and quite unable to tell anyone else what it
was (Rep. bk.6.493a-c).
Although there are problems with Plato's analogy in light of
empiricism, the notion that the sophist can skilfully gain political
control by pandering to public passions or pleasures is nevertheless
made. As Thompson observantly states, '[g]reat Socialist Rigby
is, ... but it's more the power of controversy than the force of
argument. An ounce of fact is worth a mile of theocy, they say' (RR,
217-218). Or, indeed, as Rigby himself confesses to Collins, '[d]on't
mistake me for an organiser. I'm merely an agitator, a voice in the
wilderness, preaching preparation for a Palingenesis. The program is
hidden in the order of events, and will be evolved in its own good
time. To be fettered by a programme now would be fatal' (RR, 231 ).
Claiming a stylistic affinity to John the Baptist, Rigby attempts to
push home a universal truth about socialism, hoping to pander to
the passions and pleasures of a popular desire for 'the Kingdom of
God' (RR, 231). But, according to Rigby, '[i]f we assuaged our zeal by
bearing in mind that Socialism is relative, not absolute -that it must
come by evolution, not by miracle- we should be much further ahead
than we are' (RR, 231).
And yet, to confuse matters more, Rigby claims that he is
merely 'a watchman, imperfectly qualified, I admit, though Divinely
commissioned' (RR, 231. My italics). One wonders whether or not
Rigby, the sophist, desires to have his portion of strawberries and
cream after the revolution. Readers can be certain of one thing, and
that is Sam Brackenbridge's naively devotional observation that
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Rigby is 'an artist' (RR,91) and that he is 'quick on the trigger' (RR,
92). In short, Rigby is no less an opportunist than many of the other
Furphian heroes. Indeed, rugby's curriculum vitae is impressively
broad. According to Collins, Rigby is currently a '[s]econd-rate
photographer and descriptive writer' but '[h]e has been a first-rate
engine-driver, also mechanical expert, a third-rate Journalist, and a
fourth-rate builder' (RR, 12). Furthermore, Rigby has been 'ranked
high up to ninth and tenth rate in something like a score of other
and more menial occupations; but speaking with actuarial precision,
he's a land suiveyor' (RR, 12-13).
Readers also find out that Rigby had had 'an excellent little
industry in connection with a carpenter in Sandhurst' buying 'empty
weatherboard houses at Sandhurst' and selling 'them, re-erected, on
the Spring Creek' goldfields (RR, 122-123). And, although his old
employer, Milligan Brothers, 'declined to employ' Rigby because he is
'an agitator', Rigby nevertheless refuses to take the matter further
because 'Leslie Milligan is the most astute man of [his]
acquaintance' (RR, 234). Indeed, Rigby admirably states that Leslie
Milligan 'can see ten years further ahead than the average
Conservative does -in other words, he can see a decade ahead of the
present moment. I mustn't build too much on his hostility' (RR, 234).
While Leslie Milligan can see opportunities for future avenues of
business, Rigby cannot. It would seem that rugby's socialism is not
Just a sophistic pandering to pu bile passions and pleasures, but also
an opportunistic preaching of a fashionable gospel. As Devlin-Glass
points out, '[c]learly Furphy means us to take Rigby at face value ... by
insisting that he is an ideologue, an agitator, rather than an
organiser of the Christian Socialist Utopia' (1974:75).
There is another interesting example of Rigby' s sermon to
which I would like to refer. This example not only further qualifies
rugby's status as a sophist with a sting in a divided community, but
also gives readers a better insight into rugby's character. In this
example, Rigby pits law against the human spirit. According to
Rigby, '[h]appiness is not an ingredient of life, subject to the
augmentation or diminution by prescription. It is the outcome, or
rather the fruition, of an inherent susceptibility, which latter is
governed in tone, though not affected in extent, by the conditions
whichform individual character' (RR, 184. My italics). While Rigby is
73.

correct in noting that '[m]an can no more exist without drawing his
dole of so-called happiness than without breathing' (RR, 184-185),
the manner in which Rigby proposes to implement that happiness
leaves much to be desired. Indeed, rugby's concept of happiness
appears to be heavily dependent on his notion of goodness: ·goodness
is anything that intuitively or of set purpose makes for the
establishment of a human relationship which will develop each
man's best, and staroe each man's worst' (RR, 186. My italics).
What Rigby ignores, purposefully or not, is the fact that one
man's best may be his worst according to the Views of another. For
example, we are well acquainted with the opportunism of many of
Furphy's heroes. If this opportunism is considered to be the best a
particular indivtdual has to offer, then starvtng that best, because it
is seen as a worst in the eyes of the socialists, will do nothing to
bring that indivtdual into harmony with the concept of society or
community. Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether or not an
ideology or form of government can purposefully starve the worst in a
community in order to bring out the best. But this is exactly what
Rigby proposes to do in the name of socialism. Indeed, Rigby begins
to introduce his proposition that law shapes human spirit by an
appeal to Provtdence. According to Rigby, '[a]part from the stings of
conscience, and the retribution of the world to come, God punishes
by the agency of our Criminal Law' (RR, 193).
Rigby's sophistry, and perhaps his ignorance, is caught out by
a young kangaroo-hunter:
"Sposen there's a man in a place called Sussex, in
England, an' this man shakes a bushel o' wheat for
his Missus to boil for the kids to keep them from
starving -does God give that man seven years' laggin',
and then set him adrift, with his ankles wore to the
bone with the irons, and his shoulders like a soojee
bag with floggin? Well, that was my gran'father -an' as
decent a man as ever your gran'father knowed how to
be. Is that God's style o' punishin' people with the
Criminal Law? Don't talk rubbage (RR, 193).
The story is a familiar one and, as we already know, quite
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capable of stirring deeply felt passions in colonial Australia. rugby's
answer is again a rather lame attempt to dodge the issue: 'I admit
that, where offences against property were concerned, the law was
exceedingly severe in the days of our forefathers; indeed, it is,
perhaps, too severe still in some instances, but-' (RR, 193). Rigby is
cut short by Dixon, who sharply states '(b]ut God backs it up. Stick
to your argyment' (RR, 193). Rigby does not get a chance to talk
himself clean, and the discussion is placed on hold. At a later time,
Rigby manages to steer the argument back to his initial proposition.
According to Rigby, if you '(g]lve us laws Socialistic in principle, with
a system of mutual polity', then 'all things are possible to man as a
law-abiding animal' (RR, 201). This is the crux of rugby's argument,
underpining both the concepts of happiness and goodness, for Rigby
believes that '(y]ou can make men anything you please by Act of
Parliament ... provided that such Act is sanctioned by a preponderant
moiety of the national intelligence' (RR, 201).
But is it an act based on wisdom or an educated shifting of
ignorance? Or is such an act merely a pandering to the popular
passions and pleasures of the democratic majority? There is some
truth to rugby's proposition, for one can tum men from British
colonials into Australian nationals by an act of parliament. But it
remains to be seen whether or not one can make men good, happy or
virtuous by an act of parliament. I do not think, for example, that
anyone would support the proposition that one can make men
intelligent by an act of parliament. While laws have their place and
purpose in the human order of things, they do not occupy the status
given to them by Rigby. In short, 'human nature is' not as 'plastic as
the clay from which it is derived', nor is '(o]ur collective moral
nature, in its response to the contract of laws, usages, and
culture, ... subject to rules of scientific exactness' (RR, 208).
Speaking of 'Furphy's criticism of socialist ideals',· Gilding
argues that Furphy maintained 'that idealism of rugby's kind is
largely incompatible with real life', since 'Rigby's redoubtable
political code is a little less than human' (1967:30). Indeed Gilding
notes that '(h]e is so absorbed in his argument that he has become
impervious to sentiment or tenderness' (1967:30-31). Or, as Croft
states, 'it is equally hard to ignore rugby's personal emotional
desiccation and his inability to love at the intimate level' (1996:216).
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Indeed, Collins states that '[w]hen the Ego has ceased to be a hobbyridden man, and culminated into a man-escorted hobby, there is no
hope of restoration' (RR, 262). It would seem, on a personal level,
that Rigby's preoccupation with law and the plasticity of human
nature is an attempt to lead a painless and comfortably utopian
existence.
Most readers are aware of the argument that occurred between
Rigby and his sweetheart, Kate Vanderdecken. Collins informs us
that Rigby thought the argument to be 'entirely her own fault', for
'[s]he was petulant and quarrelsome, frivolous and heartless' (RR,
17). According to Rigby, 'the best thing that had ever happened to
him was this quarrel, inasmuch as it had swept away all tawdry
romance from his life, and laid bare its grand realities' (RR, 17).
Given our understanding of Rigby's character so far, one wonders to
what extent the argument between him and Kate was due to his
dogmatic character. Collins states that '[i)n describing this quarrel
he was bitterly precise; yet I experienced disappointment, even injury,
in failing to detect any blame attachable to the other party, whilst
my dad's judicial mind could find no cause of misunderstanding
whatsoever' (RR, 17-18). The following piece from rugby's sermon may
offer a clue, for Rigby believes that 'Christianity must be translated
into secular law, and such law must be sternly enforced' (RR, 202. My
italics). Although speculative, one wonders if Furphy wanted his
readers to comprehend rugby's character through Plato's concept of
the tyrannical character. According to Plato, the tyrannical character
has

[in I his early days ... a smile and a kind word for
everyone; he says he's no tyrant, makes large promises,
public and private, frees debtors, distributes land to
the people and to his own followers, and puts on a
generally mild and kindly air .... But I think we shall
find that when he has disposed of his foreign enemies
by treaty or distraction, and has no more to fear from
them, he will in the first place continue to stir up war
in order that the people may continue to need a leader
(Rep. bk.8.566d-e).
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Even though the public domain of the 1880s and 1890s is
important to the novels, Furphy wants his readers to see that it is
Rigby's spirit that shapes and articulates MRigby", not the
omnipotent power of the law or environment, as argued by the
socialists. As Collins explains, 'in love as well as in other things,
there was nothing but roguery to be found in villainous man, I had
only to remember the Senator [Rigby], and keep on believing... .I used
him as an object lesson in fidelity' (RR, 1946:19). Collins' lesson in
fidelity is the notion that one must educate, or uplift and upbuild
the individual human character and spirit in conjunction with the
uplifting and upbuilding of the nation. By '[learning] to say, I do not
know' (BBB, 121), one can set a course to learn and to know, hence
the continual stress on ignorance-shifting in the novels. In light of
Pons' notion, readers should see Furphy's writing as 'an educational
game of the first order rather than a fireworks display testifying to
the author's cleverness' (1979:120).
Indeed, when Collins states that 'the Order of Things, rightly
understood, is not susceptible of any coercion whatsoever' (SiL, 215),
it is my contention that it is the human order to which he refers, for
Rigby's sermon on the Murray foregrounds the ideological and
emotional resistances of many of the Furphian heroes throughout
the three novels. Collins' notion that '[i]n the race of life, my son,
you must run cunning, reserving your sprint for the tactical moment'
(SiL, 215) could be a popular maxim. In short, one may coerce a
percentage of the human order to do something, but one can never
coerce every human being. There will always be resistance. As Collins
points out, 'to everything there is a time and a season -a time for
work, and a time for repose- hence you find the industrious man's
inveterately leg-weary set of frames in hopeless competition with the
Judiciously lazy man's string of daisies. The contrast is sickening·
(SiL, 215). Because of this, I shall disagree with Sutherland, who
notes that 'one of Furphy's firmest convictions was that environment
exerts a far more powerful influence upon the growth of human
character than does heredity' (1951:169).
Finally, towards the close of Rigby's Romance, Collins states
that '[t]o sane minds, the Universal Plan is the enigma of the ages;
detached, objective, and wholly intangible -any attempt at solution
thus being a capricious speculation, shaped by the proclivities or by
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the experience of its projector, and varying even With his mood' (RR,
261). What does this say about Jefferson Rigby? If Rigby is meant to
be the manifestation of Furphy's own ideology, then why should
Collins have the last word? Is Collins suggesting that State
Socialism, whether espoused by Rigby or another, is a "universal
plan" shaped by the experience and mood of the orator rather than
being the universal plan? In the search for meaning, this is
interesting, for Furphy does not offer anything resembling a
Universal Plan. Rather, he offers a series of common sense,
philosophical solutions to the mismatched affairs in the human
order of things. Accordingly, 'truth [may be] relative [and not]
absolute' (BBB, 8), but such relativity does not necessarily mean
that the human order of things needs to be divided.
In a letter to William Cathels circa May or June, 1893, Furphy,
discussing the Melbourne depression, writes:
And what price your Individualism now? The present
spectacle for gods and men which Vic. presents is the
natural and necessacy outcome. And if you argue that
'we should have done the same thing ourselves if we
had the chance', I reply that we should have been
sternly repressed. And if you argue that 'you can't
make men virtuous by act of parliament', I reply, Just
wait till I publish what I have written on that point
during the last week ....
Personally, I hope and trust that one whom I
have learned to value as I have you, is not a victim of
the hideous depression brought on by the unbridled
greed of vile men in high places. My own pity for the
unfortunate is swallowed up in anger at the so-called
Christians who could not see prosperity in the country
Without looting it. Christian as I am, myself, I say,
Damn them (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 15).
Was Furphy hinting at his agreement with Cathels and so
thematically exploring the tension between virtue, law and human
spirit in Rigby's Romance? Again, in a letter to Cathels dated the
12th of January, 1894, Furphy continues:
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The fact is that our fathers were a bad class of people.
Their ethics were Darwinism, and their religion
Antinominian, the survival of the thriftiest, and
somebody else, anybody else, to be sacrificed.
They were fine enterprising men, but they
have Somersetted the country, and I wish we were out
of it. Too much premium on the wisdom of the Serpent
and too much penalty on the harmlessness of the
dove .... We're on the wrong track. Our forefathers made
a slippery hitch in their apotheosis of Individualism
and we have to suffer for it. The only hope of my own
petty little soul is to spoke the ole chariot along the
rtght track (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:20).
Or, as Collins states, 'in this pandemonium of Individualism,
the weak, the diffident, the scrupulous, and the afflicted, are thrust
aside or trampled down' (SIL, 89). But, Furphy does not rebuke the
"fine enterprising" spirit of his father's generation. Instead, he
considers their opportunist spirit to be the direct result of an
ignorant glorification of individualism: a glorification that has
ruined the country. To recall the economic battle over Riverina and
the colonial rivalry between Victoria and New South Wales discussed
earlier, I am of the view that Furphy is not strictly anti-capitalist,
nor is he strictly pro-socialist. It would be better to say that the
flavour of the letter points to the detrimental aspects of a rivalry due
to a specific way of seeing or ideology: a rivalry based on desire,
social Darwinist principles and an Antinomian indifference to the
moral considerations of others. But there is also another important
context which perpetuates rivalry, and that is division within the
'tripartite' (RR, 262) nature of the self, as exemplified by Rigby. In
this sense, "to spoke the ole chariot along the rtght track" could be
Furphy's alluding to Plato's key concept of justice and the just man:
Justice ... is a principle of this kind; its real concern is
not with external actions, but with a man's inward
self, his true concern and interest. The just man will
not allow the three elements [Reason, Thumos, Desire]
which make up his inward self to tresspass on each
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other's functions or interfere with each other, but, by
keeping all three in tune, like the notes of a scale ... will
in the truest sense set his house to rights, attain selfmastery and order, and live on good terms with
himself. When he has bound these elements into a
disciplined and harmonious whole, and so become
fully one instead of many, he will be ready for action of
any kind, whether it concerns his personal or financial
welfare, whether it is political or private; and he will
reckon and call any of these actions just and
honourable if it contributes to and helps to maintain
this disposition of mind, and will call the knowledge
which controls such action wisdom. Similarly, he will
call unjust any action destructive of this disposition,
and the opinions which control such action ignorance
(Rep. bk.4.443c-e).
Furphy's message is clear. In the uplifting and upbuilding of a
nation, individuals must not only strive to shift ignorance, rivalry
and division, but must also strive to know themselves, thereby
uplifting and upbuilding their own character. If there is a purpose in
the human order of things, then Furphy believed that this purpose 'is
fulfilled by the production of men and women of high moral
standard, calm courage, and clear intellect' (in Barnes and
Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 124). I will investigate this more fully in
chapter three, where I shall discuss this issue in light of Furphy's
rendition of the male and female "Australian" type.
1.4. The Gospel According to Collins: uplifting and upbuilding
through the idea of rights.

G.W. Turner ( 1986: 174-175) and K.A. McKenzie ( 1966:273-276)
have both noted that Such ts Life is rich in its allusions to both the
Old and New Testaments. Indeed, a study of 'the annotations'
(Devlin-Glass etal, 1991) will confirm many of the biblical allusions
to which Collins and other Furphlan heroes refer. Discussing the
frequent use of specific sources, K.A. McKenzie states that 'Furphy's
fondness for the Book of Job, Ecclesiastes, and Isaiah may have been
80.

due ... to attitudes which he found congenial' (1966:273). According to
G.W. Turner, 'the biblical reference is acclimatised, given new and
unexpected life in its new setting' (1986: 174). More importantly,
'[t]he biblical is no longer remote from life nor life remote from the
Bible' (G.W. Turner, 1986:175). Although I agree with Turner's point,
it is not without its problems. The Bible does play an important role
in the intellectual scheme of the novels, but the novels show that its
place in colonial society and culture is far from what it ought to be.
Furphy believed that its most cherished principles on human
relations were often ignored by the Church and her laity, particularly
with the 'Gospel of Thrift' (SiL, 89). Also, in an 1894 article for the
Bulletin, Collins points out that 'the Bible is not the secret of
Riverina's greatness' (1981:398).
Collins' conclusion is based on the prevailing ignorance of
scripture, for 'there is no doubt that the healthy recoil from
priestcraft is carrying us too far', and that '(t]he Bible-hater is no
less irrational than the Bible-faddist' ((1894] 1981:398). According to
Collins, '(t]he O.T. is the most interesting, instructive, and authentic
section of ancient history within the range of literature, and an
inexhaustible mine of fearless philosophy and sublime forecast'
([ 1894] 1981:398). Furthermore, '(t]he N.T., rightly read, will be the
textbook of ideal Socialism when its professional perverter is more
extinct and less regretted than the Tasmanian blackfellow. In the
interests of moral progress, the Bible must be read; and in the
interests of honest interpretation, the parson must go' ([ 1894)
1981:398). This issue of honest interpretation finds fuller voice in the
novels, for Collins' concern with uplifting and upbuilding underpins
his directing readers to the Bible for the sake of moral progress.
But he also refers to the Bible in order to foreground the
division and rivalry between the Church and currency. Towards the
close of Such ls Life, Collins finds the opportunity to comment that
'an open-mouthed, fresh-faced rouseabout ... was just undergoing that
colonising process so much dreaded by mothers and deplored by the
clergy· (SiL, 293). The mainstay of this division and rivalry is the
clash of customs, particularly the Anglo-Australian views of piety
and good citizenship vis-a-vis the growing popularity of larrikinism,
considered to be evidence of the ever-peIVasive convict taint or 'birth
stain' (SiL, 52). On this note, I agree with Clive Hamer that the
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majority of characters in the novels 'are not idealized members of the
working class', nor are they 'shining examples of virtue trampled
down by the oppressing class' {1964:146). For example, the bullockies
are discerningly labelled by Collins as either 'outlaws' {SlL, 51) or
'Ishmaelites' {SlL, 42). Within the context of the latter, the bullocky
ought to be seen as 'a wild ass of a man,/ with his hand against
everyone/ and everyone's hand against him;/ and he shall live at
odds with all his kin' (Genesis, 16.12).
Croft explains that 'Such ts Life is a parodic epic in which
Furphy tries to make sense of society and belief, by comparing the
stem Calvinism of his forebears with the new and exciting notions of
a Christian Socialism' {1986: 160). But, in order to implement an
ideological perspective like Christian .. Socialism", one must first
redeem ..Australians" from the historically determined notion that
they 'are all under sin' {Romans, 3:9). According to Hughes, 'the
[birth) Stain would not go away: the late nineteenth century was a
flourishing time for biological determinism, for notions of purity of
race and stock, and few respectable native-born Australians had the
confidence not to quail when real Englishmen spoke of their convict
heritage' {1987:xii). As Bum had remarked, 'People seem to think
Gawd made these here colonies for a ru bbage heap' (SiL, 25 ). It is a
sentiment echoed by Cooper, who had stated much earlier that 'this
is about the last place God made' {SlL, 5).
To all intents and purposes, the novels indicate that the rivalry
. and division between Church and currency are both unnecessary
extremes which, because of prejudice, interfere with the idea of rights
and moral progress. Attacking the Church for its customary division
between 'earthly justice' and 'heavenly justice', Collins and the pipe
state the following:
Yet while the Church teaches you to pray, .. Thy will be
done on earth, as it is in heaven," she tacitly
countenances widening disparity in condition, and
openly sanctions that fearful abuse which dooms the
poor man's unborn children to the mundane perdition
of poverty's thousand penalties. Is God's will so done
in heaven? While the Church teaches you to pray, ..Thy
kingdom come," she strikes with mercenary venom at
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the first principle of that kingdom, namely, elementary
equality in citizen privilege. Better silence than
falsehood; better no religion at all -if such lack be
possible- than one which concedes equal rights beyond
the grave, and denies them here (SIL, 88-89).
Furthermore,
[t]he Church quibbles well, and palters well, and, in
her own pusillanimous way, means well, by her silky
loyalty to the law and the profits, and by her steady
hostility to some unresisting personification known as
the Common Enemy. But because of that pernicious
loyalty, she has reason to complain that the working
man is too rational to imbibe her teachings on the
blessedness of slavery and starvation. Meanwhile, as
no magnanimous sinner can live down to pseudoChristian standard, unprogressive Agnosticism takes
the place of demoralised belief, and the Kingdom of
God fades into a myth' (SIL, 89).
In this sense, 'Burns and Paine flashed their own strong,
healthy personalities on the community, marking an epoch; and from
that day to this, the Apology of Humanity acquires ever-increasing
momentum, and ever-widening scope' (SIL, 91). According to Paine,
'[t]hough I mean not to touch upon any sectarian principle of
religion, yet it may be worth observing, that the genealogy of Christ
is traced to Adam. Why then not trace the rights of man to the
creation of man?' ([1791] 1995:117). Indeed, '[t]he duty of man is not
a wilderness of turnpike gates, through which he is to pass by tickets
from one to the other. It is plain and simple, and consists but of two
points. His duty to God, which evecy man must feel; and with respect
to his neighbour, to do as he would be done by' (Paine, [ 1791]
1995:118-119. My italics). Paine's essay asserts the practicality of the
Christian idea through the distinction between '[n]atural rights',
defined as 'the rights of acting as an individual for his own comfort
and happiness, which are not injurious to the natural rights of
others', and '[c]ivil rights', which 'are those which appertain to man
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in rtght of his being a member of society' ((1791) 1995:119). Indeed,
Paine argues that '[e]very civil right has for its foundation, some
natural right pre-existing in the individual, but to the enjoyment of
which his individual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently
competent. Of this kind are all those which relate to security and
protection' ([ 1791 J 1995:119).
According to Collins, 'if social-economic conditions fail to keep
abreast with the impetuous, uncontrollable advance of popular
intelligence, the time must come when ... the latter shall assail the
former; and the scene of this unpleasantness ... is called in the
Hebrew tongue, Armageddon' (SlL, 91). Paine's most consistent point
of attack is the idea of aristocracy, or that rights are for the few, not
the many. It is interesting to bear this in mind when reading
Furphy's 'The Teaching of Christ'. This article, published in 1894 in
the Bulletin, has Collins replying to an earlier correspondent who had
assumed 'that He [Christ] was an artstocrat ... and that He denounced
only the bourgeoisie, and that He was not a democrat' (1981:399). In
the spirit of Paine, Collins states that, '[o)wing to enlightenment,
[aristocrat] is not a name to conjure with -in fact, it is impossible to
touch it without a pair of tongs and a respirator, or contemplate it
without an ounce of civet to sweeten the imagination; and the time
is not far distant when it will be carried out on a spade and buried in
quicklime, at midnight, in some secluded place' ((1894) 1981:399).
Discussing 'Christ's favourite title, Son of Man', Collins states
that '[He] struck at the very root of caste when He established a new
aristocracy of usefulness, in which he that was greatest should be
servant of all' ((1894) 1981:399-400). Or, as Collins points out in
Such is Life, '[h]eaven knows I am no more inclined to decry social
culture than moral principle; but I acknowledge no aristocracy except
one of service and self-sacrifice, in which he that is chief shall be
servant, and he that is greatest of all, servant of all' (33. My italics).
In the article, Collins also asserts that '[t)he Sermon on the Mount
is permeated by the most perfect democracy ever breathed on earth,
whilst the last awful denunciation of Jerusalem impartially embraces
artistocrat and bourgeois, and no other' ([ 1894) 1981 :400. My italics).
This view is repeated in Such ts Life, where Collins states that the
'Sermon on the Mount .... is no fanciful conception of an intangible
order of things, but a practical, workable code of daily
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life ... delivered ... by One who knew exactly the potentialities and
aspirations of man' (SiL, 89-90). In short, the New Testament is seen
as the template for a democratically enlightened Christianity and its
emphasis on rights, rather than a Christian Socialism with its view
of Christ as the redistributer of wealth.
In a letter to Stephens, Furphy wrote,
I am an Optimist and a Christian ..... Optimistic, in the
sense that I can see in the future a type of humanity
further above present attainment than the latter is
above lowest conceivable savagery. Christian,
inasmuch I believe Jesus (or His inventor) to have
given us a Square, which obviates any necessity for
working out a mathematical problem when we wish to
gauge the Absolute Morality (or Ultimate Expediency) in a word, the Squareness- of this or that action (in
Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:95).
And, in "The Teaching of Christ", Collins states that '[t]he
founder of a religion which aimed at making things new by the
obliteration of meretricious distinctions could not count aristocrat,
bourgeois or pauper, common or unclean. All were potential material
for the perfect democracy He purposed' (1894) 1981:400). As Furphy
stated in his essay on world-federation, '(t]he best hope of religion
rests not in the distorted Christianity which fences monopoly and
points the plundered tailor to a heaven won by mental suicide and
moral self-abasement, but in the restored gospel of equal rights to the
fullness of God's earth and equal liability to the consecrated penalty
of work' (1890:55. My italics). On the basis of these points, I disagree
with Dorothy Green's notion that '[t)he proper function of
Christianity may not be, as Furphy thought, to provide a blue-print
for socio-economic organisation, but to act as a beacon to light men
back to "caritas", to loving-kindness, when they have wandered too
far away from it' ( 1980:33). Furphy was as much concerned with
"caritas" as he was with the necessary socio-economic milieu for its
success.
Nor do I agree with Brady's reading of the biblical dimension in
Such ts Life. She argues that
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[t]here is something profoundly sour as well as comic,
in fact, about Furphy's sense of life, something more
despairing than a Christian vision could be, since the
Christian has a sense of God at work, even here and
now, in the midst of injustice and confusion. Despite
the optimistic words he allows Tom about the future of
Australia, Furphy offers no way to that future
(1981:61).
Yet Brady had stated earlier that Furphy 'gives priority ... to
orthopraxis, right action, rather than to orthodoxy, right belief
(1981:47). Is not orthopraxis dependent on orthodoxy, and vice
versa? The two may be distinct ideas but they are not mutually
exclusive. If, for her, '[t]he great weakness of Such is Life .. .lies in its
inability to deal with the material of life as it presents itself to
experience' (1981 :67), then this weakness occurs because she has
misinterpreted the novel's philosophical preoccupation with seeing
and responding to the material of human life. Whether or not God
works in the world, Furphy rightly shows that man must work to
uplift and upbuild man, regardless of man's aptitude for injustice or
confusion. Contrary to Brady's view, Furphy shows us that we must
put our 'trust in what is human, "all too human"' (1981 :67). As
Hamer argues, '[n]ot always is virtue rewarded and wrong punished;
the rain falls alike on the just and the unjust. Furphy scoffs at
people of blind faith who look for divine help but ignore natural
cause and effect; and he scorns the related attitudes of complacency
and self-righteousness' (1964: 143).
Hamer points out that '(i]t is more difficult to establish
Furphy's Christian viewpoint from Such is Life alone. There is a
compelling unity about the whole of Furphy's writings: he wanted to
present the three novels to the reading public for the price of one'
(1964: 146). To this I would also add Furphy's articles and letters,
since he was quite consistent in his views. Among other issues,
Furphy used Collins throughout the three novels to investigate the
religious attitude towards, what Morgan calls, 'the foundation myth
of Australia' (1979:57). According to Morgan, this foundation myth
stipulated that Australia was 'a new, clean, unpolluted land, where a
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new beginning could be made and the old mistakes not repeated; a
whole nation, one people, unified, not divided by ancient quarrels;
self-sufficient, independent and free, and protected from the rest of
the world by its vast surrounding seas' (1979:57). One is reminded of
Bernard O'Dowd's poem 'Australia' (in Cantrell, ed, 1977:86) as an
excellent example of this perspective. However, Furphy takes it a step
further by pointing out that new beginnings must require new
attitudes if old mistakes are not to be repeated, for damaging
customs can build a fatal nest.
While Brady (1981:76) is content to attribute a link between
Patrick White's writings on Australia and the biblical dimension of
the Old Testament, she cannot see this link in Furphy's work despite
the obvious intertextual evidence. She does not see that Furphy's
heroes, like White's 'characters[.] are ... strangers and pilgrims in their
society' and that 'they are faithful to the life of the spirit' (1981: 76).
Nor does she see that Collins is as much a part of 'the crucible in
which prophets are shaped' (1981:76) as any of White's heroes.
Richters may consider Collins to be a 'clownish anti-Christ' or 'a
malign rather than divine fool' (1979:261). But I think this is much
too severe a judgment based on his notion that 'it is man's "fallen"
nature that Furphy ... is ultimately concerned with' (1979:257), and
that the chief of the "fallen" is Collins. It is true that Furphy is
concerned with man's "fallen" nature, but so is Collins. As Collins
states to Stewart, 'if Adam fell in the days of innocency, what should
poor Tom Collins do in the days of villainy?' (SiL, 168).
This leads us to consider another important aspect of Furphy's
novels, especially if one considers the value of Tom Collins, as I will
do in the next chapter, and that is the opposing values of the social
and the individual. In a letter to Miles Franklin, dated 20th of
August, 1904, Furphy states, '[w]ould you believe it -I tried Religion
(Church of Christ); but had to give it best; not because it was too
exacting. but the other way about. I didn't want a church that
prohibited actual vice -for I'm not vicious- but I wanted one that
would expel me with contumely for having two coats while another
bloak had none' (Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 172). It would
appear that Furphy privileges the social over the individual, but we
must remember that it is a particular version of individualism to
which Furphy is opposed, namely one that extends rights to the few
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and not the many, or one which treats others as means to an end.
Nevertheless, Furphy's novels do exhibit a strong social orientation,
placing much emphasis on the concepts of society and community.
Furphy would agree with Plato's notion that '[s]oclety
ortginates ... because the individual ls not self-sufficient, but has
many needs which he can't supply himself (Rep. bk 2.369b). In this
sense, 'when we have got hold of enough people to satisfy our many
varied needs, we have assembled quite a large number of partners
and helpers together to live in one place; and we gtve the resultant
settlement the name of a community or state' (Rep. bk 2.369c).
Similarly, one wonders if Furphy was aware of Aristotle's assertion
'that every state ls a sort of partnership, and that every partnership
ls formed in order to attain some good' (Pol. bk 1.1), or that 'the state
ls natural, and man ls by nature an animal designed for living in
states' (Pol. bk 1.2). Bearing in mind the ideas of uplifting and
upbulldtng, Furphy would agree that human beings are social
animals, and that there ls a need for a way of seeing and responding
to life which does not interfere with natural rtghts, with civil rights,
nor with the common pursuit of goodness and happiness, or that
which ls called well-being.
Perhaps this ls what Furphy hinted at when he wrote "(y]et do I
cling ... to Plato's beautiful thought that no soul misses truth
willingly' (SiL, 87). Or why Collins, in the closing chapter of Rigby's
Romance, meditates on the concept of happiness:
But, after all, what ls happiness? "Felicity" ls its
closest synonym, and you will observe that both words
have the alternative import of Compatibility or
Accordance -as when we speak of "a happy
combination", "a felicitous phrase", and so forth. Such
a coincidence in double-meaning ls not without
stgntflcance, since it betokens an instructive subconsciousness that Happiness must not be
incongruous, or out of place, in respect of the
Universal Harmony. Doubtless, our field of thought ls
invaded by a prophetic forecast, a twilight revelation of
completer life, not directly formulated, though finding
cryptic register in everyday speech. Then -taking
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Happiness in the double-intent of the word- who shall
presume to interpret its manifestation, or limit its
scope? Passing over the vanishing happiness of the
moment, the ephemeral happiness of the day, and the
scarcely less transitory happiness of the lifetime, may
not the Ultimate Happiness of the Moral Universe be
in some way consistent with the cross-purposes of
human life? .... And if there be a Universal Purpose,
beyond individual welfare, and apart from the wayside
interests of existence -if each lifetime be but one pace
of Humanity in a decreed journey toward some
Ultimate Good- then, measuring the consummation by
its incalculable cost, that Good may be taken as the
Inconceivable Best
Ay, but -mortal men, Hal, mortal men. And women
still more inveterately mortal. Mortality is here
emphasized, not in trite confession of its precarious
tenure, but because of its abject servility to terrestial
conditions (260-261 ).
As one can see, Furphy uses the socio-historical climate of
political divisions and rivalry to underpin his concerns with moral
progress, and this is particularly the case with the cultural idea of a
national type during the federation movement. If we recall the rivalry
between colonial governments, particularly the New South Welsh and
Victorian squabbles over the Riverina, it appears Furphy thought
that society, whether in the form of Church or government, should
not be of such a nature as to interfere with or curb the needs of the
individual within a particular geographic experience. Indeed, as
Furphy's novels insinuate, disorder in society is not just a disorder
within politics, but also a disorder amongst individuals and their
need for a particular custom vts-a-vts the convict taint. Besides an
emphasis on public welfare in Furphy's novels, there is an equally
strong focus on individualism and what an individual ought to do
within the context of cultural production, particularly through the
character of Tom Collins. For this reason, I think Furphy's views of
nineteenth-century Australia share an affinity with Emerson's views
of America:
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Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the
manhood of everyone of its members. Society is ajoint
stock company, in which the members agree, for the
better securing of his bread for each shareholder, to
surrender the liberty and culture of the eater. The
virtue in most request is conformity. Self-reliance is
its aversion. It [society] loves not realities and
creators, but names and customs ([1841] 1985:178. My
italics).
Both Furphy and Emerson believed that the concept of society
in the new world ought to be a joint stock company or a partnership
of creators and realities, not just names and customs adopted from
another time and place. According to Emerson, '[a]ll men have my
blood and I all men's. Not for that will I adopt their petulance and
folly, even to the extent of being ashamed of it' ([1841] 1985:192). In
short, the emphasis is not on the abandoning of old world knowledge
and values, but a retranslation of their cultural and social relevance
by the new world experiencefor the new world experience. As Lillian
Falkland-Pritchardstates to Collins,
"Strange, isn't it -to think that a word, impalpable to
touch and invisible to sight, should be more enduring
and reliable than any material monument? The history
of nations -their migrations, settlements, conquestscan be traced by the philologist far back into ages
which afford little or no clue to the antiquarian. Yet in
spite of the paramount significance of local
designations -or, perhaps because of it- the map of
this young land is already defaced by ugly and
incongruous names, transplanted from the other side
of the world" (BBB, 71. My italics)4.
It is interesting to note that Collins does not disagree with her,

and I think this is Furphy's way of satirizing the Anglo-Australian
4

I will discuss the value of Lillian Falkland-Pritchard more fully in chapter three, where I discuss
Collins' interests in the "female" version of the national type.
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attempt to uplift and upbuild Australia through the hasty adoption
of British names and customs, which try to efface the negativity of
the fatal shore. For example, the fact that New South Wales was
called 'the mother colony' (SiL, 3) suggests that the penal system is
not only bequeathed to the much newer 'child' colonies, such as
Victoria, but also suffers under an 'adolescent' rebellion in which the
child strategically throws off the system of the parent in order to
come of age. One could say that the name change, in 1851, from the
"Port Phillip District" in New South Wales to the colony of Victoria is
the first move in effacing the convict taint. It is equally, and more
importantly, a socio-cultural homage to the head of the Empire and,
in this sense, an appeal for redemption.
Responding in an 1883 editorial to the threat of a proposed
French convict colony in the Pacific island of New Hebrides, the
Victorian Premier, James Service, stated that '[a]s far as France is
concerned, Australia is simply a geographical expression. But we
want to make it more than that; we want to make ourselves a
nation, a united people ... who are able to command respect' (in Serle,
1969:32). Furthermore, Service argued that '[e]very one of us must
feel our hearts beat strong and more strong when we think of
ourselves not merely as Victorians, or New South Welshmen ... but as
Australians' (in Serle, 1969:32). And yet, in that same year at the
Australasian Convention, Service declared that '[w]e cling to the idea
of the Unity of the Empire. We do not wish to see anything of
estrangement between Young Australia and Great Britain. We want
our sons and daughters to grow up to love the Old Country' (in Serie,
1969:32). Serle describes Service as 'a fervent imperialist' and states
that '[j Jingo enthusiasm swept Victoria remarkably early', for
'nowhere else in the colonies was there more consciousness of
growing threats to the Empire or stronger demands for a nononsense imperial policy' (1969:32).
Although Furphy did not consider a clean-break from the old
country to be possible or necessary, it is my contention that, rather
than support jingoism, Furphy would have wanted his readers to
follow Emerson's advice for the new world citizen:
[b]e it known unto you that henceforward I obey no
law less than the eternal law. I will have no covenants
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but proximities. I shall endeavour to nourish my
parents, to support my family, to be the chaste
husband of one wife, -but these relations I must fill
after a new and unprecedented way. I appeal from your
customs. I must be myself. I cannot break myself any
longer for you, or you. If you can love me for what I
am, we shall be the happier. If you cannot, I will still
seek to deserve that you should. I will not hide my
tastes or aversions. I will so trust that what is deep is
holy, that I will do strongly before the sun and moon
whatever inly rejoices me and the heart appoints. If
you are noble, I will love you; if you are not, I will not
hurt you and myself by hypocritical attentions. If you
are true, but not in the same truth with me, cleave to
your companions; I will seek my own. I do this not
selfishly but humbly and truly. It is alike your interest,
and mine, and all men's, however long we have dwelt
in lies, to live in truth' (Emerson, [1841) 1985:192193).
In Furphy's views on the truth of cultural production and the
idea of a national type, self-reliance is as important as ignorance
shifting. As Emerson postulates, '[i]s not a man better than a town?
Ask nothing of men, and, in the endless mutation, thou only firm
column must presently appear the upholder of all that surrounds
thee' ([ 1841] 1985:202). Ask nothing of men and the uplifting and
upbuilding of a nation shall come to nought. Furphy stressed, in his
own way, Emerson's notion that '[n]othing can bring you peace but
yourself. Nothing can bring you peace but the triumph of principles'
([ 1841] 1985:203). According to Collins, '[c]ollective humanity holds
the key to that kingdom of God on earth', for '[t]he kingdom of God is
within us; our all-embracing duty is to give it form and effect, a local
habitation and a name' (SiL, 95. My italics). One should see Collins'
statement as a principle, advising the new world "child" to be true to
him or herself and his or her experiences vis-a-vis the customs and
values of the old world. It is a call to self-reliance, to uplift and
up build the new individual and the new nation through the ideas of
natural and civil rights, as well as the shifting of ignorance. Once
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this road is taken, it is then possible to establish the rightful
identity of community, society and nation. As Henricksen explains,
[i]n Furphy's fiction, nationalism is never a simple and
absolute good. There is always this striking ambiguity.
Furphy was always eager to espouse pragmatic
solutions to Australia's problems and nascent evils,
usually as suggested in the Bulletin. On the other
hand, he never apotheosized nationalism. He always
saw it as ultimately marred by a flawed humanity,
always imperfect, and never utopian. The more
characteristic nationalism of the Nineties was a
mixture of over-reacting pragmatism and romantic,
numinous overtones. With Furphy's nationalism, as
with his Christianity, Furphy promptly accepted the
pragmatic road to assumed social improvement, but
cast a skeptical glance at the numinous (1985:66).
Generally, Henricksen is correct, although his thinking that
Furphy was sceptical of the "romantic", does pose a problem: a
problem to which I will devote more attention in the next chapter.
Nevertheless, if one were to identify a universal theme in Furphy's
novels, then it would be quite apt to say that his work evolves
around the search for meaning, or the avid pursuit and production of
unifiable cultural experiences, for a group of people must seek
common ground in order to make their experiences, however diverse,
a public property that promotes social, cultural and individual wellbeing. In this sense, I must disagree with Brady, who concludes her
analysis of Furphy with the notion that
[t]he great weakness of Such ts Life, then, lies in its
inability to deal with all the material of life as it
presents itself to experience. This failure manifests
itself in the stiffness and emotional wariness of the
characters and also in the discontinuity and general
sense of inconsequence of the story line which reflects
on the one hand, as we have suggested, a certain
humility, but on the other a kind of cowardice, a
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desire not to push questions but rather go around
them ( 1981 :67).
As we shall see in the next chapter, where I will deal with
Furphy's views on art in more detail, nothing is further from the
truth.
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2. Man and Art: the ethics of representing Australia for
Australia.

Of course, you're not responsible for India;
but, by Heaven, you're responsible for Australia!
-Rigby's Romance, 1946:91-

2.1. The Normative Theory of Art: creativity, culture and value.
Having discussed some of the important issues of the sociohistorical background to the novels, it is now time to turn our
attention to Furphy's views on art. Previously I discussed the view
that Furphy's novels are an education. This view has broader
implications than a mere recognition of the sheer number of literary
and non-literary allusions in Furphy's work. Chiefly, this view that
Furphy's novels are an education should be seen within the context
of art and knowledge, or art as a way of understanding. According to
the philosopher Gordon Graham, '[t]he theory that art is valuable
because of what we learn from it is sometimes called "cognitivism", a
label derived from the Latin for knowing' (1997:43).
Graham calls this cognitive approach to art the '[n]ormative
theory of art', for it 'is not concerned with the essential nature of
"art" but with explaining the different ways in which it can be of
value and the relative importance we should attach to each [artistic
work]' (1997: 127). Thus, '[i]nstead of seeking a definition of art in
terms of necessary and sufficient properties, or seeking to determine
its social function, we see what values music, or painting, or poetry
can embody, and how valuable this form of embodiment is' (Graham,
1997: 173). In Graham's view, this is especially important because
'the fact is that generation after generation and a wide variety of
cultures all have attributed a special value to certain works and
activities, and this suggests that some of the things we call art have
an abiding value' (1997: 176). How this value enriches knowledge and
understanding, so becoming a norm, depends on what 'imaginative
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creations' can bring 'to evecyday experience as a way of ordering and
illuminating [that evecyday experience)' (Graham, 1997:62).
Appropriately, this has some vecy interesting implications for
art. Discussing art's ability to allow human beings to reflect upon, as
well as structure their 'world of political experience,' Graham states
that
[a]rt can have the same sort of relation to moral and
social experience. One way of putting this point is to
say that we should think of artistic creations not as
stereotypes but as archetypes. The images of the
greatest artists do not provide us with distillations or
summations of the variety in experience (stereotypes)
but imaginacy models against which we measure that
variety (archetypes). And in certain contexts these
archetypes may be said to constitute the only reality
that there is. Things such as 'a lover', or 'a gentleman',
or 'the perfect marriage', or 'a consuming passion', or
'innocence', do not await our discovecy in the way that
black swans or seams of gold do. They are patterns
which structure our approach to the social and moral
world in which our lives have to be lived and determine
our attitude to the behaviour of ourselves and others.
Works of art that come to have a common currency
contribute to the formation of these patterns, and in
the case of the greatest works -some of Shakespeare's
plays for instance- they have been definitive. Art thus
contributes to social and moral experience, and for
this reason may be said to provide us with the
possibility not only of understanding but also of selfunderstanding (1997: 128-129).
When using the term "archetypes" in this context, we are not
dealing with Jung's idea of 'the collective unconscious' and its
'contents' of 'primordial types' or 'universal images that have existed
since the remotest times' ([ 1959) 1980:5). Instead, we need to tum to
Locke. Without delving into the finer details of Locke's distinctions,
we can contrast Graham's idea of stereotypes with Locke's 'simple
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ideas', which 'all agree to the reality of things' even though some may

not be 'the images or representations of what does [actually] exist'
(Essay, 2.10.2). Similarly, Graham's archetypes correspond to Locke's
"complex ideas" or 'mtxed modes and relations' of simple ideas, based
on degrees of sensation and reflection, which possess 'no other reality
but what they have in the minds of men' (2.10.4).
Black swans or gold are simple ideas or stereotypes, while ideas
such as innocence, love or heroism are complex ideas or archetypes.
Within the context of reference, if and when certain complex ideas or
archetypes, existing since antiquity, recur in isolated cultures
without any form of cross-cultural fertilization, it is then that one
can possibly begin to define these ideas in Jung's sense of the word.
However, we need only concern ourselves with the notion that works
of art are yardsticks for understanding reality, and that they employ,
explore or construct a currency of complex ideas or archetypes, which
have no referential existence other than the individual or common
mind. For this reason, some artistic endeavours have been judged to
be important works of art because their value is such that they
increase the wealth of an already existing body of knowledge, as well
as broadening human understanding of its own nature and condition
in the world.
Simply put, a work of art is deemed important, or even great,
because it is worth studying its treatment of specific values, or even
its creation of "new" values. It is a view shared and practised by
Furphy, for his novels allude to a diverse body of art in order to
illuminate not only specific episodes in his own art, but also specific
incidents in the reality of the Australian experience. Although the
relationship between art and value is not a simple one, since any
question of value in art is demarcated by ethical considerations, we
can at least argue that the relationship between art and value in
Furphy is based on the importance of uplifting and upbuilding a
nation ethically. One could say that Furphy's main strategy in his
art 'is to hold, as 'twere the mirror up to nature, to show virtue her
own feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the
time his form and pressure' (Hamlet, 111.2.21-24).
In this sense, the manner in which Furphy practises this view
in terms of his own art, as well as "Australian" art generally, is the
reason for inquiry in this section. While I will have more to say
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about this in the following chapters, it is important to note now that
national identity, like the concept of nation, is an archetype, an
imaginary model and unit of measure that constitutes a reality where
there formally was none. But it should not be overlooked that an
archetype also employs specific things within an already understood
reality in order to validate ostensively its right to belong amongst
that which is already known. Without this quality, nationalist
narratives will have little impact on the public domain and leave no
lasting impression in that public domain. Furphy appears to take
this as a matter-of-fact. However, what Furphy does strongly suggest
is this. If one is endeavouring to uplift and upbuild a nation
artistically, then one needs to pay attention to what one treats as a
value, particularly with the national type.
As Ernest Gellner explains, '[i]t is nationalism which
engenders nations, and not the other way round. Admittedly,
nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation
of cultures or cultural wealth, though it uses them very selectively,
and it most often transforms them radically' (1983:55). Or, as Turner
points out, '[i]t is wise not to underestimate the power of images, of
the way in which the meaning of everyday life is constructed through
representation' (1994:51). In this sense, Australian national identity
and nationhood can be seen as the claim to be recognized, to be
known and understood as a common currency, as one identity vts-avis many others, and as a set of values among many other sets of
values, particularly the British Empire. Consider the following telling
comments by A.G. Stephens in his introduction to The Bullettn Story
Book:

... the stories and sketches which follow are usually the
literary dreams of men of action, or the literary
realisation of things seen by wanderers. Usually they
are objective, episodic, detached- branches torn from
the Tree of Life, trimmed and dressed with whatever
skill the writers possess (which often is not
inconsiderable). In most of them still throbs the keen
vitality of the parent stem: many are absolute
transcripts of the Fact, copied as faithfully as the
resources of language will permit. Hence many of
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them, remaining level with Nature, remain on the
lower plane of Art- which at its highest is not
imitative, but creative,- making anew the whole world
in terms of its subject. What is desiderated is that
these isolated impressions should be fused in
consciousness, and re-visualized, re-presented with
their universal reference made clear ... .ln other words,
the branch should be shown growing upon the Tree,
not severed from it: the Part should imply the Whole,
and in a sense contain it, defying mathematics. Every
story of a man or woman should be a microcosm of
humanity; every vision of Nature should hold an
imagination of the Universe ([ 1901] 1973:vi).
It can be said that Stephens is pushing for the need between

art and understanding in relation to the short sketches that the
storybook has to offer. More than just making 'an interesting book',
Stephens' aim is to show that a characteristically Australian
narrative is starting to emerge, even though '(t]he literary work which
is Australian in spirit, as well as in scene or incident, is only
beginning to be written· ([ 1901] 1973:vi). Stephens' comment that
'[t]he formal establishment of the Commonwealth has not yet
crystallized the floating elements of national life' is rather applicable
to Furphy's Rivertna, for readers see that 'Australia is still a suburb
of Cosmopolis, where men from many lands perpetuate in a new
environment the ideas and habits acquired far away' ((1901] 1973:vivii). Despite the difference in years, Stephens' discussion of the early
twentieth century and Furphy's representation of 1883-1884 shows
that any progress in the nationalist cause was slow, eclectic and
perhaps disappointing.
It is important to bear in mind what Stephens has to say, for
Stephens is a much more sophisticated thinker than most others of
the nationalist cause. The narratives of nation and nationality,
which he considered to be "Australian", had to be much more mature
than that which the 1890s had to offer. According to Stephens, 'our
most talented story-writers are still only clever students of the art of
writing' ((190111973:vi). In this sense, '(o]nly here and there [do] we
receive hints and portents of the Future', for 'Australian nationality
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to-day is like an alchemist's crucible just before the gold-birth, with
red fumes rising, and strange odours, and a dazzling gleam caught by
moments through the bubble and seethe' ((1901) 1973:vii). The crux
of Stephens' argument is to see 'our country ... through clear
Australian eyes, not through bias-bleared English spectacles' ((1901)
1973:ix. My italics).
One must understand Australia through art, and the manner
in which to do this is to remove the English spectacles, to create
rather than imitate a way of seeing, and to respond to 'the local
sense of local beauty' ([ 1901 J 1973:vii). More importantly, Stephens
warns that '[i]t will be the fault of the writers, not of the land, if
Australian literature does not by-and-by become memorable' ([ 1901)
1973:ix). Nevertheless, Stephens does concede that '[t]hese counsels
of perfection' may be 'easier to teach than to practise' ([1901)
1973:vi), but he also points out that 'every year is teaching us
wisdom' ([1901) 1973:viii). I find Stephens' comments rather
illuminating when it comes to Furphy, for both men are of much the
same mind set. Given that both men spent the best part of five years
in a working relationship as author and editor of Such is Life, it is
possible that each influenced the mind of the other. Stephens' ideas
thematically reverberate throughout Furphy's views on art and life.
But I am also of the view that Furphy took these ideas to
greater heigh ts in an effort to show his readers the philosophical
relationship between art and life within the context of "narrative"
understanding. Perhaps this fundamental difference between the two
men was one of the reasons why Stephens missed the complexity of
Furphy's work, making the claim that '[n)o one but the proof-readers
will ever read Such ts Life right through' (in Barnes, 1990:255;
Franklin, 1944:125). As Furphy stated to Cecil Winter, 'A.G.S [is not]
a perfect critic, according to my mind (though he may be nothing the
worse for that). Too much reliance on models, and criteria, and the
"unities", and so forth. But he is far from Bayldon, Myers and others.
No critic, for instance, has ever done justice to Lawson's best work'
(in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 168).
Besides the formative influence of The Bulletin's house style,
one wonders whether or not these ideas are partly expressive of a
basic manifesto formulated by the short-lived "Society of
Irresponsibles": a society 'which Stephens had formed with himself as
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President' (Barnes, 1990:308) and a society to which Furphy
belonged. As Furphy stated in a letter to his mother, Judith:
... a society is being organized to place all Australian
writers and artists on terms of personal acquaintance,
without further introduction -the object being to
further the interests of Australian literature and art
(as distinguished from Anglo-Australian). The society
was organized by my editor, A. G. Stephens, and ... he
chooses to enlist all such purely Australian talent as
may be available. It is called the Australian Society of
Irresponsibles -signifying that no member is bound by
any rules- and the secret sign and symbol is an
inverted pewter- implying that the day of carousal is
past, and the day of work has begun (in Barnes and
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:102-103).
Despite Croft's notion that 'the content of Furphy's text may
be nationalist', but his 'language is not' (1991: 17), Furphy's
affiliation with the society shows that he is as concerned with the
uplifting and upbuilding of Australia as his hero, Tom Collins. If
Croft means to say, as I think he does, that Furphy's nationalism is
not, as Green argues, an 'aggressive Australianism' (1961 :633), then I
do not disagree with him. One of the problems with Croft's (1991:14)
notion is his basic premise that there is a difference between
Furphy's text and Collins' "text". While this is not untrue, it does
not necessarily follow that nationalism is not an issue in both texts.
Collins may be 'an Australian nationalist' (Croft, 1991:171), but it
would also be fair to say Collins is not aggressively nationalist.
I think this is important, for aggressive nationalism or
aggressive Australianism, in light of our previous discussion on the
theme of ignorance shifting, has a tendency to justify a narrowminded attitude towards the concepts of nation and national
identity. Rather than a radical closing-off, I think Furphy's text and
Collins' "text" firmly push the overall view that the many concerns
surrounding Australian national identity should be seen as universal
concerns. As Miles Franklin explains, 'Joseph Furphy built in
harmony with the contours and atmosphere of his own continent
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and used as well much treasure from the universal storehouse of
knowledge' (1944:4). In the words of Stephens, 'the branch should be
shown growing on the Tree, not severed from it ([1901] 1973:vi). For
this reason, I disagree with Croft's statement that 'deep within
[Furphy] was the desire to be Judged against the civilized standard of
the "home" culture, and not to create a form of art which would
make its own terms and therefore be found wan ting' ( 1991: 17). Croft
is closer to the truth in one of his earlier essays, when he states that
'(alt the level of deeper interpretation, we might say that Furphy's
desire was no so much for the restitution of a broken primal
union, ... but a creation of something new from independent parts'
(1989:19).
To return to the Society of Irresponsibles, there is the claim
that no member is bound by any rules, showing that, within the
common expectations of what art should be, the Society was quite
ready to break with conventional ways of seeing. Most contemporary
readers are more or less acquainted with Stephens' ((1901] 1973:viii)
view that early Australian literature is like early Australian art; both
are vei:y much the products of English conventions and English ways
of seeing. It is, therefore, interesting to note that Furphy's novels not
only represent the emergence of an Australian art, but also
themselves themati.cally deal with the move towards an unique
Australian style a little more than a year before Tom Roberts
returned to Australia, in 1885, from the Royal Academy and began
his school of pleinair painting (Whitelaw, 1985:54). Indeed, the pletn
air quality of Collins' artistic style, depicting a 'random selection' of
1883-84 "life" in Riverina, seems to imply that Collins is the
forerunner of an Australian aesthetic unveiled by the Impressionism
of the 1890s Heidelberg school. Although there is no clear date as to
when Collins sat down with his Lett's diaries to write his "extracts",
it is not inconceivable to assume that he, like the Heidelberg artists,
sets out to capture 'Nature in her Impressionist mood' (SiL, 65),
thereby attempting to give the public the evidence of uniqueness,
beauty and value that made the Australian experience worth
understanding as both a local and universal series of concerns.
Furphy's novels challenge the common notion that art is
escapist or, as Plato argues in a later dialogue than Republic, that
'artistic representation' can properly be classified as 'diversion'
10'2.

because no work of art 'has a serious purpose; all are performed for
pure amusement' (Statesman, 288c). If art is pure amusement and no
one takes it seriously, then a work of art which deals seriously with
the issues and experiences of nationalism is pure amusement and
cannot be taken seriously. This is, of course, false, for the problem
with the notion that art is escapist or pure amusement is that if it is
not escapist nor pure amusement, it cannot be art. While this may
be an acceptable judgment based on one's taste, it is not a judgment
based on the facts about works of art which attempt to facilitate an
understanding about the different kinds of experiences in the world.
As I will discuss shortly, what Furphy called "romance" may be
escapist or purely amusing as well as art, but it does not follow that
what is neither "romance", escapist nor purely amusing cannot be
called art. If that were the case, then Furphy's novels would have to
be seen as artistic failures because his thematic preoccupations are
far from escapist or purely amusing.
As the philosopher John Dewey states,
[i)t is mere ignorance that leads then to the
supposition that [the) connection of art and esthetic
perception With experience signifies a lowering of their
significance and dignity. Experience in the degree that
it is experience is heightened vitality. Instead of
signifying being shut up within one's own private
feelings and sensations, it signifies active and alert
commerce with the world.; at its height it signifies
complete interpenetration of self and the world of
objects and events. Instead of signifying surrender to
caprice and disorder, it affords our sole demonstration
of a stability that is not stagnation but is rhythmic
and developing. Because experience is the fulfilment of
an organism in its struggles and achievements in a
world of things, it is art in germ ([ 1934) 1958: 19).
Dewey's observation is a good one, for rather than solely
identifying a work of art as that which satisfies our personal whims
or amusements, art is a legitimate way of understanding, in an
ordered manner, the rhythms of the world. Art is active and alert
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commerce with the world, and can afford to be taken properly as a
yardstick for understanding the responses to life in the search for
meaning. As Dewey explains, '(e)xperience is the result, the sign, and
the reward of that interaction of organism and environment which,
when it is carried to the full, is a transformation of interaction into
participation and communication' ([1934) 1958:22). In short, works
of art are one important component in social participation and
communication. And if we want to contemplate something about our
world, our experiences, or if we engage ourselves in the search for
meaning in our responses to life, then works of art can be important
mediators of understanding.
Furphy's novels, in terms of art and understanding or
normative aesthetics, anticipate 'a number of things that twentiethcentury novelists were to explore' (Eagleson and Kramer, 1976:79).
Indeed,
[the novels examine] the relationship between fiction
and actuality, between actual and literary experience,
and between life and knowledge. Furphy wrestles with
the problem as to how realistic dialogue, and the sense
of life as it is lived, can be incorporated into a novel
which nevertheless has a full contour and shape. He is
up against the most difficult of all problems for the
novelist: how to preserve the sensations of real life
while at the same time giving real life the shape of
fiction. It offers an actual dialectical representation of
Riverina life in the 1880s in the context of a formal
shape with elements of eighteenth- century picaresque
fiction, and even the romantic novel which, through
his references to Henry Kingsley, he pretends to
despise (Eagleson and Kramer, 1976:79).
Leaving aside the issue of the romance for the moment, it
should be noted that the theoretical issues of "identity", "nation",
"new world" and "old world", within the context of artistic
representation, are also of primary concern to Furphy's novels. While
Croft also points out that Furphy is 'very much a twentieth-century
writer whose work is still relevant late in the century for which he
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has such high hopes' (1991:276), I have some reseivations about the
reasons that he gives. As I have argued earlier, I do not think that it
is 'his cast of mind', nor would I exclusively attribute Furphy's
"modem" style to 'his involuted uncertainties about art, identity, and
purpose' (1991:276). What Croft seems to read in Furphy is the seed
of some twentieth-century angst, which I think is rather
inappropriate.
Instead, one must not only see Furphy's work as a cultural
creation, but also seek to understand his work as a cultural creation
concerned with illuminating the complex processes of uplifting and
upbuilding, and this includes the uncertainties and the
contradictions in the text. As Dewey states, '[s]ince the artist cares
in a peculiar way for the phase of experience in which union is
achieved, he does not shun moments of resistance and tension. He
rather cultivates them, not for their own sake but because of their
potentialities, bringing to living consciousness an experience that is
unified and total' ([ 1934) 1958: 15). One could say that Furphy's
programme was twofold. Firstly, he wanted his readers to observe and
think about that which occurs in the novels as a work of art.
Secondly, he wanted his readers to understand that these works of
art were deeply concerned with life, both locally and universally.
In other words, art, identity and purpose are crucial factors in
the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia, and this applies to both
Furphy's text and Collins' "text". According to Wilkes,
[i]n the the work of Lawson, Furphy and Patterson, a
deliberate emphasis is placed on the features of the
Australian landscape least resembling the English
countryside -the harsher aspects may even be
especially prized- and at the same time a vernacular
idiom is asserted against the cultivated modes of the
period before. This third stage [in Australian literary
history] takes the pattern beyond adjustment to
environment: it invokes also a movement from the
artiftcial to the genuine and from a state of exile and
dislocation to a state of national pride and selfreliance (1975: 142. My italics).
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It must be said that Wilkes' comments are more or less

applicable to Lawson, Furphy and Paterson in varying degrees, for it
is a mistake to assume that these three writers form a neat little
nationalist package. Indeed, while Lawson and Paterson respectively
and unproblematically assert an Australian national identity, Furphy
questions the validity of many contemporary assertions in light of
what it means to uplift and upbuild. To put it another way, readers
are constantly encouraged to think about what it means to move
from the artificial to the genuine, rather than just accepting the
existence of a particular type as being genuine. Thus, while Lawson
and Paterson clearly render an Australian type in their art, Furphy
and Collins put forth the much more credible view that 'the Coming
Australian is a problem' (SIL, 144). According to Turner, '(t]he key
issue in talking about the role and nature of the presence of
nationalism in Australian narrative is thus not so much the range of
meanings made available but the fact of the dominance of one set of
terms, one body of myth or discourse, as the accepted mode of
representation of the meaning of the nation' (1993: 109).
Although Turner does not qualify Furphy's art with the
capacity to isolate and question this dominant representation,
preferring instead to place Furphy on an equal standing with
Lawson, it is my contention that readers should see the tension
between realism and romance, or fact and fiction, so frequently
addressed by Collins, in light of uplifting and upbuilding the
meaning and value of Australia. Once this is the case, it becomes
equally possible to see that Furphy is not concerned simply with
perpetuating the dominant representation of the Australian type, but
challenging that representation with his own, namely the scholarly
Tom Collins. To some degree, Furphy's investigation of the pros and
cons of uplifting and upbuilding precedes some of the more modem
theoretical concerns with nationalism, especially the art of nation
and the view, as expressed by Benedict Anderson, that 'nationality',
or 'nation-ness' and 'nationalism, are cultural artefacts of a
particular kind' (1991:4).
White states that '[t]he question of Australian identity has
usually been seen as a tug-of-war between Australianness and
Britishness, between the impulse to be distinctively Australian and
the lingering sense of a British heritage' (1981:47). Readers can see
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this recurring in Furphy's novels. But readers should also see that
Furphy's novels, through Collins' preoccupations with artistic
representation, foreground a tug-of-war between a number of values
vying to be quintessentially Australian. What is important is not so
much that there exists a difference of opinion, but the process where,
as White explains, 'self-conscious nationalists began to exaggerate
what was distinctive about Australia' (1981:47). In a letter to Cecil
Winter, Furphy states, '[w)rite only of something which impresses
you. Never draw wholly upon imagination; truth embellished is the
idea. Attend well to details, without making them prominent. Let
every sentence tell; let the yam go, from post to finish. Last and
greatest -Be lucid; avoid obscurity as the worst literary sin' (in
Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:146).
Much can be said about this piece of authorial advice to
Winter 1 , but in the current context what interests us is this idea of
"truth embellished". Indeed, Furphy is not opposed to exaggeration in
uplifting and upbuilding, but he is opposed to an author who takes
"truth embellished" to mean an artistic misrepresentation of norms.
As Collins warns, '[ i]t will just show you how much the novelist has
to answer for; following, as he does, the devices and desires of his
own heart; telling the lies he ought not to have told, and leaving
untold the lies that he ought to have told' (SIL, 272. My italics). This
is especially so if the narrative is written 'for full-grown people in the
painfully simple manner so often affected in literature intended for
the "masses"' (BBB, 88). Nevertheless, Furphy's notion of "truth
embellished", when applied to uplifting and up building, does appear
to indicate a rather modem awareness of the nation as 'an imagined
political community' (Anderson, 1991:6).
According to Anderson, the nation 'is imagined because the
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of
each lives the image of their communion' (1991:6). More importantly
though, the nation is imagined because '[c)ommunities are to be
distinguished, not by their falsity/ genuineness, but by the style in
1

One could say, for example, that Furphy's attention to details, without making them prominent,
naively anticipates that his readers will be observant readers, and he thus runs the risk of obscurity. If
this is the case, then this may explain why public response was poor and Furphy's faith in Such is
Life dwindled. It also might explain why 17ie B11l11-B11ln and The Brolga wac; written in a style that
resembles the literature for the masses, while its themes are an extension of his previous novels.
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which they are imagined' (Anderson, 1991:6. My italics). This point
encapsulates much of what I have said about Furphy in relation to
uplifting and upbuilding, as well as Wilkes' notion concerning the
move from an artificial Australian experience to a genuine Australian
experience in light of artistic representation and value. Indeed, it
also says much about the formative processes of an Australian
nation, for the style in which one imagines the nation will depend on
its history in Ugh t of popularized versions of official ideological
discourses.
Because Australia was born in modem European history for a
specific purpose, Australian nationalism must move fast to overturn
the nation's tainted history, thereby challenging these popularized
versions of official ideological discourses, especially the applicability
of "sin" at a national level. Hughes states that '[f]rom England, the
identity of these people looked simple: They were seen in a bald, onedimensional way as "the children of the conVicts," heirs of a depraved
gene pool, from whom little good could be expected' (1987:355). As
White points out, 'many Australians were not content simply to be
proved worthy of the old stock: some were so bold as to suggest that
the new type was in fact a decided improvement on the old' (1981:73).
In this sense, 'the Virtues of the conVicts, their enterprise and selfreliance, were said to have been passed on to the Australian type,
while their faults had been bred out' (White, 1981 :75). Nevertheless,
Anglo-Australianism dominated the celebrations on the first day of
federation, as noted by Evans et al (1997:11-14), foregrounding the
more pervasive belief that what is British is best.
As Evans et al explain, 'even in the 1950s there were still
Australians, born and bred in Australia, who called the British Isles
"home"' (1997:185). Within this context, I find White's concept of
"generational renewal" rather appropriate. Discussing such qualities
as the anti-authoritarianism and the anti-intellectualism of 'The
Coming Australian', White states that '[w]hat is surprising is how
often these characteristics were seen as being peculiarly Australian
when they can more properly be ascribed to the age-old dismay with
which one generation greets the ascendancy of the next' (1981:77).
According to White, '[t]he 1890s generation, predominantly nativebom, felt more at home in the Australian environment and felt more
need to promote an indigenous culture' (1981:87). We can take this a
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step further and, keeping in mind the correlation between "nation"
and "home", side with Anderson's notion that despite the 'fear and
hatred of the Other, and its affinities with racism, it is useful to
remind ourselves that nations inspire love, often profoundly selfsacrificing love' (1991:141). In this sense, there is another strong
reason for the 1890s generation's promoting an indigenous culture,
namely to challenge the deeply-ingrained notion that 'the word
"Australian" was a term of abuse' (Hughes, 1987:325).
Let us now consider Anderson's definition of the nation a little
further, since it offers a good understanding of that curious
phenomenon called nationalism. Besides being imagined as a
political community, the nation is also 'imagined as both inherently
limited and sovereign' (Anderson, 1991 :6). According to Anderson,
'[t]he nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of
them ... has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other
nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind'
(1991:7). Furthermore, the nation 'is imagined as sovereign because
the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and
Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained,
hierarchical dynastic realm' (Anderson, 1991:7). But most
importantly, the nation 'is imagined as a community, because,
regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail
in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal
comradeship' (Anderson, 1991 :7).
Qualifying Anderson's view, Willis explains that '[b]esides
being a political figuration, nation is a cultural construction, a
concept in which large communities believe' (1993:19. My italics). As
Anderson points out, one should treat nationalism 'as if it belonged
with "kinship" and "religion", rather than with "liberalism" or
"fascism"' (1991:5). Indeed, one needs to see nationalism as a
concept that is inseparable from the meaning of "home". This is
especially so if one is to realise that the true power of nationalism
does not lie in an official policy, but in its 'existence', according to
Ernest Renan, as 'a daily plebiscite'([ 18961 1979:81 ). Nowhere is this
more affirmatively evident than in art, since art not only has the
ability to give people a way of seeing and understanding nation, but
it also has the capacity to foreground and further encourage, either
positively or negatively, the creative response to the concept of nation
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on a large scale, especially in the communal search for meaning.
Although Homi Bhabha offers a post-structural and postcolonial reading of the 'western nation as an obscure and ubiquitous
form of living the local.tty of culture', his notion that 'the complex
strategies of cultural identification and discursive address',
functioning 'in the name of "the people" or "the nation"' and making
'them the immanent subjects and objects of a range of social and
literary narratives' (1990:292) is an equally appropriate observation
for Furphy's novels. Putting post-structural and post-colonial
readings of an already established culture aside, one can observe in
these novels the symbiotic formation of national and cultural
identity at both the outer margins of the Empire and the infant
space and time of experiencing the local 'landscape as the inscape of
national identity' (Bhabha, 1990:295). As Furphy states, '[t]he poet's
eye must see everything that is to be seen; his ear must hear
everything that is to be heard; and, finally, his pen must give to
these things a local habitation and a name' (in Barnes and
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:137).
In this sense, the creative response to the concept of nation in
the communal search for meaning takes '[ t]he scraps, patches, and
rags of daily life' and continually turns them 'into signs of a national
culture' (Bhabha, 1990:297). These scraps, patches and rags are what
Furphy, in his 1903 review, called 'the minutest details of National
life' ( 1969: 129). When the creative act makes the nation visible in
narrative, 'the very act of the narrative performance interpellates a
growing circle of national subjects' (Bhabha, 1990:297). However, as
Furphy's novels so rightly foreground, there are also '[c]ounternarratives of the nation that continually evoke and erase its
totalizing boundaries', disturbing 'those ideological manoeuvres
through which "imagined communities" are given essentialist
identities' (Bhabha, 1990:300). Some of these counter-narratives are
Furphy's novels themselves, for the complexity of Tom Collins is
such that he strategically disturbs the national and cultural
formation of a dominant Australian type in a large number of
plebiscite narratives.
The reason for this disturbance has much to do with value,
since the dominant Australian type, according to Furphy, appears to
be very much capable of perpetuating the ignorance, rivalry and
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division that had repeatedly sabotaged federation, as well as making
national life shrivel 'into provincialism', becoming 'contemptible;
and, festering into the imperial-cum-provincial sentiment' that
makes nationalism 'obscene' (1969:128}. To a certain extent, one
could say that Furphy's writings on nationalism and his challenging
of the dominant representation of the national type are marked by
what Gellner calls '[n]ationalist sentiment', which 'is the feeling of
anger aroused by the violation of a principle, or the feeling of
satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment' (1983: 1). Rather than
Bhabha's notion that '(b]eing obliged to forget becomes the basis for
remembering the nation, peopling it anew, [and] imagining the
possibility of other contending and liberating forms of cultural
identification' (1990:311}, Furphy's novels suggest that nationalism
is a process of strategic moves and countermoves in the plebiscite of
identities, especially their artistic representations and their national
identification.
To reiterate Graham's point concerning art and understanding,
'what ts in view here is human experience in its widest sense -visual,
aural, tactile, emotional, mental. Works of art can supply the
imaginative apprehension of experience in all these respects, and
their value derives from the fact that we may ourselves be deficient in
this regard. This is the sense in which art is a source of
understanding' (Graham, 1997:58}. Or, as the philosopher A.L.
Cothey explains, '(h]ow we act towards others is shaped by the
understanding of people we gain from art. More generally, we see
things through the eyes of art -and in a deeper sense than that we
see them as works of art' (1990:187}. Thus, the object of art as a
route to knowledge, like anything that we designate as knowledge, 'is
to make our understanding of experience explicit and thereby to
contribute to making our actions meaningful. The opposite of this ts
a state of confusion and ignorance' (Cothey, 1990:188-189}.
According to Cothey, there are '(s]ome artefacts [that] promote
this [state of confusion and ignorance] by masquerading as art while
in fact encouraging us to enjoy apprehending them for incidental
reasons. In this sense false art -art that ts positively bad- ts a
genuine possibility and a real danger' (1990: 189}. Although Cothey's
argument is not free from problems, namely that troublesome
distinction between good art and bad art, as well as true art vis-a-vis
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false art, he nevertheless makes a very important point: there
emerges from time to time works of art which jeopardise the attempt
to arrive at a specific value in human understanding. In Furphy's
view, this kind of art is the colonial romance. But what is it about
the colonial romance that makes it such a threat that Furphy, as
well as Collins, repeatedly attacks it?
We can begin to answer this question with a comment by Miles
Franklin. In her biography of Furphy, she states that 'Artist Time has
been distilling atmosphere from crude local colour so that the
Australian novel has advanced beyond the stage when it became such
simply by the substitution of native fauna, flora and place names for
those of other lands' (1944:2). In short, Australian literature has
moved beyond the simple formula of a British ethos with an
Australian nomenclature. Franklin's comment says much about the
state of Australian literature in both the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, especially the steady move against those AngloAustralians who ·greeted with hosannas any clever or promising
novel written in the expatriate spirit' (1944:2). It is fitting that
Franklin should introduce Furphy in this way, for numerous letters
to her by Furphy testify to his constant urging the vibrancy of the
Australian experience.
For this reason, it can be said that, besides challenging the
dominant representation of the Australian type, Furphy opposed 'the
centripetal movement towards the hub of Empire' which made
'Australian writers yield to overseas predilections in choice of
subject-matter and/ or in the interpretation of their own' (Franklin,
1944:2). In his 1903 review, Furphy makes this quite clear when he
stated that
[t]he fictional literature of Australia -scanty at most,
and uneven at best- has advanced by orderly gradation
from Anglo-Australian, through Colonial, to National.
The successional replacement of the immigrant, with
his old-world ideals, by the impressionable
representative of a new type has made such a
transition inevitable. But the mass of our literature is
British; and book-begotten sentiment dies hard, except
amongst pioneers of opinion. Conventionality persists
in viewing Australian characteristics and deviations as
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more or less exotic; whilst to the fully-emancipated
native-born, these stand as self-established units of
comparison, as normal and legitimate phenomena
(1969:128).
Anglo-Australian "romance" recreates Australia in light of old
world units of comparison, as well as British or European
perceptions of normal and legitimate phenomena. A particularly good
example of an Anglo-Australian concept and value, which perhaps
forms the basis for many romance narratives, devaluing much of the
Australian experience, is Major Mitchell's description of Victoria as
'Australia Felix', for it sets Victoria at odds with 'the parched deserts
of the interior countcy, where we had wandered so unprofitably, and
so long' (in Poynter,1987:76. My italics). But, as Furphy points out,
'tragedy, humour, pathos, [and] fancy, however indissolubly linked
with human nature, must assume unhackneyed aspects in a
continent which resembles Europe or North America only inasmuch
as there is a river in both' (1969:128. My italics). In short, the
Victorian landscape is not the sum total of legitimate phenomena in
the Australian experience just because it resembles old-world social
and economic values and can easily accommodate a British or
European way of life.
Armbruster (1991:30) and Henricksen (1985:18) each points
out that the colonial romance follows a formula in which the hero,
idealizing England and her values in Australia, generates a
substantial fortune and, after having industriously reaped from the
colonies what he could, returns to the comforts of "home". As Collins
states, '[a] novelist is always able to bring forth out of his
imagination the vecy thing required by the exigencies of his stocy just as he unmasks the villain at the critical moment, and, for the
young hero's benefit, gently shifts the amiable old potterer to a better
land in the vecy nick of time. Such is not life' (SiL, 269). In terms of
narrative formulas, one is also reminded of a comment by Willoughby
to Collins. Finding 'the colonies pretty rough', Willoughby states
that '[e]ven in your cities I observe a feverish excitement, and a
damnable race for what the Scriptures aptly call "filthy lucre'" (SiL,
35). Indeed, Willoughby, championing Mitchell's "Australia Felix",
states that '[i)n the near future, each of these shabby home-stations
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will be replaced by a noble mansion, with its spacious park; and
these bare plains will reward the toil of an industrious and contented
tenantry' (SiL, 35). Willoughby's statement captures perfectly the
flavour of Anglo-Australian rhetoric on British aristocracy.
As Tiffin points out, 'Furphy's sense of Australian life is bound
up in the detail of bush occupations so that he finds the vaguely
conceived activity in the romance pattern ... not just irrelevant or silly
but actively offensive' (1986:31). Furphy believed that, if this formula
continued to dominate Australian artistic pursuits, allowing
romance to recreate English ways of seeing and understanding, then
Australia would never be understood on its own terms, nor for its
own values in the world of knowledge. All values would thus be solely
British or European and Australia's identity would be marked by an
Empire of men whose plans for the colonies are industry and
exploitation or exotic titillation. In short, any attempt to claim that
a particular work of art illuminates a value of Australia for Australia,
as well as contribu ttng to the sum of universal concerns and values,
in whatever context, would be meaningless. In terms of offering a
"truth embellished" narrative, Anglo-Australian depictions of the
Australian experience misrepresent that experience or deny its value,
its "normal and legitimate phenomena". Discussing the valuable
horsemanship of 'Young Jack', a born and bred Australian at
Runnymede station, Collins states that
[y]our novelist, availing himself of his prerogative [to
uplift and upbuild Australia], fancifully assigns this
office [of great horsemanship] to the well-educated,
well-nurtured, and, above all, colonial-experiencer,
fresh from the English rectory. But I am a mere
annalist, and a blunt, stolid, unimaginative one at
that; therefore not entirely lost to all sense of the
fitness of things (SiL, 278).
One wonders if, to some extent, Furphy considered the AngloAustralian romance to be a catalyst in the perpetuation of ignorance,
division and rivalry in Australia, as well as an over hasty attempt to
redeem Australia from its penal origins by good citizenship and 'the
crimson thread of kinship' (SiL, 5). I must agree with Henricksen's
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observation that 'Furphy's response to Anglo-Australian fiction was
to treat their writing prtmarlly as a manifesto to be refuted, ignoring
the exceptions and countering the generalities' (1985:29). Indeed,
'Furphy was earnestly interested in the "naked truth", artistically
reproduced. In colonial fiction, he did not find it' (Henricksen,
1985:46). And, as Henricksen notes, 'Furphy's revolt against the
school of Anglo-Australian writers derived from his interpretation of
the social function of literature, as reforming rather than entertaining'
(1985:55. My italics). According to Partington, '[e]ven before location
and personae are made known, [Such is Life's] first paragraphs
introduce the idea that fiction or romance and strict chronicle offer
alternative and conflicting accounts of the suchness of things'
( 1993:238). In short, Furphy's attack on Anglo-Australian narrative
is an ethical one, for he appears to take to task any writer whose
work could have disastrous consequences for the uplifting and
upbuilding of Australia, or the values one can derive from art and
understanding.
But, as Barnes notes, '[t]he "realism" at which Furphy aimed
was qualified and in part defined by the "romance" to which he
opposed it' ( 1990:228. My italics). To some extent this is true, since
readers often find Tom engaged in a perspective on "life" worthy of
romantic pulp fiction, as is the case when Collins, having read
Ouida, comes to Warrtgal Alfs assistance. But Collins states that 'I
object to being regarded as a mere romancist, or even as a dead-head
spectator, or dilettante reporter, of the drama of life' (RR, xvii).
Collins declares that 'I am no romancist. I repudiate shifts, and
stand or fall by the naked truth' (SiL, 113). One should not confuse
"romance" and "romanticism" simply because they share the same
adjective. I must disagree, therefore, with Knight's notion that
'Collins rejects romanticism in general' (1969:243). When I speak of
Collins' "romantic" orientations, I mean the kind which are
thematically similar to Emerson's focus on nation-building, the
creative power of art, the season in Nature and the new world
experience as an environment of rights and self-reliance. Like
Emerson, Furphy appears to believe rather strongly that '(e]ach age,
it is found, must write its own books; or rather, each generation for
the next succeeding. The books of an older period will not flt this'
([ 1837] 1985:87-88).
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In the introduction to 'Nature', Emerson addresses these basic
principles of "man's" position in the new world vts-a-vts the old:
Our age is retrospective. It builds the sepulchres of the
fathers. It writes biographies, histories, and criticism.
The foregoing generations beheld God and nature face
to face; we, through their eyes. Why should not we
also enjoy an original relation to the universe? Why
should not we have a poetry and philosophy of insight
and not of tradition, and a religion by revelation to us,
and not the history of theirs? Embosomed for a season
in nature, whose floods of life stream around and
through us, and invite us, by the powers they supply,
to action proportioned to nature, why should we grope
among the dry bones of the past, or put the living
generation into masquerade out of its faded wardrobe?
The sun shines to-day also. There is more wool and
flax in the fields. There are new lands, new men, new
though ts. Let us demand our own works and laws and
worship ([ 1836] 1985:35).
When this happens, according to Emerson, there is 'creative
reading as well as creative writing' ([ 1837] 1985:90). In short, '[w]hen
the mind is braced by labor and invention, the page of whatever book
we read becomes luminous with manifold allusion. Every sentence is
doubly significant, and the sense of our author is as broad as the
world' (Emerson, [ 1837] 1985:90). Romance, on the other hand, is
parodied by Furphy and Collins to foreground not just the creative
power of the narrative act, but to show how influentially misleading
a narrative can be in terms of narrowly seeing and depicting the
values of the new world. Perhaps romance does not have 'coincidence
and cross purposes, sometimes too intricate' (Furphy, ( 1903]
1969: 130). According to Lever, 'Furphy's objection that they [romance
novels l create an alluring imaginary world apart from class struggle
still has some force' (1996-97:154). Although Lever's observation is
astute because of the preoccupation with rights and self-reliance, an
absence of class struggle is not the only reason for Furphy's and
Collins' objecting to the colonial romance. Collins' denial that he is
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a romancer is based on the fundamental notion that the romancer,
by the elaborate contrivances of plot, does not tell the tale of
national life as it is and as it ought to be.
Romance, like colonial art, merely perpetuates an old-world
way of seeing. In opposition to this, one can argue that the
Heidelberg way of seeing is a romanticist way of seeing, and this
newness of the impressionist "vision splendid" is crucial to
understanding Furphy's and Collins' narrative strategies. Collins'
affectations for realism commit him to the responsibility of reporting
on life in Riverina. But, as he says, one must not take him as a
dead-head spectator or dilettante reporter. Why is this so? In my
view, the answer lies in Furphy's remark about uplifting and
upbuilding. Collins, turning his 'mind loose for a roll in the dust of
Memory, and a cavort round the paddock of Imagination' (BBB,
1948:3. My italics), elevates the realism of the narrative to the status
of "vision splendid". In light of the ethics of uplifting and up building,
Memory and Imagination can be seen as two necessary faculties in the
creation of a "truth embellished" narrative.
In this sense, I disagree with Barnes' notion that '[i]n his
fiction, Furphy was not consciously innovative in relation to his
contemporaries in England and America -and Australia, for that
matter' (1990:228). Nor do I agree with Brady that 'Furphy is a man
divided against himself, so inwardly unsure that he dare not take
risks but must cling to what he knows' (1981:62). As Eagleson and
Kramer note, 'Such is Life is a highly experimental novel for its period
(1976:79). This is especially so with selfhood or subjectivity, nation
and narration, and the recognition of the power of language in the
construction of a reality. Like Whitman, to whom Collins refers in
his narrative strategies, Furphy was first and foremost preoccupied
with nation. When Furphy stated that his hero was involved in the
uplifting and upbuilding of Australia, one could say that this
thematic involvement in uplifting and upbuilding was equally
applicable to Furphy, as the letters to Miles Franklin testify. Thus, I
find it rather strange that Barnes should state that Furphy 'was
not ... responding to what was new in the fiction of the 1880s and
1890s' (1990:228).
Nor do I think that Barnes is justified in stating that '[t)he act
of writing was itself a release, a fulfilment, and a vindication for a
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lonely man aware that the world regarded him as a failure'
(1990:228). Furphy did not play with language or narrative on the
basis that he considered it personally cathartic. Nor do I think that
the act of writing was solely related to Furphy's economic failures.
Furphy, the currency lad, considered himself to be personally involved
in the social and cultural aspect of history, as well as being involved
in the history of ideas. In short, I think Furphy saw himself holding
·an independent diploma as one of the architects of our Social
System, with a commission to use my own judgment, and take my
own risks, like any other unit of humanity' (SiL, 1). Like Emerson,
Furphy may have 'read with some joy... the auspicious signs of the
coming days, as they glimmer already through poetry and art,
through philosophy and science, through church and state' ([ 1837)
1985:101).
In a comparative discussion of Such is Life and Don Quixote,
Suarez-Lafuente states that '[b)oth texts record the inevitable
breakage of a social construct and a given national type that had
exhausted their historical possibilities' (1994:39). Indeed, 'Furphy
and Cervantes take into consideration the possibilities of reality as it
is perceived and the reaction of individual characters to the space
they find themselves in; these individualities, Tom Collins and Don
Quixote, effect a mapping of their world and link it to their own
personal values and to a system of meaning that proves to be new
because it is built upon new premises' (Suarez-Lafuente, 1994:39).
However, I would like to modify this proposition slightly, for what the
Australian experience shows is that new premises are more inclined
to be re-evaluations rather than clean breaks from "old" premises
about what reality "was", "is" and "will" or "should be". In short, the
Australian experience diversifies our understanding that is derived
from inductive knowledge2 •
Furthermore, Suarez-Lafuente states that
[s]tarting from the fact that the concept of reality is
always elusive, that there is no such thing as a
reality .. .it can be stated that reality in itself is
construing insofar as its prescribed immutability
changes with every wink of the eye. Understood
2

I will have more to say about induction in the next chapter.
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otherwise, reality becomes a false construct. Furphy
undermines the notion of reality in the very choice of a
name for his hero, Tom Collins {1994:41-42).
Although I do not disagree with her notion that reality cannot
be reduced to a singularly immutable concept, the problem with her
concluding statement is that we are meant to see no difference
between the Tom Collins of an oral folklore and the Tom Collins of
the novel. This is a dangerous mistake, leading perhaps to a critical
devaluation of Furphy's statement that Collins is concerned with the
uplifting and upbuilding of Australia in a manner that is far from
mere comedy. While it is true that the use of .. Tom Collins" allows us
to understand reality as a plurality of meaning, it is not true that
"Tom Collins" foregrounds a reality that changes with every wink of
the eye. What the etymological implications of .. Tom Collins" make
clear is the intricate game of narration and representation in the
response to life and the search for meaning. That Furphy chose .. Tom
Collins" as the vehicle for his ideas comes as no surprise in light of
the novels' preoccupations with the power of art to generate and
direct meaning and understanding.
Indeed, it can be said that "Tom Collins", as both a novelistic
persona and an expression of 1890s popular culture, has left a
powerful impression on later generations. If we are asked to isolate a
common element between the Tom Collins of oral folklore and the
Tom Collins of the novel, then we could say that both personas tell
their stories with a design in mind. However, this is where important
differences come into play. As noted by Barnes {1990:21), Croft
{1991:85), Franklin {1944:42) and Wilkes {1990:86), the Tom Collins
of the oral tradition is seen to tell his stories or idle rumours for the
sole but frivolous purpose of character assassination, giving the
actual teller of the story a loophole from having to claim
responsibility for the damaging content of the "yarn". But, a "Tom
Collins" is only an idle rumour or tall story after the event. At the
time of delivery, it is meant to function as truth and its purpose is to
make one think about the content and truth of the message.
The Tom Collins of the novel, on the other hand, assassinates
some characters in a manner that can be seen as strategic rather
than frivolous, for the message of his narrative is a call to uplift and
119.

upbuild vis-a-vis tearing down and destroying that which is seen to be
unsuitable, as is the case with the romance novelist. Readers should
be aware, therefore, of the shift in meaning and purpose of "Tom
Collins" when considering the etymology of the name. It pays to bear
in mind that, in the novel, the meaning of Tom Collins is dependent
on the meaning of "currency lad". And, as such, the linguistic game
that Furphy plays with "Tom Collins" is a game based on the ethics
of representation insofar as representation is intimately related to
the communication of values and the promotion of understanding.
Discussing Collins' "authorship" in the 1903 review, Furphy stated
that '(t)here is interest, if not relevancy, in every sentence'
(1969:129). Or, as Douglas notes, '(Collins] voices a response to life,
based on serious assumptions, possessing serious implications,
which must be taken into account in any interpretation of the book'
(1978:24).

In this sense, Suarez-Lafuente is correct to state that '[a)fter
Don Quixote and Tom Collins have roamed La Mancha and the
bush, ... both spaces will offer, if not a new "reality", at least a new
image, new possibilities for the individual and for a different
approach to a geography that has to be considered with a new
outlook, as different as has to be a new attitude towards history'
(1994:43-44). As Bernard O'Dowd's poem 'Australia' (in Cantrell, ed,
1977:86) implies, there must be more to the future of Australia than
just a perpetuation of Old World evils, for its manifest destiny cannot
just be the dual status of antipodean prison and colonial settlement.
And it must be capable of more than just copying or perpetuating old
world ignorance and evils. Ideally speaking, it must have the same
options and capabilities as 'America'. History in Furphy's novels not
only involves the facts of a unique Australian experience, as
demanded by the chronicle style, but also an evaluation of one's
narrative strategies as found in the realm of fiction.
We might say that, although Furphy considered nationalism or
the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia to be "truth embellished",
he was also aware that 'the distinction between the fact and fiction
of nation cannot be made with such certainty' (Willis, 1993:14).
Recalling Anderson's (1991 :6) notion that style is not concerned with
the hard distinction between what is false and what is genuine in
narratives about the nation, one should not approach Collins'
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narrative with the intent of trying to distinguish what is false about
him and what is genuine. If one were to maintain such a distinction,
foregoing the clue that Collins is concerned with the uplifting and
upbuilding of Australia, then one risks misunderstanding the power
and wealth of the nationalist spirit made flesh. This, in turn, will
severely limit the reader's appreciation of Collins' creative response
to the concept of nation, as well as limit the reader's understanding
of the value of narratives to promote further the "truth embellished"
nation.
Furphy's point is this: the manner in which an author or artist
represents a pre-national community in art will shape the manner in
which the nation is understood, since art has the capacity to
illuminate, either positively or negatively, a particular human
condition or experience vts-a-vts universal concerns. Furphy's
concerns are thematically similar to Plato's concept of censorship in
Republic, for the latter states that
our first business is to supervise the production of
stories, and choose only those we think suitable, and
reject the rest. We shall persuade mothers and nurses
to tell our chosen stories to their children, and by
means of them to mould their minds and characters
which are more important than their bodies. The
greater part of the stories current today we shall have
to reject (bk.2.377b-e).
At this stage of the discussion, it can be said that what I have
investigated within the context of uplifting and upbuilding can be
subsumed under a single concept, namely aesthetic well-being. This
concept is a particularly good clarification of why uplifting and
upbuilding occur and why this process is intimately related to art,
making art a key object in the determination of value and
understanding. It cannot be stressed too often that Furphy's designs
for his novels cannot be valued merely within the context of "a good
yarn", for that overestimates the pleasure and escapist quality one
can get from the narratives. One of the most basic issues in Furphy's
writing is a nationalist's concern for the well-being of a federated
nation. In short, Furphy took to task the damaging aspect of
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ignorance, division and rivahy in the search for meaning and the
response to Australian life.
If we recall that the nation is both a community and a daily
plebiscite, then we can easily see why Furphy considered it important
to promote or create artistically those values which contribute to
communal and individual well-being. This is, of course, a veiy
complicated matter, and, it is for this reason that Furphy used .. Tom
Collins" to exemplify the complex symbiosis between art and
personal and national well-being. To recall Graham's notion that one
'should think of artistic creations not as stereotypes but as
archetypes' (1997: 128-129), it is more than likely that Furphy would
have wanted his readers to observe and perhaps emulate Collins'
most basic qualities and values. In this sense, I disagree with Croft's
notion that
Tom is an anti-hero. He expresses in himself, and in
his role as narrator, those unresolved divisions which
were deep within Joseph Furphy's personality. Unlike
the hero of the epics -the nation builders, the
saviours- Tom does not bring about unity or
redemption; instead, he leaves us with paradoxes.
Perhaps Furphy used him as a way of dealing with
those aspects of Furphy's own character which he
found ridiculous -his pedantic learning, his recidivistic
conservatism, his love of abstract thought (1991:274).
If we were to attribute some basic qualities and values to

Collins' character, then, bearing in mind the recent discussion on
the etymology of .. Tom Collins", as well as the consistent focus on
ignorance-shifting, I consider the following three to be most
important. First and foremost, readers should see .. Tom Collins" as
being expressive of the creative possibilities of language towards the
formulation of an identity between .. self' and .. other", especially
within the context of the personal and the national. This is what
Furphy meant when he stressed that '[a]ll creative Art -as
distinguished from imitative- is in the nature of a confession. Man, in
this vocation, is a god, a creator, and cannot create but in his own
image' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 137). Secondly, readers
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should see Collins as a strategic agency in the determination of
semantic value in accordance with the arbitracy nature of signs, the
conventions of a sign-system, and the demands of a particular
context. This is what I mean when I use the term "articulation".
Finally, readers should see Collins as a speaker not just within an
established system of signs, but also as a speaker who can contend a
sign's meaning in light of its emotional and intellectual value,
especially with the handing down of signs from an old world context
to a new world experience. This is what I mean when I use the term
"orientation".
The purpose of outlining these three values now is to frame the
direction of the next section. Having discussed why Collins is
concerned with uplifting and upbuilding, I will now focus on how
Collins can uplift and upbuild. Again, I do not wish to conclude that
"Furphy's text is simply a text about nationalism", for such a
conclusion does little justice to the rich complexity of Furphy's art.
Readers should not over-emphasize the nationalist dimension of the
novels in the sense that Furphy is drawn as a radical nationalist or
an advocate of 'aggressive Australianism' (Green, 1961:633). Nor
should readers underestimate the nationalist dimension. Furphy is
radical, but his radicalism ethically concerns itself more with the art
of nation than an ideologically exclusive blind faith or a microcosmic
depiction of all things Australian. One should see the nationalist
aspect of the novels, or the notion that Collins is concerned with the
uplifting and upbuilding of Australia, as a key which can facilitate
one's understanding of how and why one artistically uplifts and
upbuilds something. As Dewey points out,
is proof that man uses the materials and energies
of nature with intent to expand his own life, and that
he does so in accord with the structure of his
organism -brain, sense-organs, and muscular system.
Art is the living and concrete proof that man is
capable of restoring consciously, and thus on the
plane of meaning, the union of sense, need, impulse
and action characteristic of the live creature. The
intervention of consciousness adds regulation, power
of selection, and redisposition. Thus it varies the arts
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in ways without end. But its intervention also leads to
the idea of art as a conscious idea -the greatest
intellectual achievement in the history of humanity
([1934) 1958:25).

2.2. Social Architecture and the Theory of the Controlling

Alternatives.
At the close of Such ts Life, Collins gives the following warning
to his readers;
Now I had to enact the Cynic philosopher to Moriarty
and Butler, and the aristocratic man with a 'past' to
Mrs. Beaudesart; with the satisfaction of knowing that
each of these was acting a part to me. Such is life, my
fellow-mummers -just like a poor player, that bluffs
and feints his hour upon the stage, and then cheapens
down to mere nonentity. But let me not hear any small
witticism to the further effect that its story ts a tale told
by a vulgarian, full of slang and blanky, signifying nothing (StL, 297. My italics).

As Macbeth declares, one's life, or one's identity is 'but a
walking shadow, a poor player/ That struts and frets his hour upon
the stage,/ And then is heard no more' (Macbeth, V. 5. 23-25).
However, unlike Macbeth's declaration, one's life is not 'a tale/ Told
by an idiot, full of sound and fury,/ Signifying nothing' (Macbeth, V.
5. 25-27). This warning from Collins stands rather opposed to the
general critical consensus on the preoccupation with role-playing in
the novels. I disagree with Barnes' notion that '[t)he tone of this
[paragraph) leaves one uncertain what weight it is meant to have'
(1981 :xxii). Yet Barnes is correct in observing that the novel's final
paragraph ·carries some disturbing implications about life and its
possibilities' (1981 :xxii). Although Croft rightly notes the 'very
Shakespearean end to the book' (1991:215), I do not agree with his
final assertion. According to Croft, the novel's ending is '[o)ne in
which the fool addresses the audience and asks them to dismiss the
shades (the actors) and return to their own lives. Lives which are
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stories too, and some of them like his [Collins'] vulgarian's tale "full
of slang and blanky, stgnlfylng-nothing"' (1991:215).
And yet Croft states that '[b]efore Tom disappears, however, he
will not let us make this conclusion, believe it though we may. This ls
a diary. It ls life. It ls truth, and it ls not told by a vulgarian'
(1991:215. My italics). This ls despite Collins' clear warning to his
audience that his tale does not signify nothing. On the whole, I find
the critical responses to the novel's final paragraph, even though
they express very salient views about role playing, unnecessarily
confusing. Let us consider a sample. Henricksen argues that
'Furphy's fiction bristles with references to the stage, primarily to put
reality in doubt, and secondarily to make the reader aware that the
actors in Such is Life are just that, each playing a wide variety of
roles' (1985: 167). While I share Henrlcksen's view that the strong
focus on role-playing suggests that each character plays, or acts, a
role, I disagree with his notion that the focus on role-playing puts
reality in doubt. I am more inclined to think that role-playing reifles
a version of reality, and that certain roles chosen by particular
individuals promote certain ways of seeing and responding to life.
As Barnes notes, '[t]hroughout the novel Collins takes on
different roles, and acting becomes a metaphor for life as Collins
(and Furphy) conceives of it' (1981:xxt). Indeed, '[t]he role a man
plays ls how he chooses to let himself be seen by his fellows' (Barnes,
1981 :xxt-xxtl). But, though 'Collins ls something of a chameleon,
taking on the appropriate colour according to occasion', Barnes
claims that Collins ls 'always under the illusion that he ls in
command of the circumstances' (1981:xxt-xxil). In Partlngton's view,
'[e]nough of Collins' moral shortcomings have been detailed already
to establish that, far from his being a reliable figure, he ls at best an
lncorrtglble, although not consummately successful, role player,
protean, or chameleon-like in his attempted transformations'
(1993: 122). And, according to Hartley, Collins plays 'a long sequence
of roles' in which he 'symbolically borrows, steals, loses, finds and
swaps an assortment of clothes, pipes, horses, saddles' ( 1986: 167).
Indeed,
as narrator, [Collins] establishes himself as a mimic,
who, with minor comic distortions, acts out in turn
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the prose strategies of the lawyer, the offended
socialist, the Aussie chronicler, the scientist, the
fumbling country journalist, the philosopher, together
with the romance and detective novelists and
innumerable other literary styles, playing off the one
against the other, and refusing, finally, to be identified
with any of them (Hartley, 1986:167).
To a certain extent, the preceding critical views have some
validity, for Collins does state that '[i)n occupation, I change
involuntarily, like the chameleon, according to my surroundings' (RR,
15). But one should also remember that Collins' roles or identities
are culturally created responses to life, in which he voluntartly plays
off styles and images against each other in order to roll with the
punches. Again, the plurality of roles played by Collins does not put
reality in doubt; nor does it point to Collins' moral shortcomings and
unreliability. Collins is not, as Brady argues, 'a parodic version of all
of us who worship illusion' (1981:57). In light of the "truth
embellished" narrative, illusion may play a central role in the
response to life and the search for meaning, but it does not follow
that a degree of illusion means one worships illusion in toto. As
Collins states, '[a] lifelong education, directing the inherent loyalty
of human nature, invests anything in the shape of national or
associational bunting with a sacredness difficult to express in words'
(SiL, 11 7). Indeed,
[l)oyalty to something is an ingredient in our moral
constitution; and the more vague the object, the more
rabid will be our devotion to the symbol. Any badge is
good enough to adore, provided the worshipper has in
some way identified the fetish with himself -anything
from the standard of St. George to the "forky pennon"
of Lord Marmion; from the Star-spangled Banner to
the Three Legs of the Isle of Man.
Now, with insignia, as with everything else, it is
deprivation only that gives a true sense of value (SiL,
117).
126.

As Kiernan states, '[t]hrough Tom Collins we are presented
with an image of the way in which a society "works", the network of
relationships that exist within it, and the way these appear to an
individual within the net' (197lb:145). Or, as Wilkes explains, '[i]t
will be characteristic of Such ts Llfe as a whole to ponder the causes
of things, to seek to fix responsibility, and to contemplate the
administration of human affairs' ( 1985:3). In his biography of
Furphy, Barnes notes that '[t]he "crawling Conservative" of the
selection days had had plenty of time in the Riverina to think about
the social system and how it operated' (1990:145). In a letter to A.G.
Stephens, Furphy writes, '[f)or one thing, I was widely known as a
crawling Conservative, till I met the Lord in the way to Damascus,
and the usages of Riverina rasped the scales from my eyes' (Barnes
and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:84-85). But Such ts Life also presents
readers with an image of how the individual makes him or herself
meaningful. More to the point, it is my contention that Furphy
thought about the creative operation of identity and its orientations
from the personal to the social and the national.
In terms of a national image and nineteenth-century
Australianism, deprivation of a type gives the community a true
sense of the value of a type, and its absence makes the members of a
community work towards its presence. MacKenzie's notion that
Collins is 'a phantom identity' and 'a trickster' (1993:540) seems to
me to be unsound. Nor do I agree with his main premise that Furphy
is simply concerned 'with imposture' (MacKenzie, 1993:535).
According to Kiernan, '[i)n judging Tom we become aware of the
nature of interpersonal relationships: the way we react to others,
how much we realize about them and the web of life in which we are
enmeshed at any one time' (197lb:145). In light of my previous
discussion on art and value, as well as chapter one's discussion of
the Riverina in 1880s, we can see why Furphy depicted the Riverina
as a geography of players. And, in the sense that 'identity in
Australia is fundamentally controversial as a result of an old/ new
double bind' (MacKenzie, 1993:534), the first of Collins' "roles" to
which readers are introduced in this geography of players is the role
of the social architect.
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Unemployed at last!
Scientifically, such a contingency can never have
befallen of itself. According to one theory of the
Universe, the momentum of Original Impress has been
tending toward this far-off, divine event ever since a
scrap of fire-mist flew from the solar centre to form
our planet. Not this event alone, of course; but every
occurrence, past and present, from the fall of captured
Troy to the fall of a captured insect. According to
another theory, I hold an independent diploma as one of
the architects of our Social System, with a commission
to use my own judgment, and take my own risks, like
any other unit of humanity. This theory, unlike thejlrst,
entails frequent hitches and cross-purposes; and to
some malign operation of these I should owe my
present holiday (StL, 1. My italics).
In the postscript of a letter to A.G. Stephens, Furphy states
that '[i]f the first 3 pars. of S. is L. compel the reader to think, their
purpose is duly served' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:85).
While I will discuss the important distinction between free will and
determinism in a moment, I would like to consider now the relevancy
of this opening paragraph to role playing, for the close of Such is Life
asks readers to reconsider philosophically not just what they have
read, but also to reconsider the themes and philosophical tone of the
novel's opening paragraph. In a rather obtuse manner, Furphy wants
his readers to synthesize the novel's opening emphasis on fact with
the novel's closing comments on fiction, since both the beginning
and the end of Such is Life rightly foreground that identity has facts
and fictions. In other words, identity is "truth embellished". In this
sense, readers should see that within the "truth embellished"
narratives of identity, there is a core role in the variety of roles.
Collins is not, as Croft argues, 'a man with no centre of identity'
(1996:218).
For Collins, this core role is the role of the social architect,
allowing him to orient and articulate his responses to the drama of
the Rivertna just as an actor orients and articulates his or her role
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to respond to the specifics of a drama. And, in order to comprehend
further the centrality of the social architect's "role", it ts important
to understand that Collins, a 'native' Australian born in 1849 (in
Croft, 1991:86, 306), ls one of the new "Currency lads". As Hughes
(1987:354-355) and Ramson (1993:171) point out, Currency was a
popular emanctplst term used to describe the native born children,
including those of convict parents, in whom the future of the
Australian nation rested. One could say that the word and concept of
"currency", as a sign handed down from one generation to the next,
socially determines "the generational renewal", as White (1981: 77,
87) suggested, whereby the 1880s and 1890s radical nationalists
sought to define an Australian culture.
But one should not underestimate the fact that each radical
nationalist saw him or herself as holding 'an independent diploma',
commissioned 'to use [their] own Judgment, and take [their] own
risks, like any other unit of humanity' (SiL, 1). In this sense, the
"truth embellished" narratives of identity, orchestrating numerous
facts and fictions Within an identity, foreground the freedom of
individual Will and creativity in the drama of cultural definition or
redefinition. As Croft observes, 'unemployment in those famous
opening paragraphs of the novel ls treated not as a personal or social
disaster, but as a creative opportunity' (1996:214). But I do not agree
with Croft's strange conclusion that '[f]or Tom Collins to be
"unemployed at last" is to be away from a treadmill of lies and
duplicities, to be free from responsibility, and to have enough time to
write up the truth about work: that work has little to do with
success, and has no bearing on our mana or our destiny' (1996:227).
Nor do I agree With a similar view held by Barnes, who argues
that
[u]nlike Furphy, Collins has no family responsibilities
and has no awareness of having made an irrevocable
choice as far as his own life and happiness are
concerned. He ts not seen in the roles of son (except
for a minor reminiscence), husband or father. Hts Job
ls so minimal in its demands as to hardly impinge
upon his consciousness. He ts a free spirit as far as
social and emotional ties are concerned, and despite
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the strength of his religious and political convictions,
he is not a participant in the conflicts that are
portrayed in the novel (though his sympathies are with
the bullockies) (1990:222).
Collins may not have family responsibilities, but he is not a
flippant character. Although Collins may not get directly involved in
the minor conflicts portrayed in the novel, he is involved in the much
greater conflict concerning the ethics of artistic representation and
misrepresentation of an Australian experience and value. Through
Tom Collins, Furphy appears to lay great stress not only on the work
involved in uplifting and upbuilding, but also on the intimate
relations between the images of identity, or the roles played, and an
individual's creative choices and consequences in the historical order
of things, hence the theory of the con trolling alternatives stressing
informed choice vts-a-vts ignorant rivalry and division. I think this is
important, for the original typescript of the novel began much
differently. Gilding (1971:viii, 1967:96) states that the opening
paragraphs to the typescript of Such ts Life contained no mention of a
man's holding an independent diploma, nor did it refer to social
architecture. Furthermore, Gilding (1967:95-96) points out that the
theory of the controlling alternatives is not present in the surviving
pages of the typescript. Indeed, the original opening paragraph reads
as follows:
Unemployed at last.
Either the tendency of events during the last few
days, weeks, months, years, centuries, (for we can't
mark an arbitrary point on the line anywhere,) has
been working toward this end, or my indomitable old
Adversary has suddenly called to mind Dr.Watt's
friendly hint respecting the easy enlistment of idle
hands (in Barnes, 1990:400; in Gilding, 1971:viii,
1967:96).
In this earlier version of the opening paragraph, there is less
emphasis on human agency and a greater appeal to chance. Barnes
suggests that during his rewrite of the typescript, Furphy 'reflected
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upon and drew out of the narrative the philosophical implications'
(1990:243). According to Gilding, '[i]n the published version the
possible categories in which one may think about life have been
extended to include the possibility of independent choice and action'
(1967:106). Croft may argue that the typescript 'was far more
concerned with the notions of art, artifice, realism, and romance'
(1991:61), but it can be said that the published version treats these
same themes with more maturity, sophistication and purpose. In a
letter to A.G. Stephens, Furphy wrote, '[a]s we agreed, contraction
proper is impossible; the operation must be performed as if you
would cut an ocean liner in two, then take a portion out of the
centre, and deftly stick the ends together, making a tight, seaworthy
brig' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:62).
Without concerning ourselves too much with the exact nature
of the changes that Furphy made to his seaworthy brig, it is clear
that Such is Life became a much more complicated but focused
narrative philosophically. Along with the initial emphasis on art and
life, Furphy introduced the theory of the controlling alternatives and
the issue of social architecture, or uplifting and upbuilding. Perhaps
the most lucid example of this in light of role play and the currency
status, thereby emphasizing the powerful nature of the "truth
embellished" identity, is the following excerpt:
I thereupon resolved myself into a committee of
inquiry, and, applying the analytical system
befitting these introspective investigations,
discovered, in the first place, furtively underlying
my philosophy, a latent ambition to be regarded as
a final authority on things in general. Hitherto,
this aspiration had fallen short, partly owing to
the clinging sediment of my congenital ignorance,
but more especially because I lacked, and knew I

Now,
however, the high, drab belltopper and long alpaca
coat, happily seconded by large, round glasses and
a vast and scholarly pipe, seemed to get over the
latter and greater difflculty .... There was something
in presenting an academic-cum-capitalistic
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lacked, what is known as a 'presence'.

appearance even to the sordid sheep ... and to the
frivolous galahs .... But outside all possible
research or divination lay the occult reason why
my bosom's lord sat so lightly on his throne (SiL,
278. My italics).
In light of the prevailing ignorance, rivalry and division within
the novel's many episodes, it is rather interesting that, towards the
close of Such is Life, Collins presents an articulated identity to his
readers that embodies many of his hitherto argued values. Indeed, I
think it is important to note that this passage is the first of its kind
in the novel where Collins willingly gives a physical description of
himself to his readers. Prior to his stressing the need for a
"presence", Collins had mainly shared with his readers a volley of
knowledge, allowing readers to construct creatively a physical
identity to match the intellectual identity to which they had been
exposed. One could say that, while Collins' roleplaying had
previously been open-ended, suiting many an occasion in terms of
resourcefulness, it now manifests a much more stable image. Rather
than being out of character, readers can see the artistic spirit of
Collins made flesh, and can see the orientation and articulation, the
content of an identity taking on form. And so far as Furphy's
authorial designs are concerned, the values of his hero, which I
discussed towards the close of the last section, are rendered visible,
qualifying the power of the image-maker in social architecture.
Although humorous, the main reason for Collins' description
of himself in the above manner is to reify the qualities of authority.
As Jack the Shellback states, '[y]ou'll do a bit o' killin' at the station,
in that rig-out' (SiL, 272). Upon approaching Runnymede station,
Collins' appearance has the desired effect. Jack Frost, or Young Jack,
the station's chief horse breaker, proclaims his surprise: 'Well, I be
dash! Didn't know you from a crow! Reckoned some member o'
Parliament, or bishop, or somebody, had bin swappin' horses with
you. You are comin' out!' (SiL, 282). Likewise, Toby, the station's
rouse about, is equally surprised: 'Gosh, I didn't know you till I seen
you side-on, when you was shuttin' the Red Gate .... l thought you
was comin' to buy the station' (SiL, 283). And Moriarty, the station's
storekeeper, 'respectfully rose to his feet': 'Well, I'll be dashed!. ..You
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are coming out in blossom. Now you only want the upper half of your
head shaved, and you could start a Loan and Discount bank, with a
capital of half a million' (SiL, 284).
Within the context of etymology, Barnes states that '[s]ocially
[the] Tom Collins [of folklore] represented the lowest level'
(1990:201). Indeed, the Collins of the novel is also from 'the Lower
Orders' (SiL, 34). But, as I have already argued, one ought not to
confuse the two. The Tom Collins of the novel moves progressively
upward, and his value, with regard to uplifting and upbuilding,
becomes increasingly more apparent as his role-playing takes on
physically identifiable proportions. I would agree with Croft's notion
that readers ought to see 'Tom Collins as a gentleman' (1991:88), but
not in the aristocratic sense of landed gentry or social status. I think
Collins is a gentleman in the modem sense of the word, namely a
compliment that one is decent, honourable or kind. This is firmly in
keeping with Collins' references to social architecture, uplifting and
upbuilding, ignorance-shifting and reason, the controlling
alternatives and his role as 'a Government official of the ninth class'
(SiL, 4) or a public servant. If one recalls Collins' self-professed
'academic-cum-capitalistic appearance' (SiL, 278), then it is possible
to suggest that Collins' final and most appropriate image in the
novel is in the mould of an Emersonian "American Scholar":
resourceful, creative, native born, self-reliant, an authority on the
new world experience and scholarly.
Henricksen may point out that 'Furphy's recurrent motif is
'that man himself is never an integrated whole, that he is a different
person to every other that he meets' (1985:166-167). But I think this
is a hasty mistake, for a man could not play different roles to every
other that he meets if he did not have a sense of his own role playing
capacity within an integrated, though "truth embellished", whole. In
this sense, I disagree with Hartley's notion that 'Tom's own refusal to
adopt a definitive narratological voice can thus be seen not as an
abuse but a renunciation of authorial privilege or author-ity'
(1986: 168). While 'the name "Tom Collins" marks the place of what is
indeed an absence', I do not think Hartley is justified in claiming
that it is 'an absence which refuses to endorse or prescribe in
advance a hierarchy of interpretative or moral response' (1986:169).
Collins does not redistribute 'the hermeneutic power of attorney
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amongst his readership' (Hartley, 1986: 169) to such a degree that it
compromises his own capacity for authority in the image-making
process.
Any theoretical approach toward the concept of absence in the
novels must consider the concept as ethically meaning a lack of
community and unity of purpose in the daily plebiscite of
individuals, images and image-making vis-a-vis nation and
federation. Readers should not evaluate the novels ahistorically. I
think Collins, as well as Furphy, appeal somewhat to Emerson's
notion that people must self-reliantly 'affront and reprimand the
smooth mediocrity and squalid contentment of the times, and hurl
in the face of custom and trade and office, the fact which is the
upshot of all history, that there is a great responsible Thinker and
Actor working wherever a man works; that a true man belongs to no
other time or place, but is the centre of things· ([1841] 1985:185). As
Emerson states, '[e]very true man is a cause, a country, and an
age .... Let a man then know his worth, and keep things under his feet'
([1841] 1985:185-186). One could say that Collins' drive towards
authority in role-playing and image-making is a self-reliant
determination to counteract the tremendous 'leakage of Energy in
this world of ours' (RR, 49).
I think Emerson's concept of self-reliance sums up Furphy's
emphasis on the ethical need for role-playing and social architecture
rather nicely, for he states that
[i]f any man consider the present aspects of what is
called by distinction society, he will see the need of
these ethics. The sinew and heart of man seem to be
drawn out, and we are become timorous, desponding
whimperers. We are afraid of truth, afraid of fortune,
afraid of death, and afraid of each other. Our age
yields no great and perfect persons. We want men and
women who shall renovate life and our social state,
but we see that most natures are insolvent, cannot
satisfy their own wants, have an ambition out of all
proportion to their practical force and do lean and beg
day and night continually. Our housekeeping is
mendicant, our arts, our occupations, our marriages,
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our religion we have not chosen, but society has
chosen for us. We are parlor soldiers. We shun the
rugged battle of fate, where strength is born ([ 1841]
1985:194).
This leads us to clarify what Furphy had in mind within the
context of ethics. Although it is true that '[m]an's relationships. to
the universe and his fellow men are the real concern of Such is Life'
should we agree with Kiernan that 'the novel offers us Tom Collins'
comic response to life rather than Furphy's "philosophy'"?
(197lb:147-148). More to the point, do Furphy's novels expose the
reader to a specific guide for ethical action and, if so, what is it?
Furthermore, does the ethical dimension in Furphy's novels enhance
the interpretation of the novels, supplying a key to unlocking the
complexities of their meaning and so enriching our understanding
and appreciation of their thematic treatment of "life"? In his view
that art can enrich human understanding, the philosopher Gordon
Graham states that
[t]hough there are evident differences between art on
the one hand and science or history on the other, the
former, no less than the latter, can be seen to
contribute significantly to human understanding. In
appreciating how it does this, it is essential to see
that works of art do not expound theories or consist
in summaries of facts. They take the form of
imaginative creations which can be brought to
everyday experience as a way of ordering and
illuminating it (1997:62).
While I do not disagree with Graham's view for a vast majority
of art, it is rather interesting to note that, as well as being
imaginative creations, Furphy's novels are one of the few exceptions
where art does consist in a summary of facts and the expounding of
a theory. I have in mind, of course, the theory of the controlling
alternatives (SiL, 68-71). The theory has been problematic to
criticism on Furphy for a variety of reasons, with the most notable
135.

problem being the credulity of its exponent, Tom Collins3 • Indeed,
G .A. Wilkes thinks that the theory of the controlling alternatives 'is
clearly another of the theories in the mind of Collins that ridicules
itself as the action unfolds' (1969:41). And yet, in a much earlier
essay, Wilkes rightly points out that 'Such is Life is memorable'
because it is 'an exploration of the abiding problems of destiny and
free will, moral responsibility, and the operation of chance in the
universal scheme -problems which have engaged writers ... of all
periods, and which are still in no imminent danger of solution'
(1962:39).
According to Osland, 'Tom's theory of the controlling
alternatives is less a solution ... to the enigma of life than a
demonstration of man's desire that there should be a solution -that
life should be governed by laws, that man's actions should have some
shape. that his suffering should be to some purpose' ( 1985:240).
While it is not untrue that the theory may demonstrate man's desire
for purpose within the context of human suffering, as many theories
are apt to do, it seems strange to suggest that the theory ls less a
solution to the enigma of life. I think it is important to distinguish
between the meaning of "life" within the contexts of both nature and
society. Even if the natural processes of life were enigmatic or if life
was just simply chaotic, it does not follow that the social "life" of
human actions does not have shape nor demonstrate some capacity
for purpose. The theory of the controlling alternatives has little to do
with "life" in the natural order of things. It is not a scientific theory
of natural laws or a metaphysical attempt to solve the enigma of life.
Nor is it one of Collins' intellectual whims. Instead, the theory
should be properly seen as providing an ethical solution to the
mismatched actions of human affairs within the human order of
things, namely society or community.
Influenced by the pipe, 'an ally of established efficiency in
ethical emergencies' (SIL, 85), Collins had stated that 'there is
nothing Utopian ... in the sunshiny Sermon on the Mount', for '(i]t is
no fanciful conception of an intangible order of things, but a
practical, workable code of daily life ... delivered ... by One who knew
exactly the potentialities and aspirations of man' (SIL, 89). Collins
3

The issue of Collins' status as unreliable narrator will be discussed at greater length in the next
section.
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indicates that the uplifting and upbuilding of an individual and his
or her natural rights is equally and automatically an uplifting and
upbuilding of civil rights, as suggested by the Sermon. Although
there is a divine note to Collins' conclusion because he refers to the
"One", I think it is much better, ethically speaking, to take Collins'
message wholly within the context of utilitarianism, for 'no better
name has been found (for this "One"] than the Will of God' (SIL, 90).
As Collins states, '(c]ollective humanity holds the key to that
Kingdom of God on earth, which clear-stghted prophets of all ages
have pictured in colours that never fade' (SIL, 95. My italics).
For this reason, '(t]he kingdom of God is within us; our allembracing duty is to give it form and effect, a local habitation and a
name' (SIL, 95. My italics). In this sense, '(e]ach undertaking, great or
small, of our lives has one con trolling alternative, and no more' (SIL,
68). and '(e]ach alternative brings into immediate play a fl.ash of
Free-will, pure and simple, which instantly gives place -as far as that
particular section of life is concerned- to the dominion of what we
call Destiny' (SIL, 69. My italics). Again, '(w]hether there's a Divinity
that afterwards shapes them, is a question each inquirer may decide
for himself (SIL, 70. My italics). But, as Collins warns, 'if we decline a
brotherhood of mutual blessing and honour, we alternatively accept
one of mutual injury and ignominy' (SIL, 95).
Collins' warning is clearly a warning that emphasizes the
importance of choice and consequences, hence the validity of the
theory of the con trolling alternatives as an ethic of utility to each
undertaking in life, both in the personal sense and the communal
sense of rights. It is in this way that readers ought to take the
meaning of Collins' claim that '(a) Divine Idea points the way, clearly
apparent to any vision not warped by interest or prejudice, nor
darkened by ignorance; but the work is man's alone, and its period
rests with man' (SIL, 95. My italics). As Collins states, '(i]nstead of
remaining a self-sufficient lord of creation, whose house is thatched
when his hat is on, you have become one of a Committee of ways and
means -a committee of two, with power to add to your number' (SIL,
71 ). Furphy seems to suggest that a community with a balanced view
of common and individual purpose is the surest way of nullifying
'history' as 'a mere record of blundering option, followed by iron
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servitude to the irremediable suffering thereby entailed' (SiL, 71)4.
In this sense, I find Brady's comments contradictory, for she
argues that 'Tom's convoluted meditations on the question of
predestination leave us with a sense of determinism tempered only by
a vague hope that decent people making sensible choices can make
some changes' (1981:51-52). While I do not disagree with this, Brady
concludes with the notion that, '[d]espite the optimistic words he
allows Tom about the future of Australia, Furphy offers no way to
that future' (1981:61). It appears that any theory or scrap of
knowledge articulated by Collins is unreliable because Collins is
taken to be unreliable, even if it does offer promise for the future.
When this is the case, Furphy's views are left to dangle precariously
in an intellectual limbo simply because of the supposed unreliability
of a hero and his theories. Perhaps much of Brady's misreadings of
Furphy occur because she stresses the divinity of an ethic,
ideologically clashing with Furphy's stress on the need for utility,
hence her conclusion that 'Such is Life represents the failure of the
secular Gospel' (1981:67).
This leads us to consider another prominent interpretation of
the controlling alternatives. Croft states that 'the theory of the
controlling alternatives is ... the main [insight] we have into Tom's
belief system' (1996:223). But, unlike Brady, Croft also states that
the theory is part of Furphy's belief system, for 'Furphy could not
break from the deterministic model of man and nature ... of European
thought at the time' (1989:13). However, Croft's explanation of the
theory as a gateway to Collins' and Furphy's belief systems is not the
problem, whereas his view on determinism is. According to Croft,
'Tom attempts to define by literary allusion ... ,parable, and allegory
his notion that there is a teleological imperative, a determinism or
destiny, within which are made the aggregate of human choices'
(1996:223). Indeed, in his major study on Furphy, Croft's (1991)
views on the theory and its determinist emphasis underpins his views
in his last essay on Furphy's novels.
4

Despite Furphy's utilitarian focus on ethics, it is interesting to note the Kantian flavour of this
quotation and of Furphy's ethical view generally. Like Kant, Furphy appears to stress that one ought
not to treat human beings as a means to one's own ends, but to treat human beings as ends in a
system of ends. Perhaps Furphy's "Kantian" ethic was his chosen response to the flippant status quo
of the federation debate. As Collins states, '[m]en thinking and acting in mass, do not...follow the
line of least resistance' (SiL, 71). It seems that the line of least resistance was, for Furphy, a
common-sense approach to unity or the unification of the colonies.
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Likewise, Hartley states that 'in the confrontation between
chance and design, design emerges as a clear winner' (1986: 156).
Hartley does concede that the novel allows for 'a small air-pocket of
free-will', but this free-will should be seen as 'a departure, or
freedom, from the appearance of autonomy' because free-will calls
'into question [the] decentralization of voice' ( 1986: 168). Again,
Hartley reads Furphy post-structurally, claiming that hero and text
generate 'an absence which refuses to endorse or prescribe in advance
a hierarchy of interpretative or moral response' (1986:169). I do not
think that this kind of reading is at all justified in light of the
preceding discussion. Furthermore, neither Hartley nor Croft takes
note of the stress on free will, or choice, in the first premise of the
theory of the controlling alternatives: '[e]ach undertaking, great or
small, of our lives has one controlling alternative, and no more' (SiL,
69. My italics). One cannot undertake something unless one is able
to exercise one's will or choice.
Although Collins employs the analogy of the locomotive, which
suggests that he is from the determinist school of thought, readers
ought to see the analogy as an equally steady treatment of free-will
or choice. According to Collins, '[t]he misty expanse of Futurity is
radiated with divergent lines of rigid steel; and along one of these
lines, with diminishing carbon and sighing exhaust, you travel at
schedule speed' (SiL, 70). And, '[a]t each junction, you switch left or
right, and you go still, up or down the way of your own choosing. But
there is no stopping or turning back ... except by voluntary
catastrophe' (SiL, 70). Again, '[a]nother junction flashes into sight,
and again your choice is made; negligently enough, perhaps, but still
with a view to what you consider the greatest good, present or
prospective' (SiL, 70). In an excellent discussion of nineteenthcentury realism and the determinist case, Larkin ( 1977: 1 76)
discusses the trolley-bus school of thought and their stressing the
mean between determinism and free-will through the analogy of the
trolley-bus: a vehicle which not only depended on its environment
but also had considerable room for movement. Although Furphy does
not use the trolley-bus, he nevertheless emphasizes the same
principle of moderation by showing that the rigidity of life's "tracks"
is tempered by the "junctions" of choice.
Douglas observes that '(t]he two poles of Collins' vision of life
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are a sense of the arbitrariness of destiny and a compulsive desire to
find in the workings of fate a retributive pattern' (1964:80). But I
think the theory shows Furphy emphasizing not the desire to find a
retributive pattern in the workings of fate or destiny. On the
contrary, I think the theory emphasizes the desire to find a
retributive pattern in the workings of choice by stressing the
existence of consequences, for a consideration of the consequences of
one's choice is equally a consideration of that which determines
one's choice. In short, exercising one's choice is essentially a process
of selection, which I will discuss later when I address the concept of
authorship and creativity in Furphy's novels. For now, it can be said
that being able to foresee the consequences of a bad choice is
evidence of one's 'flash of Free-will' (SiL, 69), since one could then
freely exercise one's will to avoid those consequences, or 'what we
call Destiny' (SiL, 69) by making another choice, and so opting for
another set of consequences. As Partington notes, 'it proves possible
to change track, although not to undo all the consequences of earlier
wrong choices' (1993:97).
In this sense, the importance of ignorance-shifting is apparent
once more, for Furphy appears to place a heavy emphasis on both the
recognition of one's "flash of Free-will" and the consequences that it
will entail. We must not forget that Collins does not owe his 'present
holiday' to 'the momentum of Original Impress', but to his holding
'an independent diploma as one of the architects of our Social
System, with a commission to use [his] own judgment, and take [his]
own risks, like any other unit of humanity' (SiL, 1). Wilkes states
that '[t]he novel from this standpoint may be seen as an exploration
of Destiny and Free-will' (1985:24). But, should readers take
seriously Croft's notion that Furphy cannot escape the 'deterministic
paradigm' (1989: 13) of nineteenth-century intellectualism? I think a
question such as this touches the very heart of the problem, for
artistic creativity and its themes cannot easily be explained by an
exclusive appeal to determinism or free-will. Any conclusions based
on such an exclusive appeal would suffer from false alternatives.
It is true that Furphy cannot entirely rise above the century in
which he lived and wrote, but this is not a strong enough reason to
conclude that Furphy is wholly determined by the period into which
he was born. Despite 'the momentum of Original Impress' (SiL, 1 ),
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the intellectual dimension of Furphy's novels step beyond the rigidly
deterministic paradigm in a variety of ways. I think the most likely
historical contender for the explanation of the theory of the
controlling alternatives is not a nineteenth-century intellectualism
but the stoicism of Antiquity, especially Aurelius' Meditations and
Epictetus' Enchetrtdton5 • As Russell states, '[t]he main doctrines to
which the [stoic) school remained constant throughout are
concerned with cosmic determinism and human freedom' ([ 1946)
1991: 261). It is, of course, impossible for me to deal with either of
these two thinkers in great detail, but I think a sensitive overview of
their ideas on determinism and free-will shall do much to clarify
Furphy's and Collins' theory.
In his introduction to Epictetus' Enchetrtdton, Mann (1990:323324) explains that, in their concept of the ruling principle and the
virtuous life, the four main consequences of the stoic doctrine are:
rational man is part of the naturally rational
universe, not separate from it;
(ii) rational man is subject to the same
prescriptive laws that underpin the naturally
rational universe;
(ill) man ought to live in accordance with nature,
thus reason ought to dominate man's emotions
and actions;
(iv) man's existence as the manifestation of a
naturally rational universe meant that man is
strictly determined by the universe.
(1)

This is the view that one finds in Aurelius' Meditations, who
states that the 'Universal Nature's impulse was to create an orderly
world. It follows, then, that everything now happening must follow a
logical sequence; if it were not so, the prime purpose towards which
the impulses of the World-Reason are directed would be an irrational
one' (bk 7, 75). It is for this reason that man must aspire to 'the just
5

According to Barnes (1990:179-182), Furphy gave copies of Aurelius and Epictetus to Kate Baker
after an incident in which Leonie, Furphy's wife, due to a "love" letter written by Kate Baker while
she suffered from fever, suspected that Furphy and Kate were having an affair. Indeed, she made her
suspicions known to many members of the Furphy family. Furphy obviously considered these texts
seriously enough, perhaps hoping that Kate would find the stoic code to life equally invaluable in
difficult situations.
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thought, the unselfish act, the tongue that utters no falsehood, the
temper that greets each passing event as something predestined,
expected, and emanating from the One source and origin' (bk 4, 33).
These two meditations are some of the many examples in which
Aurelius describes the necessity of a rationally proVidential universe
of natural laws, or an "order of things", whereby man may achieve
'freedom, self-respect, unselfishness, and obedience to the Will of
God' (bk 7, 67). According to Ruf, '[t]he stoics turned to rationally
necessaiy, universal laws of nature in order to free indiVidual persons
from social oppression, but these same natural laws prescribe that
everything which happens in the world to such indiViduals happens
by rational necessity' (1987:56). In this sense, '[w)e are only free to
accept what happens or to make ourselves miserable by cursing that
over which we have no control' (Ruf, 1987:56).
Aurelius' concept of free-Will is not very clear because he does
not devote much time to it. What one finds instead is a concept of
free-will subordinated to a clearly thought-out doctrine of
determinism, for 'you cannot lay down rules until you have learnt to
obey them' (bk 11, 29). Aurelius may state that he remains his 'own
master, and none shall hinder me from doing what I choose', but his
choice is already determined, for he 'is to live the life that nature
enjoins for a reasonable member of a social community' (bk 5, 29).
Quoting Epictetus, Aurelius may believe that '[t]he robber of your
free-Will ... does not exist' (bk 11, 36), but his concept of free-will
never strays beyond its ordained place in a rationally proVidential
order of things. As Aurelius points out,
[a]ll is well With a tool, instrument, or utensil when it
serves the use for which it is made, though in this
case its maker is not present. But With things formed
by Nature, the power that fashions them is still Within
them, and remains in them. All the more, then, should
you have it in reverence, and be assured that if only
you live and act accordingly to its Will, you have all
things to your liking. That is the way in which the
universe, too, has all things to its liking (bk 6, 40).
And yet, 'one thing alone troubles me: the fear that I may do
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something which man's constitution disallows, or would wish to be
done in some other way, or forbids till a future day' (Aurelius, bk 7,
20). Despite the belief that man is the naturally rational
manifestation of a naturally rational providence in nature, which
ought to make living the virtuous life simple and clear, there is a
hint of doubt, perhaps explaining why the concept of free-will needs
to be subordinate to a belief in determinism. This would also explain
the rather curious statement that '[t]he art of living is more like
wrestling than dancing, in as much as it, too, demands a fl.rm and
watchful stance against any unexpected onset' (Aurelius, bk 7, 61).
But, then, there is always the equally problematic and contradictory
meditation that '[a]ll of us are working together for the same
end .... To one man fall this share of the task, to another that; indeed,
no small part is performed by that very malcontent who does all he
can to hinder and undo the course of events. The universe has need
even of such as he. It remains for you, then, to consider with whom
you will range yourself (bk 6, 42).
The problem with Aurelius' views on determinism and free-will,
common to most stoic doctrines, is best put forward by Russell, who
states that
[t]here are obvious difficulties about this doctrine. If
virtue is really the sole good, a beneficent Providence
must be solely concerned to cause virtue, yet the laws
of Nature have produced an abundance of sinners. If
virtue is the sole good, there can be no reason against
cruelty and injustice, since, as the Stoics are never
tired of pointing out, cruelty and injustice afford the
sufferer the best opportunities for the exercise of
virtue. If the world is completely deterministic, natural
laws will decide whether I shall be virtuous or not. If I
am wicked, Nature compels me to be wicked, and the
freedom which virtue is supposed to give is not
possible for me ([ 1946] 1991:262-263).
I think Furphy borrowed much from Aurelius, especially in
terms of a code of behaviour, the stress on community service and
the stress on the importance of reason, but I do not think that he
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places the same emphasis on a naturally rational order of things nor
on its underlying providence. Again, in the words of Tom Collins, '[al
Divine Idea points the way, clearly apparent to any vision not warped
by interest or prejudice, nor darkened by ignorance; but the work is
man's alone, and its period rests with man' (SiL, 95 ). While Aurelius
explores the spiritually intimate relationship between man, virtue
and the rational universe, Furphy's "stoic" doctrine is rationally
pragmatic, stressing the need for a utilitarian concept of virtue. As
the novels show, I do not think Furphy believed that '[w]hat does not
corrupt a man himself cannot corrupt his life, nor do him any
damage either outwardly or inwardly' (Aurelius, bk 4, 8). I think
Furphy rejected the traditional cosmology of determinism and
providence, still common in the nineteenth century.
But he recognized also that one cannot wholly abandon the
concept of determinism, particularly the idea that one is shaped by
external factors. Perhaps Furphy's interest in the socialist ideas of
his time is based on a reworking of those views, since nineteenthcentury socialism had a tendency to over-emphasize determinism, as
is the case with Jefferson Rigby. There is, however, another
possibility, which leads me to consider Epictetus' Encheiridion.
According to Mann, 'the Stoics' insistence on the law-governed
nature of the universe committed them to determinism' and, '[a]s
their critics were quick to point out, this seemed to clash with their
belief that humans are free, responsible agents' (1990:324). Within
this context, 'Epictetus' Encheiridion, or "Handbook", ... besides giving
a moving account of the Stoic view of life, attempts to resolve the
contradiction between human freedom and determinism' (Mann,
1990:324). Although Epictetus' handbook is not without its
problems, it does offer a much more consistent and pragmatic
reconciliation between determinism and free-will: a reconciliation
which I think underpins Furphy's utilitarian theory of the controlling
alternatives.
According to Epictetus,
[s]ome things are up to us and some are not up to us.
Our opinions are up to us, and our impulses, desires,
aversions -in short, whatever is our own doing. Our
bodies are not up to us, nor are our possessions, our
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reputations, or our public offices, or, that ts, whatever
ts not our own doing. The things that are up to us are
by nature free, unhindered, and unimpeded; the things
that are not up to us are weak, enslaved, hindered, not
our own .... From the start, then, work on saying to
each harsh appearance [phantasia], "You are an
appearance, and not at all the thing that has the
appearance." Then examine it and assess it by these
yardsticks that you have, and first and foremost by
whether it concerns the things that are up to us or the
things that are not up to us. and if it ts about one of
the things that ts not up to us, be ready to say, "You
are nothing in relation to me" (1990:325).
Essentially, Epictetus stresses the importance of analysing and
judging what appears before one's eyes, for one ought not to judge a
book by its cover nor allow oneself to be swayed by the appearance of
something. As Epictetus states, 'try not to be carried away by
appearances, since if you once gain time and delay you will control
yourself more easily' (1990:329). In other words, the emphasis ts not
so much on maintaining an air of indifference to all things because
of their appearances, but to shift one's ignorance towards the thing's
appearance in order to analyse the thing as rationally and objectively
as possible, evaluating whether or not the thing concerns one's sense
of self. It ts, in my opinion, a common-sense approach to the ethics
of responding to life and maintaining one's fortitude. As Epictetus
states, 'if you think that things naturally enslaved are free or that
things not your own are your own, you will be thwarted, miserable,
and upset, and will blame both gods and men' (1990:325).
Although open to interpretation, it appears that what ts
"naturally enslaved" ts determined and thus serves a purpose or
exists in a manner that ts beyond one's control. Any attempt to
exercise control will lead to frustration and despair, suggesting that
one has ignorantly and wastefully exercised one's will. It ts in this
sense that one should, '[alt each thing that happens to you,
remember to turn to yourself and ask what capacity you have for
dealing with it' because 'if you become used to this, you will not be
carried away by appearances' (Epictetus, 1990:327). To all intents
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and purposes, Epictetus' road to freedom is principally defined by
'despising what is not up to us' (1990:329). This concept of despising
what is not up to us is the most problematic aspect of an otherwise
utilitarian view of virtue, free-will and determinism. Perhaps these
problems arise chiefly through the stoic doctrine that 'nothing bad by
nature happens in the world' (1990:331). Or the equally problematic
notion that 'whoever wants to be free' should 'not want or avoid
anything that is up to others. Otherwise he will necessarily be a
slave' (1990:328).
Nevertheless, the notion that free-will and determinism are
defined by these concepts of "what is up to you" and "what is not" is
important to Furphy's theory of the controlling alternatives, its
notion of choice and consequence, and the uplifting and upbuilding
of nation and identity. Furphy's reasons for including the theory in
the rewritten version of Such is Life has much to do with the basic
precepts of stoicism on the idea of Judgment, indicating that Furphy
appeared to hold "attitudes" and "opinions" responsible for the
needless ignorance, rivalry and division of nineteenth-century
Australia. According to Epictetus, '[w]hat upsets people is not things
themselves but their Judgments about things .... So when we are
thwarted or upset or distressed, let us never blame someone else but
rather ourselves, that is, our own Judgments' (1990:326). Indeed,
what is your own is '[y]our way of dealing with appearances' and
'whenever you are in accord with nature in your way of dealing with
appearances ... then you are Joyful about a good of your own'
(Epictetus, 1990:326).
In an example of "what is up to you" and "what is not",
Epictetus states that '[i]llness interferes with the body, not with
one's faculty of choice, unless that faculty of choice wishes it to'
(1990:327). One could apply this example of determinism and freewill to one's attitude towards the Australian experience, saying that
the appearance of the Australian environment is not up to one,
whereas one's attitudes towards one's experiences within that
environment are. But I do not think Furphy would have agreed with
the notion that by asking what is up to and what is not, 'at each
thing that happens to you ... you will find that it interferes with
something else, not you' (Epictetus, 1990:327). I think Furphy
considered this to be as erroneous to ethics as Aurelius' notion that
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'[w]hat does not corrupt a man himself cannot corrupt his life, nor
do him any damage either outwardly or inwardly' (bk 4, 8). As
Furphy's depiction of the 1880s indicates, division, opportunism and
rivahy may not corrupt a person, since a person can maintain his or
her moral stature, as is the case with Stewart of Kooltoopa (SiL, 164167), but they do affect his or her life both outwardly and inwardly.
Nor do I think that Furphy would agree entirely with Epictetus'
notion that one must 'not seek to have events happen as you want
them to, but instead want them to happen as they do happen, and
your life will go well' (1990:327). In one sense, this is true, for one
could argue that one's wants and attitudes should be in accord with
the manner in which the Australian experience occurs as an event
and not with Anglo-Australian values. But there is also a sense in
which Epictetus' notion is untrue, for there is a need to distinguish
between naturally determined events and the events which occur
through human choices and consequences. For example, if rivalry,
ignorance and division are seen as events that happen as they are
meant to happen, then one must not interfere. But one could just as
easily say that rivahy, ignorance and division are appearances which
are up to human beings and their attitudes, and thus are
consequences of their attitudes and choices. In this sense, one must
interfere, for these events are not naturally determined.
Despite the problems with Encheirtdion, I think its basic
precepts of "what is up to you" and "what is not" relate well to
Furphy's concerns and the theory of the controlling alternatives. As
Epictetus points out,
[i]t shows lack of natural talent to spend time on what
concerns the body, as in exercising a great deal, eating
a great deal, drinking a great deal, moving one's
bowels or copulating a great deal. Instead, you must
do these things in passing, but turn your whole
attention toward your faculty of judgment (1990:337).
According to McLaren, 'Furphy's concern is ... with how ... we can
ever produce a society in which justice will triumph over greed and
ignorance' (1989:57). In this sense, I must disagree with WallaceCrabbe, who states that ·Such is Life offers stoic humour as the only
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response to an unpredictable fate and the terrible arbitrariness of
personal decisions' (1962: 145). In light of the previous investigation,
I do not think that Furphy saw fate as being wholly unpredictable
nor human choice to be always terribly arbitrary in a negative way.
Nor do I agree with Turner's notion that the theory shows that '[t]he
individual is powerless to determine his own destiny' ( 1954: 1 73).
Although the novels indicate that individuals cannot be in total
command of their destinies, they do point out that, whatever the
future may be, individuals exercise a great influence on that future.
One could say, however, that the individual is powerless if he or she
turns his or her attention away from their faculty of judgment, thus
leading to ignorant choices and their consequences.
In this sense, I agree with Gilding's notion 'that Tom
Collins ... derives, at least partly, from the social frustration of the
nineties and that the philosophy of the controlling alternative may
be related to an easing of social and personal frustration' (1967:106).
Barnes is rtght in noting that 'Collins' theory of the "controlling
alternative" is an attempt at a positive statement about life in which
free-will and determinism are reconciled in a theory of choice'
( 1976: 167). Indeed, the theory points out that free-will and
determinism should be seen as a matter of choice and consequence,
not the straightforward cause and effect of popular opinion.
Although Collins speaks of 'Cause (which is human Free-will) and
Effect (which is Destiny)' (SIL, 70), it can be said that the popular
notions of cause and effect tend to focus on determinism in an
absolute sense, leading to a misunderstanding of the ethical
dimension of the theory of the controlling alternatives.
As Barnes explains, '[l]ife is full of moments of choice, and we
do not know when we are faced with the decisive choice; having
chosen, we cannot avoid the consequences which a "major
alternative" entails' (1971:130-131. My italics). One could say,
therefore, that Such ts Life attempts to educate its readers with the
view that the uplifting and upbuilding of the nation is not only
something which is up to us, but something that is a "major
alternative", a choice with a series of consequences requiring one's
faculty of judgment. In this sense, I think the novels foreground the
recurring problem in nineteenth-century Australia: '[e]ach of us
supported his argument with a wealth of illustrations and thus
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fortified his own stubborn opinions to his own perfect satisfaction'
(SiL, 48)6. Furthermore, the novels thematically incorporate the
importance of self-reliance into this view, for it pushes the notion
that neither uplifting nor upbuilding will be successful if individuals
continue to be 'parlor soldiers' and 'shun the rugged battle of fate,
where strength is born (Emerson, [1841] 1985:194).
According to Wilkes, 'Collins may entertain the theory of the
"controlling alternative", but that is no reason to make it the master
theme of Such ts Life. In Rlgby'sRomance ... it is not mentioned, and it
does not figure in The Buln-Buln and the Brolga or in Furphy's letters'
(1985:25). What I am suggesting is that readers need to understand
Furphy's novels as philosophical narratives which do not continually
promote the theory of the controlling alternatives overtly inasmuch
as their episodes are textual structures built on the theory. In this
sense, I do not agree with the view held by Wilkes (1985:47) that the
key to the novels does not lie in the theory of the controlling
alternatives nor in any other unifying hypothesis. Again, readers
need to bear in mind Furphy's emphasis on observant reading, for
any readers hoping to find direct references to the theory will be
disappointed on numerous occasions and be led to the natural
conclusion that the theory is not crucial to an understanding of the
novels.
The function of the observant reader in this case is to
understand the theory and constantly comprehend the operation of
its prtnctples in the novels' human order of things. In this sense, I
disagree with Barnes' notion that the theory is 'intended to explain
events; it does not relate character and circumstance.... [for] there ts no
central theme of human behaviour' (1971:131. My italics). Nor do I
agree with Partington's notion that '[n]ot all the examples [in the
novels I provide support for the con trolling alternatives thesis'
(1993:97). According to Hamer, '[t]here are certain values that Such ls
Life does consistently affirm' (1964:147). And, as Gilding points out,
'[i]n terms of the action, there is a related attempt to construct a
theory of the sequence of events ... Thus the theory, as an
6

Perhaps this is why the phrase, "such is life," depending on the outcome of a choice, will be either
intoned with a sense of victory, as Hartley argues (1986: 167), or failure, as pointed out by G. W.
Turner (1971:vi). To agree with Osland (1985:232), the phrase generally tends to function as an
assertion of Tom's record being true to Riverina life and that his responses to life are tempered by the
precepts of stoicism.
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interpretation of human action, is a simplification of Collins'
reflections' (1967: 189). In short, the stress on choice and
consequence is a major alternative not just in the alleviation of
human ignorance, divisions and rivalries, but also in the actions
that are the natural consequences of specifically articulated
identities, of determined yet self-reliant roles played out in the
Rivertna's geography of players. As Epictetus points out,
[r]emember that you are an actor in a play, which is as
the playwright wants it to be: short if he wants it
short, long if he wants it long. If he wants you to play
a beggar, play even this part skilfully, or a cripple, or a
public official, or a private citizen. What is yours is to
play the assigned part well. But to choose it belongs to
someone else (1990:329).
Epictetus' advice to his stoic disciples could equally be seen as
Furphy's advice to the currency lads and lasses of nineteenth-century
Australia, particularly when it comes to exercising one's creativity
freely and responsibly to flesh out a cultural alternative to AngloAustralianism and its deterministic views of the convict taint.
Within this context of currency, roleplay, rights, ignorance-shifting,
judgment and the theory of the controlling alternatives, I shall leave
the concluding words to Bhaskar, who states that,
[i]n so far as an agent is interested in preserving or
extending or deepening or gaining some freedom, this
will always involve trying to understand, in the sense
of explaining, the character of some social or socially
conditioned or affectable entity, structure or thing -in
order to maintain (reproduce} or change (reform} or
otherwise dissolve or defuse, or to stimulate or release
it. To become or remain 'free', in the simple sense of
being 'unconstrained', always potentially involves both
a theory of those constrain ts and, in so far as the
freedom is feasible, a practice of liberation or liberty
preservation. One may be free or desire freedom, in
this sense, from any kind of thing (1991:75).
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2.3. On Seeing Tom Collins as Implied Author and Hero.
If we recall the postscript of the letter to Stephens mentioned
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earlier, Furphy had stated that '[i]f the first 3 pars. of S. is L. compel
the reader to think, their purpose is duly served' (in Barnes and
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:85). I have already argued that what readers
ought to think about are the following issues in relation to the
theory of the controlling alternatives: role-play, social architecture,
ethics, free-will, determinism, knowledge and ignorance, rights, and
choices and consequences. Indeed, I stressed that readers ought to
consider the theory of the controlling alternatives as a key to
understanding Furphy's novels in light of their thematic
preoccupation with the concept of uplifting and upbuilding Australia.
However, I think the theory of the controlling alternatives has a
much broader scope in the novels than just a utilitarian solution to
economic or political problems in the human order of things.
One can see that it is equally applicable to the concept of
creativity, for the manner in which one chooses to represent a
nation, or the way in which one chooses to express a newly-emerging
cultural experience, depends on choices and consequences. I have
already alluded to this somewhat in chapter one when I argued that
Furphy considered the 1890s legend to be an ignorant celebration of
an ignorance that perpetuated rivalry and division. It is important to
bear in mind the success or failure of aesthetic well-being, for the
manner in which an artist or artistic group exercises creative choice,
appealing to popular sentiment in an over hasty fashion, influences
the conventions of a particular cultural experience. In short, the way
in which the bohemian artists saw "Australia" influenced the way in
which Australia came to be seen by the popular majority both
nationally and internationally. According to Furphy, this did little to
inspire confidence in "Australia" and its "Australians".
Perhaps this is what Furphy meant when he wrote to Cecil
Winter that '[t]here is much in your suggestion respecting the causes
of pessimism in the Out-back man (who is the real Australian); but,
as you say, Ignorance is at the root of it' (in Barnes and Hoffmann,
eds, 1995: 124. My italics). Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the
heavy preoccupation with artistic creativity and representation
indicates that Furphy considered such creativity and representation
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to be majoraltemattves, not to be taken lightly, 1n the uplifting and
upbuildtng of Australia. If artists are seen as sowers, then Furphy
saw the vast majority as sowing the wrong seeds on the fields of an
Australian cultural imagtnation1 • If this ts the case, then it is
interesting to look at Furphy's preoccupation with creativity and
artistic representation within the context of authorship and the
theory of the controlling alternatives. Indeed, a general glance at the
structure of Such ls Life reveals that the so-called random selection
of events ts, in fact, a highly crafted work which stresses the power of
choices and consequences in ways of seeing and the production of
meaning.
Just as Barnes (1990:243) emphasized Furphy's drawing out
the philosophical implications during the rewrite, Partington points
out that '[i]t was during the rewriting th~t Furphy seems to have
clarified in his own mind and then realized in the new text a richer
and deeper conception of relationships between illusion and reality
in literature and life' ( 1993: 17). But I disagree with Partington's
( 1993: 1 7) strange notion that the greater emphasis on choice and
consequence through the controlling alternatives decreased the
preoccupation with fact and fiction. Croft is incorrect to claim that
the 1898 typescript of Such ls Life 'was far more concerned with the
notions of art, artifice, realism, and romance' ( 1991 :61 ). I think
readers will agree that the focus on art and life, fact and fiction, or
illusion and reality have become much more sophisticated and much
more central with the published Such ts Life and the two later novels.
When Hope stated that Such ls Life 'is a novel based on a
theory of the novel', he is astutely correct, for 'the structure is
determined rigorously by Furphy's philosophy of life' ( 1971: 109). But
I disagree with key elements of his explanation of the theory.
According to Hope,
[e]ach of [Furphy's] characters, at any particular
moment, makes an act of free-will, for the moment
presents him with two and only two alternatives of
action. Once made, the course of action ts determined
by the force of a net of circumstances, geographical,

,,..---------For example, in several letters, to which I will refer in the next chapter when I investigate Furphy's
7

and Collins' version of an Australian national type, Furphy considered Lawson's later works to be
indicative of an unnecessarily self-indulgent pessimism and, presumably, ignorance.
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physical, biological, social and psychological, so
complex that the individual has no chance of
comprehending it and no power to alter it; his choice
is always a blind choice and the pattern of his own life
is like that of a ship sailing in to an unknown port
without a chart. The most trifling decision may lead to
the most unforeseeable results as did Collins' decision
to smoke while he crossed the river (1971: 110).
Hope is right to draw our attention to the complex net of
consequences that bind an individual to his or her choice. But I
disagree with his reading blind choice in to the theory of the
controlling alternatives. While it may be true that many choices are
rashly made, leading perhaps to an unforeseeable and
incomprehensible number of consequences, it is not true to claim
that Furphy saw choice as sailing a ship to an unknown port
without a chart. Choice is not always blind choice. To read this into
the theory of the controlling alternatives is a grave error, for it
ignores the strong emphasis on reason and ignorance-shifting in
Furphy's work. Hope is right to claim that Furphy 'is putting forward
an entirely new theory of the relation of literature to life' as well as
'announcing a revolution in the nature of prose fiction' (1971:111).
But he does not see that the theory concerns itself with the ethics of
artistic creativity and representation. If one can say that the
uplifting and upbuilding of the nation is a major alternative, subject
to the conditions of the theory of the controlling alternatives, then
one can lay the same stress on the concept of authorship.
In a letter to Cecil Winter, Furphy states that '(a]ll creative Art
-as distinguished from imitative- is in the nature of a confession.
Man, in this vocation, is a god, a creator, and cannot create but in
his own image· (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:137). In short,
an artist can create works of art based on his or her own ignorance,
thus confessing ignorance, as is the case with Anglo-Australian art.
But an artist also has the potential to create artistic representations
within the context of wisdom, hence the stress on ignorance-shifting,
for this can be seen as a commitment to the research and expression
of experiential values, leading to a proper consideration of art and
well-being in the community. If we recall Collins' preoccupation with
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the creation of a "presence" in order to reify an authority, we can see
that the image Collins reiftes is dramatically opposed to the common
production of cultural images, customs and traditions which
constitute that which is now known as the Australian legend.
Instead of a celebration of ignorance, or anti-intellectualism and
anti-authoritarianism, Collins' new type of man is basically an
extension, albeit a retranslated one, of current Western values for
the sake of well-being.
In this sense, Furphy's view on art's purpose is no different
from similar views of the time. Emerson states that '[t]he poet is the
sayer, the namer, and represents beauty. He is sovereign and stands
on the centre .... Therefore the poet is not any permissive potentate,
but is emperor in his own right' ([ 1844] 1985:262). Furthermore,
'[t]he signs and credentials of the poet are that he announces that
which no man foretold. He is the true and only doctor; he knows and
tells; he is the only teller of news, for he was present and privy to the
appearance which he describes. He is a beholder of ideas and an
utterer of the necessary and the causal' ([1844] 1985:263). In much
the same vein, Whitman states that '[o]f all mankind the great poet
is the equable man .... Nothing out of its place is good and nothing in
its place is bad. He bestows on every object or quality its flt
proportions neither more nor less. He is the arbiter of the diverse and
he is the key. He is the equalizer of his age and land ... he supplies
what wants supplying and checks what wants checking' ([ 1855]
1994:486-487)8 •
In short, '[i]f [the poet] breathes into any thing that was before
thought small it dilates with the grandeur and life of the universe.
He is a seer ... he is individual ... he is complete in himself... the others
are as good as he, only he sees it and they do not' (Whitman, [ 1855]
1994:488). Or, as Furphy stated, the creative capacity in man, rather
than the imitative, makes him a god. One wonders if Furphy, as well
as Emerson or Whitman, was acquainted with Sidney's A Defence of
Poetry. According to Sidney, '[t]here is no art [or discipline] delivered
to mankind that hath not the works of nature for his principal
object, without which they could not consist, and on which they so
depend, as they become actors and players, as it were, of what nature
8

In Rigby's Romance, Collins refers to 'any poem of Walt Whitman's' as part of his canonic 'ten
masterpieces of poetry' (53) by which one can attain a thorough education, even going so far as to say
that Whitman's poetry is 'an acquired taste' (240).
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will have set forth' ([ 1595] 1966:23). However, '[o]nly the poet,
disdaining to be tied to any such subjection, lifted up with the vigour
of his own invention, doth grow in effect another nature, in making
things either better than nature bringeth forth, or, quite anew, forms
such as never were in nature' (Sidney [ 1595] 1966:23).
Simply put, the poet, or any artist for that matter, has an
aptitude or a privileged talent and a freedom of creativity to match
because he knows and sees what the common person does not.
Equally, the poet or artist can create the vision splendid, for
'[n]ature never set forth the earth in so rich a tapestry as divers poets
have done' (Sidney [ 1595] 1966:24). It is for this reason that the poet
or artist must equally comply with an ethics of representation, for
'the poet is representative', standing 'among partial men for the
complete man' and apprising 'us not of his wealth, but of the
common wealth' (Emerson, [ 1844] 1985:260-261 ). Given our
theoretical climate on art, we tend to think that such a view on the
freedom of creativity is extreme, especially within the context of
authorship. Instead, we tend to focus on the complex web of social,
cultural and historical processes that make a work of art the product
of a time rather than the expression of an elevated state of
awareness or divine genius, namely the author. Our modem view is,
and will perhaps always be, best expressed by Roland Barthes:
a text is made of multiple writings, drawn from many
cultures and entering into mutual relations of
dialogue, parody, contestation, but there is one place
where this multiplicity is focused and that place is the
reader, not, as was hitherto said, the author. The
reader is the space on which all the quotations that
make up a writing are inscribed without any of them
being lost; a text's unity lies not in its origin but in its
destination. Yet this destination cannot any longer be
personal: the reader is without history, biography,
psychology; he is simply that someone who holds
together in a single field all the traces by which the
written text is constituted (1977: 148).
Barthes places heavy emphasis on the grooves of culture (Kress,
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1988:12-13). According to Barthes, 'we know that to give writing its
future, it ts necessary to overthrow the myth', for 'the birth of the
reader must be at the cost of the death of the author' (1977:148).
Barthes' view ts simply a strategy for reading, for it does not prove
that the concept of authorship ts dead. Indeed, Barthes' reader ts a
sociological ideal rather than a sociological fact, being the product of
a countermove that is as extreme as the view it challenges. In short,
Barthes pits a version of social determinism against the more
traditional view of an unbridled freedom of creativity. But the social
determtntst view does not have the capacity to explain adequately the
concept of artistic creativity and its relationship to individual freewill. Of the four views on creative free-will already discussed, it ts
only Sidney who suggests that the poet is not tied to an object or set
of conventions, for he ts 'lifted up with the vigour of his own
invention', thus 'making things either better than nature bringeth
forth, or, quite anew, forms such as never were in nature' (Sidney
[ 1595) 1966:23).
Neither Emerson, Furphy nor Whitman suggests that the poet
is free to create what he or she desires without any recourse to
society or culture. In each of these three artists, the origin of the
work is as important as its destination. In Furphy's views, an artist
may be a god by his or her creative capacity, but even the creative
power of a god is tied to the well-being of his or her community in a
deeply responsible way. In this sense, the notions of authorship and
creativity must strike a balance between freedom of invention and
social determinism: a balance which Furphy achieves by the
introduction of the theory of the controlling alternatives to Such ts
Life. Again, I do not think that Furphy aligned himself artistically to
a common currency on art on the basis of cultural insecurity.
Rather, I think Furphy saw a truth and value in this currency which
needed to be promoted in the Australian literary scene, hence his
discussion of authorship with Cecil Winter, who wrote under the
nom de plume of "Rivertna". In the spirit of A.G. Stephens, 'the
branch should be shown growing upon the Tree, not severed from it'
([ 19011 1973:vi).
According to Heseltine, 'Such ts Life ts nothing less than an
attempt to use the resources qfthe self as the means of celebrating a
nation as yet unstoried, artless, unenhanced' ( 1986:8. My italics).
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One should not forget Furphy's emphasis on the "truth embellished"
nature of artistic creativity. But, if we consider Barnes' (1981:xxixxii) notion that Collins' chameleon-like role-playing only generates
the illusion of control, then one could also argue that Collins'
identity, or Collins' many colours, is the effect of an eclectic
pastiche, rather than a creation in one's own image. In short, Collins
could be seen as nothing more than an identity that is shaped by the
grooves or conventions of society and culture, revealing that the
resources of the self are actually the resources of culture and society.
One can also take note of both Barnes' (1990:57-62, 81, 96) and
Franklin's (1944:10-22) biographical information on Furphy's
stylistic flair for literary parody and say that Furphy's 'literary'
identity and his sense of "self' are marked by the self-same processes.
This, then, leads us to consider an important problem: how
can one create an original or distinct image in one's own image when
one's identity is based on parody or imitation? In other words, how
can one create in one's own image when one's identity is permeated
through and through by otherness? Is identity or selfhood an act of
creative or imitative art? In short, can someone, whether a literary
figure or not, create from one's own image when that image is
determined and directed by the grooves of society and culture? This
has particularly severe implications for nation and national identity,
for it follows that the pursuit of the self-image called Australian
national identity cannot occur independently from that "otherness"
which determines and directs it, namely the British Empire. Thus,
Furphy's notion of creating in one's own image is an artistic fallacy,
for one's creativity and one's image are determined and directed by an
otherness which makes imitation supreme. Barnes' notion of the
illusory nature of control is, in this sense, quite valid.
But to take such a hard view is to miss the point, for Furphy's
meaning of creative art is fleshed out by the concept of the
confession. Again, according to Furphy, '[a)ll creative Art -as
distinguished from imitative- is in the nature of a confession. Man, in
this vocation, is a god, a creator, and cannot create but in his own
image· (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:137). Indeed, observant
readers of the novels will agree that Furphy does not write nor create
his "art" in a vacuum. Nor does he undertake his artistic endeavours
in ignorance of the greater cosmopolis, for Furphy brings a wealth of
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experience and understanding to his work, which possibly accounts
for the mature style of his narratives. There is a rather interesting
truth in Furphy's predicating the confession to creative art that does
indeed make art potentially creative rather than imitative. How is
this so? Graham states that '[a]ny depiction of nature that tries just
to copy must fail, partly because every "copy" must involve seeing
selectively, and partly because the work must reflect the
representational resources available to the [artist]' (1997:89. My
italics).
Indeed, Graham (1997:88-92) discusses the difference between
representation in art and representationalism, the latter being
concerned with seeing the mimetic value of art in terms of its ability
to create a direct copy of reality. According to Graham, 'thinking
about mimesis must eventually lead us to reject representationalism'
as 'naive' (1997:89), for such a view rejects any work of art that does
not offer a direct copy of reality. Representation in art and creativity
means evaluating a work of art for the things it directs the viewer or
reader to see and understand, especially that which is often
overlooked in the day-to-day world. Furphy's style is one of creative
representation, rather than a purely imitative representationalism.
Furphy recreates or imitates the conventions or grooves of "reality"
only insofar that he can direct the reader to think further about his
or her reality. In this sense, it should be noted that Furphy's mimetic
style, rather than copying reality or imitating a set of ready-made
conventions, such as Anglo-Australian romance, employs specific
resources of self, society and culture in order to create a sense of self,
society and culture within the context of aesthetic well-being.
In this manner, Furphy foregrounds the fact that art and "life"
are a process of selective seeing, of exercising control and using the
confessional and representational resources of the self as a point of
origin in order to control and direct a reader's attention to the
purpose of a text and its destination. This is most important to bear
in mind, for it is the key to gauging the value of Tom Collins and his
artistic designs. As G.W. Turner explains, '[t]o be a chronicler [like
Collins] is to be objective, a "camera" .... Even a camera, however,
focuses on particular details and points in chosen directions'
( 1990:41 ). Although Anderson speaks of communities, it can just as
easily be said that the creative freedom of identities, both personally
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and nationally, 'are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/
genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined' ( 1991 :6).
According to Smolicz, identity, whether personal or national, 'can
only be understood by reference to individuals involved in cultural
renewal, interaction and further development' (1991:51). This is
similar to White's (1981:77, 87) concept of "generational renewal"
discussed earlier. Furthermore,
(i]t is initiated through individual members who
construct their personal cultural systems by reinterpreting and modifying the herttage(s) that have
been transmitted to them by the home, school and
other social agencies. This modification may be the
result of members' own scientific and/ or artistic
creativity, as well as cultural inputs from outside
sources, including the heritages of ethnic groups other
than their own (Smollcz, 1991:51).
Or, as the philosopher Ernst Cassirer concludes in An Essay on
Man,

(m]an cannot find himself, he cannot become aware of
his individuality, save through the medium of social
life. But to him this medium signifies more than an
external determining force. Man, like animals, submits
to the rules of society but, in addition, he has an
active share in bringing about, and an active power to
change, the forms of social life (1944:223).
This brings us back to a consideration of the concepts of freewill and determinism, or choices and consequences, within the
context of creativity and authorship. In short, the theory of the
controlling alternatives, besides being an ethical guide for conduct in
daily affairs, stresses that authorship and creativity are equally a
major alternative, especially if an author is concerned with the
uplifting and upbuilding of cultural identity, or a nation and a
community. Indeed, the emphasis on choices and consequences lends
itself quite readily to the concept of seeing selectively, for the manner
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in which an author chooses to represent the self, society and culture
in art can influence the way in which readers think about the value
of their identities and the way in which they can continue the
process of cultural creativity. What the theory of the controlling
alternatives brings to the concepts of authorship and creativity is,
therefore, the concept of selection.
According to Furphy's views, the "truth embellished" narrative
of personal and national identity must, at the point of origin, give
due consideration to what one ought to represent in terms of the
narrative's destination9 • In other words, one ought not to leave
'untold the lies that (one] ought to have told' in order to tell 'the lies
[one] ought not to have told' (SIL, 272). Without mentioning the
theory of the controlling alternatives, Partington explains that
Furphy wished to establish that no narration is simply
a statement of unambiguous facts, since some selection
must take place ... and that there must therefore be
some criteria of significance or interest at work to
guide, explicitly or implicitly, that selection (1993:248249. My italics).
Speaking of his narrative strategy in Rtgby's Romance, Collins
states that '[i]n recounting the event here, I am merely adjusting, not
jumbling, the order of things -transposing and grouping my
occurrences, after the manner of some more famous, if less faithful,
historians' (216). According to Lever, '[Furphy's] ethic of equality
cannot rest with a conventional realist novel of ordered narrative and
stable character. So Such ts Life adopts realist techniques at the
same time that it questions their validity' ( 1996-97: 158). Lever's
observations are good, but it must be said that Furphy questions the
validity of certain realist techniques only insofar as he questions
their validity of representation. All narratives employ some realist
techniques in order to communicate a message or value. Without a
dose of realism, no narrative could reconcile its messages or values
with the world of readers, which is its origin and destination.
Philosophically, Furphy understood that '[i)t is in literature 9

In response to Barthes' concept of an ahistorical reader, one could state the following: if authors
create selectively, readers read selectively, for it is only in this manner that the destination of a text
can have any importance.
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poems, plays, novels- that our self-images are fashioned with the
greatest complexity and where exploration of the constitutive images
of moral and social life is most obvious. This is one of literature's
peculiar powers and gives it, in this respect, pre-eminence among the
arts' (Graham, 1997:129). It is an understanding that can be equally
applied to Collins. Given that Furphy gave much consideration to
the link between the controlling alternatives and authorship, as well
as Tom Collins' concerns with uplifting and upbuilding Australia
through a novel based on selected observations from pocket diaries,
it is important to note that Collins is meant to be seen not simply as
a product of Furphy's authoring, but should be seen distinctly as an
author himself.
To make this more clear, we must tum to Wayne Booth's
Rhetoric Qf Fiction, since it is his distinction between implied author
and unreliable narrator that implicitly underpins past critical
discussion of Furphy and Collins' relationship. According to Booth,
'[o]ur sense of the implied author includes not only the extractable
meanings but also the moral and emotional content of each bit of
action and suffering of all of the characters' (1983:73). Furthermore,
'[i]t includes ... the intuitive apprehension of a completed artistic
whole; the chief value to which this implied author is committed,
regardless of what party his creator belongs to in real life, is that
which is expressed by the total form' (Booth, 1983:73-74). In
accordance with Booth's distinctions, Furphy has traditionally been
identified as both the real and implied author, while Collins has
been identified as an unreliable narrator.
Although Furphy is the real author of the novels, he is not the
implied author. As I will show in a moment, critical opinion in the
past has not adequately made this distinction, and has lead to
inaccurate judgments about Tom Collins. In short, Collins ts '[t]he
"implied author"' because he 'chooses, consciously or unconsciously,
what we read; we infer him as an ideal, literary, created version of
the real man; he is the sum of his own choices' (Booth, 1983:74-75. My
italics). This is particularly so if we conceive of authorship as a skill,
craft or work, as a process or labour of selection, of creativity and
representation with choices and consequences. As Raphael states,
'the free creativity of an artist .... is clearly a process of causation, of
making, and it does not cease to be a process of causation when we
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think of it as a series of free choices' (1994:110). Likewise, the
process of free creativity or free choice does not cease to be free
simply because it can be seen as a series of causations. Consider the
following confession of our implied author, Tom Collins:
[t]he reader, however unruly under weaker
management, is by this time made aware of a power,
beyond his own likes and dislikes, controlling the
selection and treatment of these informal annals. That
power, in the nature of things, resides napoleonically
with myself, and has, I trust, been exercised toward
the information and edification of the few who fall
under its jurisdiction -suggesting, as it does, Tom
Hood's idea of perfect rule: An angel from heaven, and
a despotism (SiL, 263).
Speaking of the multiple levels of theory in Such is Life, both
Brian Kiernan (197lb:135) and G.A. Wilkes (1985:39) argue that
Furphy controls the theorising process and, in this manner, invites
readers to respond to Collins at every stage of the narrative, thus
making the novel a collaborative effort. This is undoubtedly true, for
Furphy is the real author. But, because Collins is the implied
author, one must be aware of the textual fact that it is Collins who
invites us to respond to "Collins", since the reader's very first
acquaintance with him, in the opening paragraphs of Such is Life, is
primarily an acquaintance between reader and implied author, not
reader and hero. As Kiernan notes, '[b ]ehind the rambling, punning,
self-mocking, self-condoning train of thought which renders
[Collins'] responses is Furphy's "placing" Collins' idealization of
himself (1964:138). This is Furphy's artistic game, for he had wanted
to see 'Tom Collins severely slated for his pedantry, literary
arrogance, and general offensiveness' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds,
1995:139). But there is a strategy to this game which does not simply
involve categorizing Collins as unreliable. In a letter to Kate Baker,
Furphy states that
I have arranged with Grant Hervey to write a scorching
criticism of S. is L., as soon as the book is out,
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accusing T. Collins of copying Miss Franklin ...
whereupon I shall retort, with some rancour. In the
end, it will be demonstrated that the testimony of two
men is true, and that the pseudo-Australian authors,
whom you have been taking as your guides, don't know
as much about the countiy as they pretend (in Barnes
and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 100).
The structure of Such is Life is such that readers are meant to
take Collins as the implied author who knows much about the
countxy and has a vision for her future. This is particularly so if one
considers the opening commentaxy to each chapter in Such is Life, as
well as the proem to Rtgby's Romance, for it is there that Collins
alludes to the ethically creative relationship between individual
choice and consequence, and the process of selection that occurs
with artistic representation or misrepresentation 10 • But, once the
initial opening paragraphs to Such is Life come to their conclusion,
the relationship between reader and implied author shifts to reader
and hero, and Collins becomes the central character in the narrative
world of the Riverina. In short, one could say that each chapter in
Such is Life has two beginnings. The first beginning presents Collins
in the creative capacity and skill of the implied author, controlling
the uplifting and upbuilding process. The second beginning, which
fleshes out the world of the Riverina on carefully selected dates,
depicts Collins as a hero who is, like any other hero, subject to the
consequences of rivalxy and division, the consequences of creative
choice, as well as the consequences of particularly damaging versions
of an Australian cultural identity.
Besides the importance of an historically social and cultural
background to the novel, Such ts Life demonstrates that readers are
not absolutely free to interpret what they like, for they are under an
implied authorial jurisdiction, or a monopoly of selected choices and
consequences. This implied authorial jurisdiction does not lie with
Furphy, but with Collins. As the real author, Furphy is a vexy clever
10

In The Buln-Buln and the Brolga, Collins claims that he has 'no desire to make myself the hero of
my own story' ( 14). This is true. Yet it can be said that this is but one of many examples of an
authorial speech act whereby Collins practises the skill of authorship to make readers focus on Fred
Falkland-Pritchard, Barefooted Bob and Lillian Falkland Pritchard as heroes. Furphy's last novel deals
with Collins' authorial strategies in a much more subtly sophisticated manner.
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strategist. In this sense, the view that Collins should be seen as an
implied author challenges the traditional view that Collins is an
unreliable narrator, since, according to Booth (1983:159), a narrator
can only be unreliable if he or she is consistently inconsistent with
the values or norms of the implied author and the text. Upon close
examination of the central concern of the novels, namely the ideas of
uplifting and upbullding Australia, it can be said that the actions of
Collins, as hero, are in no way inconsistent with the values and
norms espoused by Collins, the implied author. Collins may lie from
time to time and deceive other characters through role-playing, or he
may not make clear connections between characters and events, but
it is my contention that Collins' untraditional characterisation is
not inconsistent with the value he places on obseivant reading as an
implied author.
Booth (1983: 159) points out that deception or lying do not
necessarily indicate unreliability. Indeed, Booth argues that '[a] great
work establishes the "sincerity" of its implied author, regardless of
how grossly the man who created that author may belie in his other
forms of conduct the values embodied in his work' (1983:75). Since
Collins is both implied author and hero, it is simply illogical to
maintain the view that his narrating is unreliable. It is better to say
that Collins is not reliable in the traditionally expected sense, and
that readers need to take his advice to read obseivantly in the same
way that one needs to obseive "life" observantl.y. In light of this, it is
time to sample some of the critical views on Collins as an unreliable
narrator. Clancy, in his book, A Reader's Guide to Australian Fiction,
states that
[t]he narrator Tom Collins ... undertakes to select
entries from his diary and lay them before the reader.
Only after a while does the 'obseivant reader' realize
what Collins himself early admits -that the selection of
en tries is highly purposeful and that an ironic gulf has
developed between Collins the narrator and Furphy the
author(l992:34. My italics).
Firstly, Clancy makes the mistake of ignoring Collins' status
as implied author by attributing authorship to Furphy. Secondly, if
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one pays close attention to Clancy's words, then one begins to realize
that what he states is contradictory. If Collins, as a narrator, has
the power to craft a narrative selectively from his diaries, then
Collins is an implied author, not simply a narrator. To say that
'Collins either fails to see [the significance of the carefully planted
narratives] altogether, or sees it only partially' (1992:34) seems to me
to be illogical. Because the diaries can be seen as notebooks from
which Collins creates the novelistic narrative, readers assume that
Collins possesses 'the more sterling, if less ornamental qualities of
the chronicler' SIL, 1). Yet, as the opening commentary to each
chapter in Such ts Life indicates, this assumption is quickly
overturned, for Collins purposefully brings to the skill or craft of
chronicling the skill or craft of authorship. Collins may warn readers
·against any expectation of plot or denouement', thereby securing
them ·against disappointment' (SIL, 52). But it is interesting to note
Collins' claim that 'sometimes an under-current of plot, running
parallel with the main action, emerges from its murky depths, and
causes a transient eddy in the interminable stream of events' (SIL,
199).
This indicates that Collins possesses an implied author's
knowledge of the existence of a plot. Indeed, the fact that Collins
admits to several acts of censorship in the presentation of his diaries
ought to make the reader doubly aware that Collins is an implied
author, just as he is the hero of the novels. Rather than observing a
manufactured distance between Collins and Furphy, readers should
equally be aware of a manufactured distance between Collins as an
implied author and Collins as hero. In this sense, Croft's notion that
'[T]om denies any plot in his rigorously empirical and aleatory record'
yet 'unconsciously presents the alert reader with the plot' (1986:158)
seems to me to be untenable. It might be better to say that by
claiming there is no emphasis on plot, and then pointing out that
one emerges, Collins consciously desires to make readers obseive and
think about what they are reading. Collins is quick to counteract the
potential view that his narratives are purely ornamental or escapist,
as with Anglo-Australian romance, requiring little or no thought, or
that his narratives are not directly concerned with social
architecture, or the uplifting and upbuilding of a nation and its
identity.
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These are all big issues for a character who is generally
considered to be unreliable. As I will discuss shortly, Collins' implied
authorship is an integral part of the strategic game Furphy is
playing. Nevertheless, the view that Collins is an unreliable narrator
has persisted without adequate rational ground. Despite the fact
that G.W. Turner discussed Collins' chronicling within the context of
photography and selection, he states that '[w]e are in the hands of
an "unreliable narrator"', for '[w]e must accept the factual part of the
narrative, but the writer's analysis of the facts and theorizing about
them must be suspect' ( 1990:50). To be suspicious of Collins'
theoretical analysis of the accepted facts is a matter of analytical
disagreement, not unreliability. Another odd evaluation is Douglas'
notion that 'Collins the narrator ... tries to come to grtps with what
has happened to him, and Furphy the author, who knows more than
Collins ever can, works very subtly' to show that 'Collins gropes
through the blind alleys and deceptive ways of life' in an attempt to
master '[t)he overall vision of Furphy's' (1978:22).
In a somewhat similar fashion, Zeller writes that Furphy 'set
up an implied author with whom the appreciative reader can
collaborate in creating meaning about life in the Rivertna (and life
generally)' (1988:44). But Collins is still 'a notoriously unreliable
narrator' and 'the business of storytelling should serve as a warning
to the reader of Such ts Life not to approach the book as dogmatically
as Collins approaches most subjects' (Zeller,1988:48). Indeed, '[w]e
(the expert Australian readers whom Furphy has created) sit outside
Collins' Rivertna world and understand things better than he does',
and yet 'it is the job of the yamer to do more than just entertain; he
must also enlighten' (Zeller, 1988:48). Zeller's yamer is presumably
not Collins, but Furphy, despite the fact that he claims Collins to be
the novel's implied author. Furthermore, it is also strange that he
does not see that Collins sits outside the world of the Rivertna by
virtue of his being the implied author, or that Collins, as hero, acts
in accordance with the values and norms of the novels. As Booth had
stated, 'I have called a narrator reliable when he speaks for or acts in
accordance with the norms of the work (which is to say, the implied
author's norms)' (1983:158).
Equally bizarre is Oliver's notion that 'Furphy uses Collins
much as Conrad uses Marlowe, not only to gather the facts but also
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to guarantee them' (1944:17). It is bizarre because Oliver claims that
'Furphy needs to establish the character of Collins very carefully,
since his narrator is not only to interpret the enclosed story for us; he
is also to misinterpret it' (1944:16-17. My italics). Barnes makes
much the same claim, for he states that 'Furphy intends that the
reader should discover the inadequacies of the nominal narrator as
an interpreter of the circumstances he records' (1976: 153). In Barnes'
View, '[w]hen Collins is "afflicted" [by the roles he plays or a labyrinth
of thought] ... he ceases to be a reliable narrator, and the observant
reader must become his own interpreter' (1976: 159). What both
Barnes and Oliver seem to miss is the fact that Collins is as much
an implied author of the circumstances he records as he is the hero.
In this sense, if the reader must rely on his own interpretative
capacities, then he must also rely on Collins for direction.
According to Gilding, 'Tom Collins is Furphy's key method of
givtng unity to the "yams"' (1967:85). Interestingly enough, Gilding
(1967:152) is quite prepared to claim that Collins is the controlling
consciousness of The Buln-Buln and the Brolga, but not Such ts Life.
And yet Gilding maintains the standard View that 'Collins is a "mere
annalist" who is temporarily incapable of recording his fact
objectively', for 'he is deceived in his cherished belief that he is
always objective' (1967:26). Indeed, 'Tom is a philosopher who never
arrives at the right conclusion and whose complicated reasonings
are, for the most part, merely manifestations of vanity' (Gilding,
1967:84). On a similar note, Devlin-Glass states that 'Tom is an
unreliable philosopher, although a stimulating and comic one; he is
dramatically conceived as a clownish figure and continually satirised
by Furphy' (1974:84. My italics). Furthermore, '[Tom's] weakness as a
thinker is his tendency to reach firm conclusions on the scantiest of
evtdence', even though '[t]here is often a modicum of good sense and
Justice in what Tom proposes' (1974:84).
Croft thinks that '[t]he reasons for Tom's blindness are his
intellectual rigidity and his reluctance to change a hypothesis to flt
the facts' (1991:87). Thus, '[w]hen the reader has a clear idea of Just
who and what Tom Collins is, she is then in a position to sift the
clues from certain "extracts from the diary of Tom Collins" and to
rearrange them into the novel created by Joseph Furphy' (Croft,
1991:87). Croft's proposal is both pointless and strange, since the
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reader is already presented with a novel created by Joseph Furphy.
Equally, Partington states that 'Collins sometimes sees more than
those around him, but on other occasions he sees less .... Clues rain
thick and fast [and] Tom possesses none of the three attributes of
intuition, veracity and memory to which he lays claim and he
constantly displays the very failures in understanding he castigates
in others' (1993:61). However, on the preceding page, Partington
claims that 'Collins himself seems to have adequate credentials in
both spheres' of 'practical knowledge based on direct experience and
theoretical knowledge based on vicarious experience' (1993:60).
Which is it to be?
More confusing, however, is Henricksen's (1985:43) view that
Furphy's novels do not have heroes nor villains; rather they have
anti-heroes. Henricksen's view is taken directly from Kiernan, who
argues that 'Collins is the anti-hero as author, and his role as the
anti-hero could be defined as his consciousness of his failure to live
up to what he imagines the expectations of the reader of fiction to
be' (197la:6). In other words, Collins is an author who knows that
he is unreliable because he cannot write for the masses, nor can he
gauge his market. This is despite the fact that Collins does not want
to write 'in the painfully simple manner so often affected in literature
attended for the "masses'" (BBB, 88). As Collins states, 'I have one
style of narrative -take it or leave it' (RR, 249). Nevertheless, the
commonly accepted view seems to be that Collins is unreliable, and
readers must follow the clues given by Furphy, the implied author, in
order to see the truth of Collins' errors.
But, critics who maintain that Furphy is the implied author
oversimplify their appreciation of the novels, and err in their
evaluation of Collins. Indeed, it is important to understand Collins'
following confession, from Rtgby's Romance, about his narrative
strategies, for this best explains what occurs in Such ts Life and The
Buln-Buln and the Brolga:

[i]n recounting the event here, I am merely adjusting,
not jumbling, the order of things -transposing and
grouping my occurrences, after the manner of some
more famous, if less faithful, historians (RR, 216).
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Within the context of Collins' confession, one is reminded of
Manning Clark's concept of the historian:
[e)very historian, like every writer, must accept his fate
as a Merlin, a man in whom there is both an innocent
child and a devil, a creator and a destroyer. Such a
man has no difficulty in accepting the etymology of the
word 'historian'. The htstor was the wtse man who told
a story about the past, vouched for the accuracy of the
events he described, and used those events to
communicate to his readers or his listeners his vision
of life. The htstor must be able to entertain his readers
or audience -that is, hold them. He must have
something to tell them about their world -that is to
say, he is the true psychedelic or mind expander. He
shows them clearly something of which they had been
but vaguely and dimly aware. The histor must choose a
subject which touches men deeply, write about things
that matter .... Above all, history must be told in the
same way as all great stories have been told ..... That is
to say, the writer must do three things: create a time,
place, and people .... Happily, for the historian there is
a source- of inspiration. There is Clio, the muse of
history .... Now the word Clio comes from a Greek verb
which means to celebrate. I mention this to remind
you that every historian must preserve a balance, a
harmony between his duty as an artist to celebrate life
as it is, and a duty as a moralist to show how the
world can be improved (1980:32-33).
Clark's "historian" brings much scope to Collins' confession
that his authoring and chronicling represents 'Tom Hood's idea of
perfect rule', namely '[a]n angel from heaven, and a despotism' (StL,
263). Equally, it does much justice to a proper appreciation of
Furphy's claim that Gollins is concerned with the uplifting and
upbuildtng of Australia. Despite his predominantly post-structural
reading of the novel, and his not classifying Collins as an implied
author, I must agree With Hartley's notion that
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[i]f we accept that Collins is responsible for every word
of Such is Life, and within the framework that the
novel constructs itself we have no other choice, as far
as I can see, then we must recognise that Collins
himself -as is certainly apparent in many sections, if
not all- is a very erudite and capable character, with a
penchant for irony, a finely-honed perceptual capacity
that can hunt out the mystery behind the horse-andsaddle incident, and a highly sophisticated sense of
play (1986: 166-167).
In Hartley's words, Collins is 'one of the most complex and
finely-wrought characters in Australian literature' and to maintain
that he is an unreliable narrator 'is a reduction of Furphy's full
artistic achievement' (1986: 166 ). This artistic achievement is the veiy
fact that 'Collins ... acts as a double to Furphy as author' (lndyk,
1986:307). As Arthur states, 'the reader is presented with a pseudoautobiographical chronotope ... .Its time is, or purports to be, the time
of the writing of the novel; its place, the place of writing' (1987:55).
Indeed, Arthur notes that 'there are two poised pens and two
autobiographical chronotopes, that of the ortginal diarist and that of
the later chronicler/editor who selectedfrom the diaries' (1987:54. My
italics). But in each chronotope exists the skill or craft of an implied
author who not only selects from life anecdotes for his diaries, but
also selects from those diaries specific anecdotes for works of fiction
with a purpose.
What, then, are we to make of the critical opinion that Collins'
ego perverts any sense of objective reliability? Devlin-Glass states
that 'Tom's ability to interpret personalities is extremely defective
because his own ego interferes, protesting its own ever-imposing
needs' (1974:78). Similarly, Osland claims that '[a] philosopher can
only be as good as the faithfulness of his observation of the facts of
life, and Tom's observation of life, and hence his observations on life,
are distorted by the reflection of his own ego .... The ego that distorts
Tom's observations also leaves its mark on his philosophy'
(1985:233). Perhaps this is what G. W. Turner meant when he stated
that '[t]hough a misguided philosopher [such as Collins] represents
only a particular philosophy, his exposure is apt to implicate
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philosophy in general' (1990:50). One can say this about any
philosopher, scholar or artist who exerts some influence on their
respective disciplines, whether they tum out to be misguided or not.
Mitchell is closer to the truth: '[e]very man, using whatever
powers of perception and reasoning he possesses, tries to find a
hypothesis which will explain his own experiences and those of
others. He brings to the test of his experiences hypotheses which
claim to offer a satisfying solution. Furphy makes it increasingly
clear that no single hypothesis of which he knows will explain more
than part of the complex pattern of experience as he observes it'
(1967:150-151). This is a good explanation of the ego's relationship
to the world, tying in nicely with Furphy's emphasis on ignoranceshifting and knowledge. Indeed, Collins' view that 'truth is relative'
and 'not absolute' (BBB, 8) is a surprisingly modern and astute
observation of an ego's relation to the world, and an ego's desire to
make sense of the world. Furthermore, the fact that an ego interferes
with the world, serving up a selected vision, does not necessarily
endanger the road from ignorance to wisdom. Nor does it dictate that
the ego is unreliable.
The view that Collins is an unreliable narrator is the greatest
red herring in critical studies on Furphy. But where did this view
originate? I think the answer to this question can be found in
Furphy's 1903 review. In this fascinating piece of Australian
literature, Furphy wrote that
[o ]riginality is a characteristic of Such ts Life; and this
is attained, to begin with, in the simplicity of the
scheme. Setting out with an unpremeditated purpose
of amplifying the diary-memoranda of one week -the
book naturally falls into seven chapters. The first date
is taken at hazard, from a series of filled-up pocket
diartes .... Then for sufficient reasons, the diary-records
cease to be consecutive, and are henceforth separated
by monthly intervals .... Underneath this obvious
dislocation of anything resembling continuous
narrative, run several undercurrents of plot, manifest
to the reader, though ostensibly unnoticed by the
author (1969:130. My italics).
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Within the framework of an implied author in Such is Life, this
last point is simply illogical. How is an author able 'to mask
coincidence and cross purposes, sometimes too intricate' (1969:130)
if he cannot notice several undercurrents of plot in his own
narrative? Indeed, how can readers notice an ostensibly unnoticed
undercurrent of plot while the implied author cannot? Is it not better
to say that the implied author's masking intricate coincidences and
cross purposes within the narrative must necessarily result in an
.ostensibly unnoticed plot, since masking implies no direct intention to
show things overtly to the reader, including plot? Would this not
determine the way in which Collins depicts himself within the
narrative world of the Rivertna?
A.A. Phillips is incorrect to say that '[w]e do not see through
Tom's eyes, for we often know more than he does .... Moreover, the
reader sees Tom himself, and sees him not at all as Tom does' ([ 1958]
1980:39). How is it that the reader can see more of Collins than
Collins himself when the reader must rely on Collins as the implied
author? Is it not fair to say that the masking of coincidence and
cross purposes necessarily indicates both a breadth of vision and a
crafting of plot, which is a knowledge? The vast majority of critics
have taken Furphy at face value, without giving due regard to an
observant reading of the review he wrote. It must be mentioned that
Furphy wrote the review as a reviewer, making no mention of his
being either the implied or real author of Such ts Life, and readily
attributing authorship to Collins several times.
To say that there are several undercurrents of plot ostensibly
unnoticed by the author indicates that the author, whether real or
implied, either pretends not to notice the undercurrents of plot or
has no intention of foregrounding these undercurrents to his readers
in the traditionally expected sense. Because this is the case, Collins
is oot an unreliable narrator in Booth's sense of the term. But,
Collins is not a reliable narrator in the traditional sense of overtly
guiding the reader through the finer details of plot or character
development. Furthermore, Collins is not a reliable author in the
traditional sense of overtly guiding the reader through the twists and
turns of his narratives. Either of these two views runs contrary to
the stress placed on observant reading. Despite his traditional
reading of the novels, Croft's idea of 'Tom's ... cunning concealment'
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(1991:36) offers an excellent insight into Collins' strategies as
implied author and hero.
What, then, is Furphy trying to achieve wtth the review? The
review is a brilliant narrative strategy, designed to alert readers to
several important factors in the novel and encouraging them to read
observantly. In short, Furphy was diplomatically trying to direct his
readers to observe certain clues. It is quite plausible that he
strategically hid his disappointment in the fact that not even the
man he saw as his intellectual equal, namely William Cathels, had
read the novel observantly. Although Cathels' letter to Furphy on
Such is Life, reproduced in Barnes' biography (1990:263-265), has
much positive commentacy about the novel, there is nevertheless an
uncertainty in Cathels' observations, as if he were trying to be
cautious about a novel he neither liked nor understood. As Croft
explains, 'Furphy's friend, Cathels ... praised Joe [Furphy] for his
skills as a chronicler, and found justifications for his ornate style,
while never sensing anywhere in the book that there might be a plot
or any unifying principle at all' (1991:49).
Indeed, the scenario is much the same with A.G. Stephens, for
he did not 'seem to pay any attention to Furphy's letter in May about
the cunning use of a by-play in the plot', since 'Stephens thought of
the work [not] as a novel [nor] as having a plot, nor of the narrator
as being involved in any by-play' (Croft, 1991:48-49) 11 • Stephens
considered Such ts Life simply as ·a record of Australian life' (Croft,
1991:49). Equally, '[j]ust as Stephens had not followed up the lead
given him in Furphy's letter when he read the manuscript, Cathels
either did not remember, or failed to take the hint' (Croft, 1991:49).
Barnes states that 'Stephens was a recognized literacy authority' and
that, 'in Furphy's personal universe, Cathels also was an authority,
and one whose opinion of [Furphy's] writing mattered greatly'
(1990:267). I think the unobservant reading of these two important
figures in Furphy's life amply justifies Furphy's strategy, for it seems
strange that Furphy should send Stephens a review of his own novel
when the latter asked for a synopsis, unless Furphy pragmatically
wanted to show something, as well as curb any future misreadings or
misunderstandings.
11

In a letter to Stephens dated May 2, 1897, Furphy wrote, 'you will notice that a certain by-play in
plot and eclaircissement is hidden from the philosophical narrator, however apparent to the matter-offact reader' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:29).
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By placing the blame on Tom Collins' inability to "notice" the
clues, he thereby solved the potential problem of having to rewrite
the narrative so that Collins did supply the clues, which would
effectively change the style of the novel, turning it into the kind of
literature for the masses Furphy so despised. However, he equally
opened up an opportunity for critics to create that rather fallacious
issue of the unreliable narrator in Such is Life. I believe Furphy did
not expect the current consequences to arise, since he seems to
think that his obseivant reader, once properly prompted, would not
see Collins as flawed, but as an implied author who masks
coincidence and cross-purposes, including the by-play of plot, in
order to challenge the conventions of popular literature. Furphy tried
to correct contemporary and future misreadings in a diplomatic
manner. The reason for this diplomacy is best explained by Collins,
who states that 'no person except the systematic and successful
hypocrite has too many friends, or too good a character. Any fool can
get himself hated, 1f he goes the rtght way to work; but the game was
never yet worth a rap, for a rational man to play' (SiL, 162).
Given the rivalry and division in colonial Australia, this is also
an excellent justification by Collins for his own diplomatic selections
or censorship, as is the following:
[b]uilt into the moral structure of each earthly
probationer is a thermometer, graduated
independently; and it is never safe to heat the
individual to the boiling-point of his register. You
never know how far up the scale this point is, unless
you are very familiar with the particular thermometer
under expertment.... Nations, kindreds, and peoples are
individuals in mass; and here the existence of an
overlooked boiling-point is the one thing that makes
history interesting (SiL, 240).
Most readers are aware of the fact that Collins selects the most
discerning narratives of his experiences because, whenever selections
appear too risque, Tom strategically changes tack in accordance with
the emphasis on choices and consequences, or selection and the
controlling alternatives. Much of chapter three in Such ls Life is a
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fuller and more carefully overt working-out of this principle. As
Colllns states, '(t]n the race of life, my son, you must run cunning,
reserving your sprint for the tactical moment' (SIL, 215. My italics).
Kiernan states that 'Tom not only presents an image of himself to
the characters in the book, but also attempts to present a flattering
image to us' (1964:137). If we recall Croft's (1991:88) proposition, we
must agree with him about seeing Tom Collins as a gentleman.
Collins strives to be the hero and labours to maintain that tmage.
But Collins does not simply labour to gtve his readers a wellgroomed, artstocrattc image of himself. Instead, Collins labours to
create the rtght qualities for the newly-emerging national type. As
Collins freely confesses, the 'foolish reader will be instructed' and
'the integrity of narrative preserved' (SIL, 113).
Collins is not only quick to censor an incident, but also very
particular about making his reader aware of a strategic need for such
censorship. When Jack the Shellback tells Collins the tale of the
penguin and the man-o' -war hawk, Collins states that 'he gave me
such a description of this afflicted bird as, in the interests of science,
I have pleasure in laying before the intelligent public. I must,
however, use my own language. Jack's rhetoric, though lucid and
forcible, would look so bad on paper that the police mtght interfere
with its publication' (SIL, 275). This ts one of many authorial
comments by which Collins justifies his selections ethically. Indeed,
the self-same reason ts gtven in the authorial commentary of chapter
two, where Collins states that 'anyone who has listened for four
hours to the conversation of a group of sheep drovers ... wtll agree
with me as to the impossibility of getting the dialogue of such
dramatts personae into anything like printable form' (SIL, 52). And, in
the authorial comments of chapter seven, Colllns observes that
(t]he routine record of March 9 ts not a desirable text.
It would merely recall forth from fitting oblivion the
lambing-down of two stalwart fencers by a pimply old
shanty-keeper; and you know this sort of thing has
been described ad sickenum by other pens, less proper
than mine -described, in fact, till you would think
that, in the back-country, drinking took the place of
Conduct, as three-fourths of life; whilst the remaining
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fourth consisted of fighting (SiL, 263).
But, according to Collins, 'outside the shearing season, you
might travel a hundred miles, calling at five shanties, without seeing
a man the worse for drink; and you would still be likely to go a
thousand miles, calling at fifty shanties, without seeing any
indication of a fight' (SiL, 263). Through these examples, readers can
see that Collins' selections are ethically justified within the context
of artistic representation and uplifting and upbuilding, particularly
in light of the prevailing rivahy and division in nineteenth-century
Australia. Equally, it can be said that Collins writes for the widest
possible readership, indicating that the craft or skill of authorship is
one which takes into consideration the origin and destination of a
narrative. Again, 'no person except the systematic and successful
hypocrite has too many friends, or too good a character. Any fool can
get himself hated, if he goes the rtght way to work; but the game was
never yet worth a rap, for a rational man to play' (SiL, 162). In
selecting, crafting or censoring "life", there is an appeal to an ethical
strategy and wisdom in matters of artistic representation and
cultural production for the sake of an aesthetic well-being within the
individual and the community.
We could say that Collins, as the implied author, uses an
heroic image of himself to present himself as the ground for the
newly-emerging national type. But we must also say that Collins,
within the skill or craft of authorship, understands such a
presentation to be strategically possible but never absolute. This is
because Collins has, like so many currency lads or lasses, 'a
commission to use [his] own judgment, and take [his] own risks, like
any other unit of humanity' (SiL, 1). In this sense, one can
understand why Collins has 'Collins' state, '[l]et each of us keep
himself behind the spikes on this question of restricted capability'
(SiL, 32. My italics). Or that '[t]ruth may be relative, not absolute'
(BBB, 8). What is important to realize is this. If one were editorially
to remove all the passages where Collins addresses his reader
personally about his narrative strategies, then one could argue that
Collins would become the narrator of a narrative which generates the
illusion of an accurate representation of life. In this sense, events
could occur of which Collins would be completely unaware.
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As it stands, however, Collins quite openly confesses to the

reader that his random selections are subject to his capacity to
censor that which he deems unsuitable. In short, he acts in the
capacity of an author with his notebooks, generating illusions and
crafting a narrative with a particular design in mind, namely the
uplifting and upbuilding of Australia. In terms of Furphy's artistic
designs, readers ought to keep in mind that the content of Such is
Life has been placed there by Collins as an implied author. It is a
choice that Furphy made both willingly and strategically. This
illustrates quite neatly the immense scope which the theocy of the
controlling alternatives has for Furphy in both an artistic and a
personal sense. As Gilding notes, but does not pursue further,
'behind the philosophy of the controlling alternative lies an
awareness of the complexity of human experience; and behind the
conception of Collins the philosopher lies a Collins who responds in
a conststent way to this experience' (1967:97).
2.4. Uplgting and Upbuilding the Antipodes: concluding rem.arks
on Authorship.

At a particular stage of the narrative strategies in Such is Life,
Collins refers to 'Joe Collins' (93). This is interesting, for it generates
the question as to how far apart Furphy and Collins are in the real
and implied author relationship. At times, both share a remarkably
close biographical affinity, which Barnes (1990) and Croft (1991)
note. Indeed, Furphy states that 'I write only of what I know' (in
Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124). And in a letter to Miles
Franklin, Furphy wrote, 'I find it best to take some actual occurrence
as a bed-log, and build thereon -telling the stocy, not as it did
happen, but as it should have done' (Barnes and Hoffmann,
1995: 177). Artistically, Furphy places great e~phasis on the "truth
embellished" technique. Furthermore, it is Collins who also lays
claim to this artistcy when he states that '[ i)t will just show you how
much the novelist has to answer for; following, as he does, the
devices and desires of his own heart; telling the lies he ought not to
have told, and leaving untold the lies that he ought to have told' (StL,
272. My italics).
In an earlier essay, Barnes states that 'Collins can hardly be
177.

separated from hiS creator, stylistically, although one must say that,
when Furphy writes as Collins, he writes as a man with a license to
display his wit and learning, but he does not always judge vei:y
happily what the reader will recognize' (1981::xxiii). To a certain
extent, this is true, for Furphy's emphasis on observant reading, of
piecing together a series of scattered clues, runs the risk of veiling
his strategy and designs too deeply under the guise of formlessness.
Nevertheless, by using the character and nom de plume of Tom
Collins, as well as the emphasiS on observant reading, Furphy is able
to give his novels not only the capacity for social commentai:y, but
also the quality of a philosophical investigation into the artistic
nature of personal and national identity. Concerning Such is Life,
Hartley states that identity is synonymous with 'plot,' becoming 'as
much a matter of exclusion, or concealment, as of inclusion, or
mapping-out' (1986:156).
One can extend this rather apt observation to both Rtgby's
Romance and The Buln-Buln and the Brolga. Although Hartley does
not make the connection, his emphasis on inclusion and exclusion
principally captures the concepts of authorship and selection, of
choices and consequences in the theoi:y of the controlling
alternatives. In this sense, I diSagree with Croft, who states that '[i]t
is often assumed by readers of the three major works that Tom
Collins' opinions are those of Joseph Furphy, and that they express
the same socialistic idealism that is evident in some of his letters.
That iS far from the truth. Tom's ideas on political economy are often
thoroughly conservative' (1991:94). This is problematic, for I think
both Furphy and Collins express an interest in socialist ideas, as I
have already argued, but they are not socialists. Again, it is my
contention that both are Philosophes who express their faith in an
enlightened new world and its type.
Nor is it entirely clear just what Croft means by claiming that
Collins is thoroughly conservative, for Collins iS concerned with the
creation and dissemination of a way of seeing and responding to life
in Australia that challenges the more conservative ideology of AngloAustralianism. Although Croft rightly makes a distinction between
Joseph Furphy and Tom Collins, it is unfair and problematic to
suggest that Collins' radicalism and philosophizing is simply a guise
for his 'conservative leanings' (1991:95) and desire to amass capital.
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What one finds in the relationship between real author and implied
author, or Furphy and Collins, is a carefully woven tapestry of
affinities and distances, for Collins represents the chosen other
whereby Furphy sought to fathom the value of his experiences in the
Riverina and to communicate the meaning of that value in light of
uplifting and upbuilding. Furphy himself had said that '[a]s T.C. I
can make myself objectionable with better grace' (in Barnes and
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:84).
In terms of the value of Tom Collins, this is the crucial link
between Furphy and his implied author, for uplifting and upbuilding
in the daily plebiscite cannot be separated from the concepts of
authorship and selection. Nor can uplifting and upbuilding be
separated from the ethics of representation in art, for Furphy and
Collins stress that the production of stories in a newly-emerging
social and cultural identity must consider the well-being of the
individual and the community, as is evident in Furphy's use of the
adjective "truth embellished". For this reason, I must disagree with
Barnes' notion that '[i]n Collins's narrative we see a man acting in
ignorance of how his actions in the present will affect not only his
own future but that of others' (1979: 19). To have an awareness of the
ethics of representation, of what the self ought to do in art and life,
is to have an awareness of how that articulation strategically, as a
response to life, can have an impact on the human order of things.
This is an important aspect of the wonderfully complex relationship
of values between Furphy and Collins as real author and implied
author.
According to Barnes, '[h]e [Collins] is a version of Furphy
himself, or, to put it another way, he is Furphy playing a role, and I
am inclined to think that this role was necessary to Furphy as a
writer' (1979: 12). But, readers are meant to see that Collins is also
"Collins" on his own terms and with his own resources of self proper
to him, hence his articulation of the theory of the controlling
alternatives and his engagement with the concepts of authorship,
selection, "truth embellished" representation, "presence" and roleplay. Croft (1991:265) points out that Furphy's book of collected
poems, edited by Kate Baker and first published in 1916, was the
first work by Furphy to have authorship accredited to him. During
his lifetime, Furphy refused to drop his nom de plume, stating to
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Stephens that '[t]here is one thing I hate; yea, two that I abhor; and
these three things are celebrity, fame, renown, and reputation; also
there are five things that my soul lusteth after; and these be
obscurity and privacy' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:84).
Besides privacy, I think Furphy knew that public recognition of his
being the author of Such is Life would spoil what he sought to
achieve with Tom Collins.
In this sense, Croft's notion that, '[f]or Joseph Furphy, Tom
Collins' writings are lies' and, 'for Tom Collins, romances, such as
those which form the basis of Furphy's three novels, are also lies'
(1991:51) is much too problematic 12 • Croft may point out that Such ts
Life has 'two authors: one fictional and one real' (1991:85), but he
devalues Furphy's designs for Collins by remaining with the concept
of an unreliable narrator due to the etymological origin of "Tom
Collins". Whether or not Collins actually exists in the normal sense
readers attribute to an author does not matter. Tom Collins'
fictionality in no way negates the more important issue of why
Collins exists and how art, especially through the intimacy between
language and literature, is a crucial element in expressing the
fundamentals of that existence in the world. As I have already
argued, readers ought to see both a similarity and a difference
between the "Tom Collins" of Australian folklore and the "Tom
Collins" of the novels. The meaning and value of both "Tom
Collinses" is intimately related to yarning or the tall story, but each
yams or tells tall tales for different reasons.
Unlike the practical Joker of Australian folklore, readers are
meant to see, through the Collins of the novels, an intimate
relationship between identity, well-being and narrative strategy in
the world outside literature. As Furphy had stated to Stephens, 'the
usages of Riverina rasped the scales from my eyes' (Barnes and
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:85). Indeed, on many occasions in Such is Life,
Collins takes great care in communicating the look and feel of the
Rivertna through his expositions of the environment. This, I think, is
important, for the Riverina is meant to be seen as the quintessential
environment where colonial society, both rural and urban, strives to
establish a cultural value in the Australian experience. As an
12

I will discuss the issue of lying more fully in the next chapter when I examine its thematic
predominance in The Buln-Buln and the Brolga in light of uplifting and upbuilding a national type or
"identity".
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analogy, the Rivertna is an expansive space and time of events where
the act of recognizing an event and seeing that event as it unfolds
leads to the phenomena in which the self qualifies the environment
with value and meaning. It can be said that the Riverina is a
geography of players, where the self-other relationship predominates
because of colonial rivalry and divisions and a strong presence of
international identities.
Although Collins, as implied author, uses himself, as a hero,
to fill this space and time with value, he also stylistically employs
the Rivertna itself, drawing the reader's attention to that curious
event and phenomenon known as the mirage. In the opening
authorial commentary to chapter four of Such ts Life, Collins states
that
[t]he mirage is one of Nature's obscure and cheerless
Jokes; and in this instance, as in some few others, she
is beyond Art. She even assists the illusion by a very
slight depression of the plain in the right place. In
fact, an artist's picture of a mirage would be his
picture of a level-brimmed, unruffled lake; also, the
most skilful word-painter, in attempting to contrast
the appearance of water with that of its fac-simile
(sic), would become as confused and hazy as any
clergyman taxed to dffferenttate hts creed from that of
the mollah running the opposition. And Nature, in
taking this mirthless rise out of the spectator, never
repeats herself in the particulars of distance, area, or
configuration of her simulacre (StL, 129-130. My
italics).
Nature is beyond art because "she" is beyond man's control.
Yet nature's mirage makes man aware of the possibility of art by
stimulating man's interest in geographically specific optical illusions.
But the qualities generally associated with mirages or simulacra in
nature also indicate that what one can create in art may not be
easily distinguished from the artistic production of values from
another social and cultural landscape or geography. Although the
mirage in art has a much more stable existence than the mirage in
nature, because the former is a phenomenon rather than an event,
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Collins strongly suggests that artistic images, despite the skill or
craft of the author or artist, are not wholly exempt from generating
the same eventful qualities. One could take Colltns' commentary on
the mirage as a parable for the need to establish control over
selection tn artistic creativity, especially with the uplifting and
upbuildtng of a national identity and the production of an
appropriate cultural creed for the Australian experience. If left to the
choice of another, such as Anglo-Australiantsm, then the consequent
images and experiences which can selectively define an Australian
identity and creed will suffer.
Indeed, the facsimiles that are called Australiana will be hard
to differentiate from British values and ways of seeing. This, then,
leads us to a consideration of the concept of the ..Antipodes", for one
can say that national identity or the national type, tn much the
same manner as the mirage, ts an optical illusion generated by
specific features in an environment and the way in which people
respond to those features. More importantly, the optical illusion of a
national type depends on ways of seeing and attributing value, or an
attitude. As Elliot (1966:51) indicates, the most persistent attitude,
through which Australia and Australlana has been seen, ts that of
the Antipodes, or the land of topsy-turvydom. According to Elliot,
this Northern European notion was bound up with the idea that,
'[tin the new world, the slate was clean, perfection was in [man's]
grasp, and [he] was yet agatn to prove his quality' (1966:52). In short,
new worlds 'always presented themselves tn terms of an expanding
human happiness' (1966:52). This ts interesting, for the value of the
Antipodes, as an attitude, ts intimately tied to a European concept of
well-being 1n an exotically new, yet strangely famtllar, landscape.
In this sense, according to Elliot, Australia did not quite make
the grade:
[a) man must arrange his mind according to his
inherited dispositions. This seems to have been even
more difficult, and therefore in many respects a slower
process, in Australia than tn America. The
environment itself was stranger; the landscape made
greater demands. There were far fewer natural
similarities than the settler had discovered 1n America;
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it was inevitable that there should be much reluctance
to accept and become identified with a landscape and
conditions of life in which so many of the articles were
novel and unfamiliar. It was the antipodes, the land of
opposites; the landscape, the plants, the birds, the
animals, all held a strangeness that kept the notion of
anomalousness before the mind. Moreover, in practical
life not only did the seeker after the lost paradise
discover that labour in this vineyard could be heavier,
and nature more uncertain in her rewards, than in the
old land; but the freedom for the spirit promised in the
new country, if it really existed -and in some real
senses it did- was purchased dear at the cost of a
forbidding isolation. To be lived in at all, the
Australian environment demanded imperatively a far
from gentle reorganization of the whole of a man's
habits and attitudes (1966:54. My italics).
In short, Australia was more antipodean than any other
"Antipodes". It was, in terms of "identifiable" values, a land of
mirages. But, while the landscape 13 was different, indicating that the
production of stories about the environment would communicate
this difference, it is equally fair to say that writing the Australian
experience cannot be totally severed from a universally acceptable
manner of producing meaning and value in the western cultural
tradition. Collins is aware of this, and his invoking of the parable of
the mirage also indicates that environmentally specific cultural
productions have both differences and family resemblances, or
particulars and universals. Readers should see Collins' Rivertna as
an environment which not only emphasises the need for ethics in
matters of artistic representation, but also as an environment which
shows that certain selections in the cultural production of a
common identity or type have, or can have, family resemblances with
an already existing body of national or cultural productions.
As Furphy stated in his 1903 review, '[t]he corresponding
penalty of [al National consciousness is a certain narrowness of
13

I will discuss landscape in more detail in the next chapter when I investigate Furphy's and Collins'
version of an Australian national type.
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outlook, a spontaneous impression that the sun rises over the
Barrier Reef, and sets behind the Leeuwin' (1969: 128). In Furphy's
view, as well as Collins', this kind of narrow awareness or
spontaneous impression is the direct result of an unnecessarily
ignorant rejection of Western culture and, more importantly,
Australia's place in the Western cultural canon. When Collins claims
that 'the coming Australian is a problem' (SIL, 144), or that a single
type is a problem because, 'lacking generations of development' like
the squatter, 'there are a thousand types' (SiL, 164), he strongly
suggests that the Australian branch cannot be severed from the
western tree. Historically, therefore, one ought to see the concept of
the Antipodes and its focus on national identity as a tug-of-war
between "Australian" and Anglo-Australian attitudes.
It might be said that what Anglo-Australians despised,
"Australians" celebrated, and vice-versa. If one considers the Boer
War. for example, one can see this conflict of attitudes emerge in the
opposing concepts of Anglo-Australian "jingoism" and Australian
"larrikinism". According to Evans et al, 'young larrtkin males (and to
some degree, their female companions) had come to be typified as the
epitome of disorderliness' while' [y]oung men who volunteered to
fight in the South African war ... were usually viewed as upstanding
examples of loyal. well-disciplined manhood' (1997:78). Indeed,
Docker (1986:52-53) draws an interesting comparison between the
"Australian" antipodes, or the world-upside-down, and Bakhtin's
concept of the carnival. suggesting that larrikinism was the popular
means by which "Australians" expressed their dislike of AngloAustralian cultural imperialism. According to Kunzle, '[t]he
broadsheet theme of the World Upside Down ... .lent itself historically
to a variety of interpretations, and was capable of fulfilling diverse
and even contrary social and psychological needs'( 1978:39-40).
But the staple diet of this broadsheet theme was the conflict of
attitudes between two opposing groups, respectively holding
dominant and subordinate social positions, who were each devalued
by the other's use of '[t]he principle of inversion' (Kunzle, 1978:41).
This conflict of attitudes appears to irk Furphy, for he sees the
"Australian" antipodean attitude, fostered by the Bulletin school and
its celebration of difference and uniqueness of identity, as an
unnecessary rejection of the western cultural canon and so an
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unnecessacy celebration of ignorance. Again, Furphy had stated to
Cecil Winter that '(t]here is much in your suggestion respecting the
causes of pessimism in the Out-back man (who is the real
Australian); but, as you say, Ignorance is at the root of it' (in Barnes
and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 124. My italics). Despite the fact that '(t]he
Empire was an emotional necessity and a source of national security
and political stability' (Stewart, 1996:5), I do not think that Furphy
nor Collins wanted Australia to follow, in a jingoistic manner, 'the
English drumbeat' (SiL, 139). In the authoring of an identity or the
creation of a national optical illusion, both Furphy and Collins
emphasise that the concept of the Antipodes, or the world-upsidedown, rather than remaining caught in the grip of two opposing
views, ought to come under the same ethical emphasis as any other
artistic process of selection and representation.
Indeed, what one finds With Collins is a synthesis of these two
extreme views, indicating that Collins, as an implied author,
presents his readers With an image of an emerging Australian type
different from the articulated images of the time. Without my
referring to specific episodes, readers ought to see this design in the
novels, especially with the contrast between Collins and the
bullockies, as well as other masculine identities in the novelistic
world of the Riverina. Furthermore, this design of providing an
alternative direction for the newly-emerging type can be found in the
numerous references to the Australian woman and her values. By
utilising the concept of the Antipodes in a positive manner, and by
employing Collins as both an implied author and a hero, Furphy
negotiates his way through the ignorant extremes of Australianism
and Anglo-Australianism to show that an aesthetic well-being is
possible because an arbitration between these two views is possible.
In short, the novels indicate that the theme of a world upside
down, or the Australian antipodean attitude, can add greater scope
to an already existing body of values in the western cultural canon 1 4.
I think Furphy would have sided With Walt Whitman's opening lines
in the 1855 preface to Leaves of Grass: 'America does not repel the
past or what it has produced under its forms or amid other politics
or the idea of castes or the old religions', for America 'accepts the
14

Because Collins is a currency lad, it is interesting to see the novels and the issues I have been
discussing as advice to the currency lads and lasses of the 1880s and 1890s, especially in matters of
authorship and artistic representation in the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia.
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lessons with calmness' (1994:383). Indeed, it is my contention that
Furphy wanted to see the self-same "antipodean" attitude take firm
root in Australia. In short, the antipodean attitude is, for Furphy,
the act of seeing value in the new world, an emphasis on ethics and
selection, and an awareness of the controlling alternatives in light of
past errors 15 • The manner in which Furphy expresses this belief will
be the focus of investigation in the next chapter, where I will discuss
Tom Collins' relationship, as both an implied author and hero, to
the newly-emerging type and the role of the self-other relationship in
the production of an identity.

15

To a certain degree, Furphy's relationship with the "past" is much more secure than that other
Australian nationalist who was influenced by Whitman, namely Bernard O'Dowd. Indeed, in
O'Dowd's poem "Australia", there is an uncertainty towards the past that makes it "the fatal nest",
rather than a series of lessons from which Australia can learn.

186.

3. Man and Identity: new worlds, guardianship and the
antipodean type.

About the time when Fred went to England, Steve
Thompson and I, confident that we were men of the
time, departed from our homes in different directions,
to fulfil, severally, our great destinies. Our efforts, by
the way, have been rewarded by a measure of success.

-The Buln-Buln and the Brolga, 1948:39-

3.1. Reading and Weaving a Nation: morality and the loosely

federated yarns.
Collins reminds his reader that, '[w]hen I undertook the
pleasant task of writing out these reminiscences, I engaged, you will
remember, to amplify the record of one week; Judging that a rigidly
faithful analysis of that sample would disclose the approximate
percentage of happiness, virtue &c., in Life' (StL, 52. My italics). But
there are many incidents in the narrative where Collins considers
censorship to be necessary. Reiterating his commitment to the reader
at a later stage in the novel, Collins states, '[o]f course, I am
committed to any narration imposed by my random election of dates;
but Just notice that perversity, that untowardness, that cussedness
in the affairs of men' (StL, 204). Because of this, the changes made
by Collins indicate a strong, ethical concern for the idea of
authorship. This is particularly so with Anglo-Australian romance
and its use of a system of values that 'persists in viewing Australian
characteristics and deviations as more or less exotic' (Furphy,
1969: 128). Equally, there is opposition to 'the fully-emancipated
native born', whose values create a 'National consciousness' with a
'certain narrowness of outlook' (Furphy, 1969: 128).
Barnes points out that, '[a]long with Lawson and Paterson,
Furphy was creating an image of the Australian type' ( 1979:36).
However, there are problems with Barnes' statement, particularly if
readers think of placing Furphy in the same school of thought as
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either Lawson or Paterson. This mistake is made by Vance Palmer,
who concludes The Legend of the Nineties by claiming that Furphy,
Lawson and Paterson 'established the type -the Joe Wilsons, the
Clancys, and the Tom Collinses- and at the same time they fixed the
habit of regarding it as a literary norm' (1963:170). But Palmer's
view, as Cantrell (1977:xxvi) suggests, is much more indicative of a
nationalist mind set in the twentieth century than a truth about the
1890s nationalist period. Indeed, the 1892 debate between Paterson
and Lawson, as discussed in detail by Bruce Nesbitt (1971), or more
recently by Mark Horgan and Michael Sharkey (1996), points to the
inconclusiveness of the debate, as well as the strategies used by
many nationalist writers to prop up their versions of bush life rather
than engage with the issue of realism set down by Lawson 1 •
Setting aside the complexity of the debate itself, it is important
to be aware of the debate's significance to Furphy and Tom Collins.
Although nationalism was an influential factor, the Lawson and
Paterson debate was not directly concerned with an emerging
national type. Rather, it was concerned with 'the bush as an
important source of artistic inspiration' (Horgan and Sharkey,
1996:66). As Cantrell explains, although Paterson 'seemed to suggest
that Lawson was merely being pessimistic about the bush, .... what
was at stake, for Lawson at least, was the whole notion of the
relationship of a writer to his society' (1977:xxi). In short, '[s]hould
the writer attempt to fabricate and idealise his experience in the
interests of a national ideal? Or should he try to depict the world as
he saw it, in spite of the hurt to himself and his readers?' (Cantrell,
1977:xxi). Although it is not a clear-cut argument, it is nevertheless
an ethical one. And it is an ethical argument in which Furphy
participated. According to Partington,
[i]f some experiences are more likely than others to
foster Absolute Truth or greater relative truths,
relationships with the land are often thought to be an
especially vital element. One of the most celebrated

---------, Of further interest is the notion that, according to Paterson, the debate was deliberately staged and had

initially been prompted by Lawson's suggesting that he and Paterson would profit by it (in Horgan
and Sharkey, 1996:69. See also Cantrell, 1971: 138 and Nesbitt, 1971:4). One wonders if Lawson had
wanted to use Paterson and his style as a vehicle for his own ideas concerning realism in art, and that
the debate, although staged, culminated into what Paterson later called 'the "undignified affair"' (in
Nesbitt, 1971:3).
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literary controversies during the period in which
Furphy was conceiving the original Such ts Life was
between Banjo Paterson and Henry Lawson as to
whether the Bush was at heart beneficent or
malevolent. Although Furphy is not a lyrical writer,
his descriptions of the vast open plains of the Rivertna
are powerfully evocative .... Yet he is on the side of
Lawson against Paterson and pours scorn on arcadian
notions of a benign AustraltaFeltx (1993:167-168).
While there is validity to Partington's claim, I do not think he
"pours scorn" on Paterson as a show of support for Lawson's antiarcadian polemic. Furphy's relationship to Lawson and Paterson is of
a much more subtle complexity than Partington states. In a letter to
Cecil Winter, dated the 28th of July, 1904, Furphy (in Barnes and
Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 169) admired the poetry of both men, although
he believed Lawson to be the greater poet. However, in a letter to
Winter, written six months earlier, Furphy (in Barnes and Hoffmann,
eds, 1995:147) mourns the loss of Lawson's poetic genius to drink
and self-indulgence. Furphy did not admire Lawson's prose,
considering it to be pessimistic and as detrimental to the artistic
uplifting and upbuilding of a true sense of community in Australia as
Anglo-Australian romance. When discussing the causal relationship
between pessimism and ignorance 'in the Out-back man' a year
earlier, Furphy had written to Winter that 'the pessimist is simply a
man who errs in his interpretation of Nature' (in Barnes and
Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 124).
According. to Nesbitt, 'Furphy was actually challenging
Lawson's major premise, not defending it' (1971:12). Furphy's letters
give us much more information about his views on Lawson than on
Paterson, yet I am inclined to think that Furphy saw some validity to
both sides of the debate. Ethically speaking, there is no difference
between Paterson's and Lawson's position in the debate, for both are
ultimately concerned with individual and communal well-being. Both
stress the importance of understanding the land and one's
relationship to it and within it, yet they do so from two opposing
styles. In this sense, the Lawson and Paterson debate offers nothing
more than an artistic stalemate. If one romanticises the land and its
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people, then one misunderstands one's relationship to the Australian
environment and one's chance of success in it. Yet, if one depicts the
grtm reality of that environment, constantly stressing struggle or
battle, then one undermines the human capacity to accept
challenges and to hope, which are two important things that a
romantic perspective can offer in the face of adversity.
Furphy appears to be aware of this dilemma, offering an
alternative way of seeing and responding. I think the following
passage from Such is Llfe is an indirect yet revealing reference to the
debate:
[i]t is not in our cities or townships, it is not in our
agricultural or mining areas, that the Australian
attains full consciousness of his own nationality; it is
in places like this [Rtvertna], and as clearly here as at
the centre of the continent. To me the monotonous
variety of this interminable scrub has a charm of its
own; so grave, so subdued, self-centred; so alien to the
genial appeal of more winsome landscape, or the
assertive grandeur of mountain and gorge. To me, this
wayward diversity of spontaneous plant life bespeaks
an unconfined, ungauged potentiality of resource; it
unveils the ideographic prophecy, painted by Nature in
her Impressionistic mood, to be deciphered aright only
by those willing to discern through the crudeness of a
dawn a promise of majestic day (SIL, 65. My italics).
Readers ought to note the style of the language, for it
oscillates between realism and romanticism. Throughout the three
novels, Collins' style is a moderation of realist and romanticist
principles, namely an emphasis on depicting the way things are, as
well as an emphasis on a way of seeing and responding where man
does not sink into pessimistic resignation. It is my contention that
Furphy wanted to present Tom Collins, in terms of character, as a
hybrid between a Joe Wilson and a Clancy, and that the debate
between Lawson and Paterson ought to be considered as an
important factor in gauging the value of Collins. Of further interest,
readers ought to see that Collins, through his status as implied
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author, indicates quite cleverly that realism, or chronicling, does not
faithfully depict what is there, but is a case of 'seeing selectively'
(Graham. 1997:89) and cannot avoid a degree of romanticising. As
Furphy points out in his 1903 review of Tom Collins' novel,
[w]hen ... reinforced by acute obseivation, and cast into
literary form, [the National consciousness] invests
with interest the minutest details of National life. Add
humour, sympathy, and felicity of phrase, together
with that rarest of mental qualities, initiative, and the
subtle touch of nature is achieved. Such fiction may be
truer than truth itself, since the latter, often
anomalous and untypical, is always part-hidden from
view. But here a new light of significance is flashed on
the commonplace; a shade of actuality softens the
bizarre; and each scene, action or colloquy, carrying
authenticity on its face, becomes an indispensable
accessory to the completed work. This describes Tom
Collins -at his best (1969:128-129).
If one recalls Furphy's stressing a truth embellished style to
Cecil Winter, then one ought to see that this idea is a mean between
the two styles set forth by Paterson and Lawson2 • According to
Horgan and Sharkey, '[t]he melancholy interpretation of the outback
had become as hackneyed as the golden age connotations against
which Lawson launched his attack' (1996:91). Because the opposing
realist and romantic styles had such sway in Australian narratives, I
think Furphy considered them to be false alternatives, for they
maintained a division and rivalry that affected the uplifting and
upbuilding of Australia. In terms of representing a way of seeing and
2

I think it is important to note that, of the three writers, Furphy is the eldest, while his implied
author, Tom Collins, is roughly the same age as Lawson and Paterson. For this reason, as well as his
fervour for The Australian Society of Irresponsibles, I tend to think that Furphy saw himself
artistically not only as a promoter, but also as a teacher of Australian art. In a letter to Cecil Winter,
Furphy writes that '[y]esterday a young swell cove of 25 (stranger to me) called on me at the shop to
ask the loan of "S'L." for a week, as he had arranged to contribute an evening's address to a local
Literary Ass. on Aus. Lit....This young fellow, I found, knew as much of Aus. Lit. as I know of
Chinese ... so I took pity on him. By arrangement, I collected all the Aus. Lit. available, which I am
to place in his hands tomorrow' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 169). Furthermore, it is quite
likely that he was, through Such is Life, attempting to educate Australian writers in matters of artistic
representation.
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responding to life which is beneficial to individual and communal
well-being, Furphy seems to suggest quite strongly that both Lawson
and Paterson respectively followed 'the devices and desires of his own
heart; telling the lies he ought not to have told, and leaving untold
the lies that he ought to have told' (SiL, 272. My italics).
With such destgns underpinning Furphy's novels, we ought to
see the value he places on observant reading, and consider Steve
Thompson's comments from the lost child episode in chapter five of
Such ts Life:

I compare tracking to reading a letter written in a good
business hand. You mustn't look at what's under your
eye; you must see a lot at once, and keep a general
grasp of what's on ahead, besides spotting each track
as you pass. Otherwise, you'll be always turning back
for a fresh race at it. And you must no more confine
yourself to actual tracks than you would expect to find
each letter correctly formed. You must just lift the
general meaning as you go. Of course, our everyday
tracking is not tracking at all (SiL, 189).
Firstly, the lost child to whom Thompson's comments refer is
Mary O'Halloran, the 'perfect Young-Australian' (SiL, 73). Keogh
(1989:61) and Scheckter (1981:69) note that Mary O'Halloran
functions as a symbol of the nation's future, and it is fitting to see
Thompson's comments as stressing the need for observant reading
and truth embellishment in light of tracking the national future.
This is particularly the case, as Furphy suggests, when it comes to
serving up the 'details of National life' (1969: 129). However, because
of the Lawson-Paterson debate, Furphy adds another dimension to
this state of affairs, and that is an ethical emphasis on the moral
ramifications of a particular genre and its articulation of life. Furphy
makes clear that the way in which an author imagines the
community or the landscape, through a chosen genre, will affect the
way people respond to life and the way the idea of nation is seen, for
these 'imaginary models ... constitute the only reality that there is'
(Graham, 1995: 129).
In short, Furphy's three novels express the modern view that
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the novel itself is a powerful medium in which the idea of nation can
be observantly read and tracked. According to Benedict Anderson,
'the novel and the newspaper .... provided the technical means for "representing" the kind of imagined community that is the nation'
(1991:25). This view can be extended to art generally. Yet Anderson is
correct to point out that the novel has the greater ability to
construct 'societies' as 'sociological entitles of such firm and stable
reality that their members ... can even be described as passing each
other on the street, without ever becoming acquainted, and still be
connected' (1991:25). As Brennan explains, '[r]ead in isolation, the
novel was nevertheless a mass ceremony; one could read alone with
the conviction that millions of others were doing the same, at the
same time' (1990:52). Bearing in mind the notion that the novel has
the capacity to imagine the unity of nation, it is now time to
consider what Furphy may have meant by his idea of a loose
federation.
In a letter to Cecil Winter, Furphy wrote, 'I made a point of
loosely federating these yams (if you understand me); till by-and-by
the scheme of "S'Life" suggested itself. Then I selected and altered
and largely rewrote 7 of these stories, until they came out as you see'
(in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 125. My italics). Barnes is
perhaps the first to propose an investigation on the effect of the
loosely-federated structure in Such ts Life. He argues that '[t)hrough
the diary plan and the interlocking narratives Furphy gives an
impression of the seeming shapelessness and uncertain
consequences of events of everyday life' (1971:130). Again, in his
monograph on Furphy, Barnes repeats these conclusions, adding
that 'Such ts Life tends to be an accumulation, an aggregation of
parts, rather than an organic unity' (1979:28-29). As Barnes later
states in his biography of Furphy, 'though he apparently talked of
writing a novel long before Such ts Life took shape, it is unlikely that
he began with a clear intention of writing a single prose work'
(1990:170). Barnes makes it sound as if great authors produce great
works, or that great works must necessarily have an unmistakable
organic unity from their initial conception to the final draft.
Perhaps one is now in a better position to understand Barnes'
notion that 'Furphy had "federated" or organised his stories around a
central idea which he illustrates: the book shows us the inexplicable
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irony of circumstance, but it does not, as Hardy's Tess of the
d'Urbervilles, imply a Vision of man in the universe' (1971:131).
Rather than an inexplicable irony of circumstance, Furphy's novel,
through Tom Collins, does imply a Vision of man in the universe,
although it may not necessarily be the same as Hardy's. This vision
of man has much to do with his need to express his sense of self and
community, and to uplift and upbuild this need artistically if there is
something morally wanting in the existing narratives on human
experience. Speaking of the 'loose federation' of episodic 'yarns' and
Furphy's 'craftsmanship,' A.A. Phillips states that '[t]o judge the
gaps, to devise a convincing means to make the additional revelation,
must have demanded a most determined energy of invention' ([1958]
1980:39). Phillips ([ 1958] 1980:39) further argues that this aspect of
Furphy's craftsmanship reflects the manner in which our knowledge
of others in society is constituted: a point with which I agree,
although I would also extend this to the knowledge of selfhood.
Barnes touches on this aspect of the novel when he explains
that, '[b]y 1893 Furphy was committed to Tom Collins and a series of
'loosely federated' narratives in which Collins's presence and mental
habtts provlded the basic connection between separate actions'
(1990:221. My italics). According to Croft, '[t]he very experience of
reading Such ts Life is indeed that of dealing with a "loose federation"
in which the federated pieces slip and slide in their hierarchy, but
never lose their federal identity' ( 1989: 1 7). This is one of the main
reasons why I think Collins ethically lays claim to 'a generally haphazard economy With poetical justice' (SiL, 52). With its "random"
acts of selection, as well as the theory of the controlling alternatives,
the idea of a loose federation is significant to the novels' View of
identity or "character". I will return to this in a moment. For now, we
need to look more closely at the idea of guardianship because it
further clarifies the relationship between morality, the national type
and Furphy's belief in a purpose. As I have cited in chapter one,
Furphy had stated the following to Cecil Winter:
Now, a man doesn't need to be a psalm-singing sneak
to admit that beyond the material elements of life,
beyond the minerals, plants and animals, beyond the
changing seasons, and so forth, there lies a purpose.
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We don't know definitely what this purpose may be;
but I don't think it is fulfilled by plethoric ·banking
accounts. Same time, I believe it is fulfilled by the
production of men and women of high moral standard,
calm courage, and clear intellect (in Barnes and
Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 124. My italics).
Or, as Furphy had written in a letter to Cathels, it seems 'to
me that the purpose of our life was to make this world somewhat less
of a disgrace to its alleged Creator' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds,
1995:49). According to Collins, 'may not the Ultimate Happiness of
the Moral Universe be in some way consistent with the crosspurposes of human life?' (RR, 260). But, as Collins also explains,
'[t)here is Joy amongst us over one blackleg of maximum ability and
minimum integrity' (RR, 227). Within this context of high moral
standards, calm courage and clear intellect, one is reminded of
Plato's idea of the Just man, namely harmony between reason,
courage and desire in the individual. It is important to note that
Plato's idea of Justice in the individual is crucial to his idea of Justice
in society, and, in this sense, it is also the key factor in his idea of
social guardianship, or the Guardians. As Plato makes clear, 'our
properly good guardian will have the following characteristics: a
philosophic disposition, high spirits, speed and strength' (Rep.
bk2.376c)3 •
Plato's idea of the Guardians is important to the idea of
uplifting and upbuilding the nation in Furphy's novels, especially
since there is a close relationship between artistic representation, a
national type or guardian-image and well-being in the community.
Discussing the education of the Guardians, Plato (Rep. bk2 .376c377c) stresses the value of first impressions that leave permanent
marks, suggesting that the education of their minds must begin with
stories of a fictional, or .. truth-embellished" nature. It is interesting
3

For those who are not familiar with Republic, it is important to note that 449a-457b, in book five,
deals extensively with equality between the sexes, concluding that the only valid difference between
men and women is a woman's capacity to bear children. Other than that, Plato sees no reason to
exclude women from the same occupations as men, including guardianship, if their aptitude for the
position deems them properly fit to fulfil the role. For this reason, the use of "man" in the phrase
"the just man" is generic, not gender specific. I think this idea underpins Furphy's emphasis on "the
production of men and women of high moral standard, calm courage, and clear intellect", as cited
above. Equally, this idea underpins Collins' emphasis on the Australienne in Such is Life. This issue
will be discussed more fully in the third section of this chapter.
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to see 'the magnificent myth' (Rep. bk3.414b-415d) and 'The Myth of
Er' (Rep. bkl0.614a-62ld) as truth-embellished stories, and that
their first impressions are meant to leave permanent marks on the
minds of the young. The result of such a move ts to provide solid
ground for justice in the individual and well-being in the community.
For this reason, Plato concludes that 'our first business is to
supervise the production of stories, and choose only those we think
suitable, and reject the rest' (Rep. bk2.377c).
To return to Furphy, this is important, for the uplifting and
upbuildtng of Australia must begin with its stories. And, since the
first impressions of stories leave permanent marks, it is fair to say
that the qualities necessary to successful guardianship must begin
with the correct representation of a type. Furphy's stress on the three
elements indicates the importance of artistically considering a
guardian-type which assists in 'the production of men and women of
high moral standard, calm courage, and clear intellect' (in Barnes
and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124).
Clearly, the guardian-type in art is intimately related to
identity, roleplay, censorship and well-being. This is equally so for
Plato, who suggests that '[i]f [our Guardians] do take part in
dramatic or other representations, they must from their earliest years
act the part only of characters suitable to them -men of courage,
self-control, piety, freedom of spirit and similar qualities' (Rep.
bk3.395c). In short, the Guardians 'should neither do a mean action,
nor be clever at acting a mean or otherwise disgraceful part on the
stage for fear of catching the infection in real life. For... dramatic and
similar representations, if indulgence in them is prolonged into adult
life, establish habits of physical poise, intonation and thought which
become second nature' (Rep. bk3.395c-d). Leaving aside the finer
details of Plato's rather problematic theory of art in book ten of
Republic, as well as the relationship between Plato's theory and
Furphy's own ideas on art, it is fair to say Furphy supported Plato's
views on the need for censorship because certain 'representations
definitely harm the minds of their audiences, unless they're
inoculated against them by knowing their real nature' (Rep.
bk10.595b). This view applies equally to Collins.
But Furphy also agreed with Plato's notion that literature
needs 'defenders' who can prove 'in prose ... that she doesn't only gtve
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pleasure but brings lasting benefit to human life and human society'
{Rep. bkl0.607d). To a certain extent, one ought to see Furphy's
novels as a defence in prose of a great variety of literature, just as
one ought to see Collins, with his 'ten masterpieces of poetiy' {RR,
53), as their chief defender. If Such ts Life is not 'a formless slab'
{Green, 1930: 127) or a narrative built by 'magpie-like greed for
information' {Green, 1961:613), then what ts the purpose of the
many and varied literacy allusions? As I have already discussed in
chapter one, and as noted by Partington {1993:147, 208), G. W.
Turner {1986:173) and Henricksen {1985:127), Furphy sees an
amalgamation of an emerging Australian culture with the European
tradition as beneficial to human life and society in Australia. As
suggested in the 1903 review, an Australian literature which offers
little more than an 'insular survey' is 'contemptible' and 'obscene'
{Furphy, 1969: 128).
The idea of seeing Collins as a defender of literature is quite
fruitful when it comes to understanding his 'affected mannerisms': a
term used by Furphy to make 'the casual reader' aware of the profuse
number of 'more or less apt ... quotations and inferences' {Furphy,
1969: 129. My italics). Gilding ts correct in stating that 'the
mannerism' reinforces 'a sense of Collins' character' {1967:210). But I
disagree with his notion that Collins' affected mannerism 'deflates
both Collins and the unrealistic way in which "poetic" notions are
entertained' {1967:210). One ought to investigate Collins' affected
mannerism within the uplifting and upbuildtng of an identity, the
theory of the controlling alternatives and the idea of a loose
federation. However, according to Hartley, '[n]ot only does literature,
and more pertinently fiction, pe,vade [Collins'] speech, but it invades
his perception' {1986:161). Employing old world literature or fiction
to see and respond to life ts not an uncontrollable phenomenon, as
suggested by Hartley's use of the verb "invade", but a looselyfederated and politically finite "fabric" woven by Collins. Nor do I
agree with Partington, who claims that Collins 'can cite the Bible,
classical myths and literature ... [as well as] a range of contemporary
political and anthropological commentators ... but [he] is rarely able
to draw an appropriate lesson from these to illustrate his argument
or to illuminate a problem' {1992: 147).
Collins' affected mannerism, being an extension of his status
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as implied author, strategically mines the serviceable material of the
European tradition in order to help weave together the value of the
unique Australian experience. For example, R.S. White notes that
'the Shakespearean element ts by no means incidental or merely a
matter of a display of learning', for '[m]any of the quotations have an
tntrtnstc connection with the situations Collins ts describing' while
'others are used to create a network of ltterary echoes and
connections that bear upon the moment' (1989: 10). In this sense,
intertextuallty ts both a political and interpretative tool in the moral
strategy of uplifting and upbuildtng the idea of nation. And it ts for
this moral strategy that otherness ts used selectively to establish a
thematically beneflctal all1ance between old and new. Even though I
have used the term "intertextuallty", which it undoubtedly ts, there
ts a much more appropriate idea for this technique: an idea with
which Furphy may have been familtar, gtven the theological interests
of his family generally. That idea ts mtdrash.
Deist and Burden explain that mtdrash ts a method whereby
one 'makes use of the so-called method of strtngtng of pearls of the
rabbis' so that one supports one's 'argument' by cttlng 'one after the
other a whole series of Old Testament texts' (1980:61 ). The reason for
this ts simply that 'these texts contain references to the idea which
[one] ts arguing about' (Deist and Burden,1980:62). According to
Jacobs, mtdrash ts '(t]he method by which the ancient Rabbis
investigated Scripture in order to make it yield laws and teachings
not apparent tn a surface reading' (1995:345). It ts a point equally
made by Deist and Burden, who add that mtdrash, as a form of
exegesis, 'quite simply means "interpretation" or "investigation"'
(1980:62). As Boyartn makes clear, '[m]uch of rntdrash presents itself
in the form of a paraphrase of the Btbltcal text 1n which verses and
parts of verses from many places in the canon are combined into a
new discourse' (1987:539-540). Boyartn states that 'mtdrashtc
reading recogntses the scope of a verse beyond tts initial context 'by
inscribing or grafting it into other [syntagmatic] chains' or contexts:
a process he calls 'recontexting' (1987:543).
Boyartn suggests that rntdrash ts basically a strategic tool for
keeping allve a cultural tradition within a troubled status quo:
the rabbis, faced with the disruption of their times,
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the destruction of the Temple and Jewish autonomy in
Palestine and with the necessity for appropriation of
Scripture for their times, found the creation of a
radically intertextual literature the ideal interpretative
and reconstructive tool, which preserved the privileged
position of the Biblical text by releasing it from its
position of immobilised totality .... The midrash reaches
its goal via a hermeneutic of recombining pieces of the
canonized exemplar into a new discourse. We thus see
how its intertextuality seroed both the revolutionary
and conservative periods of the midrash and its
authors, preserving the old wine by pouring it into new
bottles (1987:555. My italics).
Both Furphy and Collins are keen to pour old wine into new
bottles, striving to keep alive the more salient laws and teachings of
a cultural tradition by working pieces of the old canon into a new
discourse supporting rights and the new world experience. The
purpose of this is to educate an Australian readership in matters of
judgment, conduct and responsibility, and to expose them to a
cultural insight or wisdom which Furphy and Collins believe holds
true regardless of socio-economic structures or historical change in
western civilization. Partington argues that 'Furphy is somewhat
selective in quotation, since his main objectives are to attack all
forms of hierarchy and advance egalitarian principles' (1993: 151).
While Furphy and his implied author are selective about which wine
to pour, it is not true to say that they attack all forms of hierarchy,
since the main objective is to overturn the idea of aristocracy and to
advance both the idea of rights and right judgment. If and when
Furphy and Collins advance egalitarian principles, then they do so
because such principles are judged to be concurrent with both
natural and civil rights in light of uplifting and upbuilding.
Bearing in mind Collins' affected mannerism, the looselyfederated structure, and the emphasis on national character and type
through the moral idea of guardianship, we ought to now readdress
the idea of 'the observant reader' (SLL, 2). Barnes states that '[t]he
"observant reader" comes to see that Such ts Life does show how life
has "presented itself' to a very observant and exact chronicler (which
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is what Collins claims to be), who does not always grasp the
significance of what he is chronicling' (1976:153). This indicates that
the observant reader must 'assume part of the responsibility
normally carried by the narrator in a work of prose fiction' (Barnes,
1976:153). While I do not disagree with this allusion to readerresponse theory, I do disagree with Barnes' notion that the issue of
the observant reader is simply concerned with the exposure of
Collins' 'inadequacies' (1976:153). In my opinion, Barnes makes the
mistake of observing Collins simply as a narrator, ignoring the
latter's claim 'to have enough money ... to purchase the few requisites
of authorship' (SIL, 1).
The question of Collins' inadequacy or unreliability is best
explained by Collins' own confession to the reader that, '[i]n the race
of life, my son, you must run cunning, reserving your sprint for the
tactical moment' (SIL, 215. My italics). If one were to ask what must
the observant reader observe of Collins' 'fair picture of Life, as that
engaging problem has presented itself to [him]' (SIL, 2), then I would
argue that he or she must chiefly observe Collins' reasons for
censoring and his cunning articulation of the aesthetic
representation, or Collins' truth-embellished strands of national life.
On this note, it is useful to refresh ourselves with Collins' notion
that 'no person except the systematic and successful hypocrite has
too many friends, or too good a character. Any fool can get himself
hated, if he goes the right way to work; but the game was never yet
worth a rap, for a rational man to play' (SIL, 162). As Croft suggests,
'Tom's unreliability does not come from obtuseness, but from cunning
concealment' ll991:36. My italics), although Croft seems to think
that this is only applicable to the Andy Glover episode.
Put simply, one must observe Collins' dual status of implied
author and hero, and his ability to harness the mldrashlc power of
literature and its storehouse of ideas for the purpose of reconciling a
penai colony With the idea of nation, as well as challenging the value
of contemporary stereotypes, both Anglo-Australian and Australian,
which fuel division and rivarly. Collins' intellect is not, as Croft
states, like the 'soft sofa' that 'takes' on 'the impression of whomever
sat on it last' (1991:155). This statement is undermined by his earlier
and more valuable notion of Collins' cunning concealment.
One must take heed of Collins' confession that '[t]he
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reader ... is ... made aware of a power, beyond his own likes and
dislikes, controlling the selection and treatment of these informal
annals' and that '[t]hat power, in the nature of things, resides
napoleonically with myself (SIL, 263). For this reason, I disagree with
Barnes' notion that the loosely-federated structure 'turns life into a
matter of accident,· or that '[m]an has free will at moments, but he
can only exercise it blindly; he ts essentially passive, being acted upon
by circumstances' (1979:20. My italics). Although Collins ts shown to
be passive to some of the circumstances of life, his theory of the
controlling alternatives equally shows that life's loosely-federated
circumstances are actively authored, or modelled and censored, as a
means to an end.
Using the sign of the currency lad to harness the power of
language and ideas, Collins articulates "Collins" to weave an
epistemologically and morally rich environment for the community
and the idea of nation, as well as weaving together certain qualities
or crtterta for the ·national type as a loosely federated idea. Collins
suggests that the national type, as an ethically manufactured image,
must be, to some extent, a loose federation so that the type inspires
loyalty to the community and its cultural experiences. According to
Collins, '[l]oyalty to something is an ingredient in our moral
constitution; and the more vague the object, the more rabid will be
our devotion to the symbol' (SIL, 117). But the novels also express
urgency in devotion to the rtght kind of symbol. As Collins shrewdiy
states, '[i]nstead of remaining a self-sufficient lord of creation, whose
house is thatched when his hat is on, you have become one of a
Committee of Ways and Means -a committee of two, with power to
add to your number' (SIL, 71).
Despite his recurring concern with morality, many readers have
telt that Collins has a dubious moral constitution because of the
outcome of the Andy Glover episode, but I would like to point out
that Collins frequently extends his civility and follows a number of
"bush" customs throughout the novels. This is evident when Collins
comes across the stranger during the sandstorm known as the
Wilcannia shower, and gives him 'half a pint of water' from his
already low supply, as well as tobacco and an offer to lend him 'five
bob' (SIL, 267). The stranger accepts Collins' offerings with the
exception of the money, stating 'I've got a couple or three notes left;
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and even if I hadn't, I'd think twice before I touched your money.
Money's a peculiar thing' (SIL, 267). The observant reader ought to
bear in mind Willoughby's noting the 'feverish excitement and ...
demnable race for what the Scriptures aptly call "filthy lucre"' (SIL,
35). Or his noting that, '[l]ike most things in this countcy, it appears
to be a matter of £ s. d.' (SIL, 29). One can add to this the
opportunism of a great variety of characters in Such ts Life and
Rtgby's Romance, or the actions of Barefooted Bob in The Buln-Buln
and the Brolga, as well as the observations on human nature in some
of Furphy's letters.
The Wilcannia shower episode, like so many other episodes in
the three novels, evolves around the crucial issue of justice. Firstly, I
agree with Wilson's (1979:128) sharp observation that justice is the
staple theme of the very comic chapter three in Such ts Life, of which
the Glover episode is a part. However, I would like to add that the
idea of duty is equally important. Chapter three is interesting not
because the reader sees the naked Collins strategically trying to
obtain clothes, but because he encounters a lack of justice and duty
in a variety of situations, particularly in regards to Andy Glover.
With the Glover episode, it is frequently pointed out by critics that
Collins has money while Glover has none, and that Collins ignores
the ethical meditation on poverty "delivered" by his own mighty
meerschaum (SIL, 85-91). This leads Croft to state that Collins is
'too mean to share' (1991:156), a conclusion which is more or less
restated in Croft's (1996:224) last essay on Furphy.
Yet the meditation on poverty is not so much a meditation on
poverty, but an attack on the Church's disregard for 'earthly justice'
vis-a-vis their 'conception of heavenly justice', which 'is found in the
concession of equal spiritual birthright, based on the broad charter
of common humanity, and forfeitable only by individual
worthlessness or deliberate refusal' (SIL, 88). To all intents and
purposes, Collins does not tgnore his duty to Glover, nor does he do
him an injustice simply because 'purse-pride' and 'a sort of moral
laziness, together with our artificial, yet not unpraiseworthy,
repugnance to offering a money gift, had brought me out rather a
Levite than a Samaritan' (SIL, 95). Again, the Wilcannia shower
episode, as well as Willoughby's observations on the pious zest for
money in the colonies, gives the reader the necessary information
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that money is seen as a peculiar thing, and that justice is much
better extended through gifts of food, tobacco and tea or water. One
could argue that without money, even if one does view it as the root
of all evil, one could not afford to offer gifts to a 'worn and weary
brother' (SIL, 266) such as the Wilcannia stranger, or a 'bent and
haggard wreck' (SIL, 91) like Andrew Glover.
As the episode clearly shows, Collins' act of supplying Glover
with 'damper[,] ... a large wedge of leathery cheese, a sheath-knife, and
the quart pot and pannikin' (SIL, 91), as well as 'a plug of... tobacco'
(SIL, 93), does not make him a mean individual or morally dubious
because he consciously withholds his money. Furthermore, the
Glover episode is not just confined to this short encounter, for it
recurs on several occasions and, in each case, the issue of justice
and duty in human relations comes to the fore with much scope.
This is particularly the case with the "run-in" between Quarterman,
the local Justice of the Peace, and Glover with regard to the burning
of the farmer's haystack. There are several important points which
readers need to observe. Firstly, it pays to observe Quarterman's
character closely, since the outcome of the Glover episode depends
on him, not Collins. During an encounter with another swagman, to
whom he gives 'the usual civilities' of 'a pannikin of tea, some fried
fish, and the slice of the edge of a damper' (SIL, 121 ). Collins is
informed of Quarterman's character and the mood in the district:
[The swagman) followed fishing and duck-shooting for
a living; but there was so many informers about these
times that a man had to keep his weather-eye open if
he wanted to use a net or a punt-gun. People needn't
be so particular, for there was ale Q- had been warning
and threatening him yesterday, and here was the two
young Q-s out this morning at the skreek of daylight,
falling red-gum spars to build a big shed, and the ale
(man) out on horseback, picking the best saplings on
the river. Ole Q- was a J. P. His place was just across
the flat, with ,a garden reaching down to the lagoon.
Q- himself was the two ends and the bight of a
sanguinary dog' (SIL, 121).
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Collins goes to see Quarterman in order to enquire after Pup,
who had gone missing while Collins was busy stealing clothes from
the latter's washing line. Collins finds Quarterman 'dining in solitary
grandeur', and asks him if he has seen 'a big blue kangaroo dog' (SIL,
122). Quarterman's attitude is arrogant: Tm not thinking about your
dog. You and your dogt I'm thinking about a valuable stack of hay I
had burnt this morning; and you've given me a clue to the
incendiary' (SIL, 123). This is interesting, for Collins had given
Quarterman no clue whatsoever in regards to the perpetrator who
burnt his haystack. Collins' playful description of his 'informer' (SIL,
122) are answers to Quarterman's questions concerning just how
Collins came to know that Pup was on his property. In other words,
Quarterman simply assumes that Collins' informer is the same man
who burnt his haystack. What is even more interesting is
Quarterman's own aptitude for knowledge. From a textual point of
view, the interview between Collins and Quarterman unfolds over
three pages, and the observant reader can safely assume that the
interview lasts approximately ten to fifteen minutes.
During this time, Collins is subjected to a variety of name
changes. At the beginning of the interview, Collins introduces
himself and, contrary to Barnes' (1976:165) opinion, he does not gtve
an alias nor does he play a role. Quarterman acknowledges Collins'
name, using it three times only. From the fourth time onwards,
Collins is addressed by the following names respectively: 'Mr.
Connell', 'Mr. O'Connell', 'Mr. O'Conner', 'Mr. Connor' (SIL, 123),
'Mr. Connelly', 'Mr. Conway' (SIL, 124), 'Mr. Connellan', and 'Mr.
Collingwood' (SIL, 125). This is despite the fact that Collins, shortly
after being addressed as Mr. Conway, is asked by Quarterman for his
'address' (SIL, 124). Collins informs his reader that 'I wrote my name
and official title, giving our departmental office in Sydney as a fine
loose postal address, and laid the paper beside the magnate' (SIL,
124. My italics). Collins authorially shows that the Justice of the
Peace is careless with any evidence given to him. Glover's
incarceration for burning the hay stack does not happen because
Collins had purposely implicated Glover with the crime.
Addressing Quarterman diplomatically, Collins confesses that
'I can't help taking a certain interest in this matter. Would it be
impertinent in me to ask who the person was that saw the suspected
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incendiary up the river on yesterday afternoon?' (SiL, 124).
Quarterman replies that his informant is 'Mr. Arthur H-', who is a
'[v]ery respectable man, having personal knowledge of the incendiary'
(SiL, 124). Once agatn, Quarterman is careless in matters of criminal
inquiry, since observant readers know that Collins is the incendiary
for whom the Justice of the Peace is looking. Collins himself tries to
point this out: 'I think you will agree with me that a successful
criminal prosecution is a Pyrrhic victory at best. At worst- that ts, if
you fail to prove your case; and, mind you, it's no easy matter to
prove a case agatnst a well-informed man by circumstantial evidence
alone- if you fail to prove your case; then it's his tum, for malicious
prosecution; and you can't expect any mercy from him' (SiL, 124).
Collins reiterates his point: '[y]ou may be morally certain of
the identity of the scoundrel, but your proofs require to be legally
impregnable' (SiL, 125). Collins cites the Johnson case, where '[t]he
scoundrel...got at Johnson for false imprisonment', stating that
'[y]ou hold the incentive in reserve, I think you said?' but '[p]ardon
me- is it a sufficient one?' (SiL, 125). According to the angry
Quarterman, '[i]t don't take much incentive to be sufficient for a
vagabond without a shirt to his back!' (SiL, 125). Collins continues
to press home his point: '[t]rue ... but "Seek whom the crime profits",
says Machiavelli. What profit would it be to such a scoundrel to do
you an injury, Mr. Q-?' (SiL, 125). Quarterman's answer is indicative
of the division and rivalry between currency and AngloAustralianism: '[t]he propertied classes is at the mercy of the
thriftless classes' (SiL, 125). It is for this reason alone that the
Justice of the Peace is determined to bring the incendiary 'to the
book', making 'an example of him' and to 'make him smoke for it'
(SiL, 123).
Quarterman backs down from arguing 'the matter' any further
with 'Mr. Collingwood', noting from the written information Collins
gave him that '[y]our business keeps you on the move' and that he
ought to see his daughter, 'Miss Jemima, and tell her I authorise her
to gtve you the dog. And a very fine dog he ts' (SiL, 125). To all
intents and purposes, Quartennan's moral stance is ftnnly based on
a customary prejudice, which has probably been strengthened by his
being the victim of arson 'at Ballarat' (SiL, 123), and his role as
Justice of the Peace appears to do nothing more than perpetuate the
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ignorance and injustice of the ongoing division and rivalry in the
colonies. This conclusion is further supported by the evidence
surrounding the haystack itself. When Collins sees Jemima
Quarterman, she tells him that
[f]ather's not himself to-day .... He blames us for
burning an old straw-stack; and I'm sure we never
done it. Mother's been at him to burn it out of the way
this years back, for it was right between the house and
the road; and it was '78 straw, rotten with rust. But
I'm glad we didn't take on us to burn it, for father's
vowing vengeance on whoever done it; and he's awful
at finding out things' (SiL, 126).
Collins tries to convince Jemima that the fire could have been
started in a variety of possible ways. According to Jemima, '[i)t seems
very reasonable, sir....Anyway, I'm glad the old stack's out of the
road. The place looks a lot cleaner' (SiL, 127). From the information
given, the valuable haystack is not so valuable after all. But
Quarterman's desire to prosecute the vagabonds and thriftless
classes puts Glover in an awkward position. As Quarterman states to
Collins, whom he calls Mr. O'Conner, 'I been the instigation of
bringing more offenders, and vagabonds, and that class of people, to
justice than anybody else in this district. If I'd my way, I'd stamp out
the lawless elements in society' (SiL, 123). One wonders how many of
these "offenders" suffered much injustice through the prejudices of
men like Quarterman. Also, the fact that Glover suffers from both
opthalmia and deafness makes him unable to defend himself against
the quick and clever prosecution of the Justice of the Peace, and one
further wonders just how Just Quarterman is by taking advantage of
Glover and, perhaps, others like him.
It is after the retelling of this episode (SiL, 294-296) that
Collins extends his duty and a sense of justice to Glover once more,
by giving him his opthalmia glasses which had lent an air of
authority to his scholarly guardian-type. I agree with Croft
(1991:201) that Collins understands his role in the incarceration of
Andy Glover, but I do not think that the incarceration itself is the
surprise which leads Collins to censor his recognition of Glover. Nor
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do I agree with Indyk (1986:314-315), who suggests that Glover is
Collins' double, and that the return of the swagman towards the
close of Such is Life makes Collins unwillingly accountable for his
earlier actions, which had led to Glover's imprisonment. As I have
discussed, Collins does not attempt to escape the issue of justice or
duty, since it is fundamental to his concerns with uplifting and
upbuilding. Collins' cunning concealment of his identity is part and
parcel of avoiding the wrath of Glover's mate, Terrible Tommy
Armstrong, who is 'one of your practical, decided, cocksure men;
guided by unweighed, unanalysed phenomena, and governed by
conviction alone- the latter being based simply, though solidly, upon
itself {SIL, 296-297).
Terrible Tommy Armstrong is no different from Quarterman
and it is more than likely that Collins would prefer to wait for a
tactical moment. Agreeing with Barnes {1993:46), I find that much of
the confusion in this issue is the result of misreading Collins' role in
the episodes involving Andy Glover. But I would equally extend this
observation to Collins' role in the novels. According to Richters,
'Such is Life chronicles the moral history of its narrator and
culminates in his fall from ... grace at the moment when he fails or
refuses to acknowledge even to himself the identity of the swagman
[Glover)' (1979:246). Because of this, Richters concludes that 'the
central and possibly the unifying subject of Such is Life ... is the
history of Tom Collins' moral decline' {1979:246). In support of this
conclusion, Richters states that Furphy, as an author, is concerned
with 'the problem of man's "fallen" nature ... through the actions as
well as the theories of his narrator' (1979:257. My italics). Indeed,
Richters writes that 'Furphy grapples with the further paradox not
only of a recalcitrant reality but of a recalcitrant philosopher whose
very philosophizing puts his humanity at risk' {1979:257J.
I do not follow Richters' point, since many episodes in the
three novels show Collins actively involved in the promotion of
humanity within the context of equality, liberty, fraternity and the
idea of happiness. Although Indyk notes that '[t]here seems to be
nothing about himself that he isn't prepared to alter if the situation
demands it', I have problems. with his notion that Collins'
'pragmatism lends itself so well to the evasion of responsibility that
it must raise the question as to whether there can really be any
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morality in his attitude at all' (1986:314). It is true that Collins is
pragmatic, executing suitable roles for certain situations, but he
does not have a morally vacant attitude. Indyk seems to indicate this
when he concludes that '[t]he diversity of his social "parts" allows no
escape from the claims of social equality and moral responsibility'
(1986:315). Whenever Collins does play a role, deceiving a particular
character, he does so for a specific moral purpose. For example,
Collins deceives Glover's mate and Avondale's boundary-rider,
Terrible Tommy Armstrong, into believing that he is a fellow Scot,
but the purpose of this deception is to find a safe-haven for Warrtgal
Alfs bullocks until Alf recovers from his illness (SIL, 160).
Nor do I agree with Croft's notion that '[t]he progress of the
novel [Such ts Life] shows the gradual deterioration of Tom from the
energetic and charitable being of the first chapters, to the dandified
conservative of the last chapter, whose callous but necessarily selfish
treatment of Andy Glover is the final glimpse we are given of him in
this novel' (1996:218). If Collins' treatment of Glover is necessarily
selfish, then why bother to discuss Collins' gradual deterioration or
moral decline? Would it not be better to investigate the idea that
Collins is cruel to Glover in order to be kind? And, if this were the
case, what purpose would it serve? Nevertheless, Croft believes that
'[c]lothes are the stgns of this deterioration' because Collins, having
'accumulated a bell-topper', semtotically shifts from an egalitarian
image to a 'symbol of the bloated plutocrat' ( 1996:218). Since Collins
never describes it, how does Croft know Collins' manner of dress in
the initial stages of the novel? Rather than a bloated plutocrat,
these clothes, along with the mighty meerschaum pipe, are meant to
symbolize scholarly presence and authority.
Contrary to Croft's notion, Collins does not 'forget his simple
duty to give alms and relieve the suffering of a fellow human being'
(1996:225). Besides the Glover and Wilcannia shower episodes,
readers ought to note that Collins helps Rory O'Halloran by giving
him money, as well as his 'Shakespear as a keepsake, with a billy
and pannikin, and a few days' rations' (SIL, 63), or the convivial way
in which he shares tobacco with Willoughby (SIL, 34). And readers
ought to bear in mind Collins' calm courage, clear intellect and high
moral standard during Warrtgal Alf s illness, particularly with the
rescue of Alfs bullocks from impoundment at Yoongoolee station.
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This is despite the fact that Warrtgal Alf is first introduced as an 'evil
natured beggar' (SIL, 6) by Mosey, and that his reputation with the
rest of the bullockies is no different, particularly William Cooper.
Collins is not, as Suarez-Lafuente argues, 'a theorist' who is 'too
slow and irresolute for action' (1994:45). Nor is Croft rtght to say
that 'Tom is the epitome of that Wesleyan ethic which Rigby
attacked, and which Joseph's elder brother John, epitomised -a
committed Christian who nevertheless is quite happy to accumulate
while others starve' ( 1996:225).
But this leads us to consider what kind of moral Justice and
duty the novels put forth. Given the relationship between Glover and
Quarterman, it is fair to say that the idea of justice in the novels is
shaped by an informed proportionalism, rather than actions based
on hearsay or ignorant speculation. Also, because Justice requires
action, it pays to bear in mind Collins' theory of the controlling
alternatives, since any course of action must be decided on the basis
of its ethical consequences. In short, the novels shape the idea of
Justice in light of consequentialism. The interesting thing to bear in
mind, though, is the equally strong emphasis on duty, or deontology,
whereby any action must be carried out within a given framework of
customary moral imperatives, as suggested by the idea of a national
type. Although consequentialism and deontology stand opposed, it
appears Furphy believed that neither can escape the requirements of
the other, and that morality is best served by a proportional appeal
to law, custom and situational ethics. Such a view is concurrent
with the rest of his thought, particularly his emphasis on natural
and civil rtghts in the 'practical, workable code of daily life' of the
'Sermon on the Mount' (SIL, 89).
3.2. Half Bushman and Half Bookworm: identity, well-being and
the guardian-type.

That Collins, as implied author, is preoccupied with the
aforementioned issues is perhaps what Furphy, writing to Stephens,
meant by 'the plan of the book is not like any other that I know of, at least I trust not' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:29). In a
letter to Franklin on the subject of My Brilliant Career, Furphy wrote
that 'our Joint yet independent record ought to demonstrate the
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existence of a bush-born type somewhat different from the crude
little semi-savage of conventional Australian fiction' (in Barnes and
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:148). I think readers are meant to see Collins
not only as this bush-born type, but also as the ground for the
national type. Furthermore, I think Furphy believed that the selfsame observation could be made about Franklin's Sybylla Melvin,
and it is interesting to bear her in mind when investigating Collins'
artistic rendering of the Australienne. Bearing in mind Plato's
comments about first impressions and permanent marks through
fiction, it ts my contention that Collins, as the implied author,
creates and articulates a truth-embellished image of hts self in order
to flesh out artistically the right qualities of an Australian type.
Because Collins ts concerned with guardianship, readers ought to see
him as a personification of Furphy's belief in the relationship
between a 'purpose' and 'men' with 'high moral standard, calm
courage, and clear intellect' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds,
1995: 124.).
Collins should be seen as an artistic rendering of Plato's three
elements in the individual, demonstrating the need for their balance
in order to achieve just actions toward people and society. It ts
interesting to note that Collins refers to himself as 'Plato' (BBB, 121,
125), and that he clings 'to Plato's beautiful thought ... that no soul
misses truth willingly' (SlL, 87). What ts this truth? Given that
Collins' thematic concerns take their cue from similar themes in
Republic, thiS truth can be defined by the undeniably damaging effect
of Ignorance, division and rivalry. For this reason, Collins stresses
the importance of education because it teaches one the skills to
judge justly for well-being, both socially and individually. Nowhere ts
thts more pertinent in both the novels and Republic than the first
impressions and permanent marks of arttstic representation in light
of guardianship. The truth that no soul will miss willingly is to
safeguard the right way of seeing life and responding to life for wellbeing.
As Socrates makes clear, this argument 'ts not a trivial one',
for 'our whole way of life ... ts at Issue' (Rep. bk. l.352d). With thts in
mind, Collins' notion that 'we always think in words' (RR, 137) ts a
rather revealing one, as ts his statement that '[w]e are not such stuff
as dreams are made on, but precisely the reverse' (RR, 261). For thts
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reason, to know that one thinks in words is as important as knowing
how to judge the impact of one's thought within the context of
natural and civil rights. As Collins states, nothing is 'worse than a
locally-seated and curable ignorance which makes men eager to
subvert a human equality, self-evident as human variety, and
impregnable as any mathematical axiom' (SiL, 87). Insofar as Collins'
intellectualism is concerned, I think Furphy would have agreed with
Milner's view that '[t]he function of the radical intellectual was to
connect immediate objective to long-term ideal, in a rhetoric that
could inspire both idealism and practical action' (1988:263). In a
discussion on the psychological bases of national identity, William
Scott states that identity and identification 'is a definition of self in
terms of group membership', and that 'national identity may be
represented as a [geometrical] congruence between self-concept and
nation-concept' (1991:33).
But he is quick to point out 'that there are degrees of
identification' (1991:34). While it is fair to say that 'judged
characteristics of the nation may be incorporated into the self, it is
equally important to note that 'judged characteristics of the self may
be projected onto the nation' (Scott, 1991:34). For Scott, this kind of
'identification seives primarily to strengthen the ego against a hostile
world by associating the self with a powerful other' (1991:34).
Bearing in mind Collins' affected mannerisms, Scott's comments are
beneficial to an understanding of Collins' uplifting and upbuilding in
the novels' order of things. However, in Collins' case, there is also a
greater awareness of one's impact on individuals and society,
particularly with what one sees, weaves and projects onto the wider
community through narrative. Readers should not see Collins'
articulating his self, as ground for a national type, merely as an
egoistic defence against a hostile world. Instead, readers ought to see
that the self he projects onto the national type is one which
emphasizes a high moral standard, calm courage and clear intellect.
Any hostility is reseived for all forms of ignorance which undermine
these qualities in guardianship.
Overall, the image of the national type supported by the novels
is best explained through Furphy's own description of himself,
namely '(h]alf bushman and half bookworm' (in Barnes and
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:156). Defending his own learned style to the
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reader, Collins states that 'this habit of mine was acquired early in
life, when my chief ambition was to emulate, or even excel,
Macaulay's erudite "schoolboy'" (BBB, 89). More importantly,
any genial pedant that casually assumes you to know
who Oliver Cromwell was -when, in point of fact, you
neither know nor want to know- is an angel of light
compared with the transparent prig who, in simple
sentences and words of one syllable contends (as in a
book lying before me now) that the landlord is the
greatest of all benefactors, seeing that to him the
tenant owes his hovel, his pig-sty, his hen-house -in a
word, his foot-hold on the crust of this planet.
Distrust the presumptuous snob who avowedly writes
down to an implied standard of adult information or
intelligence, thus adding the insult of condescension
to the injury of sinister purpose (BBB, 89).
The value of education has little to do with education for its
own sake, but with a strategic need to foreground democracy and
rights. For this reason, it is important to note that Collins' use of
the term philosophy, or philosopher, should be seen within the
context of a way of life, not simply a focus on academic argument or
logic. Even though Plato's and Furphy's views on democracy differ,
this view parallels Republic, where Socrates is presented as the
embodiment of a moral and intellectual style of life towards the good.
As Trevor Saunders explains, '"Platonic justice" is an internal,
psychological state, the condition of functional harmony between the
rational, spirited and appetitive "parts" of the soul, a harmony
crucially characterized by the domination exercised by reason and
knowledge' (1987:26-27). Indeed, the idea of supervising the
production of stories, as well as Plato's theory of art, strongly
supports this kind of interpretation, for censorship suggests that the
value of first impressions is wholly dependent on the idea of
permanent marks in light of the good, which is the effect first
impressions have on well-being.
To return to the novels, Plato's idea of the good, as an
emphasis on well-being, contributes to their central theme, further
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qualifying the idea of u pllftlng and u pbuilding within the context of
democracy and rights, as well as clarifying the reason for a concern
with the ethics of artistic representation, truth-embellishment,
guardianship and the national type. Whether or not he was aware of
the term, Furphy's novels show a deep concern for the Socratic idea
of eudatmonta. According to Saunders, "'[h]apptness" ts the
conventional but somewhat misleading translation of eudatmonta. It
ts not primarily afeeltng, a warm glow of serenity and contentment;
it is rather an objective state of affairs, something like "achievement
and success in living"' (1987:25). As Saunders explains, 'Socrates'
view of the world was fundamentally teleologtcal. He saw it as a
rationally ordered structure, in which men, like many other things,
have a function. That function ts to fit in with the whole; that ts
what man ts, in some sense.for' (1987:25). Furphy's view of the world
seems to be similarly teleological, gtven the consistent use in the
novels of the phrase "such ts life", as well as the phrase "the order of
things".
In this sense, '[t]o fit in, to fulfil one's function, ts presumably
advantageous and leads to happiness [eudatmonta]' and '[m]oral
knowledge ts, therefore, knowledge of that function' in light of
knowtng 'what will bring good and what will bring evil' (Saunders,
1987:25). With this in mind, it pays to recall Collins' notion that
'[a]lternate sunshine and rain is the law of Nature; alternate smiles
and tears ts the law of human life; and this rhythmic reaction ts as
necessary to healthy moral being as the tide to the sea, or the wind
to the atmosphere' tBBB, 23). Since the novels are concerned with
eudatmonta, it ts fruitful to bear in mind the general view of the
national type in the 1890s. As White has already noted, 'many
Australians were not content simply to be proved worthy of the old
stock: some were so bold as to suggest that the new type was in fact
a decided improvement on the old' (1981:73). Indeed, 'the virtues of
the convicts, their enterprise and self-reliance, were said to have
been passed on to the Australian type, while their faults had been
bred out' (White, 1981 :75).
In an age preoccupied with eugenics, White states that 'the
idea of a national type reinforced ideas about the importance of
"character" in the lives of men and women', for 'national prosperity,
morality, and so on were thought to result from national character'
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(1981:65). Bearing in mind Scott's (1991:33-34) views on the degrees
of identification between self and nation, the novels stress that the
national type must be a symbiosis of self-qualities and otherqualities, and not simply a narrow provincialism. Discussing the
notion that 'almost any serious writer' aims to make 'his reader a
different person from what he was before', Northrop Frye states that
'[t]wo forms of identity are involved in studying a work of literature.
There is identity as, which is a basis of ordinary knowledge, and is a
matter of fitting individuals [or things] into classes' (1990:77). And,
'[t]here is also identity with, which has several dimensions' (Frye,
1990:78). According to Frye, '(a] metaphor of the "A is B" type
expresses an identity with that is not found in ordinary experience',
so that '(i]dentity in this context means unity with variety' (1990:78).
Frye's views are quite applicable to Furphy's authorial
intentions for two reasons. Firstly, the midrashic style of the novels,
through Collins as the implied author, treats the national type as a
categorically intertextual and recontextual process. Secondly, the
educational dimension of the novels, through Collins' heroic self,
approaches the national type as a vehicle for well-being, or a
metaphorical identity-with the idea of the good. Although he does not
connect Collins to the idea of authorship, preferring to approach him
as a character and narrator, Wilson does obseive that 'Tom creates
himself out of his diary entries', for 'both his clarities and opacities,
his sharpness and obtuseness, are self-bestowed' (1979: 135. My
italics). Discussing the closing paragraph, which is concerned with
roleplay, Wilson states that '[t)he last sentences are important. They
indicate the most difficult task of all in an anatomy of how (and
what) men know: the problem of knowledge has both an outside and
an inside; thus everyone must be an object of knowledge to himself
(1979:142). But, given the focus on individual and communal wellbeing, this view needs to be qualified, for the value of the self as an
object of knowledge cannot be divorced from eudaim.onta.
For this reason, I must disagree with Partington, who states
that 'Furphy clearly believed that personal identity was already
highly ambiguous in the Riverina. Collins' chameleon-like character
may be a portent of a future in which the emancipated self can
assume almost any role or point of view and possess very little otherdirected social content and social identity' (1993: 145). Partington's
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comment is problematic, since identity, as the novels indicate,
cannot be divorced from its social context, nor from the social idea of
the good or well-being. But one should not take this to mean that
iden tlty is wholly determined by the social, for the idea of
authorship, along with the theocy of controlling alternatives, stresses
the complexity of individually articulated roles throughout "life". As
Wilson notes, '(a]ll (characters) play roles, and all imply more than
they tell' (1979:142). In short, '(r)ole-playing is not limited to
Tom ... but pervades the novel in multiple instances' (Wilson,
1979: 142). Because of the nature of the discussion, it is important to
consider the followlng, if somewhat lengthy, declaration by Collins:
0. W. Holmes remarks that each of us is the totting-

up of two columns of figures -paternal and maternal.
This is true of the vecy small baby; it is not true of the
adult. The latter is the totting-up of one column,
namely, his own self-discipline -headed, to be sure, by
Holmes's twofold total as a single item .... Certainly,
self-discipline is vecy largely directed and limited by
extraneous conditions (BBB, 7).
And,
lilt is an axiom of mine -and in no way clashing with
what I said just now touching the column of figures,
headed by Holmes's twofold total- that a man, if not
trimmed, espaliered, and pot-bound, by routine
systems of education or social conventionalities,
naturally burgeons into a specialist. I would go so far
as to say that, not only is each individual designed to
do something well, but he is fashioned by Nature to do
that something better than anybody else. Man, though
born in a state of deplorable helplessness and sottish
ignorance, is inherently dowered with certain
rudimentacy talents. These, reaching the dignity of
joey-faculties, are developed, this way or that way, by
the operation of a Will, which (never forget) is in tum
moulded by outward conditions. And there being no
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such thing in Nature as uniformity of power, the
strongest of these faculties -circumstances being
favourable- dominates and dwarfs the rest .... Under
present conditions, we find one man who can do
nothing but cheat; another who can do nothing but
show off; another who can do nothing but loaf;
another who can do nothing but toil. And so on (BBB.
15-16).

Given its emphasis on the shaping of character and identity,
readers ought to be aware of three very pertinent elements in the
passage, name]y education, experience and aptitude or talent. In the
prelimtnacy discussion to the idea of Justice, society and
guardianship, Socrates states that 'no two of us are born exactly
alike. We have different natural aptitudes, which flt us for different
Jobs' (Rep. bk.2.370b). More importantly, it ls 'better to exercise one
skill [techne]' than 'to try to practise several', Just as '[l]t ts fatal in
any Job to miss the right moment for action' (Rep. bk.2.370b). One
could say that Collins' aptitude for roleplay ls naturally suited to the
skills of authorship and, With an educated awareness of matters
regarding eudatmonta. he chooses the rtght moment to weave together
a truth-embellished and loosely-federated national image, hence his
Joy at being unemployed. As Socrates states, '(q]uantity and quality
are therefore more easily produced when a man specializes
appropriately on a single Job for which he ts naturally fitted, and
neglects all others' (Rep. bk.2.370c).
For this reason, Socrates concludes that 'we should make it
our business, if we can, to choose men With suitable natural
aptitudes for the defence of our state' (Rep. bk.2.374e). According to
Socrates, '[i]n other cases this does not matter much -the
community suffers nothing very terrible if its cobblers are bad and
become degenerate and pretentious; but if the Guardians of the laws
and state, who alone have the opportunity to bring it good
government and prosperity, become a mere sham, then clearly it ts
complete]y ruined' (Rep. bk.4.42 la). Although he would not disagree
With these points, especially With the poor examples set by the
colonial governments in the federation debate, I think Furphy
believes that the degeneration of skills and moral principles in the
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community does harm the community. Given the many episodes
where Collins either sets or makes a moral example, the novels
strongly suggest that 1t ts important to safeguard aptitude, skills and
eudaim.onl.a at all levels of human interaction, especially 1f one
desires to achieve and maintain a national community.
Yet Plato ts aware of this fact, for he has Socrates state that
'cohesion' ts 'the result of common feelings of pleasure and pain
which you get when all the members of a society are glad or sony at
the same successes and failures' (Rep. bk.5.462b). His solution ls to
make words which denote possession a communal idea, rather than
an individual one, so that '[o]ur citizens, then, are devoted to a
common interest, which they call my own; and in consequence
entirely share each other's feelings of joy and sorrow' (Rep.
bk.5.464a). Despite his sharing Plato's belief in the need for a
common good, Furphy shows this to be very problematic, given the
sheer complexity of life in the daily plebiscite and peoples' tendencies
to privilege natural rtghts over civil rtghts in light of desire. One only
needs to look to the first chapter of Such ts Life to see that some of
the bullockies' opportunism undermines any true sense of
community because of degenerated skills and moral principles. This,
in turn, affects their identity or roleplay, their opinions of others and
other's opinions of them, which ultimately find a voice and a value
in thP. much grander narratives of Australian national identity and
experience.
Given the novels' concerns with eudatmonta, it ls interesting to
note that the idea of the good finds equal voice in the thought of
Epictetus, whom Furphy called 'that grand old stoic' because he
made 'the path of self respect ... so plain, so attractive, and so
practicable' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:147). However,
unlike Plato's exclusive concern with a guardian class, Epictetus
seeks to make the principles of eudatmonta applicable to all. In a
discourse entitled 'What Is The True Nature Of The Good?', Epictetus
states that 1t ls 'the power to understand how [to] deal
with .. .impresstons' (Dts. bk.2.8.6). Elsewhere, he states that '(t]he
~!')f'riflr m:::itP.rtal that the good and noble man works upon is his own
governing faculty ... and it ls the function of the good man to deal
with his impressions in accordance with nature' (Dis. bk.3.3.1). And,
in an earlier discourse, Epictetus states that 'if you ask me what is
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the good of man, I can only reply to you that it consists in a certain
dlspostti.on of our choice' (Dis. bk.1.8.16. My italics). For this reason,
'it is the task of the educated man to form a rtght judgment in
all ... cases', for 'whatever the difficulty that afflicts us, we must bring
forward, the appropriate aid against it' (Dis. bk.1.27.2).
As the first passage of Enchetridion strongly implies, eudatmonta
is knowing that '[s]ome things are up to us and some are not up to
us' (1990:325). If we recall Enchetrtdion's emphasis on roleplay,
especially its claim that your choice 'is to play the assigned part well'
because the choice of the role 'belongs to someone else' (1990:329),
then it is important to see that one's identity is based on the rtght
judgment of certain impressions in light of the good, or well-being.
Bearing in mind Collins' concern with authoring and censoring
certain impressions, chiefly those of characters or identities who
upset or have the potential to upset the uplifting and upbuilding of
an Australian identity, the idea of personal and national identity in
the novels is conceived no differently from Plato's concern with
aptitude, skills and eudatmonta, nor Epictetus' concern with
impressions, disposition and judgment. Collins' discussion of the
theory of the controlling alternatives uses Shakespearean identities
to look at the results of certain choices and consequences, due to
certain aptitudes and judgments, within the context of the good or
well-being. With Hamlet as the first example, Collins states that
up to a certain point of time, the Prince governs his
own destiny -at least, as far as the Ghost's
commission is concerned, and this covers the whole
drama. He is master and umpire of his circumstances,
so that when two or more lines of action, or a line of
action and a line of inaction, appear equally
efficacious, he can select the one which appears to be
of least resistance. But subsequent to that point of
time, he is no longer the arbiter of his own situation,
but rather the puppet of circumstances. There are no
more divergent roads; if he desires to leave the one he
has chosen, he must break blindly through a hedge of
moral antagonisms. His alternatives have become so
lopsided that practically there is only one course open.
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The initial exercise of judgment was not merely an
antecedent to later developments of the plot; it was a
Rubicon-crossing, which has committed the hero to a
system of interlaced contingencies; and the tendency of
this system bears him away, half-conscious of his own
impotence, to where the rest is silence. The turning
point is where Hamlet engages the Players to enact the
Murder of Gonzago (SIL, 69).
Referring to Othello's question, '"Who can control his fate?"',
Collins replies, '[n)o one indeed. But every one controls his options,
chooses his alternative. Othello himself had independently evolved
the decision which fixed his fate, recognising it as such an
alternative' (SIL, 69). To return to the issue of identity, or roleplay,
one can say that its articulation, or the art of playing, is an option
which, as a major or minor alternative, fixes one's fate toward a
certain direction. This seems to be the case with Macbeth, for Collins
states that '(t)he interest of the play centres on the poise of incentive
between action and non-action, and the absolute free will of election.
But that election once made, we see -and the hero himself
acknowledges- a practical inevitableness in all succeeding atrocities
which mark his career as king' (SIL, 69).
This observation is applicable to Collins' use of the other two
key Shakespearean identities. In other words, the articulation of an
identity is central to the issue of choice and consequence, as well as
the issue of judging one's first impressions correctly, particularly in
light of eudalmonia. Illustrating the point that numerous judgments
concerning impressions or aptitudes are made unwisely, Collins
states, 'how often do we accept a major-alternative, whilst innocently
oblivious to its gravity!' (SIL, 69). According to R.S. White, '(lit seems
perfectly valid -and quite helpful- to argue that each of Shakespeare's
tragic heroes makes a profoundly important decision which turns out
to be either misguided (in the case of Othello), or compulsive
(Macbeth), or wilful (Lear), or conscientious (Hamlet) -and that none
of these decisions is initially contemplated solely on a moral level'
(1989:20).

But, while 'Macbeth and Hamlet do indeed debate the moral
nature of their future conduct', I must disagree with R.S. White's
219.

notion that 'they can be seen as just as "irresponsible" in their own
ways as Collins' (1989:21. My italics). Regardless of how one sees
Hamlet, Othello or Macbeth, Collins is far from morally
irresponsible. Nevertheless, for R.S. White,
Collins' theory ... can steer us away from what I regard
as the two great dead-ends of Shakespearean criticism:
the notion of the "flawed hero", which becomes fairly
irrelevant, and the notion that Shakespeare is
somehow mystically interested in morality as an
abstract philosophical issue rather than as embedded
in the impetuous actions of men and women played
upon the stage in gripping narratives. It also
encourages us not to accept the "heroes" at their own
estimate but instead to focus attention on their
actions and the consequences for others in the play
(1989:21)
Although R.S. White's observations concerning the net result
of Collins' theory are very astute, I must disagree with his notion
that the theory makes the issue of a tragic flaw irrelevant. It is more
than likely that Furphy was familiar with the idea of the tragic flaw,
and he may have taken it to mean an ill-judgment based on aptitude
and impulse in light of a major alternative of choices and
consequences. I do not think one should take this to mean, as
Partington does, that 'fatal decisions are the result of basic character
defects in great minds' (1993:212). This is an oversimplification, for it
suggests that tragic consequences are unavoidably determined,
thereby nullifying the issue of choice. If one considers the tragic flaw
within the context of natural aptitude or disposition, remembering
that Collins' concern with uplifting and upbuilding shows him
equally concerned with impressions and judgment, then one could
say that Shakespeare's tragic heroes serve to illustrate the complex
relationship between one's aptitude, one's choice and the
consequences of one's identity and action on others in light of
eudaimonia.

Given the nature of the discussion so far, I must also disagree
with Barnes' notion that '[t]he central character, Tom Collins, is
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fully established as a personality, but we do not receive the
experience through his mind' {1971:118-119). Nor does Furphy,
according to Barnes, 'attempt to record the movement of the human
mind' ( 1971: 119). Opposing Furphy to Vtrgtnta Woolf, Barnes
explains that 'his concern is with the pattern of events, not the
human consciousness', and so '[h]e creates characters from the
outside, as they appear to the observer', revealing 'them mainly
through their speech' (1971:118). While this last point ls not untrue,
I find Barnes' claims to be a good illustration of an incorrect use of
intertextuality as an interpretative tool. The assumption that Woolfs
style is t:he style for mapping the movement of the human
consciousness, and the conclusion that Furphy's style, because it is
not like Woolf s, does not concern itself with the mind, are simply
fallacious.
More than any other quality, readers identify with Collins
through his mind. More importantly, the development of "his" novels,
because of uplifting and upbuilding, concern themselves chiefly with
the many aspects of the mind's movement through time and space,
namely first impressions and permanent marks, aptitude, education,
judgment, choice and consequence, and eud.atmonta. Barnes may be
correct in saying that '[a]s a writer, he [Furphy) has more in common
with the comic novelists of the eighteenth century than with the
psychological realists of his own time' (1979:35), but this does not
mean that 'Furphy ls no explorer of feelings' because 'he shies away
from the region of private experience', or that the novel has an 'inner
emptiness' {Barnes, 1979:24). Beartng in mind my contention that
Collins is a phUosophe, one ought to see his inner life as an inner
Enlightenment, whereby the aforementioned issues concerning the
mind and eudatmonta are passionately addressed to his observant
reader, his philosophical confidant. Nowhere is this more prevalent
than the various meditations in the three novels.
Given the importance of artistic representation, guardianship
and the national type in the novels, the meditations illustrate
Collins' fundamental belief in the self-evident truth of rights,
education and rational judgment to the uplifting and upbuildtng of
Australia and its national type. As Collins states, '[e)rudition, even
in the humblest sphere of life, is the sweetest solace, the unfailing
refuge, of the restless mind; but if the bearer thereof be not able to
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do something well enough to make a living by it, his education is

simply outclassed, overborne, and crushed by his own superior
ignorance' (SIL, 34). Furthermore, this situation is equally the case
for Furphy, as the many letters discussing ignorance-shifting and the
essay on world federation testify. More importantly, each meditation
tackles a particular issue in order to stress the universal value of fine
tuning one's judgment for amendments in knowledge and artistic
representation, thereby foregrounding the role of the mind and inner
life to achieve eudaimonta. No example from Such ts Life better
illustrates this need for the fine tuning of judgment than Collins'
meditation on gentlemen (SIL, 31-34), which is the first to occur in
the novel, as noted by Wilkes (1985:4-5).
Taking pity on Willoughby's struggles, Collins states that '[h]e
was a type -and, by reason of his happy temperament, an exceedingly
favourable type- of the "gentleman," shifting for himself under
normal conditions of back-country life' (SIL, 32). Because of this,
Collins launches his attack:
Urbane address, faultless syntax, even that good part
which shall not be taken away, namely, the calm
consciousness of inherent superiority, are of little use
here. And yet your Australian novelist finds no
inconsistency in placing the bookish student, or the
city dandy, many degrees above the bushman, or the
digger, or the pioneer, in vocations which have been
the life-work of the latter (SIL, 32).
Using Willoughby, Collins' point is to illustrate that outdated
or inappropriate values in art, within the context of first impressions
and permanent marks, lead to ill-judgment and unnecessary struggle:
Without doubt, it is easier to acquire gentlemanly
deportment than axe-man's muscle; easier to criticise
an opera than to identify a beast seen casually twelve
months before; easier to dress becomingly than to
make a bee-line straight as the sighting of a theodilite,
across strange country in foggy weather; easier to
recognise the various costly vintages than to live
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contendly on the smell of an oil rag. When you take
this back elevation of the question, the inconsistency
becomes apparent. And the longa of Art, viewed with
the brevts of Life, makes it at least reasonable that
when a man has faithfully served one exclusive
apprenticeship, he will find it too late in the day to
serve a second. Moreover, there are few advantages in
training which do not, according to present social
arrangements, involve corresponding penalties (SIL,
32).
Collins' attacks on the idea of gentleman should be seen
within the context of judgment, aptitude, skill and eudatmonta.
Discussing the dangers of 'ignorance' in '[ e]ach sphere of life' (SIL,
32), Collins does not reject the idea of gentleman entirely, but seeks
to recontextualize it in light of the idea of rights, as well as the
aptitudes and skills naturally suited to life in the back-country.
Despite the fact that an actual gentleman, who 'was brought up so
utterly and aristocratically useless', ts deemed to be 'mentally and
physically ... fit for anything',
(o]ur subject is not the "gentleman" of actual life. He
ts an unknown and elusive quantity, merging
insensibly into saint or scoundrel, sage or fool, man or
blackleg. He runs in all shapes, and in all degrees of
definiteness. Our subject is that insult to common
sense, that childish slap in the face of honest
manhood, the "gentleman" of fiction, and of
Australian fiction pre-eminently (SIL, 32-33).
Indeed,
it ts surely time to notice the three-penny braggadocio

of caste which makes the languid Captain Vernon de
Vere (or words to that effect) an overmatch for half-adozen hard-muscled white savages, any one of whom
would take his lordship by the ankles, and wipe the
battlefield with his patrician visage; which makes the
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pale, elegant aristocrat punch Beezlebub out of Big
Mick, the hod-man, who, in unpleasant reality, would
feel the kick of a horse less than his antagonist would
the wind of heaven, visiting his face too roughly;
which makes a party of resourceful bushman stand
helpless in the presence of flood or fire, till marshalled
by some hero of the croquet lawn; above all, which
makes the isocratic and irreverent Australian fawn on
the "gentleman," for no imaginable reason except that
the latter says "deuced" instead of "sanguinary," and
"Jove" instead of "by sheol." Go to; I'll no more on 't; it
hath made me mad (SLL, 33).
Collins suggests that if Australian art does not change its
attitudes or values to the idea of gentleman, then its first
impressions and permanent marks will leave too many in an illprepared state, making grave misjudgments about their aptitude and
skill to survive in the back-country. In short, Anglo-Australian art
perpetuates a mindset where too many will struggle like Willoughby,
for the environment will quickly level the utterly and artistocratically
useless man:
And don't fall back upon the musty subterfuge which,
by a shifting of value of the term, represents
.. gentleman" as simply signifying a man of honour,
probity, education, and taste; for, by immemorial
usage, by current application, and by every rule which
gives definite meaning to words, the man with a shovel
in his hand, a rule in his pocket, an axe on his
shoulder, a leather apron on his abdomen, or any
other badge of manual labour about him -his virtues
else be they as pure as grace, as infinite as man may
undergo- is carefully contradistinguished from the
"gentleman". The "gentleman" may be a drunkard, a
gambler, a debauchee, a parasite, a helpless potterer;
he may be a man of spotless life, able and honest; but
he must on no account be a man with broad palms, a
workman amongst workmen. The "gentleman" is not
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necessarily gentle; but he is necessarily genteel.
Etymology is not at fault here; gentility, and gentility
alone, is the qualification of the ·gentleman' (SIL, 33).
According to Croft, '(Collins] does, it is true, indulge in a
number of attacks on the concept of a gentleman, but we should be
sensitive to his inconsistencies and contradictions' (1991:88). There
is neither inconsistency nor contradiction in the attacks. Instead,
one ought to see Collins' meditation as an attack launched by a
gentleman and a phnosophe against an aristocratic idea of gentleman,
which keeps 'the Lower Orders' (SIL, 34) from self-evident rights such
as the uplifting and upbuilding of their personal and national
identity. Collins does not attack the idea of gentleman in order to
nullify it entirely, for he is 'no more inclined to decry social culture
than moral principle; but (Collins acknowledges] no aristocracy
except one of service and self-sacrifice, in which he that is chief shall
be servant, and he that is greatest of all, servant of all' (SIL, 33. My
italics).
One only needs to re-examine the dialogue between Willoughby
and Collins after his first meditation to note that the issue of
sharing tobacco is designed to foreground the importance of social
welfare between men of the Rivertna (SIL, 34). In this sense, it is
important to note that the transaction occurs between two 'types' of
gentlemen, namely Collins and Willoughby, against a background of
heroes who indulge more in opportunism than egalitarianism.
Barnes is rtght to note that Willoughby is 'an anti-heroic version of
the English gentleman' (1990:218). But, rather than an attack on
Willoughby's own character, the meditation on gentleman is, for
Collins, the first of many meditations where he strategically attacks
the aristocratic principles of Anglo-Australianism in both art and
life. Again, I shall appeal to Croft who argues that '(m]any readers
will disagree violently with the notion of Tom Collins as a gentleman,
but I would ask them to look carefully at what we see of Tom in
Furphy's works' (1991:88). But Collins' idea of the new world
gentleman does not involve an acceptance of old world attitudes.
Dutton is wrong to conclude that 'Tom Collins, complete with
ragbag of disorganised knowledge and Shakespearean quotations, (is]
lost somewhere between the gentleman and the bullock-driver, and
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belonging to neither species' (1965:15. My italics). Collins is far from
lost. Like Willoughby, Collins wants to make himself 'mutually
agreeable' so that 'the natural result is a grace and refinement' (SIL,
35) of character. However, this should not be seen as a pandering to
Anglo-Australian custom or values. Instead, Collins' idea of a
gentleman is not aristocratic, but defined by the principles of the
Rights of Man, which he considers to be fundamental to the uplifting
and upbuilding of the Australian nation and its type. For this
reason, Willoughby's notion that such a measure of grace and
refinement can only be achieved through 'inherited wealth' (SIL, 35)
is overturned by the consistent stress on equality, education and
rational Judgment in light of the good or well-being. As Collins
states,
[t)o be sure, there are men of social culture who
gallantly and conspicuously maintain an all-round
superiority in the society to which I myself hereditarily
belong, namely the Lower Orders; but their
appearances are like angel's visits -in the obvious, as
well as in the conventional but remoter sense. I can
count no less than three men of this stamp among my
ten thousand acquaintances. When the twofold
excellence of such ambidexters is not stultified by
selfishness, you have in them a realised ideal upon
which their Creator might pronounce the Judgment
that it is very good. Move heaven and earth, then, to
multiply that ideal by the number of the population.
The thing is, at least, theoretically possible; for it is in
no way necessary that the manual worker should be
rude and illiterate; shut out from his rightful heirship
of all the ages. Nor is it any more necessary that the
social aristocrat -ostentatiously useless, as he
generally is- should hold virtual monopoly of the
elegancies of life (SIL, 34).
As I have discussed several times throughout this thesis, the

contrast between the old and the new is a strategy of equal force in
the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson. One can say that Emerson is
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also concerned with guardianship, and that his guardian-type is best
articulated in 'The American Scholar'. On an Epictetian note,
Emerson states that '(t]he office of the scholar is to cheer, to raise,
and to guide men by showing them facts amidst appearances. He
plies the slow, unhonored, and unpaid task of observation' (( 18371
1985:95). Furthermore,
[t]he scholar is that man who must take up into
himself all the ability of the time, all the contributions
of the past, all the hopes of the future. He must be an
university of knowledges. If there be one lesson more
than another which should pierce his ear, it is, The
world is nothing, the man is all; in yourself is the law
of all nature, and you know not yet how a globule of
sap ascends; in yourself slumbers the whole of Reason;
it is for you to know all; it is for you to dare all
(Emerson, (1837] 1985:103-104).
Emerson argues that '(l]ife is our dictionary. Years are well
spent in country labors; in town; in the insight into trades and
manufactures; in frank intercourse with many men and women; in
science; in art; to the one end of mastering in all their facts a
language by which to illustrate and embody our perceptions' ([ 18371
1985:93). As Collins states, 'there is something well worth study in
the spectacle of a man' (RR, 227). According to Emerson, '(c]olleges
and books only copy the language which the field and the work-yard
make' (11837] 1985:94). And, in this sense, 'Man Thinking must not
be subdued by his instruments. Books are for the scholar's idle
times' (Emerson, (183711985:89). But, from reading Furphy, one gets
the impression that books do more than Just "copy" the language of
the "field" and "work-yard". They creatively give shape to life. Perhaps
it might be said that the book which thematically treats life is more
important than life itself. This is because the book unifies the
experiences of life and embeds those experiences with a purpose.
Emerson makes clear that '(e]ach age, it is found, must write
its own books; or rather, each generation for the next succeeding.
The books of an older period will not flt this' (118371 1985:87-88). If
and when this occurs, then there is 'creative reading as well as
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creative writing' (Emerson, (1837] 1985:90). In short, '[w]hen the
mind is braced by labor and invention, the page of whatever book we
read becomes luminous with manifold allusion. Every sentence is
doubly stgnifl.cant, and the sense of our author is as broad as the
world' (Emerson, [ 1837] 1985:90). Barnes argues that '[Furphy] did
not want to accept the generally pessimistic forecasts of the evolving
Australian type' ( 1990: 233). Indeed, 'the character of Tom Collins
himself is a denial of the commonly accepted view of Australians as
having no interests in things of the mind, and the whole work
implicitly denies that English society provides a norm against which
the Australians will be found wanting· (Barnes, 1990:233). As
Emerson explains,
[t]he main enterprise of the world for splendor, for
extent, is the upbuUdtng of a man. Here are the
materials strewn along the ground. The private life of
one man shall be a more illustrious monarchy, more
formidable to its enemy, more sweet and serene in its
influence to its friend, than any kingdom in history.
For a man, rightly viewed, comprehendeth the
particular natures of all men. Each philosopher, each
bard, each actor has only done for me, as by a
delegate, what one day I can do for myself ([ 1837]
1985:99-100. My italics).
Because Collins is meant to be seen as the Australian scholar, I
must disagree with Barnes' notion that '[t]he fictional world of Such
ts Life is notable for its "absences". Collins is a man on his own: his
background is suggested only in the vaguest way, and no clear sense
of his biography emerges from the narrative' (1990:222). Collins'
background is marked purposefully by a multiplicity of occupations
rather than vagueness. Among others, he is seen as a civil servant
(25, 37) and ex-bullock-driver (46) in Such is Life, as a drover (xviii)
and a swagman (249) in Rtgby's Romance, and a mechanical expert
(1) in The Buln-Buln and the Brolga. Because readers first see him as
a 'Deputy-Assistant-Sub-Inspector' (SiL, 94) and 'an official of the
ninth class' (SiL, 37), it is interesting to bear in mind the idea of the
public or civil servant and compare Collins with his superior,
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Rudolph Winterbottom.
The result of such a comparison is quite fruitful, for
Winterbottom's only merit for securing his official position appears
to be his place in an Anglo-Australian aristocracy. As Willoughby
states, 'I scarcely think Mr. Rudolph Winterbottom holds any
Government situation. His private fortune is fully sufficient for all
demands of even good society. Ah! now I have it! His son Rudy -his
third or fourth son- holds some appointment' (SiL, 38). Within the
context of the national type as a scholarly guardian-image and the
novels' aforementioned concerns, as well as Collins' own scholarly
aptitude and skills, Rudolph Winterbottom hardly seems fit to hold a
position which is superior to Collins. Despite his Anglo-Australian
paternalism, Winterbottom is artistocratically useless, and Collins
unveils this fact by showing his readers Winterbottom's letter, in
which Collins is given his official orders with 'child-like penmanship'
and 'chance-like orthography' (SiL, 131). To all intents and purposes,
the comparison between ..Collins" and Winterbottom allows Collins,
as implied author, to foreground the injustice to the idea of rights.
More importantly, Collins' numerous occupations and roles
foreground the scholar's various connections to the "system",
suggesting that he is out to neutralise rivalries and is himself an
emerging sign of the national type in all its complexity and looselyfederated diversity. Like Whitman, whose relevance I will discuss a
little more in a moment, Collins lays claim to his "self' as being
'large' and containing 'multitudes' (Leaves of Grass, 79). And, like
Emerson, who originally expressed this synthesis of the one and the
many in the character of the American Scholar, Collins wishes to
make clear that 'Man is not a farmer, or a professor, or an engineer,
but he is all. Man is priest, and scholar, and statesman, and
producer, and soldier .... Man is thus metamorphosed into a thing,
into many things' ([1837] 1985:84). For this reason I must disagree
with H.P. Heseltine, who states that
... the intricate complexities of plot create an enormous
gap between the ultimate purpose of the novel and the
stuff of which it was made. By a tremendous effort of
the will and imagination Furphy bridged that gap
through the very artifice of his plotting, an effort
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which for once allowed a nineteenth-century novelist
almost to escape the tyranny of an uncertain self
(1986:8. My italics).
There is actually no gap between the ultimate purpose of the
novel and the stuff of which it was made, for the loosely federated
sketches of National life focus the reader's attention on the need for
an imagined community through the uplifting and upbuilding of
Australia. Collins may claim that '[w]e know what we are, but we
know not what we shall be' (SIL, 70). But this should not be seen as
a confession of uncertainty. Instead, this claim ought be seen within
the context of Collins' capacity as scholar and teacher for both the
bullockies and his readers. In other words, rather than an uncertain
self, one ought to see a preoccupation in the novels with the truthembellished self. And, given the issues discussed in this section, one
can say that Collins attempts to teach an appropriate way of seeing
and responding to life for the sake of eudaimonta. In a letter to Kate
Baker, placing great value on her vocation as a teacher, Furphy
writes '[y]our work will never perish. Your contribution to the sum of
human progress is definite and genuine' (in Barnes and Hoffmann,
eds, 1995:99).
Given Furphy's emphasis on the importance of creating a
eudatmontcally truth-embellished self, it is interesting to compare
Collins to Whitman. Collins makes several important allusions to
Whitman. In Such ts Life, Collins states that 'whatever else a man
sings, he always sings himself. But you must know how to interpret'
(258). In Rtgby's Romance, the allusion is more direct, for Thompson
reminds Collins of the 'ten masterpieces of poetry' the latter had told
him about 'at Deniliquin in the spring of [18]72' (53). Included in the
'ten masterpieces' is 'any poem of Walt Whitman's' (53), which
suggest that Leaves of Grass itself may be one of the ten
masterpieces.
Of further interest is Collins' notion that Pup, his kangaroodog, is 'a law unto himself (RR, 240): a phrase used by Whitman, in
his poem, 'For Him I Sing', to express his intent to awaken the
natural self-reliance of the new world Man or American Adam, which
I will discuss more in a moment. Although Pup's antics throughout
the novels suggests that to be 'a law unto himself means to be
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unruly, I do not think that this is entirely the case. The phrase also
foregrounds Pup's natural self-reliance, and it ts this idea of a
natural self-reliance, tempered by a moral consciousness, which
readers need to bear in mind when dealing with Collins. I think this
is what Furphy meant when he wrote to Cathels, asking him for
information on Kingsley's novel, that 'Tom C., like Pup, is a law unto
himself (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:42). However, Pup ls
self-reliant or "a law unto htmself' in a natural order of things, while
Collins is self-reliant or "a law unto himself' within the moral
constraints of a human order.
Besides Furphy, another strong supporter of Whitman was the
Australian poet, Bernard O'Dowd, whom Furphy described to Cecil
Winter as 'an ideal democrat -able and scholarly, strong and
sympathetic, temperate and uncompromising, absolutely without fear
and without reproach' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:132).
According to McLeod (in McLeod, ed, 1964:9-17), O'Dowd addressed
many groups, including The Australeum and the Australian Natives'
Association on the spirit of Whitman and democracy. Indeed, when
one reads the letters O'Dowd wrote to Whitman (in McLeod, ed,
1964:18-39), one becomes aware of the great zeal the former had for
his "teacher". Perhaps Furphy had had personal discussions with
O'Dowd or had listened to him g1v1ng a public address on Whitman
and democracy, since '[h]ls son Sam was a member of the Australian
Natives Association for a short while in the 1890s' (Barnes,
1990:156).
Setting aside Whitman's status as real author, one of the first
observations that can be made about Whitman's Leaves of Grass is
its rendering of Whitman as both implied author and hero, or creator
and created. Indeed, the ideas of truth-embellishment and well-being
are key themes throughout the work. As Whitman wrote in 'Song of
Myself, '[lJong enough have you dream'd contemptible dreams,/ Now
I wash the gum from your eyes' (LG, 75). For this reason, one can say
that Whitman is also a teacher of a way of seeing and responding to
life which is conducive to eudatmonta. In other words, Whitman is
concerned with the uplifting and upbuildtng of America.
Furthermore, considering that the self-same themes exist in both
Leaves of Grass and the three novels, readers ought to note that
Collins and Whitman, within the idea of authorship, write from an
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enlightened belief in equality, liberty and fraternity, creating a truthembellished, heroic self as full expression of these beliefs.
Collins' 'Riverina' and Whitman's 'America' represent the
genesis of a nation and the means by which a new people shall rise.
As R.W.B. Lewis explains, '[i]n the case of Whitman, the type of
extreme Adamtc romantic, the metaphor gains its power from a
proximity to the literal, as though Whitman really were engaged in
the stupendous task of building a world that had not been there
before the first words of his poem' (1962:114). Speaking of the
mystical dimension of 'Song of Myself, Miller Jr explains that '[t)he
traditional mystic attempted to annihilate himself and mortify the
senses in preparation for absorption into the Transcendent' while
'Whitman magnifies the self and glortfi.es the senses in his progress
toward Union' (1962:93). Or, as Lewis notes, 'Whitman acted on the
hopeful conviction that the new Adam started from himself; having
created himself, he must next create a home' (1962: 115). In this
sense, 'the Adamic personality.... had to become the maker of his own
conditions -if he were to have any conditions or any achieved
personality at all' (Lewis, 1962: 115).
In his poem, 'For Him I Sing', Whitman declares,
For him I sing,
I raise the present on the past,
(As some perennial tree out of its roots, the present on
the past,)
With time and space I dilate and fuse the immortal
laws,
To make himself by them the law unto himself.
(LG, 1994:9. My italics).
What is implied by this 'law unto himself? Firstly, that a man
can be made a law unto himself is the staple theme of Leaves of
Grass. In this sense, 'For Him I Sing', as well as 'One's-Self I Sing',
function as a prelude to the artistic uplifting and upbuilding of man
by way of the self-evident, natural and civil rights of all men and
women, which were established by the French National Assembly and
its Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens in 1789,
supported by Paine ([ 1791 J 1995) and asserted by Jefferson's
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Declaration of Independence. Regarding these prefatory poems,
Middlebrook states that they establish 'the identity of .. Myself," or
"the Real Me," as a fiction -the personification of an act of
imagination' (1974:27). I think Whitman's style is a perfect example
of Furphy's idea of truth-embellishment, for identity in Leaves of
Grass is more than simply an imaginative act or fiction. Rather,
Whitman's style employs the new world to create the new world,
telling the lies he ought to have told. In this sense, identity is an act
of eudatmontc creativity which attempts to establish the justice of
'self and 'nation' through man's self-evident rights, or his being a
law unto himself.
As Collins had stated, 'human equality' is as 'self-evident as
human variety, and impregnable as any mathematical axiom' (SlL,
87). In short, '[t)he principle of being a law unto one's self means
self-reliance' (Briggs, 1968:213. My italics). Or, in the words of
Emerson, who coined the term,
[t)here is a time in every man's education when he
arrives at the conviction that envy is ignorance; that
imitation is suicide; that he must take himself for
better for worse as his portion; that though the wide
universe is full of good, no kernel of nourishing com
can come to him but through his toil bestowed on that
plot of ground which is given to him to till (1985
[1841 ): 176).
Whitman, as both the implied author and hero, is the prophet
of a nation with the new covenant or gospel, Leaves of Grass, under
his arm. He is prepared to assert his new-found identity through an
act of self-reliance and 'tum the bridegroom out of bed and stay with
the bride myself (LG, 59). As Briggs notes, '[Whitman) maintained
that nature and the cosmos or God are not significant but for the
soul of man. Man gives meaning to the universe' (1968:66). According
to Whitman, 'I hear and behold God in every object, yet understand
God not in the least' (LG, 77). In this sense, '[t)he reality of God for
Whitman is in man, not either theism or pantheism or deism or
atheism' (Briggs, 1968:86). Nor is the reality of God evident in an old
world order of kingship, divine rtght and aristocracy, as indicated by
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the injustices of George III against the American colonies.
Paine, arguing against Burke's theological 'catalogue of
barriers ... between man and his Maker', asserts that '[t]he Mosaic
account of the creation' fully expresses 'the unity or equality of man',
which 'places him in a close connection with all his duties, whether
to his Creator, or to the creation, of which he is a part' ([ 1791]
1995:118). Briggs explains that 'Whitman made a synthesis of enmasse and individual, which was his conception of true democracy',
emphasizing 'the independent indMdual worth of every man and the
necessity for self-reliant individuals under the protection and
encouragement of just law and free government' (1968:213). But
Whitman's synthesis of individual and en-masse must be seen within
its proper context, namely the idea of self-reliance and the God-given
natural and civil rights for all men and women.
From Collins' frequent meditations to Whitman's loafing with
'a spear of summer grass' (LG, 27), one can argue that Collins'
novels. like Whitman's Leaves of Grass, are a 'gift', reserved 'for some
hero, speaker or general,/ One who should serve the good old cause,
the great idea, the progress and freedom of the race' (LG, 11 ). One
could also imagine Collins singing to his novels the words Whitman
had sung to his volume of poems: 'falter not O book, fulfil your
destiny' (LG, 4). Like Whitman, Collins thinks he is 'no
sentimentalist, no stander above men and women or apart from
them' (LG, 47). And, like Whitman's 1855 Preface, Collins similarly
believes that the '[g]reat genius and the people of these states must
never be demeaned to romances' (LG, 497. My italics). Whitman
states that '[a]s soon as histories are properly told there is no more
need of romances' (LG, 497): a statement which can greatly assist the
reader's understanding of the designs in Collins' truth-embellished
diary.

In 'By Blue Ontario's Shore', Whitman speaks of '[a) nation
announcing itself in which he shall 'reject none, accept all, then
reproduce all in my own forms' (LG, 297). Whitman's "self' sets out
to become the national image of redemption and, in his 1855 preface
to Leaves of Grass, Whitman's Emersonian spirit proclaims that
'America does not repel the past or what it has produced under its
forms or amid other politics or the idea of castes or of the old
religions .... [America) accepts the lessons with calmness .. .' (LG, 483).
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ThiS seems to be a direct defence of the Declaration of Independence
and its stress on self-evident rights, for Whitman argues that
'Americans of all nations at any time upon the earth have probably
the fullest poetical nature' and 'the United States themselves are
essentially the greatest poem' (LG, 483). But, according to Whitman,
America is great not just because America accepts the lessons of
history with calmness, but because America 'is ... a teeming nation of
nations' (LG, 483).
Joseph Jones (1976) notes that the American nineteenthcentury nationalist movement is an influential index for the shaping
of Australian nationalism. However, despite the influence on some
Australian writers of Paine, Jefferson's Declaration, Emerson and
Whitman, Jones does not link Furphy to this line of thought.
Bearing in mind the rich diversity of nationalities in the Rivertna,
the novels imply that Australia has the potential to be great because
she too can be a teeming nation of nations. Nevertheless, Jones is
content to leave the American influence on Furphy with Bellamy's
Looking Backward, thus categorizing Furphy's work, especially
Rtgby's Romance, as primarily socialist and Furphy as a
'workingman's apostle' or 'the spokesman of labour' (1976:101).
Thus, ·rugby's views are Furphy's' while 'the narrator "Tom Collins"
opposes him as a conservative counterfoil' or simply 'plays the fool'
(1976:102). In an article written eleven years later on American and
Australian literary connections and disconnections, Kiernan (1987)
cites Jones' conclusions, maintaining much the same attitude
towards Furphy and Collins as Jones.
But, rather than socialist, one ought to see the concern with
labour and labouring classes in the novels as humanist. This
humanism is a direct result of the right to equality, liberty and
fraternity for all men and women, not just the aristocracy. As Barnes
notes, '[t]hose who have taken Tom Collins to be a representative of
the Bush Legend have seldom acknowledged just what an oddity he
is' (1990:204). Contrary to Barnes' (1990:157) earlier notion, this
observation must equally be extended to include both Furphy's and
Collins' relationship to socialism. To illustrate the point, let us look
at how Collins does not flt comfortably into the "either/ or"
categories of Kate Schaffer's list concerning "the typical Australian":
a list much more suited to Lawson or the Bulletin's journalistic style.
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Typical Australian

Other

('me')

(not-me)

practical
rough and ready manners
natural/ common man
lmprovisor / original
'near enough' standards
laid back
skeptical of
religion
intellectual/ cultural
pursuits
Jack/ egalitarian
fiercely independent
a mate
swears/ gambles/ drinks

theoretical
polished manners
affected/ civilized man
planner/ derivative
exacting standards
hard working
believer in
religion
intellectual/ cultural
pursuits
master/ elitist
officious authority
an individual
controls swearing,
gambling. drinking
containment
(Schaffer, 1988: 19-20).

freedom

One can say that Collins, as both implied author and hero,
purposefully conflates this "self-other" list at most points,
challenging only the issues of swearing, gambling and drinking.
Although Collins had made a bet with Moriarty, one needs to
remember that even Moriarty had noted Collins' opposition to
gambling (SiL, 225). In other words, Collins' wants to see the typical
Australian as a manifestation of both sides of the list, with the
exception of certain qualities which jeopardise eudatmonta. This is
more than likely the case, for Thompson, stressing his acquaintance
with Collins since their youth, states that, regardless of what they
did, 'lilt was always his way' (SiL, 24). Yet, in the words of Thompson
-words which can be connected authorially to Collins- Tom Collins
[c Jomes as near the blackfellow as it's possible for a
white man to get. And you couldn't kill him with an
axe. Then start him at any civilized work -such as
splicing a loop on a wool rope, or making a yoke, or
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wedging a loose box in a wheel- and he has the best
hands in the country. At the same time, it's plain to
be seen that he has been brought up in a class of
society that sticks a napkin, in a bone rtng, alongside
your dinner plate (SiL, 25).
Within the context of an ethically proper representation of the
Australian type in literature, Thompson's speech applauds the allround achievements of Collins' identity vts-a-vts the other bullockies'
scathing comments, including his own earlier comment that Collins'
'philosophy mostly consists in thinking he knows everything, and
other people know nothing' (SIL, 24). But, whether or not Collins'
abilities are true is not the issue. It is more than likely that Collins,
as the implied author who controls the content of the bullockies'
dialogue, is serving up a truth-embellished, heroic self-hood. But it
is truth-embellishment in keeping with guardianship, with uplifting
and upbuilding for eudaimonla. Collins' identity cannot be studied
without obseivantly reading the many issues surrounding uplifting
and upbuilding. Although Wilson is right to note that Tom's 'identity
is far more elusive than the simple judgments of the first chapter
permit' (1979:141), Collins gives ample clues to his own heroic
identity as a half bushman and half bookworm.
Because this is the case, it interesting to note the role of the
bullockies. The importance of this matter is tied directly to the way
in which Collins orients and articulates his self-image as the ground
for the national type within the uplifting and upbuilding of the
nation. This is especially apparent in his inquiries on the "Coming
Australian" and the "Australienne". Croft may conclude that 'the
agents of redemption in Furphy's novels are women' (1991:272), but
the image of man is also stylistically drawn to be an agent of
redemption. As I will discuss more fully in the next section, it is fair
to say that only some images of women in the three novels are agents
of redemption, for the character of Maud Beaudesart is neither an
agent of redemption in Collins' novels nor in Furphy's novels. But
before we can come to this issue, we must explore the redemptive
potentiality of men in the narratives, since it is crucial to the
masculine image of the scholarly guardian-type presented by Collins.
If, for Furphy. the real Australian is 'the Out-back man' (in
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Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 124), then one can see that
Furphy's rendition of the bullockies is a depiction of a "raw" social
system which can uplift and upbuild Australia. But, while issues
such as the duffing of grass and the drought foreground the rivalry
and struggle between 'the Lower Orders' (StL, 34) and an 'Australian
aristocracy' (StL, 26), the novels also foreground an opportunistic
rivalry in the Lower Orders that circumvents any attempt at
communal purpose. One is reminded of Furphy's earlier comment
that life's 'purpose' will never be 'fulfilled by plethoric banking
accounts' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124). For example,
Collins indicates that the newly arrived Scot, 'Tom [Armstrong] had
acquired, without any severe wrench of his finer feelings, the
boundary man's hostility to the bullock driver' (SlL, 159). Given
Collins' views, this customary hostility is unnecessary. Nor is it
necessary that, generally speaking, '[e]ach of us supported his
argument with a wealth of illustrations and thus fortified his own
stubborn opinions to his own perfect satisfaction' (SiL, 48).
Nevertheless, the bullockies ought to be seen as part of the raw
material for nationhood, since they represent the social class for
whom the Rights of Man were written. Consider the following
exchange between Collins and Lushington in Rtgby's Romance:
"It takes my breath away," murmured Lushington.

"I've been strangely misinformed respecting the
erudition of bullock drivers. Latin and Milton. Are they
all like this?"
"Certainly not. Other branches of knowledge are
no less ably represented. They excel chiefly as
linguists" (RR, 121).
Although Lushington, a man educated in law (RR, 120) is
impressed by Thompson's commitment to memory of Milton's verse,
the emphasis is not on the bullockies' ability to learn or swear, but
their reasons for learning. As Collins tells his readers, Thompson
'told me that he had committed to memory this particular passage,
thinking it might come in handy for courting purposes' (RR, 121).
Equally, Dixon's commitment to learn Latin from Willoughby was
not an acquisition of knowledge for the sake of ignorance-shifting or
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the upbuilding of man, but a desire to possess a knowledge by which
to beat one's rivals. As Dixon states, '[w]hen you git into an
argument with a feller, you can jist watch yer (adj.) slant an' lay the
opponent over with a sort o' bull's-eye phrase, an' he ain't got a word
to say. What the (sheol) can he say?' (RR, 37). Dixon's learning
simply perpetuates rivalries between men because he has the
potential to frustrate hiS opponent with 'edicated words' (RR, 37). As
Collins replies, '[y]es, it gives you an unmerciful purchase .... But a
man should spread his studies a bit' (RR, 37)4.
While the bullockles' aptitudes and skills show promise, the
raw material needs to be shaped, hence the focus on the value of
judgment, education and ignorance shifting in the novels. Both
Furphy and Collins believe that education would smooth over the
division, rivalry and opportunism which pitted man against man,
colony against colony and the colonies against federation.
Furthermore, it seems evident that Furphy wanted to counteract the
apathy and fear of bushmen towards their own ignorance. As Collins
explains, '[a]mongst well-bred bushman, lack of information is
always carried off by august indifference; otherwise there would be
derogation of dignity. Of course, in cases where assistance can be
rendered or advice given, a certain chastened interest is even
justifiable, but this interest must be purely objective, and entirely
foreign to anything like curiosity or solicitude' (RR, 241-242). But,
while '[t)he bushman must know all that may become a man',
Furphy, as well as Collins, work to remedy the general notion that
·anything that [the bushman] doesn't know ... isn't worth knowing'
(RR, 242).
Old Price's notion that Thompson's curse 'was invidiously
owin' to yer own (adj.) misjudgment' (S#L, 19) is significant, as
regards the following excerpt from a dialogue between Rigby and
Thompson:
"... Steve! I have known and respected your father for
five-and-twenty years- Will you promise to carefully
read the Enchetrtdlon of Epictetus, if I give you the
4

Of further interest, Thompson states that 'though they couldn't improve one another, they infected
one another. Willoughby took Dixon's style of swearing with him for a keepsake, and left Dixon his
style of slapping Latin in people's faces. Hanged if I know which habit is the worst' (RR, 73). And,
according to Thompson, Willoughby, armed with Dixon's "habit", has found work in a Sydney
insurance office.
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book to-morrow?"
"No, I'll swear I won't!" replied Thompson, in quick
alarm. "The name's quite enough for me. I can find
enough worry in knocking out a living, without any
help from that class of people. Bad thing to know too
much" (RR, 268).
Firstly, this dialogue unveils an interesting paradox, namely
that members of a society value education, yet show a tremendous
aversion to being educated in matters of judgment. Furthermore, the
curse can be seen as Thompson's aversion to using his intellect,
courage and desire, or the three elements which make an indMdual
just in a balanced way for his own well-being. He fails to realize that,
within the context of the controlling alternatives, his curse is the
result of his own misjudgment, and thereby fails to recognize that
his misfortunes are the consequence of his own ignorant choices.
And, within the context of articulating an identity, one can say that
Thompson's curse is equally a failure to tell the right lies, or an
inadequate truth-embellishment of one's identity within the context
of eud.aimonta and roleplay. As a case-study, Thompson demonstrates
that the bullockies have an aptitude for learning and a strong sense
of judgment in accordance with their skills, which is their means of
survival. But, in a moral sense, readers ought to observe that their
three elements are not balanced, and that any knowledge they
possess is devalued in light of eud.almonta.
3.3. The Coming Austmlian Debate: landscape, gender and the
Australienne.

According to Tiffin, '[ d)ichotomies of many types helped to
frame the ideas of what nineteenth-century Australia and its
inhabitants were', most notably 'the development in attitude to
landscape, climate and environment' (1987:60). Indeed, '[e]arlier
speculation about genetic mutation gave way to ideas and models of
social response' wherein 'the landscape's essential weirdness' was
compared to 'climatic norms elsewhere' until '[i)t was largely replaced
by an attitude which foregrounded the practical difficulties of life in
the bush' (Tiffin, 1987:60). In short, climate and landscape are
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crucial when it comes to imagining national type or identity in the
antipodes, particularly with either an evolutionary degeneration or
regeneration of the Anglo-Saxon species5 • White (1981:81-83)
explains that the Coming Australian debate was part of a more
widespread, Anglo-Saxon debate on The Coming Man, with whitemale supremacy utmost on the racial agenda, and that the image
itself was an intellectual product derived from popular literature
concerned with men of empire and action.
Several Bulletin articles tackle these issues either separately or
often confusingly together. According to an article vis-a-vis Clarke's
views on the 10th of November, '(r]ace-quality is not altogether a
matter of food and climate. In any historical comparison, much must
be allowed for racial heredity; much for difference in complexity of
civilisation; much for the constant evolution of humanity' ( 1894:6).
Yet the self-same article stresses that '(t]he Bulletin asks its
correspondents all over Australia to forward information of
characteristic national developments as foreshadowed in individuals,
or classes, or localities, always providing that they be chronicled with
brevity and brains' ( 1894:6). Another article, published on the 29th of
December, suggests that '(i]t would be a good thing for Australians if
the average temperature of their continent could be reduced 10
degrees all round', since '(t]he quick change from childhood to adult
age (due to climate) tends to weaken the national physique' (1894:6)0 •
However, in an interesting about-face, the article equally
argues that '(t]he bush, giving health and strength not to be found in
alleys and factories, dowers manhood and womanhood with
dignity .... Theirs is a stoic philosophy; that of the coast is gay and
epicurean' (1894:6). Furthermore, '(t]here is a note of feminine
frivolity about Australian cities; a tinge of masculine harshness
about the Australian bush' whereby '(t)he cities judge intuitively; the
bush reasons logically' (1894:6). Indeed, an article published on the
27th of October, 1894, gets to the heart of the matter. According to
5

In The Annotated Such is Life ( 1991 :467-470), there is an extensive summary of the opinions held
by Clarke, Trollope, Froude, O'Rell, Shaw and Adams concerning the debate of the Coming
Australian in the 1890s. Equally, one can look at the Bulletin article on page 6, Saturday, the 27th of
October, 1894, for an overview of the debate.
8
One can turn to Dr. H. Marten's two essays, published respectively in the Bulletin on the 28th of
July and the 11th of August, 1900, for a greater scientific discussion of climate and premature aging.
Marten's views come from a paper delivered to the South Australian branch of British Medical
Association, and was originally published in The Australasian Medical Gazene, July 1900.
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the writer,
[i]t is in our power by politic government to alter many
of the conditions of national life, and so to weaken, if
we cannot withstand, the currents of deterioration in
our national character. If observers and thinkers can
but determine the nature and force of those currents,
and statesmen can erect a barrier to their influence,
the Republic of Australia will long live to amuse its
children with the prophecy of Marcus Clarke [that the
Australian race will be extinct in five-hundred years I
(1894:6).
This self-same programme underpins the comments in the
following article on Federation, written by Ernest Favenc and
published on the 19th of January, 1895,
[the Murray] is the Nile of Australia .... The bond of
union, then, between [New South Wales, Victoria,
Queensland and South Australia] may be said to be
based upon the one great river system .... The
unification of the four provinces, whose life-blood may
be said to be the Murray and its host of tributaries,
must eventually lead to the reclamation of the whole
continent for purpose of close settlement .... With all
the new science of the world within our grasp, and the
hereditaiy pioneer spirit in our hearts, the foundation
of a great nation that will people Australia from end to
end should be now laid in the eastern half and, by the
natural and irresistible progress of expansion,
gradually embrace the continent (1895:6).
Where does Furphy stand in this debate? To all intents and
purposes, I think Furphy understood that the debate had much to do
with a search for meaning and the need for eudaimonic certainty. He
also saw the Coming Australian debate as something which stems
from a human order of things rather than a natural one. As Furphy
had stated to Stephens, 'I am a Biological Agnostic because
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Darwinism is unduly boomed' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds,
1995:95). This is not to say that climate or landscape do not play a
part in national types, but they are not the sole factor, as the debate
indicates. Like Collins, I think Furphy thought the views in the
debate to be nothing more than 'Nankin palaces of porcelain theory,
which will fall in splinters before the first cannon-shot of
unparleying fact' (SiL, 144). I also think the novels indicate that the
Coming Australian is not subject to biological or racial deterioration,
but socio-cultural reevaluation, since pioneer societies will always
forego some of the customs which established societies deem
"civilized" and necessary. In short, '[t]he Coming Australian is a
problem' (SiL, 144) because '[c]onfused identity seemed to be in the
air' (SiL, 292). And, for Furphy, confused identity was in the air
because of ill-judgments in light of eudaimonta.
For this reason, I must disagree with Barnes' notion that,
lacking 'the strength of the emotional link he feels' for the landscape,
which 'is intellectualised to the point of abstraction', Furphy 'does
not try to give concrete form and substance to his hopes, he does not
try to visualize the future in relation to the particular landscape'
(1986:101). Furphy's landscape ts intellectualised precisely because
the future relationship between "Australians" and their environment
depends on judgment, controlling alternatives and knowing what is
up to you and what is not. Perhaps the emotional element is
downplayed because, as Elliott points out, '[t]he element of surprise
is quite gone, the attachment complete' and, for Furphy, 'it is never a
question of explaining an improbable vista or justifying a grotesque
one', since '[t]he naturalness of nature no longer calls for apology'
( 1966:66). Furphy seems to indicate that no matter what the
credentials of the writer, any view on the Coming Australian is
subject to authorship. Some views are better than others, but all
must bear in mind the impact they will have on the reading public,
especially when it comes to their seeing and responding to life.
Because of Furphy's emphasis on judgment, roleplay and the
ethics of truth-embellishment, I disagree with Johnson's (1965) hasty
generalization that Australian fiction, unlike American fiction, offers
no road out, or no option for its heroes to cross the frontier and
evade the social structures and responsibilities which society
dictates. The falsity of this view is equally foregrounded by Paterson's
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verse, which offers a road out through the city-bush dichotomy, or
Lawson's earlier verse on unionism, democracy and Republicanism.
To all intents and purposes, the road out of one society is the road
into another. Johnson (1965:24-25) rightly suggests that the
Australian interior places the Australian hero face to face with
death, but this is no different from the American hero, despite
differences in geography. Simply put, the frontier is not just a
physical space. It is also a mental and social space, or a way of
seeing and responding to life whereby an error of judgment can lead
to catastrophe. For this reason, I must disagree with Croft's notion
that 'the realistic world of Riverina' is, in fact, 'a distorted world'
which 'a theologian might call Hell' (1986:160. My italics). Rather
than seeing and responding to the bush as hell, Collins lays claim to
the '[tline open country we have in the interior' (BBB, 65).
This leads me to question Vincent Buckley's notion that
'Furphy's characters do not experience Australia as a source-country;
nor does any of them give much sign that he thinks of himself as
having a destiny, to be gladly affirmed and lived out' (1979:84).
According to Buckley, '[w]hen a country is a source-country, it ts
already potential to poetry' (1979:78). Buckley provides a list of
criteria that enables a country to become a source-country, which
includes

* habits of perception pregnant with the language
which presents them;
* images, natural objects and events, places and their
conformations, tending towards archetype or towards
some importance in history;
* place-names, proper names. Perceived systems of
genealogy and of the relation of families to places;
* historical events, especially those which are linked
with legend and/ or poetry, or which changed the
fortunes, or rulership, or ownership, and hence the
psychic processes, of the race. such as emigration,
famine, dispossession, land wars.
* a language, if retained.
the traces in emotion of a language, if lost;
* patterns of family life;
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* legends, adaptations of still earlier myths,
imaginative manners of controlling both the hot
human and cold inhuman sea:
* folklore, Fairy raths. Sacred trees. Hearth-customs.
Significance of days, wells, rocks, gestures, paths.
These separated out for purposes of .. belief' and also
merged with the day-to-day life of the people.
* an accent, a pace, a pitch, a rhythm of speech.
* a political imagination and need
(1979:78).
Buckley argues that '[m)ost of these things could not be
brought to Australia. What remained was the ache of their absence'
(1979:78). Comparing Australia to America, he believes 'that America,
faced with the same contradictions as ourselves made persiStent and
even programmatic attempts to overcome them -to become, in short,
a source-country' while the Australian project suffered under
'laconicism' (1979:85). I cannot but reject Buckley's proposition.
Furphy's novels may not encompass all the above criteria, but they
certainly do encompass some. Perhaps the strongest criteria for
enabling a country as source-country is a political imagination and
need, a move towards a national type, habits of perception or generic
ways of seeing, and the accent, pace, pitch or rhythms of speech.
Whether one sees them as Collins' or Furphy's, the novels possess all
these criteria, for the Riverina enables Australia as a source-country,
as a teeming nation of nations. Interestingly enough, Buckley, in an
essay published six years later, states that 'Furphy identified himself
as all-embracing Australian', calling him, 'if the comparison be not
too bizarre, the Walt Whitman of his time and place' (1986:42).
I would now like to address some main points by Kay Schaffer,
especially her notion that '(t)he bush against which [the masculine
Australian character) forms a sense of identity is represented as a
feminine other' (1988:42). Given Collins' referring to Australia as the
'virgin continent' who has 'long ... tarried her bridal day!' (SiL, 65), it
is true that the land, or bush, in Furphy's fiction, is representatively
feminine, as feminist critics, writing about Furphy, agree. But his
depiction of this .. otherness" of the land is not in the manner that
Schaffer argues as being representative of the 1890s nationalist
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tradition. Schaffer's ( 1988) findings on the construction of
Australian national identity are based on her notion of Lawson as
the founding father of a masculine tradition: a tradition which sees
the feminine "other" from an entirely negative perspective. Because of
this, Schaffer states that
[i)n Lawson's fiction the bush is an evocative presence.
It can be awesome, endless and enduring. Yet it is also
harsh and unforgiving. It forms a constant, silent and
ultimately unconquerable backdrop for the
bushman .... The bushman resolves neither his struggle
for survival against the landscape nor his battle for
authority against the British civilization. Like his
digger counterpart, he often ends his days in bitter
resignation -dazed by the bush, crazed by drink or
dead in the struggle. The struggle with the land-asother determines the nature of this character, the
Australian character (1988:42).
While this may be an appropriate reading for Lawson, as well
as other authors Schaffer cites, it is an unsuitable reading of the
Australian character and landscape in Furphy's novels. As I have .
already discussed, Furphy was not entirely satisfied with Lawson's
grim realism. For Furphy, Lawson's crowning achievement was the
optimistic depiction of young Australia in his verse. Thus, Schaffer's
notion that the Australian national identity is marked by a
masculine struggle with the land-as-other, or 'the bush as cruel
mother' (1988:22), often ending in bitter resignation, is problematic
when it comes to Furphy. Schaffer's discussion of Francis Adams'
1890s article on the death of Burke and Wills is particularly
interesting here. She writes that '[Adams'] use of the term
"absorption" suggests the power of the bush, like the fantasy of the
primal mother, to suck up its inhabitants, assimilating them into its
contours and robbing them of a separate identity' (1988:52).
According to Schaffer, '[t)his is a powerful fantasy in Australia'
(1988:52). Readers of Such ts Life will be aware of the fact that the
aristocratic Burke and Wills are not national heroes. As Mosey
states, 'Wills was a pore harmless weed, so he kin pass' but Burke
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'died for want of his sherry an' biscakes' (SIL, 26). It is only
Willoughby, the aristocrat, who argues that Burke and Wills are
·gentlemen ... who have exhibited in a marked degree the qualities of
the pioneer' (SIL, 26). According to Mosey and the other bullockies,
'there ain't a drover, nor yet a bullock driver, nor yet a stock-keeper,
frome 'ere to 'ell that couldn't 'a' bossed that expegition straight
through to the Gulf, an' back agen, an' never turned a hair -with
sich a season as Burke had. Don't sicken a man with yer Burke. He
burked that expegition, right enough' (SIL, 26). Burke and Wills'
death had nothing to do with the "absorptive" power of the bush.
Instead, their deaths are marked by Burke's incompetence.
Furphy, like Schaffer, sees "absorption" into the bush as a
powerful fantasy in Australian Writing rather than an actual fact.
This is consistent with his focus on the ethics of representation.
Schaffer (1988:17, 29) is remarkably quiet on Furphy, subordinating
him to her masculine nationalist tradition epitomised by Lawson. In
order to maintain her feminist critique of the manly Australian
national identity, she focuses on Barbara Baynton 'as a dissident in
her radical resistance to the social and political consensus regarding
woman's place within the Australian tradition' (1988: 169). But one
should be equally aware of a similar dissidence in Furphy. As DevlinGlass notes, while Furphy cannot 'be exculpated entirely of sexism',
his 'attitudes to gender are complex and multi-layered' (1991:39). She
argues that 'he critiques gender construction' in the sense that his
novels are an 'examination of male ratiocination' ( 1991 :39).
Devlin-Glass' notion is problematic, since Furphy sees
ratiocination as a crucial tool in the uplifting and upbuilding of
individuals, communities and nation. Nevertheless, Devlin-Glass
rightly indicates that
Furphy's ... construction of the land is significantly
different from the one considered normative by the
constructors of the radical nationalist tradition, for
whom the bush is either a "vision splendid" or harsh,
destructive, and synonymous with failure, a threat to
identity and sanity .... [H]e is not driven by the
imperative to conquer and to master, or to the brink of
madness. Although he, like his contemporaries,
247.
\,

i

l.

~

unconsciously sexuallses the landscape, his approach
is not phallocentrtc. Rather, he sees the relationship
between man and the land as interactive (1991:40).
But, as Devlin-Glass states, '[i]f she is a virgin, awaiting
consummation, a metaphor which ... had much currency in the
period, then it is on her terms, and the suitor must prove his
worthiness' (1991:41). This notion of proving one's worthiness on
"her" terms shows that 'the concept of a contract between man and
nature is crucial' (Devlin-Glass, 1991:41). According to Devlin-Glass,
'Furphy often depicts failed or failing small selectors and instead of
finding the land itself responsible ... he seeks human agency'
(1991:42). Again, Furphy seeks the source of failure in errors of
judgment, as the Epictetian flavour of the theocy of the controlling
alternatives indicates. As Keogh states,
[t]he Australian land renders meaningless attempts to
see it from a European perspective, with a
corresponding failure and sterility in attempts to
impose upon it a too strictly European landscape. This
is also symbolized by the treatment of women and
sexual relationships in the text. Despite a strongly
pessimistic undertone, the outlook is not totally bleak.
There are some signs of hope, a suggestion that a
fusion of the two conflicting elements, land and
landscape, is possible (1989:55. My italics).
The land is feminine, while landscape, as explained by Keogh
(1989:55), signifies the man-made physical or mental environment,
or the masculine way of seeing. In this sense, the emergence and
survival of the "Australian" depends not only on a masculinity which
can tum the land into a landscape, but also on a femininity which
reads the land and "her" 'ungauged potentiality of resource' (SIL, 65).
As Collins suggests, "she" -both Woman and land- must be
'[f]aithfully and lovingly interpreted' in order to unveil her 'latent
meaning' (SIL, 65). In other words, '[w]hen "landscape" arises directly
from the conditions of the natural environment, life will be fruitful,
peaceful, fair and just. The opposition between land and landscape is
248.
'

I

~

used in [Such is Life] to examine not Just economic struggle, but the
whole ideological basis of the future Australia' (Keogh, 1989:63).
Martin thinks that this 'suggests a bush invested with female and
male attributes or aspects' (1992:73).
Devlin-Glass argues that '(t]he land's destructive mode was, for
Furphy, able on some occasions to be circumvented by prudent bushwisdom, and, if not, ameliorated by men and women acting
cooperatively' (1991:43). I must disagree, therefore, with Partlngton's
notion that 'the centre of Furphy's interest, like that of Lawson, is
men rather than women' (1993:107). Nor do I agree with Lever's
conclusion that 'the novel's failure to address the "other half' of
human experience is put before the reader as a failure of fiction'
(1996-97:161). This is despite her noting that 'Furphy too deserves to
be read in terms of feminist concerns', for 'his novels proclaim an
interest in gender and gender representation, gendered writing and
reading' ( 1996-97: 157). Given the complexity of his novels, Lever's
evidence is rather limited, for her view is based on a reading of an
excised portion 'from the original Such ls Life later published as
"Rigby and the Authoress"' (1996-97:153).
It is interesting to note that the novels' time period coincides
With the early stages of the Australian suffrage movement, most
notably, as discussed by Anne Summers (1994:396-397), the
Women's Christian Temperance Union in New South Wales during
1882 and the Women's Suffrage Society, founded by Harriet Dugdale
and Annette Bear in Victoria during 1884. I think Furphy is profemtnist, and the movement's campaigns in the 1890s either shaped
or coincided with his own views on women's roles in society. Barnes
points out that '[i]n the original Such is Life the theme of gender
confusion was highlighted by Furphy's adoption of non-sexist
pronouns -"se", "sim" and "sis"- which could be used to cover both
male and female' ( 1990:227). Summers ( 1994:395-396), Sheridan
(1988:29-30) and White (1981:77) note that the rise of Australian
feminism cannot be separated from the rise of Australian
nationalism. Discussing The Dawn, Sheridan (1988:38-40) and
Docker (1991:3-25) respectively note that the magazine, although it
had never been as piously nationalist as the Bulletin, was principally
concerned With the uplifting and upbuilding of women because it saw
them as the moral force in the regenerative evolution of an
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Australian society and culture, which, according to many feminists,
was in a state of decay due to men and their immoral needs.
According to Summers,
[t]he feminists had identified as the two most
important tasks of the modem family the socialization
of children and the control and conflnemen t of
sexuality. They argued that 'the family' was in danger
of becoming ineffective because these two functions
were being Jeopardized by the disjunction in the
relationship between domestic and political life. Both
functions were in need of reform, reinterpretation or
reconfirmation and they saw women in their God's
Police role as providing the linchpin to this social
renovation. They saw that women needed avenues of
political expression to be able to effect domestic
reforms [and, for thts reason, they lobbied for the vote 1
(1994:414).
As Docker notes, '[w]here the Bulletin considered men superior

in evolution because of their possession of rationality, The Dawn
assumed women's rationality and considered men inferior in
evolution because of their lack of purity' (1991:52). This led to an
intense and absurd attack by the Bulletin writers on feminism and
the New Woman, as noted by Docker (1991:47-55), Sheridan
(1988:34) and White (1981:83), for they felt that she would hamper
the progress of the masculine national type and its programme of
enlightened democracy in Australia. Yet Docker, in light of Sylvia
Lawson's The Archibald Paradox, states that the Bulletin's attitude
was 'ambivalent and varied', for 'they approved of the New Woman in
so far as she was distant from puritanism, temperance, religion and
didn't go around accusing men of molesting her' (1991:53). In short,
they approved of her when she was rational.
Although Furphy wrote for the Bulletin, he is not a Bulletin
writer, as I pointed out earlier. His own concerns, as well as those of
his implied author and hero, are not far removed from 1890s
feminism, most notably 'the link between family and society' in
which 'women were performing their du ties as citizens by producing
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and educating children who could contribute actively to the
development of the nation' (Summers, 1994:414-415). As he had
stated to Winter, 'I believe [purpose] is fulfilled by the production of
men and women of high moral standard, calm courage, and clear
intellect (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124). Besides 1890s
feminism, this view is equally found in Republic (bk5.45lc-457b),
where Socrates advances the view that women's equality and
suitability for guardianship should be judged on aptitude rather than
sexual difference. In light of Collins' uplifting and upbuilding, I
would like to refute Croft's claim that '[w]hen we read the works as
novels by Joseph Furphy, rather than as the diaries of Tom Collins,
it is possible to see the women characters as being far more
important than they appear to be for Tom' (1983:1).
One does not have to appeal to Furphy's text to see the value
of women, for such a possibility is equally recognizable in Tom's
"text". This is especially so with 'the short, silky moustache which is
the piquant trade-mark of our country-women' (SiL, 211-212). As
Martin states, '(t]he moustache is, in Furphy, a signifier of a
profound disruption of the division between the sexes' (1992:69). For
Martin, the moustache-as-sign allows 'individual bodies [to] assert
difference and avoid the stereotyping [normally associated with the
fixing of gender]' (1992:75). This is because the moustache indicates
that the "Australian" Woman reconstructs her gender role by
appropriating customary masculine values, indicating that gender is
not a fixed and natural set of attributes, but a truth-embellished
construction subject to personal, historical and environmental
change in light of eud.atmonta. In this sense, I disagree with Lever's
notion that '(t]he sexual stereotypes on which the novel [Such ts Life]
seems to operate are proven time and again to be unreliable guides to
the physical identity of characters' (1996-97:159).
Nor do I agree with Croft's (1983:10) notion that Collins is
blind to the positive value of Australian women because all he can
see is their moustache. Collins may see Jemima Quarterman initially
as a gender oddity, but he is not repulsed by her masculine and
feminine qualities. He may state that he was' horror-stricken'
because '" Jim" was a magnificent young woman, riding barebacked, a
la clothes-peg', but 'she was' also 'a phantom of delight' (SiL, 115).
Collins' initial 'revulsion of feeling' quickly turns into 'the quickest
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and fullest' passion he had 'ever experienced' (SiL, 115). Indeed, 'it
was some minutes before' Collins became 'his own philosophic self
again' (SiL, 115), seizing the chance to use her as evidence of a
particular "Australian" type, for he states that '[e)ven in the distance,
I fancied her attitude was that of a girl who had imprudently set in
motion a thing that she was powerless to stop' (SiL, 115).
In his first letter to Miles Franklin, Furphy 'desired to draw
[her] attention to some striking parallelisms in My Brilliant Career
and [his] own book Such ts Life', especially the 'remarkable' parallel
between 'the bush-born girl' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 148),
namely Sybylla Melvin and Jemima Quarterman. Furphy praises
Franklin's My Brilliant Career because 'no book yet published
contains so many echoes of my own literary ideas and avowals as
yours does' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 153). Contrary to the
letters Furphy wrote to Cathels, he is less concerned with knowledge,
preferring to discuss the Australian experience. Lever notes that
Furphy praised 'Franklin as the true bush girl who offered a feminine
expression of the experience of Australia which was so dear to him'
(1996-97:156). More than this, I think Furphy had found in Franklin
and Sybylla Melvyn the clear intellect, calm courage and high moral
standard necessary to the "Australian" type.
Spender notes that 'much of [Australian] women's literature
embodies a search for':.!ndividual and communal identity' (1988:xv).
Discussing My Brilliant Career, Spender states that
Miles remained well within the traditions of literary
women's concern with love and marriage, but she
didn't merely ask questions -she rebelled, and with
great gusto. In almost swashbuckling manner, she
scoffed at some of the conventions that were supposed
to be sacred in women's lives: the heroine Sybylla
Melvyn rejects romance -and suitors- and determines
to lead an independent, full and creative life
(1988:274).
Equally, but in the context of the drama, Docker explains that
'[t]he Australian heroine, the vigorous and independent currency
lass, was made of altogether sterner stuff, as she strode the
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nineteenth-century stage, cowering villains and rendering pale its
male heroes' ( 1991 :xxvU). It is this independence of character, of
making 'no apologies for being egotistical', as well as the writing of 'a
yam' rather than 'a romance' (Franklin, [1901) 1990:1), which made
Furphy personally admire Franklin. Indeed, her introduction to My
Brilliant Career maps out much the same concerns with the ethics of
representation as Furphy's novels. For example, Furphy wrote that
I like your portrait [in My Brilliant Career] exceedingly
well. It bespeaks frankness, courage, generosity,
surpassing sweetness of disposition, and mental
capacity of the highest order. Above all, it conveys to
me the conception of value -womanly value; and this
is idea that I would wish to impress upon yourself.
You are an exceptional girl. Don't hold yourself
cheap .... If you knew me as well (through reading my
book) as I know you (through reading yours), you
would perceive that there is no need for ceremony
between us. We have much in common. Though
doubtless many people know even more of bush life
than we do, I question -with all modesty- whether any
can depict it as well. Let this be our point of contact
(in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 153).
According to Barnes and Hoffmann, '[o]ut of his fascination
with [Miles Franklin] came a series of deeply-felt and deeplyconsidered letters in which [Furphy] gave of his best' (1995:27). As
Furphy argued to Franklin, attempting to dissuade her from
becoming an expatriate,
[t]here is variety enough here; between the seething
Pandemonium of the cities and the hallowed solitudes
of the Out-back; between the serrated profile of the
Great Divide and the long, long levels of Rivertna. And
literature has hardly yet touched the fringe of
Australian life-conditions. Practically nothing has
been exploited but the amenities of the Home-station,
the hardships of the Selection, and the most unlikely
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nugget found by the reduced gentleman. Stay among
the eucalypti, Miles, and earn the adoration of your
countcymen by translating the hosannas and elegies of
the Bush into vernacular phrase {in Barnes and
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:166).
In light of this, I dispute Croft's notion that, '[h]aving failed in
the male world of materialism, [Furphy] constructed a world of
metaphor and spirit which he associated with the female' {1983: 10).
It is not 'a deep sense of failure' which led Furphy to construct 'his
two-layered novels where women show heroic, positive values' {Croft,
1983:10), but an emphasis on ignorance-shifting and better judgment
towards men and women in the "Australian" experience. Barnes
argues that '[t]he world Furphy creates is a world of masculine
values, in which the experiences of wives and mothers are treated
only marginally' {1990:222). Given the immense scope that uplifting
and upbuilding entails, Barnes' statement is problematic. What one
needs to consider is why the focus on specific women is what it is,
for Collins claims that 'I always make a point of believing the best
where women are concerned' (SIL, 118). Furphy himself had declared
to Miles Franklin that he had an 'unbounded faith in the Australian
woman in general, and the meteoric Miles in particular' {in Barnes
and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 182).
In order to see more clearly the novels' attitude to women, one
ought to begin with an analysis of the aristocratic woman, Maud
Beaudesart, and the American woman, Kate Vanderdecken. In a
letter to Cathels, Furphy {in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:42)
points out that Maud Beaudesart is the daughter of Kingsley's hero.
Sam Buckley. According to Furphy, 'this is a breach of literary
etiquette', but '[t]he author of Geoj. Hamlyn deseives no courtesy' {in
Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:42). Martin states that 'Mrs
Beaudesart, the most sinister female, is after all centred in the home
and amongst the pastoralists, while Alf [Molly Cooper] and Jim
[Jemima Quarterman] have a free range of the landscape and gender
possibilities' {1992:75). Towards Jemima Quarterman, the romantic
descriptions of her beauty {SIL, 132) say more about her value as
Currency lass than a perpetuation of the traditionally 'stereotyped
woman of the male literary imagination' {Croft, 1983:3). But, towards
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Beaudesart, the aristocratic woman, Collins exercises his cunning
concealment, for she is 'the archetype of the fatal woman' (Croft,
1983:3), representing danger for the Australienne. One can see this
in Beaudesart's sharp treatment of Ida (SIL, 211-214), another
Currency lass. As Collins states,
Levites, tribesmen, and Gentiles alike, used to poke
fun at me over Mrs. Beaudesart; but the fact that they
thought they knew my real standing, whereas they
didn't, seemed to weigh so much in my favour as to
make their banter anything but provoking. Yet my
relations with the gentlewoman were painful enough
(SIL, 210).
Beaudesart's crusty values run contrary to Collins' interests in
the Lower Orders. As Collins explains to his reader, Maud
Beaudesart had been 'a singularly handsome young lady' but 'became
a veritable heroine of romance' (SIL, 209). Furthermore, her nuptial
interests in him make Collins feel that he is 'a done man' (SIL, 228),
as is evident in the following exchange between Moriarty and Collins:
"You don't want to marry her, then, after all?"
"How long do you suppose I would last?"
"Well, don't marry her" (SIL, 228).
One must remember that Beaudesart, before her interest in
Collins, had already been widowed three times (SIL, 209-210, RR, 87),
and this prompts Collins, towards the close of Such ts Life, to
fabricate a scandal involving himself in order to escape Beaudesart's
interest in him. As Collins states, 'I must help her to keep up the
grisly fraud of feminine reluctance' for 'I have the dubious
satisfaction of knowing that the enterprise brings me a good many
days march nearer home' (SIL, 228). The plan fails, for the scandal
only increases Maud's interest in her "Tom Collins", whom
Montgomery, the squatter, had introduced as 'the last lineal
descendant of Commander David Collins, R.N.' (SIL, 210). Because of
this, it is incorrect to conclude, as Brady does, that 'Collins prefers
erotic daydreams to real women' and a misreading to suggest that
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'[t]he "tawny-hatred tigress with slumberous dark eyes" he dreams of
ts always submissive and makes no claims on him' (1981:64. My
italics).
Nor is it correct for Barnes to state that '[t]he farcical plot
involving Mrs Beaudesart presents [Collins] as the male ego
threatened by the possibility of marrtage and domesticity' (1990:222).
As Collins remarks about Beaudesart, the novels' dangerous tigress,
'if [she] assumes -if she merely takes for granted- that I'm going to
many her, I must do it, to keep her in countenance .... Of course, she
had no business to accept me unawares' (SiL, 228). The Ou1d1an
tawney-hatred tigress is anything but submissive or passive, as noted
by Knight's (1969:248-250) discussion of Collins' reading of Ouida's
Strathmore. She ls quite capable of making claims on men, for her
exotic sexuality appeals directly to male desire. As Collins states,
'what a sweet, spicy, piquant thing it must be to be lured to
destruction by a tawny-hatred tigress with slumberous dark eyes'
(SiL, 130). More importantly, the dangers of the aristocratic femme
fatale indicate the need for the new world woman with her clear
intellect, calm courage and high moral standard.
With this in mind, let us consider Kate Vanderdecken. In a
letter to Kate Baker, Furphy, working on Rtgby's Romance, writes
I think there is something beautiful (don't you?) in the
picture of the ever-faithful woman [Kate Vanderdecken]
making her long over-sea pilgrtmage to find that her
demigod [J(efferson Rigby] has absolutely forgotten that
she ever existed. A lesser genius than the present
scribe would make Rigby an unworthy person; but here
we find him enthroned as a man humanly perfect in
intellect and principle, besides being gentle, brave and
chivalrous. Now this ls the true tragedy -the tragedy of
the heart. None of your adultery or manslaughter
business. Red paint is too cheap for the present artist
(in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:75).
To most Furphy critics, Kate Baker's response is well known.
Recalling a conversation with Furphy, she had stated,
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I didn't [see the tragedy]; that was a man's view. I
couldn't see any woman of spirit tailing over a
continent to look for a man who had never made a
move to find whether she was alive or not. The best
part in Kate Vanderdecken was where she "hoist sail
and away" and "left the lord lamenting".
Rigby deserves shooting! Despite Tom Collins's
efforts to get him to make some sort of amends to
Kate, Rigby doesn't make even an attempt. Brave?
Chivalrous? Brrrr!
The story, however, serves for a peg on which
Joseph Furphy can hang hiS Ethico-cum-philosophic
pedantcy (in Franklin, 1944:165-166).
Franklin's view of Rigby is 'that he remains a wooden figure'
and '[l]ike Kate Vanderdecken he is described but never comes alive'
(1944: 165). According to Franklin, '[i]n Kate Vanderdecken, Furphy's
discernment of womanliness versus femininity collapses into
masculine sentimentality over feminine graces' (1944: 157). This is in
direct opposition to her notion that, in Such is Life, '[s]ome of
Furphy's studies of women are as excellent as his observations of
men or horses' especially 'with unattractive women, or those past
nubility' (1944:157). But, several years after the conversation with
Kate Baker, Furphy had written, in a letter to Cecil Winter, that
'[t]he "romance" -remotely founded on fact- was [just] written in a
leisurely and wanton frame of mind, and the accessories filled
themselves in, so to speak, up to the desired size of the book' (in
Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:147). Between such an initially
strong expression of an intention and a later, casual allusion to the
Kate and Rigby romance, what was Furphy tcytng to achieve with
these two heroes?
Did he seriously reconsider their roles after Kate Baker's
retort? Or were his initial intentions less than serious? Questions
such as these are not easily answered, but the pu bltshed version of
the novel does not subordinate the character of Kate Vanderdecken
to Jefferson Rigby. The title, Rigby's Romance, suggests more of a pun
on rugby's actual romance with state socialism than with his old
flame, Kate Vanderdecken. As Croft states, 'Furphy's ideal male is
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beyond the lure of the sirens, in love with a set of ideals rather than
a real woman' (1991 :242). Or, as Gilding notes, 'Rigby has romance
in his life -but it is not directed at Kate. Rigby is in love with the
political cause he espouses, which is almost to say, with argument
itself (1967:29). Rigby is not Furphy's ideal male hero, for Kate's
character cuts much too strong an imprint on the reader's mind. She
does not wait for Rigby, and one gets the impression that her leaving
indicates a pragmatic character rather than a heroine of romance
who dotes on a supposedly ideal man or "demigod".
One ought to see the value of Kate Vanderdecken in contrast
to Mrs. Beaudesart. As Collins states, '[t]he women were in no way
alike, save that both were attractive to the eye, and both bore
evidence of that social cultivation which is every women's birthright;
and would be every woman's inheritance if men in name were men in
reality' (RR, 87). Franklin, noting this comparison, states that 'Mrs.
Beaudesart and Kate Vanderdecken, his most extended portraits of
women, are both out of plumb with reality' (1944: 157-158). As we
already know, Beaudesart represents an aristocratic, stock-in-trade
literary character. Yet Franklin rightly indicates that Kate
Vanderdecken is also a stock-in-trade literary character, but I
disagree with her notion that she 'belongs to Victorian stock female
roles' (1944: 159). While Collins' sympathies do not lie with
Beaudesart, they are 'centred on Miss Vanderdecken' (RR, 22). Why is
this so? According to his own 'twenty-three years' contemplation'
(RR, 22) of her image, Kate had the 'figure of a beautiful, though
somewhat mynheer [manly or masculine, RD I looking, sheaf of
contradictions' with 'unavailing remorse ... on her damask cheek' (RR,
19).
It would seem that Collins, as implied author, has his heroic
self sympathise with a stock-in-trade victim of romance. But her.
masculinity is also noted through his use of the Dutch "mynheer". It
is in this sense that the novel resumes the contrasts between old
world types and new world types begun in Such ts Life. And, if the old
world type of woman, such as Beaudesart, makes herself known by a
fatal and unrelenting expression of interest in a potential lover, then
the new world type of woman, such as Kate, is prepared to be
pragmatic rather than traditional. Kate will not pursue nor make
claims on Rigby in the same manner as Beaudesart pursues and
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makes claims on Collins. As Croft notes, 'Kate compromises neither
her dignity nor her independence to accomplish her ends' (1991:226).
The new world type is clearly meant to be seen as more desirable in
terms of the self-evident right to self-definition and self-expression.
In terms of the strategic value of Kate Vanderdecken, I would
have to disagree with Croft, who argues that 'the stocy of the
complementacy half of Rigby's romance, Kate Vanderdecken, is never
articulated properly by Tom and only partly understood by him. That
is also the case with the two main female characters [Molly Cooper
andLtUtanFalkland-Pritchard] in his other major works' (1983:1). The
issue of Tom's only partly understanding the value of Molly Cooper
and Lillian Falkland-Pritchard will be dealt with a little later, but it
is obvious that Tom's status as both implied author and hero
severely problematises Croft's claim. According to Collins, Kate
is,'[b]y the foot, American', for 'the foot of the American woman is a
badge as distinctive as the moustache of the Australienne' (RR, 5-6).
Collins also states that 'there was a good expression in the foot now
under notice; it was a generous, loyal, judicious foot, yet replete with
idealism and soulfulness' (RR, 6).
The "foot" actually alludes to a sense of stateliness or
surefootedness in nation and direction. Thus, the presence of Kate,
as a national type of post-civil war America, suggests that Collins is
alluding to the potential for unity amid diversity, especially rivalcy.
One can infer that Collins, as well as Furphy, conceives of a similar
future for "Australia", and that the surest sign of this future is the
mustachioed Woman. One should approach Collins' theocy of 'sexcharm' and 'sex-value' (RR, 10-11) with this in mind. Defining the
two terms, Collins states that '[t]he former conveys passion; the
latter adoration. The former sees femininity; the latter, womanhood.
And these are the two extremes' (RR, 11 ). Furthermore,
... it is worthy of note that, where the controlling
masculine minds are moved or biased by the sexinfluence, the force is exercised by a woman, not by a
female. And not till the peach-bloom of youth is gone
can the woman dominate the female and her
personality reach its maximum angel-loveliness or its
most formidable devil-beauty.
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... the world is swayed by women, not by females. And
each man, be he king or beggar, is a little world of his
own. If he be swayed by a female, as kings and beggars
frequently are, he is an extremely little world.
But don't misapprehend me as identifying or
confounding femininity with youth, and womanhood
with maturity. Just as many a man, having outlived
the boy's enthusiasm and ingenuousness, retains the
boys uselessness and self-conceit, so, in the other sex,
mere femininity too often accompanies maturity.
When this occurs -in fact, when the case is one of
incorrigible femininity- the subject is good for two
things only: to suckle fools and chronicle small beer
(RR, 11).
Although Croft discusses Collins' theory, arguing that it is a
development of 'Rory O'Halloran's A Pleafor Women in Such is Life'
and noting that 'Kate ... belongs to the second category' (1991:225,
226), he does not explore it any further within the context of a
comparison between Beaudesart and Kate. A Plea For Woman (SIL,
75- 77) argues for the sex-value of women, challenging the biblical
notion that women have 'a preternatural bias toward sin in a general
way' by contrasting the evil of 'the Solomon-woman' with the
goodness of the modern 'Shakespear-woman' (SIL, 76). While
Beaudesart is, through her sex-charm, the sinister aristocrat or
Solomon-woman, Kate Vanderdecken, as the American type of new
world Woman, is the manifestation of sex-value, possessing dignity,
surefootedness and independence. She is the embodiment of the
Shakespeare-woman, possessing clear intellect, calm courage and
high moral standard. Kate may be 'a stock female role', but she is
not 'Victorian', as Franklin cla1ms (1944: 159). Although Kate recedes
into the background during the sermon on the Murray, perhaps
justifying to some extent Franklin's notions, she returns in full force
in Collins' allusion to the powerful and versatile image of "Kate" in
Shakespeare's Taming of the Shrew (RR, 236).
Rigby may think that Kate is 'petulant and quarrelsome' as
well as 'frivolous and heartless' (RR, 17), but he is no Petruccio. As
Croft explains, Rigby is 'a small-souled, over-bearing, and essentially
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heartless man, who hides his deficiencies under a cloak of idealism'
(1991:245). The value of Kate exceeds that of Rigby, simply because
'Shakespeare's Kate would have been more than a match for Rigby'
(Croft, 1991 :222). In this sense, the comparison between Kate
Vanderdecken and Shakespeare's .. Kate" is very appropriate to the
new world type of Man, since the play explores the idea of love and
friendship ... Kate" is quite prepared to live with Petruccio so long as
it does not mean sacriflcing her spirit, her 'loyal' and 'lofty nature'
(RR, 17). nor her rights. Collins is alluding to the Shakespearean
.. Kate" not just in Kate Vanderdecken, but also in the ..Australienne",
since both are seen to possess the very masculine traits of selfdeflnition, vitality and independence of identity necessary to nationbuilding and eudaimonia.
3.4. Men, Women and Marriage: the imagined community
through the Australian romance.

According to Barnes, '[w]hen [Furphy] introduced Rory
O'Halloran and his wife [Deborah] into the revised version of Such ts
Life, he came closer to his own marital situation [to Leonie] than
anywhere else, but not in a way that invited any identification'
(1990:221). Or, as Partington notes, 'Furphy's portrayal of the
ongoing hostility between Rory O'Halloran and his wife can be seen
as a reflection of his own miserable marriage, which neither party
ever made any move to terminate' (1993:96). Much can be said about
the marriage of Rory and Deborah O'Halloran in light of Furphy's
marriage to Leonie. But I think one should approach the O'Halloran
episode as a parable of Young Australia's future, especially since the
narrative is woven tightly around the theme of sectarian rivalry. Both
Keogh (1989:61) and Scheckter (1981:69) note that the child, Mary
O'Halloran, functions as a symbol of the nation's future and that
the success of her future is jeopardised by her parents' sectarianism.
Collins introduces Rory as 'a Catholic of the Catholics' (SlL,
54) and Deborah as 'a red hot Protestant', strategically pointing out
that 'she didn't want Dan [Rory], and Dan didn't want her, but
somehow they were married before they came to an understanding'
(SlL, 56). Given the stress on judgment in light of the controlling
alternatives, Collins points to the dogma which underpins this
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rivalry in two ways. Firstly, he states that 'I tried, in a friendly way
and confidential way, to draw him out respecting certain of his
Church's usages and tenets, which I knew to be garbled and falsified
by Protestant bigotry' (SlL, 57). Secondly, Collins dedicates a
significant portion of his narrative to elucidate to his readers the
finer points of this rivalry in the old world (SlL, 57-61). As Croft
notes, Collins' 'long digression on the history of sectarianism in
Northern Ireland' is 'to prove the point that the division was not the
product of theological difference, but was engineered by the landedclass of Ulster to divide and rule the peasantry' (1991:141).
One could equally look to Hughes (1987:182-183) for an
account of the social engineering that divided Ireland, legally
privileging Irish Protestants over and above the Irish Catholics and
literally stripping the latter of all their entitlements. Through Mary
O'Halloran's death, this engineered sectarianism is shown to have
devastating consequences for the future of Young Australia. As
Collins states, 'a clearer-sighted Jeremiah could never have
prophesied the deliberate introduction of hydrophobia for dogs,
glanders for horses, or Orangeism for men. Yet the latter enterprise
has been carried out' (SlL, 58). In short, '[s]omeone has carried his
congenial virus half-way round the globe, and tainted a young
nation' (SlL, 58). As Evans et al note,
[r)eligious antagonism and violence flared periodically
in nineteenth and early twentieth century Australia
between English, Welsh, Scottish or Irish Protestants
and Irish Roman Catholics. Religious differences were
sharpened by ethnic rivalries as old world struggles
between Anglo-Saxon colonisers and colonised Irish
Celts were transported with these migrants into
Australia. In these conflicts, the Irish, who were
roughly one-quarter of the colonial population, were
usually the underdogs. As citizens, they were, on
average, poorer, less well placed, more excluded and
less powerful than many Protestants were. They were
at various times the subjects of prejudice, suspicion
and occasional assault. This did not mean, however,
that Irish Catholics did not, at other times, also
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initiate trouble and disturbance (1997:80).
According to Collins, '[l]t was a vital and personal fact to
[Rory], though only a historical truth to me, that this hereditary war
of the Btg-endlans and Llttle-endlans had been conducted by our
own immediate forefathers' (SiL, 60). Indeed, 'Rory couldn't get away
from the strong probablllty that my grandfather had overpowered his
own contemporary ancestor in the name of the Glorious, Pious and
Immortal Memory, and had chopped his head off with a spade' (SiL,
60). This ls despite the fact that Rory had freely migrated to Australia
approximately 'thirteen years before' (SiL, 56), staking his 'future on
the prosperity of Australia' (SiL, 57). But Rory does not arrive in
Australia to make a clean start, preferring instead to perpetuate Old
World history, legends and myths. As Collins notes, Rory was
'dreamy, idealistic' and 'born of a legend-loving race' (SiL, 61),
implying that this, rather than reason, formed the basis of his
judgment, choices and consequences.
According to Hughes,
the story of English oppression and Irish resistance
did not evaporate in Australia. On the contrary, it
survived most tenaciously as one of the primary
images of working-class culture, flourishing long after
the [Convict) System itself had receded from memory.
The Irish stuck to one another. They were clannish
and had long memories .... They always felt they were
being punished, not for their crimes, but for being
Irish. In Australia, as in Ireland, each act of
oppression contributed to a common fund of memory;
fact might waver into legend, but the essential content
did not change. By the 1880s, when the Protestant
majority in Australia had all but sublimated the
"hated stain" of convlctry, the Irish still kept the
memory of the System alive (1987:194-195).
Readers of Such ts Life are now in a better position to
appreciate Collins' attack on the 'Catholic and Protestant slaves of
dogma', and Furphy's own views in the strategically written line,
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'[s]mall sympathy have ye from this Josephus' (SfL, 60). Franklin may
note that 'Mrs. O'Halloran is introduced in bare outline only'
(1944:161), but she does not see that Deborah's dogmatism is, like
Rory's, strategically designed to foreground the sectarian rivalry
which will lead to the tragedy of Mary's death (SfL, 187-192). Croft
states that '[g]iven such a background it ts not surprising that Mary/
Young Australia should go astray and lose her bearings even in the
Utopia paddock, tom as she is between a seductive patriarchy and a
punitive matriarchy, between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism'
(1991:141). As Keogh (1989:62) and Scheckter (1981:68) note, Mary's
landing on her head in the bilby-hole and her dying by suffocation
symbolically seems to indicate that mental attitudes caused her
downfall as Young Australia.
From the sectarian rivalry of the O'Hallorans, readers
encounter the next debilitating mental attitude towards Young
Australia in the marriage of the Vivtans, or the "Sollickers". The
Vivian/ Solllcker episode cunningly alludes to Anglo-Australianism,
or "Britishness" in 1890s' Australia. On first meeting, Collins, 'the
Irresistible', encounters Edward Vivian, or Sollicker, 'the Immovable'
(SfL, 137). Croft states that '[t]o Tom, Sollicker appears [as] the
immovable object of the old feudal order, while he himself is the
irresistible new order for whom compassion and individual rights are
more important than property' (1991:166). In short, old world
attitudes meet the new, and
[w]hen a collision of this kind takes place, it
sometimes happens that the Irresistible bounces off in
a more or less damaged state; at other times, the
Immovable ts scattered to the four winds of heaven in
the form of scrap, while the Irresistible, slightly
checked, perhaps, in speed, sails on its way. But you
can never tell (SlL, 137).
In terms of uplifting and upbuildtng, the Vivian/ Solllcker
episode is one of mixed blessings. Collins manages to save Warrtgal
Alfs bullocks from impoundment at Yoongoolee by Edward Vivian,
the station's boundary rider, as well as secure the medicine needed to
help Warrigal Alf. Croft notes that '(t]he only way Tom can tum
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Sollicker around is to appeal to his feudal notion of chivahy and to
the idea that an Englishman would not impound an invalid's
working bullocks' (1991:166). But, despite Collins' strategic victory,
this is also the episode where Collins specifically concedes that 'the
Coming Australian is a problem' (SIL, 144). Why is this so? In order
to answer this question, it is best to clarify some of the important
details of the episode.
As well as meeting Edward Vivian, Collins also meets his wife,
Helenar Vivian. According to Collins, she was '[a] tall, slight,
sunburnt, and decidedly handsome young woman, with a brown
moustache' (SIL, 143). From these details, the evidence of the
"Australienne" remains intact. But, unlike Jemima Quarterman,
Helenar Vivian does not, strictly speaking, display what Collins
would call sex-value. Observant readers will note that she leans more
towards sex-charm. Helenar Vivian has an 'ill-concealed vainglory', a
'sunny laugh' and a 'comely face, over flowing with merriment' (SIL,
143). Readers will also recall that, when Edward Vivian commented
on her flirtatious manner towards Collins, 'an inch of Helenar's
tongue shot momentarily into view' (SIL, 143). Or, when Collins
prepares to return to Alf with the medicine, Helenar personally saw
him off, 'testing with her finger and thumb the integument on
[Collins' J near flank' (SIL, 144 ). As Croft notes, 'Tom's interview with
Mrs. Vivian is fraught with sexual undertones .... [and] it is also
apparent that she is a lively, open woman with an independent and
cheeky nature' (1991: 166).
But, I disagree with his notion that '[a]t no time do we sense
that she is being condemned for her past actions, nor that she feels
badly about them' (Croft, 1991:166). Helenar Vivian's past actions
are important, for they concern the paternity of the bush born child,
Roderick Vivian. Although Collins does not spell it out, the correct
details of Roderick's familial relations are nevertheless apparent.
This is particularly evident with the discrepancies between the length
of time the Vivians have been married (SIL, 142) and Roderick's age
(SIL, 143). In other words, Helenar was pregnant for four months at
Yoongoolee before she married Edward: a marriage requested by their
employer. Furthermore, the young Vivian's Christian-name, 'in
honour of Muster M'Intyre' (SIL, 142), as well as his 'comically
Scottish ... features' (SIL, 144), indicate that he is the true son of
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Roderick M'Intyre, the owner of Yoongoolee station, where 'there was
nothing... but Highland pride, and Highland eczema and hunger' (SIL,
153).
When Collins, referring to Roderick's Currency lad status,
proclaims to Edward that 'you're an Englishman, and you're proud of
your country; but I tell you we're going to have a race of people in
these provinces such as the world has never seen before' (SIL, 143),
Edward, the Immovable, firmly disagrees. But even Edward is
perplexed by the physical qualities of his "son", for he states that
'[c]limate plays ole Goozeb'ry wi' heverythink hout 'ere' (SIL, 144).
Thinking that Roderick ts his son, Edward believes that colonial
Australia wreaks havoc upon the otherwise stately qualities of the
English type. As Edward states to Collins, pointing to both himself
and his "son", '[c)'lonians bea n't got noo chest, n' mo'n a greyhound'
(SIL, 144). Edward's belief about the effects of the climate
foregrounds his ignorance concerning Roderick's true paternity. But,
Edward's beliefs also leads Collins to doubt the emerging national
character, for he states that 'the Coming Australian is a problem'
(SIL, 144). When Collins returns to Alf, he 'contemplated the
unconscious outlaw', noting that
AIL.was a decidely noble-looking man, of the so-called
Anglo-Saxon type, modified by sixty or etghty years of
Australian deterioration. His grandfather had probably
been something like Sollicker; and the apprehensions
of that discomfortable cousin were being fulfilled only
too ruthlessly. The climate had played Old Gooseberry
with the fine primordial stock. Physically, the Suffolk
Punch had degenerated into the steeplechaser;
psychologically, the chasm between the stolid English
peasant and the saturnine, sensitive Australian had
been spanned with . that facilis which marks the
descensus Averni (SIL, 161. My italics).
Are we meant to take Collins seriously? I think we are, but not
because he himself is swayed by a causal link between climate,
landscape and 'racial degeneracy' (SIL, 161), nor with any similar
view suggesting the emergence of some rugged heroic type. Given the
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consistent emphasis on judgment and the Epictetian controlling
alternatives, as well as the ideas of truth-embellishment and the
ethics of representation, the Coming Australian is a problem because
of unsound judgments based on climate and type. Although Roderick
will not suffer the same fate as that other Young Australian, Mary
O'Halloran, his potentiality to create Young Australia is curbed
because of "Britishness". One could say that Roderick the Irresistible
has met Edward the Immovable. The Vivian marriage, unlike the
O'Halloran marriage, works, but it will not inspire a positive, new
world type. Collins, as well as Furphy, strategically indicates that
Roderick Vivian will share the same outlook as other BritishAustralians who, in the 1890s, believed that 'Britishness was genetic
-a racial and familial bond- the bond of an offspring to a parent, of a
devoted son and daughter to their "dear old Mother"' (Evans et al,
1997:24).
In other words, Collins hints that Roderick Vivian 'will define
himself nationally only in a secondary way', forsaking the creation of
'self-images which emphasised their [Australian] distinctiveness from
the people of the British Isles' (Evans et al, 1997:25). This is what
readers of Such ts Life should bear in mind when they are confronted
with the use of the word "Sollicker" for the Vivians. Wilkes
(1990:306, 1996:19), as well as "The Annotations" (1991:460), define
the term within the context of words like "big", "good", "great",
"whopper" or "force". For this reason, I think "Sollicker" alludes to a
subject of the Empire, and that his being nicknamed "the
Immovable" by Collins further supports this. Since Collins would
rather build an Australia for Australians, creating a distinct selfimage vts-a-vts other nationalist images, the term "Sollicker", as a
sign indicating a British or jingoistic attitude, poses a distinct
problem for "the Coming Australian". In short, a "Sollicker", like the
Anglo-Australian romance novelist, will tell the wrong lies, hand
down the wrong identity, and be the cause of much ill-judgment in
light of eudatmonia and the Australian experience.
Bearing in mind Roderick Vivian, we must turn our attention
to that other illegitimate son in Furphy's novels, namely Fred
Falkland-Pritchard. Like Roderick Vivian, Fred ought to be seen as
an illegitimate son of the Empire. Indeed, the theme of illegitimacy,
in the Pritchard paternity, is introduced when Fred's "father" had
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told Collins' father that he 'was the illegitimate son of an illegitimate
son of George IV (BBB, 5). Further in the novel, when Collins tells
his reader that Fred's "father" had 'died of some unpronouncable
scientific term signifying internal haemorrhage of irascibility and
malevolence' (BBB, 37), the details of Fred's illegitimate status are
revealed in a series of clues for the observant reader to piece together
(BBB, 38-39). I will not go into the full details of Fred's illegitimate
status, except to say that he is the son of Sir William Falkland and
Miss Kirkham, the 'seventh daughter of the Rev. Clarence Kirkham,
incumbent of Thorpe Mullock, a parish contiguous to Falkland
Lodge' (BBB, 38).
Readers ought to bear in mind the familial relations between
the "Sollickers" and M'Intyre at Yoongoolee, for Miss Kirkham was
married off to Fred's "father". Sylvester Pritchard, at the
encouragement of Sir William, in the same manner as M'Intyre
encouraged the marriage between Helenar and Edward. Evidence in
the novel suggests that Sylvester Pritchard, a 'road contractor' in
Victoria and a man who 'could always manage to boss half a dozen
men, picked for servility and cheapness' (BBB, 5), was employed at
the Falkland estate in England, having a similarly immovable mental
attitude as Edward Vivian. Furthermore, both natural fathers of the
bastard sons have substantial fortunes and are already married,
suggesting that while they are concerned with the welfare of their
illegitimate sons, they are also concerned with the outbreak of a
scandal. And finally, Just as Roderick Vivian had been named 'in
honour of Muster M'Intyre' (SiL, 142), a textual clue to his true
paternal relations, Fred also carries the truth of his illegitimacy in
his patronymic. As Collins cleverly indicates, '[t]hese family
entanglements [between the Falklands and the Prttchards] seem to
afford a clue to the origin of hyphenated names' (BBB, 39).
I use the term "cleverly" because Collins' authorial articulation
of Fred's details direct the observant reader to see that hyphenated
names afford a clue to such family entanglements, especially
illegitimacy. Like Gilding (1967:167, 1971:xvi), one might be tempted
to say that Furphy, rather than Collins, is directing his reader's
attention to Fred's true status. But this can only be done at the
expense of seeing Collins purely as a hero. Barnes is correct in
noting that Collins is 'now only a shadow of the original', but he is
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not 'a mannerism' (1990:365). Collins steps back from centre stage
because it is taken by Fred Falkland-Pritchard. In other words,
Collins, as Croft (1991 :250) notes, acts in the capacity of verifying
the "truths" of Fred's elaborate yarns. Yet this act of verification is
not to expose Fred as just 'a skilful liar' of 'pathetic fantasies' (Croft,
1991:250), but to show the function of the lie in the art of nation
and identity.
For this reason, I disagree with Croft's notion that Collins'
status in The Buln-Buln and the Brolga is simply that of 'a realist'
(1991:250). Devlin-Glass also sees Collins as a realist or rationalist
who cannot accept romance, arguing instead that it is Furphy who
'enlarged upon the positive value of the romantic lie' (1974:88). This
is true but problematic. Besides ignoring Collins' authorial status
and truth-embellished style, Devlin-Glass makes no distinction
between romance and romanticism when she uses the adjective
"romantic". Nor does she make a distinction between the customs of
Anglo-Australlanism and Currency in regards to the positive value of
romance and marriage. In this sense, I am not sure what to make of
Devlin-Glass' notion that '[t]he romantic/ realistic dichotomy reveals
itself as increasingly untenable and artificial as Furphy's
examination of lying proceeds' (1974:88). Despite this, Devlin-Glass
(1974:75) is right to note that The Buln-Buln and the Brolga is a much
more thematically tidy piece of writing, continuing with patterns of
thought set out in the previous novels.
Gilding is astute in observing that 'The Buln-Buln and the
Brolga is the result of Furphy's full recognition that reality is like the
novel in that reality and social structures are constructions of the
wills and imaginations of the minds who inhabit, who in fact create,
them' (1971:xiv). But I cannot agree with his claim that 'the point of
attack [in the novel] is ebullient Australian nationalism, in particular
the city dweller's exaltation of the bush' (1967: 172). Like the previous
novels, the distinction between realism and romanticism, or Lawson's
and Paterson's styles, is merged, since the national type must be
strategically truth-embellished and loosely-federated in order to make
its eudatmontc value appealing to all. As Collins states towards the
close of his narrative,
[t]here must ... be something in Fred, after all -some
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magnetic property, enabling him to draw from the
heterogeneous mixture of society such a finelytempered bit of steel. And, beyond controversy, there
was only one thing in Fred. Therein, as a matter of
mere necessity, his magnetism must lie (lie is good).
Moreover, this magnet-metaphor may serve to throw
light upon many of the conjugal successes and
disasters that have puzzled philosophers (BBB, 141).
Although Fred is an illegitimate son of the Empire, he is, as
Collins explains, 'eligible for membership in the Australian Natives'
Association' (BBB, 39) because he was, like Roderick Vivian, born in
Australia. As I have already discussed, Roderick Vivian's creativity is,
as Currency lad, curbed by the "sollicker" mental attitude. But, the
question generated by this juxtapositioning of familial relations is
whether or not the same mental attitude will influence Fred
Falkland-Pritchard. Or will he, like Collins, be concerned with the
uplifting and upbuilding of Australia? Although The Buln-Buln and
the Brolga thematically returns to familiar ground, its thematic
tidiness, or cohesion, centres around an exploration of a principal
theme, and that is the value of lying. Collins states that '[l]ying
commends itself to the juvenile mind as being easy, inexpensive, and
convenient; and in course of time the habit becomes fixed' (BBB, 8).
Also, '[l]ying is, of all the arts, the most popular and cosmopolitan'
(BBB, 8).
From this, Collins proceeds to discuss historical examples
related to the liar's paradox, stating that 'of all the accusations of
mendacity which from time immemorial have primed our atmosphere,
probably not one has been groundless -except, perhaps when some
Chinaman, after a few hours patient controversy, has applied the
epithet to his jibbing horse' (BBB, 8). The liar's paradox, with the
exception of its inapplicability to certain contexts, transgresses the
notion that something must be either true or not true, as is the case
with Collins' statement that 'truth is relative, not absolute' (BBB, 8).
According to Von Wright,
[t]he antinomies of logic have puzzled people ever
since they were discovered -and will probably continue
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to puzzle us for ever. We should, I think, not regard
them as much as problems awaiting a solution, but
rather as providing a perpetual-raw material for
thinking. They are important, because thinking about
them challenges the ultimate questions of all logic and therefore of all thinking (1983:25).
For Von Wright, the liar's paradox is an example of 'an
antinomy' because 'the conclusion of the argument ... is a
contradiction' (1983:27). Von Wright's approach to the liar's paradox
is very fruitful for the novels, since it allows us to take two wonderful
antinomies from the novels as raw material for further thinking
about the novels. Firstly, the notion that the novels are not fiction,
as often stated by Collins. And secondly, the notion that the novels
are not fact, as implied by Collins' claim to authorship and
censorship. It would be futile, as Von Wright suggests, to try and
solve these two antinomies logically. To attempt to do so would mean
missing the point of the liar's paradox. Because of the contradictory
outcome of true and not true, the liar's paradox blurs the distinction
between fact and fiction. The value of the liar's paradox for the
novels rests with thinking about, or seeing and responding to the
idea of truth-embellishment in light of the ethics of representation,
thus challenging the idea that all forms of lying are morally
reprehensible.
Despite his earlier claim that Collins verifies the truth behind
Fred's stories, I find it strange for Croft to say that 'there are no
hidden stories which might make Fred's fantasies real' (1991:253).
Firstly, Collins only verifies some of the truths from which Fred
builds his fantasies. As Collins states, 'I knew him to tell the truth
three times' (BBB, 9), and Collins proceeds to relate the three
episodes to his reader (BBB, 9-37). Rather than verifying the reality
of Fred's fantasies, which is a logical contradiction, Collins uses the
truth about Fred to foreground the truth-embellished style, which
Fred uses to refashion heroically both the three episodes and his self
later in the novel. Within the context of the liar's paradox as a
narrative technique, Partington states that '[o]ne possible solution is
that Furphy wished to establish that no narration is simply a
statement of unambiguous facts, since some selection must take
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place' (1993:248). As Zeller explains, '(w]hat we learn about the
yarn ... is that it is something more than simply a well-formed tale. It
is a story in which the teller has invested not only something of
himself, but also something of the life around him' (1988:48).
For this reason, Croft's notion that '[t]he skilful fabulist can
corrupt the world of the real, and substitute for it the illusions of
fiction' (1991:257) seems rather perplexing. The novels indicate that
the dangers of fiction, chiefly romance, are everpresent, but since
reality is constantly permeated by fiction, it does not necessarily
follow that fiction corrupts reality. Although the potential is readily
there, yarning, or lying is not always about corrupting reality, it is
also about being well-deceived in light of eudatmonta. As Collins
states, '[o]ld Dr Johnson says that the greatest sublunary happiness
consists in being well deceived -well deceived' (BBB, 20). Or, as
Collins later points out, '[l]et a man devoutly and constantly believe
in himself, and he will find a multitude of others to believe in him
also' (BBB, 74). In this sense, I do not agree with Barnes' claim that
'The Buln-Buln and the Brolga [has] less intellectual weight', even
though it displays 'both a fascination with the techniques of
narration and a confidence in handling them' (1990:365).
Bearing in mind the principal concern with lying, the first
theme to which the reader is introduced is the notion 'that no man
is a hero to his vally-de-sham' (BBB, 4). There are several reasons for
this. Firstly, Collins has Just received a letter from Fred, who has
informed him that he has a '(w]ife and three (3) children' (BBB, 2)
and is on his way to Echuca. Secondly, Collins' encounters with the
O'Halloran and Vivian marriages, as well as the unfruitful romances
in Rtgby's Romance and the stories of infidelity told by Warrtgal Alf in
Such ts Life, lend strength to Collins' notion since it appears that
male and female relations, in Rivertna, have little or no success. And
thirdly, it serves as an introduction to Fred Falkland-Pritchard,
whose aptitude for lying seems to indicate no more success with
women than the other male heroes. As Collins states, '[Fred's] one
positive quality was mendacity' while '(h]is negative qualities spread
out in an old man plain of comprehensive incapability, in the centre
of which, his solitary characteristic reared its awful form above the
clouds and midway left the storm' (BBB, 4).
Indeed, '[y]ou could sit down and rest in the cool shade of one
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of his fabrications. Tasteful, audacious and adroit in his one art, he
was limp and washy and generally inadequate outside that speciality'
(BBB, 4). All in all, Collins seems to have much evidence in favour of
his 'theory that women do not love their husbands' (BBB, 40).
further suggesting that the ..Coming Australian" seems to have very
little hope. As Zeller states, '[f]rom his theory Collins reasons that
Mrs. Pritchard must indeed hate her husband because he is good at
nothing but lying; once she sees how little truth there is in Fred's
yam's, their marriage is doomed' (1988:45). According to Collins,
'[w]omen's love is romantic, and flows like the Solway in romantic
atmosphere, but ebbs like its tide when a more intimate knowledge
has resolved that atmosphere into its prosaic components' (BBB, 43).
In short, 'the hero vanishes' when 'the scare-crow truth of
masculinity, the incorrigible he-ness of the he-feller, comes out only
too brightly under the penetrating rays of Hymen's slush-lamp' (BBB,
42).

Despite the bitter tone, one should not jump to the conclusion
that Collins is sexist, for it foregrounds his disappointment with
both the pervasiveness of sex-charm over sex-value and his past
encounters with marriages. As Barnes states, 'nowhere in his fiction
does Furphy portray marrtage as a fulfilling relationship' (1990: 188).
That is, of course, until readers encounter the Falkland-Pritchard
marriage. Thus, while Collins has much evidence in favour of his
theory, it is not rock-solid. Nor is it meant to be. As Collins
confesses, 'my theory of the feminine vally-de-sham ought to be
stated as subject to certain exceptions' (BBB, 74-75). Indeed, the
theory is a strategy, and the authorial Collins uses Fred and his
abilities to overturn the notion that 'no man is up to the husbandideal of a loving woman' (BBB, 44-45). In terms of lying, Fred may be
'the over-indulger' (BBB, 8), but the point is made: marriage requires
the same eudaimonic principles needed for uplifting and upbuilding a
nation, namely correct judgment, truth-embellishment, an
understanding of one's controlling alternatives and guardianship. As
Collins states, '[t]he fact is, that authority or precedence, however
ridiculous, being once accepted and enthroned, is apt to paralyse
judgment' (BBB, 85), hence the emphasis on telling the rtght lies.
For this reason, one must be wary of Croft's notion that
Collins does not 'understand married love and what we must callfolie
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a deux' (1983:9). According to Croft, 'Furphy's

interest in this
short novel is the relationship of man and wife, and how marriage
can only work if there is a shared delusion. Marriage, he seems to be
saying, has to be based on illusion rather than reality' (1991 :248). It
is a view shared by Partington, who states that '[w]hen a marriage
is ... happy, as with Fred ... and his wife, the main reason seems to be
that one party is mistaken about the character of the other'
(1993:97). Unfortunately, neither Croft nor Partington takes into
account the idea of truth-embellishment and the consistent focus on
the ethics of representation in all three novels. To all intents and
purposes, it can be said that Collins' preoccupation with uplifting
and upbuilding is also applicable to Fred.
From being an initially 'pusillanimous' young Australian, who
spent his 'juvenile days' as a 'scapegoat' for 'the bad boys of the
generation' (BBB, 4), Fred emerges as the hero of the Franco-German
War, selected 'out of 180 000 men' by the Emperor of France to
perform a service that [the Emperor] would trust to no man but an
Australian' (BBB, 111. My italics). Fred's importance to the War effort
is such that, when Fred is wounded, the Emperor sends for
'Dupong... the cleverest surgeon in the world -a man wearing thirteen
Continental orders on his breast' (BBB, 114). It is this man who
proudly proclaims that nothing can kill Fred, for '[h]e has the
Australian constitution -the constitution of a horse!' (BBB, 114).
Fred celebrates his truth-embellished identity, telling the right lies
and turning the old world on its head with the kind of antipodean
heroics worthy of the "Coming Australian". This process enhances
the Falkland-Pritchard marriage and, subsequently, enhances Young
Australia, for Fred the Currency Lad has given heroism and legend to
his children, who will presumably create and narrate the Australian
experience in a grand manner.
Within this context, the reader needs to remember the details
of the relationship between Roiy and his daughter, Macy O'Halloran,
'the perfect Young-Australian' (StL, 73). Roiy, the Irish Catholic, was
'born of a legend-loving race' (StL, 61) and, according to Collins,
main

was [Macy's) guide, philosopher, and crony. He was her
overwhelming ideal of power, wisdom, and goodness;
he was her help in ages past, her hope for years to
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come (no irreverence intended here; quite the reverse,
for if true family life existed, we should better
apprehend the meaning of .. Our Father, who art in
heaven"); he was her Ancient of Days; her shield, and
her exceedingly great reward (SiL, 74).
It is interesting to note that the first marriage encountered in
the three novels raises the question of .. true family life" and asks the
reader to consider the meaning of .. Our Father, who art in heaven".
Apart from the obvious biblical reference within the context of
sectarian rivahy, there is also a clever pun on Rory's heroic status in
the eyes of Mary, and the sense that Rory's ability to yarn could lead
to an Australia legend .. if true family life existed" in light of uplifting
and upbuilding. Despite the fact that the O'Halloran episode leads to
tragedy, the relationship that Rory has with his daughter is a
strategic forerunner to Fred's relationship with his children.
Stylistically, the Falkland-Pritchard marriage indicates .. true family
life", but the paradox to this truth is the necessity of embellishment.
What, then, does this say about Lillian Falkland-Pritchard? As I have
pointed out earlier, the previous encounters with marriage or
romance lead readers to expect a sorry state of affairs for the
Falkland-Pritchard marriage and anticipate a rather unsavoury
quality to Fred's wife. According to Collins' theory,

Fred's antithetical complement... would carry a stern,
practical, masterful look; also the poor woman would
be sour in temper and repellent in manner, through
continual brooding over her grand mistake (BBB, 66).
From this, Collins, acting as the ·gushing novelist' (BBB, 66),
gives his readers a nomenologically detailed account of her features
in accordance with her unsavoury character. But, one should not
take this at all seriously, for Collins has already pointed out that
nomenology is a science which 'sometimes runs crank' (BBB, 66).
Gilding states that, in his description of Lillian, Collins 'himself
departs far from actuality' (1971:xvi). While this is true, I think
Collins is strategically leading his readers to the value of Lillian to
the Falkland-Pritchard marriage in light of a .. true family life" for
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Young Australia. Once confronted with Lillian, Collins states
immediately that '[n]omenology... was at fault once more' (BBB, 68.
My italics}, indicating that Collins is completely aware of its
fallaciousness from past experiences.
In face and figure she was beyond criticism; not only
negatively perfect, but almost aggressively attractive.
Analysed, this attractiveness was of the kind that
faithfully indexes a true woman's temperament -which
implies much, and nothing but good. Owing to many
co-operate causes, the Australian woman of the best
type has probably no equal on earth; and Fred's wife
was a satisfactory illustration of our country's possible
achievement in the most momentous and far-reaching
of all national commissions. In no respect was she like
her picture; indeed, I noticed with a touch of chagrin
that even her moustache was golden brown instead of
rusty black (BBB, 68).
Not only does Lillian have sex-charm, she is also the shining
example of sex-value evident in the "Australienne". Croft argues that
'Mrs Falkland-Pritchard is all that a novelist could ask for in a
heroine' (1991:255). But, to approach Lillian as the novelist's perfect
heroine is to overemphasise her sex-charm in light of her sex-value. I
think Lillian Falkland-Pritchard represents the high moral standard,
calm courage and clear intellect which Furphy thought so important.
Croft is correct in noting that 'Mrs Falkland-Pritchard and Tom
share common intellectual interests' (1991:250), for there are many
instances in the novel where Lillian can be said to represent sexvalue for Collins. However, there is one instance where a dialogue
between Collins and Lillian foregrounds an important aspect of her
sex-value, and that is a woman's influence on 'the controlling
masculine [mind]' of her husband, who, 'be he a king or a beggar, is a
little world of his own' (RR, 11):
"Tell me, Mr Collins, do you find much change in
him since you were boys together?
"No change," I replied, with my habitual
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truthfulness. "Only the ripened fulfilment of his early
promise. I may tell you that, in the olden days, we
simply recognised his superiority and let it go at that.
In fact, he's gifted with a power that I've never
equalled."
"I'm glad to hear you say so," rejoined Mrs
Pritchard, evidently relieved. "I do admire a
magnanimous spirit. But -speaking confidentiallydoesn't it seem strange to you that the world, against
its own interests, passes by men like Fred, and
lavishes place and power on mere nobodies?"
"Not more strange than true, however," I replied,
veiling my bewilderment under a sympathetic air. "And
-apart from the injustice perpetrated- society, in so
doing, sustains a loss."
"Yes; but, you see, Mr Collins, the sin of society,
in this case, ls visited on the victim, as well as on
society itself. I should like to see society suffer the
whole penalty. Of course, you can reason the question
out dispassionately, while I feel the injustice day by
day, as I see condemned to inaction hands that the
rod of empire might have swayed."
"Or waked to ecstasy the living lyre," I rejoined
thoughtfully; and I maintain, even now, that my
quotation was the more apt of the two -heartless,
maybe, but just a desperate grip at something tangible
in this chaotic situation {BBB, 72- 73).
According to Croft {1983:10, 1991:272) readers ought to see
Lillian as the hero of the The Buln-Buln and the Brolga. While this ls
not untrue, one should not negate Fred's status as hero. Rather,
readers ought to bear in mind Franklin's notion that Furphy
observed 'what every woman knows, but what few men have moral
courage to admit; that men's creative work needs to be nurtured by
women' {1944:38). Whether or not 'Lillian Pritchard' sees 'through
(Fred's) lies' or 'accepts them as fact' {Zeller, 1988:45) ls not the
issue. What ls important ls her capacity to nurture Fred's creative
potential in accordance with the high moral standard, calm courage
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and clear intellect of her sex-value. She completes the family's sense
of purpose and is relieved to hear that Collins equally appreciates the
power of Fred's magnanimous spirit. Collins may do 'his best to be
cultured and civilised ... even to the point of agreeing with the wife's
inflated opinion of her husband' (Croft, 1991:256), but one should
recall Collins' recognition of Fred's ability 'to draw from the
heterogeneous mixture of society such a finely-tempered bit of steel'
(BBB, 141).
Again, the novel's preoccupation with lying, through the liar's
paradox, challenges the notion that all forms of lying are morally
reprehensible. Fred's lies seive to uplift and upbuild, and, in light of
the ethics of representation, it is worth noting that his 'power ... lay
largely in the quality of compatability and congruity' (BBB, 103). As
Collins explains, '[y]ou would never hear him say, like your firstperson singular novelist-liar, "my blood ran cold" -"I was unneived
with terror" -"I never was so frightened in my life" -or words to
similar purport' (BBB, 103). In accordance with Collins' views, such
lies are morally reprehensible. Indeed, '[Fred] could see the
inconsistency' and, '[w]ith the instinct of genius, he perceived that
the genuine hero, relating his little adventure, never descends to that
sort of palaver, simply because attested courage neither knows nor
needs any such paltry foil' (BBB, 103).
Despite the style of his last novel, one wonders whether or not
Furphy used Fred Falkland-Pritchard to point out that the uplifting
and upbuilding of Australia, or the art of nationhood, is not Just a
process of Federation, but also "Frederation". Also, one wonders if
Fred's truth-embellished character, as the heroic Coming Australian,
is meant to be seen as a guide to the value of Tom Collins. If this is
the case, then one is faced with reconciling Collins' scholarly
philosophical type with Fred's swashbuckling hero. Perhaps Furphy
hoped that the reading public would take to Fred's truth-embellished
character more than they had done to Tom Collins, and that Fred's
popular image, in conjunction with Collins' commentary on Fred's
aptitude and skills, would spark public interest in the issues first
articulated by Collins in Such is Life, namely that uplifting and
upbuilding Young Australia depends not just on the art of nationbuilding, but also on clear intellect, calm courage and high moral
standards.
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With this in mind, it is the romance plot which is most in
need of reassessment, of observant reading and thinking within the
context of Collins' preoccupation with uplifting and upbuilding.
Croft states that 'Molly's and Alfs story is the core of Such ts Life'
because 'the thread which runs through [chapters one, four. six and
seven] is the story of the Coopers and the Morrises, of Molly and Alf
(1991: 112). But Croft also proposes the following perplexing
question: '[i]f the Molly/ Alf story is the core of Such ts Life, why is it
hidden?' (1991: 113). According to Croft, '[t]here are no simple
answers to this question, because they lie deep in Furphy's own
nature, and deep in the ideas of the time' (1991:113). I am not
entirely satisfied with Croft's observations. It is true that the Molly/
Alf romance is an important aspect of the novel, but I do not think it
is the core. The romance plot is but one more treatment of the idea
of uplifting and upbuilding, which is the most likely candidate for
the "core" of Such ts Life, as well as the other two novels.
According to Nina Knight, 'the story of Molly and Alf is the
longest and the most intricate, and it has contributed largely
towards establishing Such ts Life as an elaborately structured work of
:fiction' (1969:245). This is certainly true, but to read Such ts Life
through the romance plot alone leads to some very problematic
conclusions about Collins. Although many critics have given their
interpretation, I find their views unsatisfactory. I think this is largely
due to three factors. Firstly, the idea of uplifting and upbuilding has
largely been ignored. Secondly, no critic has fully considered Furphy's
idea of authorship nor Collins' status as the implied author. And
thirdly, the issue of Collins' induction has not been satisfactorily
investigated. It is this last point to which I want to draw my reader's
attention. No reading of the romance plot will do justice to Such ts
L!fe so long as it ignores the philosophical idea of induction 1 • Indeed,
the intricacy of the romance plot turns on this form of epistemology.
As Collins states to Stewart of Kooltoopa, 'my information [about
Warrtgal Alf] is derived from no random hearsay, but is obtained by
an intransmissible power of induction, rare in our times' (SIL, 170).
7

Although there is no hard evidence, it seems likely that Furphy had been exposed to some of Hume's
ideas. Barnes (1990:57) notes that the Furphy family knew the Scotsman, James Hutcheson, who was
self-educated and well-read in British philosophy. Barnes (1990:57) points out that Hutcheson was
both a leading public figure in Kyneton and John Furphy' s master when he was an apprentice. It is
also quite possible that Furphy had read many works of British philosophy for himself at either The
Mechanics Institute in Shepparton, or the public library in Melbourne.

279.

What does induction mean? Hospers (1990:188) explains that
induction infers conclusions about a future event from a sample of
like events in the past. Using the example of throwing a stone up
into the air, he states that '[w)e can't validly deduce "It will fall to
the ground" from "It has always done so," but we consider that it has
always done so as evidence that it will do so in the future'
(1990:188). As Hume originally wrote in his An Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding, 'I shall allow ... that the one proposition may
justly be inferred from the other; I know, in fact, that it is always
inferred. But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of [a
priori) reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning' ([ 1777)
1990:799). According to Hume, '(t)hat there are no demonstrative [or
a priori or deductive) arguments in [matters of fact and existence)
seems evident, since it implies no contradiction that the course of
nature may change and that an object, seemingly like those we have
experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects' (Enq.
[ 1777) 1990:799).

And, '[t)o say that it is experimental is begging the question.
For all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that
the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be
conjoined with similar sensible qualities· (Enq. [ 1777) 1990:). In this
sense, Hume states that '[i)f there be any suspicion that the course
of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the
future, all experience [as demonstrative or a priori evidence) becomes
useless and can give rise to no inference or conclusion' (Enq. (1777)
1990:800-80lt. Hospers (1990:190) explains that inductive reasoning
can never be deductively valid because conclusions are not inferred
with certainty from the premise. This view is held by Russell, who
states that
[i)t is to be observed that all such expectations are
only probable; th us we have not to seek for a proof
that they must be fulfilled, but only for some reason in
favour of the view that they are likely to be fulfilled ....
8

For Hume, a priori or demonstrative reasoning, as opposed to 'moral reasoning' or a posteriori
reasoning concerning 'matters of fact', are 'the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic' (Enq.
[1777] 1990:794). Because this is so, one cannot demonstrate the relationship between cause and
effect in matters of fact as one can with number and, in this sense, conclusions based on matters of
fact or experience have no certainty of outcome.
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Experience has shown us that, hitherto, the frequent
repetition of some uniform succession or coexistence
has been a cause of our expecting the same succession
or coexistence on the next occasion (1912:62).
According to Hume, 'all arguments from experience are founded
on the similarity, which we discover among natural objects, and by
which we are induced to expect effects similar to those, which we
have found to follow from such objects' (Enq. [ 1 777] 1990:800. My
italics). In short, '[f]rom causes, which appear stmllar, we expect
similar effects. This ls the sum of all our experimental conclusions'
(Enq. [1777] 1990:800). Within this context, the idea of probability
is, for Hume, 'the concurrence of...several views or glimpses [that
imprint] the idea more strongly on the imagination; gives it superior
force and vigour; renders its influence on the passions and affections
more sensible; and in a word, begets that reliance or security, which
constitutes the nature of belief and opinion' (Enq. [ 1777] 1990:811).
Because of this, Hume concludes that, '[a]s a great number of
views ... concur in one event, they fortify and confirm it to the
imagination, beget that sentiment which we call belief, and give its
object the preference above the contrary event, which ls not
supported by an equal number of experiments, and recurs not
frequently to the thought in transferring the past to the future' (Enq.
[1777] 1990:812).
Although he does not discuss the issue of certainty and
probability, or a priori and a posteriori reasoning, in any detail, I
assume this ls what Croft (1991:50, 87, 274) alludes to when he
states that Collins' mistakes are chiefly due to the perils of
induction. According to Croft, 'Tom's major intellectual
characteristic is his reliance on induction to establish an hypothesis,
and blindness in the face of facts which deny that hypothesis. The
best example of this ls his unswerving belief in his theory of
nomenology' (1991:96). And yet, Col11ns knows that nomenology, 'like
all other sciences except Mathematics, sometimes runs cronk' (BBB,
66). Collins is not unaware of the possibility of contrary outcomes
associated with the inductive method. More to the point, Croft
believes that '[f]or Furphy, the truth, reality itself, was a fiction; it
was story. For Tom Collins, writing was a record of fact based on
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obseivation and induction -histocy' (1991:51).
Because of the importance of truth-embellishment for both
Furphy and Collins, Croft's View is clearly false. Readers should not
assume that, because of the lack of certainty, '[t]he suchness of life
which we see from [Collins'] pen is one which is produced by
induction, and it is usually wrong' (Croft,1991:173). One of the most
remarkable features of the novels is their focus on the widespread
use of induction in inferring and evaluating the many facets of the
suchness of life. This is interesting, for Hospers (1990: 191) and
Russell (1912:63, 69) both note that human beings, as well as
animals, are naturally inclined to infer inductively in daily life.
Hume's Views on this matter are no different, but he does offer a
reason as to why inductive inferences occur. In A Treatise of Human
Nature, he states that 'all probable reasoning is nothing but a species
of sensation·, for 'lilt is not solely in poetcy and music (that] we must
follow our sentiment, but likewise in philosophy' (1911: 105 ).
In other words, '[w]hen I give the preference to one set of
arguments above another, I do nothing but decide from my feeling
concerning the superiority of their influence' (THN. 1911:105).
According to Hume, '[o]bjects have no discoverable connection
together; nor is it from any other principle but custom operating
upon the imagination, that we can draw any inference from the
appearance of one to the existence of another' (THN. 1911: 105-106.
My italics). Within the context of inductive inferences, Hume argues
'that the supposition, that the future resembles the past, is not
founded on arguments of any kind, but is derived entirely from habit,
by which we are determined to expect for the future the same train of
objects to which we have been accustomed' (THN. 1911:134-135). In
this sense, 'there is no probability so great as not to allow of a
contracy possibility; because otherwise it would cease to be a
probability, and would become a certainty' (THN. 1911:136). But
Hume also points out the following:
[s]hould it here be asked me, whether I sincerely
assent to this argument, which I seem to take such
pains to inculcate, and whether I be really one of
those sceptics who hold that all is uncertain, and that
our judgment is not in any thing possessed of any
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measures of truth and falsehood; I should reply, that
this question is entirely superfluous, and that neither
I, nor any other person, was ever sincerely and
constantly of that opinion. Nature, by an absolute and
uncontrollable necessity, has determined us to Judge
as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more
forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller
light, upon account of their customary connection
with a present impression, than we can hinder
ourselves from thinking, as long as we are awake, or
seeing the surrounding bodies, when we tum our eyes
towards them in broad sunshine .... My intention .. .is
only to make the reader sensible of the truth of my
hypothesis, that all our reasonings concerning causes
and (il{ects, are derived from nothing but custom; and
that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of
the cogitative part of our natures' (THN. 178-179).
According to Stuart Hampshire, 'Hume tried to convince his
readers that there can be no knowledge that can be called
distinctively philosophical knowledge, no hope of rational insight
into the structure of reality' (1966:4). Hampshire states that '[a]
philosopher may study the anthropology of knowledge; he may
describe the deep-rooted habits and customs which form our view of
the external world and the system of our ordinary beliefs', but 'he
can only remove the illusions and the pretences of traditional
philosophy' (1966:4). Most importantly, a philosopher's Job is to
point out 'the illusion that there must be some ultimate Justification
of our habits of thought, which is external to these habits
themselves' (Hampshire, 1966:4). I must disagree with some of
Hampshire's interpretation of Hume, for Hume had stated that
none but a fool or madman will ever pretend to dispute
the authority of experience, or to reject that great
guide of human life; it may surely be allowed a
philosopher to have so much curiosity at least, as to
examine the principle of human nature, which gives
this mighty authority to experience, and makes us
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draw advantage from that similarity, which nature has
placed among different objects (Enq. [l 777] 1990:800).
Hume does not argue that no knowledge can be philosophical.
Nor does he discount the possibility of a rational insight into the
structure of reality, but he does stress that a knowledge which claims
to know that structure with certainty ls false, since no conclusions
derived from matters of fact can know the a priori relationship
between causes and effects. Because of the fallaciousness of any
claim to an a priori insight into the structure of reality, Hume ls
opposed to any traditional philosophy which concerns itself with
demonstrative proofs of experiential "facts". In this sense, Hume
(Enq. [ 1 777] 1990:803) argues that the ultimate justification for our
habits of thought, concerning matters of fact, ls custom, and that
custom ls one's experience of an operation which has the propensity
to repeat itself without human reason or understanding. Using the
example of heat and flame, Hume states that 'we are determined by
custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other',
and that '[a]ll inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of
custom, not of [a priori] reasoning' (Enq. [ l 777] 1990:804).
According to Hume, '[c]ustom ... ls the great guide to human
life', since '[l]t ls that principle alone, which renders our experience
useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of
events with those which have appeared in the past' (Enq. [ 1 777]
1990:805). Hume's views on customs and habits are quite important
to an understanding of the three novels and the romance plot, since
the three novels show that the issue of induction ls more
complicated than Croft affords. It ls true that probability in cause
and effect ls not certainty, and that certain probable effects are more
than likely to be met with a contrary outcome. But this ls not always
the case. In other words, there are certain probable outcomes, which
we may infer by way of custom or habit, that are more than likely to
be fulfilled. When such outcomes are not fulfilled, we tend to look for
the reason as to why they are not rather than conclude that an
inductive method ls wrong. In these cases, we tend to examine the
relationship between customs or habits of thought, degrees of
support, and external but contrary influences.
When reading Furphy's novels, I think that these points ought
284.

to be kept in mind. Interestingly enough, the word induction itself
seemed to have had some currency in the 1890s, particularly with the
Coming Australian debate, and its usage sheds light on Collins'
induction and the romance plot. In a Bulletin article published on the
10th of November, 1894, the writer states that
in any conjectural horoscope of the coming Australian,
we must start from things as they are, not from things
as they have been. History may be a light to our path,
but it can never be the path itself. With patient
observation of facts for a few years more, sufficient
should be known of Australian character as modified
by Australian conditions to enable general principles,
the result of alien experience, to be aptly applied. But,
without preliminary induction, deduction is a tool
which slips in the hand (6).
Or, as Collins states,
[w]hat authority had the boundary man [Roderick
Vivian] or I to dogmatise on the Coming Australian?
Just the same authority as Marcus Clarke, or Trollope,
or Froude, or Francis Adams -and that is exactly
none. Deductive reasoning of this kind is seldom safe.
Who, for instance, could have deduced, from certain
subtly interlaced conditions of food, atmosphere,
association, and what not, the development of those
silky honours which grace the upper lip of the
Australienne? No doubt there are certain occult laws
which govern these things; but we haven't even
mastered the laws themselves, and how are we going
to forecast their operation? (SlL, 144. My italics).
What Collins calls nature's "occult laws" is described by Hume
as nature's secret powers. According to Hume, 'nature has kept us at
a great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the
knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals
from us those powers and principles, on which the influence of these
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objects entirely depends' (Enq. [ 1777) 1990:798). What we apprehend
we do by way of custom, but custom gives us no lnstgh t in to the
relational power of the natural causality between two things. In
Robert Wilson's view, 'Such ls Life ls, without a doubt, a
philosophical novel' because '[t)wo philosophical problems dominate
the novel', namely 'the often-discussed issue of free will versus
determinism' and 'the nature of knowledge· (1979:127).
More to the point, Wilson contends that '[h)ow men know -by
what means and with what limitations- ls the "central" problem of
Such ls Life and shapes, at least in part, its structure' (1979:128).
And, '[l)n the course of Such ls Life, Tom comments upon two ways of
knowing, each of which ts a solution to the persistent problem of
knowledge' (Wilson, 1979: 129). According to Wilson (1979: 129), these
two ways of knowing are, firstly, the subsumption of things to
already established categortes or laws, and secondly, an emplrlcal
identification of things which assert their individuality and thereby
resist general classifications or categorization. Wilson ( 1979) calls
the former categoric knowledge, and the latter tautegorlc knowledge.
Discussing Collins' claim that 'the best kind of knowledge· ls
'acquired from observation and experience' (SiL, 274), Wilson argues
that it ought to be seen within 'his contempt for the English upper
classes (and the novelists, such as Kingsley, who glorify them) since
their knowledge depends upon already-formed categories' (1979: 129).
Wilson (1979: 129) thinks that Furphy cleverly does not allow
Collins' conclusions to stand because Collins' consistently fails to
recognize and identify things properly vis-a-vis pre-existing categortes.
According to Wilson (1979:131), knowledge, or ways of knowing in
the novel, ls either categoric or tautegortc, and Colllns' preference for
the tautegorlc ls his downfall. But Wilson makes a grave mistake
when he assumes that Collins' preference for the tau tegortc exhibits
a continual disregard for the categoric. While 1t ls true that Colllns
attacks the Anglo-Australian idea of aristocracy and its categortes, 1t
is not true that he has contempt for categoric knowledge altogether. I
do not see how Wilson could have come to this conclusion since
Collins ls quite prepared, as I have already shown, to refer
lntertextually to a variety of canonical works, which can be said to
constitute Wilson's definition of categoric knowledge. Yet Wilson
acknowledges this, noting that 'Tom's chronicles are remarkably full
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of categorical propositions', and '[n]ot all of these are false, ... but
their mere presence sets off the theory that knowledge is experiential,
particular, and intuitive' (1979: 137).
That Collins gives preference to the tautegoric is true, but this
preference should be seen as a consisten,t effort to recontextualize
the categoric so that readers may judge and appreciate better the
Australian experience, as indicated by the ideas of uplifting and
upbuilding. Or, in light of the above-mentioned Bulleti.n article,
Collins' preference for the tautegoric is the use of induction to
observe general principles or customs and habits which could
categorically delineate an Australian character. Wilson is right to
note that a strict adherence to 'categorical knowledge· can 'lead to
stiff-necked prejudices' (1979:130), but he fails to mention that the
greater result of such categorical knowledge is the deep-seated and
widespread colonial division and rivalry between the customs and
habits of Anglo-Australianism and the idea of currency, as indicated
by Quarterman's character. Perhaps this is another reason why
Collins claims that '[t]he coming Australian is a problem' (SlL, 144).
Nevertheless, Wilson soundly judges that 'the requirements of
knowing have emerged from the novel as both categoric and
tautegoric, neither being of much account on its own' (1979:142).
To put it in simple terms, knowledge is constituted by both
inductive and deductive methods. Yet Wilson fails to consider how
many categories are themselves the product of tautegoric or inductive
knowledge. In other words, how many categories are created by
experience, customs and habits. Upon realising that he is on the
Victorian, rather than the New South Welsh side of the Murray,
Collins confesses the following to his reader:
[m]y worldly-wise friend, .... [i]f you have never been
bushed, your immunity is by no means an evidence of
your cleverness, but rather a proof that your
experience of the wilderness is small. If you have been
bushed, you will remember how, as you struck a place
you knew, error was suddenly superseded by a flash of
truth; this without volition of judgment on your part,
and entirely by force of a presentation of fact which
your own personal error -however sincere and
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stubborn- had never affected, and which you were no
longer in a position to repudiate (SiL, 106).
Perhaps one of the fundamental points that the novels make
about induction and the use of categories is the notion that, in
experience, truth comes from error, and that error changes the
categories which underpin one's judgment, one's seeing and
responding to life through custom and habit. This point is made
almost twenty years later by John Dewey in his Reconstruction tn
Philosophy. According to Dewey, '[o]ld truth has its chief value in
assisting the detection of new truth .... Endless and persistent
uncovering of facts and principles not known -such is the true spirit
of induction' ([ 1920) 1957:34). Indeed, '[c)ontinued progress in
knowledge ts the only sure way of protecting old knowledge from
degenerating into dogmatic doctrines received on authority, or from
imperceptible decay into superstition and old wives tales' (Dewey,
[ 1920) 1957:34). Furphy appears to use Collins to point out that
induction modifies established customs and habits, and that
ignorant evaluations lead to the permanent marks which form some
"new" customs or habits, but not necessarily one's which inspire
eudatmonta.

This adds scope to the novels' focus on tgnorance-shifting and
their Epictetian emphasis on judgment, suggesting that inductive
ways of seeing and responding to life can be improved by a tautegoric
breaking or remaking of certain categories. It also explains why
Collins ts so openly preoccupied with censorship, since he ts keen to
point out that authors and artists must select and represent, or
break and remake "life" in a manner that is sufficient for eudatmonia.
To all intents and purposes, Furphy's use of the term "induction" ts
similar to that in the aforementioned Bulletin article. But Furphy ts
also astutely aware that customs and habits find their chief outlet in
literature and art, and that literature and art generate the customs
and habits which form the notion of culture.
As one can see, Collins' use of induction in the novels is not
so clear-cut as Croft concludes. Croft is right to point out that
'Tom's reliance on the powers of induction leads him to some strange
conclusions about Warrtgal Alf (1991: 173), but the situation ts not
so simple that one can conclude that Collins is wrong. Despite being
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aware of Collins' cunning concealment, Croft seems to take no heed
of the possibility that cunning concealment runs throughout the
romance plot. Even an appeal to Furphy's 1903 review cannot
support the notion that Collins is wrong, since the review offers a
rather interesting observation on this matter. Furphy states that
'[u]nderneath this obvious dislocation of anything resembling
continuous narrative, run several undercurrents of plot, manifest to
the reader, though ostensibly unnoticed by the author' (1969: 130. My
italics). This simply suggests that the implied author either pretends
to be unaware of a plot or has no intention of foregrounding these
undercurrents to his readers. It does not state that the plot is wholly
unnoticed by the implied author, which, in terms of Furphy's creative
results, is absurd.
As I mentioned earlier in my thesis, Furphy was attempting to
steer both current and future readers of Such ts Life in the right
direction, and the easiest way to do this was to point out both the
existence of a romance plot and Collins' thematic strategies. In a
letter to Cathels, which the editors, Barnes and Hoffmann, believe to
have been written in 1895, but may also have been written as early
as 1894 or as late as 1896, Furphy states that he 'worked [Johanna
Jorgensen] into my opus as Nosey Alf, the boundary- rider, Cooper's
sister supposed to have suicided, -though the narrator, Collins, never
thinks of establishing the connection' (1995:24). According to a
footnote by Barnes and Hoffmann, 'there is no way of telling whether
the version Furphy was working upon was the "final copy" of Such is
L!fe, as he hoped, or an earlier draft' (1995:24-25). But Barnes and
Hoffmann think it is the final copy and that the year is 1895. If this
is the case, then it pays to bear in mind that this final copy is the
hand-written manuscript which he later edited into the 1903 novel at
Stephens' request. More importantly, the fact that Collins never
thinks of making the connection does not mean that Collins does
not know the connection. It is more than likely that Furphy wanted
to give Cathels a clue to Collins' strategy.
For this reason, I must disagree with Deborah Crisp, who
states that '[i]t is generally considered a clever irony that, despite the
copious hints planted by Collins the author, Collins the first-person
fails to recognise the "true" identity of Nosey Alf Jones towards the
end of Such is Life' (1994:6). This is a vecy debatable statement and
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can only be supported by providing evidence of a clear distance
between Collins as implied author and hero. More importantly, it is
debatable because it fails to address the complex issue of induction
which links Collins, as implied author, to Collins, the hero, and vice
versa, in a eudatmontc evaluation of life through art. Crisp's essay is
itself a rather strange investigation of the romance plot, since she
concludes that readers ought not to look to Molly Cooper for 'Nosey
Alf s identity', but 'outside the pages of Such is Life', for such a move
would 'reassess the evidence from a wider and more objective
perspective' (1994:8). I think she places too much emphasis on
reader-response theory, which does nothing more than advocate a
dangerous idea of liberty in interpretation and devalues
intertextuality as a method for greater insight into a work of
literature.
Within the context of Collins relationship to the romance plot
and its characters, Nina Knight (1969:250) explains that Collins is
quite correct about many details in Warrigal Alfs life, but his strange
conclusions stem from his interpreting Alfs love story through
Ouida. I think Collins' playfulness with Ouida is meant to
foreground the inept use of inductive categories in seeing and
responding to life. In other words, readers should not expect the
novel's romance plot to conform wholly to the classic ingredients of
the categorical romance, nor should they discount the ingredients of
the romance category altogether. As Croft states, the Molly/ Alf 'story
is a story of fidelity, of love, and it involves the classic ingredients of
the romance: the genesis of love, its thwarting, suffering, and the
quest for fulfilment' (1991: 112). I disagree, therefore, with Keogh's
notion that, because of her disguise, Molly Cooper 'represents the
woman who has broken free of traditional restrictions and who will
therefore be more the equal of her partner rather than his property'
(1989:62). Molly's disguise is far from a wilful breaking free in the
sense that Jemima Quarterman has broken free. Instead, Molly's role
as Nosey Alf is forced upon her because Anglo-Australian custom or
habit responds to her facial disfigurement by making her
unacceptable for marriage. But this leaves her in a catch-twenty-two,
since the only option for her is marriage.
Throughout her masquerade as Nosey Alf, Molly Cooper pines
for her fiance, Alf Morris, despite being jilted by him because she was
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no longer an object of beauty. Indeed, of all the female characters in
the three novels, there are only two who sufficiently meet the criteria
for the common notion of the romance heroine, namely Molly Cooper
and Maud Beaudesart. Although not alike in their attitudes to love,
both come from Anglo-Australian families, both are ruined
financially by the economic mismanagement of a family member, and
both possess the feminine quality of yearning for the customary
husband. As Rodriguez notes, '[n]ot only does Furphy make Nosey Alf
faithful to a romantic and virtuous love, conceived and actively
pursued only when both partners are free; he gives her fineness of
feature apart from the area of injury, and a womanly figure'
(1975:181). This point is equally noted by Martin, who adds that
'[h]is hut offers an additional record of his nature -the area in the
front is swept, he grows flowers, [and] he keeps a domesticated cat'
(1992:71). Knight thinks that '[t]he story of Alf and Molly relates to
the Victorian romantic novel, to various other elements in Such ts
L!fe itself and, most importantly, to Collins' continual rejection of
the novelist's art' (1969:255).
What Collins rejects is not the novelist's art but the telling of
the wrong lies. Nevertheless, Knight's observations are quite helpful.
Readers ought to be aware of the immense playfulness throughout
the romance plot, particularly with the relationship between
inductive categories and identity. In order to support his notion that
Collins uses categories wrongly, Wilson uses many examples to point
out 'Tom's plain misinformation' (1979: 136), most notably Collins'
definition of a ship-chandler. According to Collins, a ship-chandler is
'[a] man that supplies candles to ships' (SlL, 22). This is where the
problems begin, because the text does not give any good reason for us
to think that Collins seriously believes his own definition. Indeed,
the definition is a reply to Mosey's asking what a ship-chandler is,
and Mosey's question is itself an interruption of William Cooper's
story about his sister, Molly, and her misfortunes. The two most
likely reasons for this definition are, firstly, that Collins is being
facetious to Mosey's interruption, and secondly, that Collins is
pointing to the elaborate yet logical word-play and clues throughout
the romance plot for his reader.
It is interesting to note that Collins, the implied author, has
Willoughby tell an amusing pun on the same page that Cooper
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begins his stm:y about Molly: '[a] student, returning from a stroll,
encountered a countryman, carrying a hare in his hand. "Friend,"
said the student quietly, "is that thine own hare or a wig?" The joke,
of course, lies in the play on the word "hare"' (SIL, 20). Willoughby's
explanation of the pun is a clue to the reader to read observantly and
think about the way in which words and their meanings can offer
leads within a certain context. To return to the word "ship-chandler",
its general definition is a dealer or merchant of shipping supplies,
such as canvas or ropes. But, etymologically speaking, "chandler"
can also mean a maker and merchant of candles since it derives from
the French word, chandelier, meaning candle-seller, and has its
origin in the word chandelle, or "candle". To all intents and purposes,
Collins' use of a "categocy" is one in which he foregrounds polysemy
as a strategic tool to the finer points of the romance plot.
To consider another, more pertinent example, let us look at the
following exchange between Moriarty and Collins on the subject of
Nosey Alf:
"...Alfs a mis -mis -mis -dash it" "Mischief-maker?" I suggested.
"No. -mis -mis""Mysterious character?"
"No, no. -mis -mis" "Tcy a synonym."
"Is that it? I think it is. Well Alfs a misasynonym
-woman hater- among other things" (SIL, 232).
The word Moriarty is looking for is, of course, misogynist. But
the word-play is an interesting one and serves to unveil some salient
leads by the pun on the prefix "mis-". Furthermore, the use of the
word "synonym" also offers some sharp clues to Nosey Alfs true
gender, which, with the many added clues that Collins cunningly
foregrounds, ought to lead readers to conclude that Nosey Alf is
Molly Cooper. In short, misasynonym is meant to lead the observant
reader to make the move from "man" to "wo-man" through the use of
the prefix "mis-". Another example is the name "Nosey Alf' itself, in
the sense that it is a direct clue to the disfigured Molly Cooper, as
described by William Cooper in chapter of one. But, to be called
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"nosey" also points to someone who is, proverbially speaking, deeply
interested in the affairs of another. Although the word-play in the
romance plot is, at times, quite direct, it can also be very elaborate.
For this reason, readers need to tread carefully, for it is wrong to say
that Collins misses Nosey Alf s true identity.
Rather, the emphasis is strongly on obseivant reading and on
the tautegorical reevaluation of categories, particularly With the
"romance" genre and its customary or habitual depiction of male and
female relations. As I have already discussed, Furphy's novels put
forth the notion that the new world is historically and politically
marked by the meaning of the New Man and the New Woman. Croft
may note that Collins' 'question "Who is she?" leads us to the
hidden story of Molly Cooper' (1983:10). But, the question 'Who is
she?', which Collins asks in the Warrtgal Alf episode (SIL, 135) and
the Nosey Alf/ Molly Cooper episode (SiL, 258), also directs us to the
categorical values and features of the emerging "Australienne" in
light of an inductive uplifting and upbuilding of the nation. As
Collins states to the facially disfigured Nosey Alf/ Molly Cooper,
[d]o we love a woman for her beauty, for her virtues, or
for her accomplishments? .... In the first place ... we
must inquire what the personal beauty of woman is,
and wherein it consists. It consists in approximation
to a given ideal; and this ideal is not absolute; it is
elastic in respect of races and civilizations, though
each type may be regarded as more or less rigid within
its own domain (SIL, 260).
Although he had offended Nosey Alf/ Molly Cooper earlier on,
by quoting the proverb that 'A woman's first duty ... is to be beautiful'
(SiL, 259), an obvious slap in the face for Molly Cooper, Collins'
explanation of the customary or habitual ideal of woman's beauty
includes the potential for the retranslation of such ideals to suit the
"Australian" experience. Collins foregrounds how categories influence
our ways of seeing and responding to life, or our judgment, and he
indicates that these categories can be remade tautegorically. One
wonders whether or not Collins' view spurs Molly Cooper to abandon
her role as Nosey Alf, the boundary rider, and pursue Warrtgal Alf to
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Queensland. As Collins states, '(s]poken words inform the emotional
side of our nature, through the intellectual' (SU., 254), but the true
nature of social or cultural customs and habits is more properly felt
rather than seen. In keeping with Collins' emphasis on truth from
error, one wonders if Nosey Alf/ Molly Cooper has seen the light in
regards to the customary or habitual nature of beauty,
understanding that a new approximation of beauty can increase the
probability of her own happiness.
Croft thinks that the romance plot will not 'end in marriage·,
for 'Furphy was too much of a realist to let his romance end in such
a state; instead he ends the story with a possibility, but no
suggestion of a resolution' (1991:112). Indeed, '[as] with many
formulations of the romance to be written in the early twentieth
century, this one ends without closure, but it is a romance
nevertheless -a particularly modern one which stresses gender
confusion, the unresolved pursuit of happiness, and a deracinated
restlessness' (Croft, 1991:113). But is not the possibility of
resolution a suggestion of resolution? The Alf/ Molly romance should
be read as a parable for the future direction of "Australia",
particularly its customs and habits which influence the sociocultural way of seeing and responding to life. In this sense, one
ought to bear in mind the success of the Falkland-Pritchard marriage
and its emphasis on truth-embellishment. Perhaps Furphy was of the
opinion that the categories which we use in making our Judgments
not only have a tautegoric basis, but also end up being truthembellished.
In this sense, Furphy seems to suggest that the success of a
union between men and women in the Australian experience is
wholly dependent upon a reevaluation of customs and habits toward
gender roles. Bearing in mind Collins theory of sex-charm and sexvalue, Such ts Life seems to indicate that Molly Cooper moves from
the former to the latter during the course of the novel. Instead of
remaining an Anglo-Australian daughter, who lives her life in
disguise because of inherited social customs and habits, she becomes
a woman with calm courage, high moral standard and clear intellect.
The situation seems to be much similar with "Warrigal" Alf Morris,
who, during his illness and confessions to Collins, sees that beauty
is not a necessary condition of marriage. Given the emotional bond
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between Molly Cooper and Alf Morris, one could say that the success
of their romance depends on their fulfilling certain conditions
indicated by the Falkland-Pritchard marriage, though not necessarily
to that extreme.
In a letter to Miles Franklin, Furphy states that '[m]oral
squalor is a poor foundation on which to build romance. Apart from
all puritanism or sanctimoniousness, there ts such a thing as selfreverence' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:160). According to
Croft, 'Furphy... realised the power of romance. The "mawkish" love
stmy in Bellamy's Looking Backward made the novel in his opinion.
And that love st01y led to the popularisation of Bellamy's radical
social theories' (1991 :113). In light of Collins' concern with u pllftlng
and upbuilding the nation through literature and art, readers ought
to be aware that the romance plot is but one piece in a much larger
puzzle, and that it is a piece designed to emphasize both Furphy's
and his implied author's views on categories, Judgment, experience
and social relations. In this sense, one could say that the Alf/ Molly
romance plot is an Australian romance which moves from moral
squalor to self-reverence, foregrounding a way of seeing and
responding to life that is conducive to eudalmonta.
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4. Conclusion: remarks on observant reading for future
studies on Furphy.
The originality of this thesis began with the teasing out of
Barnes' suggestion that Such is Life needed to be seen as a cultural
creation. But this thesis has taken Barnes' suggestion to all three
novels, locating them firmly within the 1880s, and employing a
socio-historical reading of that period in order to appreciate the
novels more accurately. This had not been done previously. Equally,
it has been the aim to appreciate Furphy's novels on the basis of
what he meant by Collins' relationship to the ideas of uplifting and
upbuilding. Using Furphy's letters, the 1903 review and textual
evidence, the thesis has argued that a much more coherent view of
the novels is to look at Collins as their implied author and hero, and
that the novels themselves represent Collins' moral response to the
colonial rivalry and division which plagued the federation movement
in the 1880s. Indeed, the traditional view of Furphy as the actual
and implied author of the novels, and Collins as the unreliable
narrator, has been shown to be inconsistent with the novels
themselves for a variety of reasons. Finally, the extended discussion
of these main points has resulted in a much needed reevaluation of
the romance plot and some other key episodes.
Despite claiming this crucial ground, more work needs to be
done. For this reason, I think we need to end with a question. What
does Furphy mean by observant reading? Critical opinion has shown
that the idea is important, since it is consistently pointed out that
Collins is not an observant reader. But many critics have failed to
draw out the full implication of the relationship between Collins as
the implied author and the hero, adhering to the customary view
that there is a clear case of unreliable narration in the novels. This
is not the case. Furthermore, many critics have approached the idea
of observant reading as a simple act of gathering and interpreting
facts correctly. To a certain extent, Collins does appear to suggest
this when he claims to have 'the more sterling, if less ornamental
qualities of the chronicler' (SiL, 1). But the idea of 'an intuition
which reads men like sign-boards', as well as 'a limpid veracity; and a
memory which habitually stereotypes all impressions except those
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relating to personal injuries' (SiL, 1), indicates something more.
Observant reading requires the reader to engage with matters
of fact in light of authorship, as well as uplifting and upbuilding. In
this sense, the sterling elements of the chronicler do not amount to
an ability to see facts for what they are, but to see them for what
they could be. Collins' strategy is to 'afford to the observant reader a
fair picture of Life as that engaging problem has presented itself to
[him]' (SiL, 2. My italics). A fair picture of life is not necessarily a
factually true one, as is meant to be the case with Journalism. In
terms of observant reading, the idea of life as an engaging problem,
and the fair picture as a solution, anticipates the unravelling of
ambiguities and complexities characteristic of close reading. A fair
picture is not simply reading and rereading the novels. It is reading
and thinking about the issues set out in the opening paragraphs of
Such ts Life, issues which represent Collins' response to life.
Furthermore, these issues are carried through to the other two
novels, so that the three novels together offer a response to the ideas
of uplifting and upbuilding, or federating a nation. For these
reasons, I think the idea of observant reading is an ethical one
because it emphasizes an engagement with the way people see and
respond to life, and the way they live life. As an ethical idea,
observant reading brings immense scope to the core ideas of uplifting
and upbuilding, and these core ideas unveil the exceedingly complex
relationship between art and life. Given Collins' concerns, Furphy is
wise to incorporate that complexity into his novels, particularly
through the interrelated ideas of personal identity, national identity
and authorship.
In short, matters of fact may help to give a distinct flavour to
an artistic reading of life, but the final product must be, as the
novels stress, both truth-embellished and ethically rtght. As Furphy
wrote to Franklin, 'I find it best to take some actual occurrence as a
bed-log, and build thereon -telling the story, not as it did happen,
but as tt should have done' (Barnes and Hoffmann, 1995:177. My
italics). But, one must not follow 'the devices and desires of his own
heart; telling the lies he ought not to have told, and leaving untold
the lies that he ought to have told' (SiL, 272. My italics). Readers and
critics ought to bear in mind Plato's emphasis on first impressions
and permanent marks, as well as his idea of the magnificent myth,
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and its role in maintaining well-being or eudatmonia in Republic.
Because of the core ideas of uplifting and upbuilding, as well
as the issue of natural rights and civil rights, it is my contention
that the novels require an ethical investigation of many of their
episodes, for the authorial Collins encourages the observant reader
to ask questions about their details. For example, in regards to the
Glover episode, consider the following questions. In terms of duty, is
it better to give someone who is down on his luck, food or money? If
you gave them money, what would they do with it? Is it just to
prosecute someone on the basis of custom or appearance? Given that
customs necessarily lead to specific ways of seeing and responding to
life, do customs necessartly lead to justice or well-being? Is it just to
prosecute someone for damaging or destroying a part of your property
which is considered worthless or an eye-sore? In short, each episode
has a specific set of questions which need to be investigated
ethically, for readers of the novels should not make rash conclusions
about Collins' moral position, as has been the case in the past.
I would also like to suggest that future research pay more
attention to Rigby's Romance. Of the three novels, this one has been
the most neglected. The reason for this seems to be the notion that
the novel simply represents a word-for-word espousal of Furphy's
basic belief in socialism. This is not the case. As I have already
argued in my thesis, Furphy is not a socialist, and any expression of
interest in socialism ought to be seen within the context of a
Phllosophe's demand for human rights and moral progress. More
importantly, Rigby's Romance is itself much too complicated a novel
to be an espousal of socialism. Rigby himself does not fare well, and
that has much to do with his notion that 'man is a law-abiding
animal' and that 'you can make men anything you please by Act of
Parliament' so long as 'such Act is sanctioned by a preponderant
moiety of the national intelligence' (RR, 201). As I argued in my
thesis, it is possible to make individuals Australian by an act of
parliament, but I hardly think anyone could be made good, happy or
virtuous in this way. Rigby's belief is problematic, and I think Rigby's
socialist "Sermon on the Murray" is the antithesis of Christ's
democratic "Sermon on the Mount", for Rigby shapes and divides
humanity by law, while Christ brings it together through an appeal
to rights and the compassionate side of human nature.
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rugby's arrogant relationship to the other heroes during his
determinist sermon strongly suggests that human nature is the
spanner in the socialist's deterministic order of things. As Binney
states, '[y]our system is outside the range of practical politics'
because '[i]t would press too hard on personal liberty' (RR, 205). If
Furphy's Rigby was, in any sense, the ideal male hero, then it should
follow that, stylistically, Rigby ought to have disciples, not enemies.
Readers should bear in mind Plato's Socrates, whose disciples
challenge him, but do not threaten 'to tilt' him 'into the ensanguined
river' (RR, 200). Within the context of uplifting and upbuilding the
human order of things, I think Rigby's Romance continues the study
of human nature begun in Such ts Life, and that Rigby himself is not
excluded. This is especially the case when it comes to Rigby's
opportunistic nature, as I have discussed in the first chapter of my
thesis. Also, readers ought to bear in mind that Collins is still the
implied author, despite his diminished status as hero, and that
rugby's dialogue is ultimately controlled by him. Because this is so, I
think future readers ought to examine the contrast between Collins'
belief in rights with rugby's belief in law.
Finally, besides Shakespeare and the Bible, as well as other
works that form Furphy's mtdrashic string of pearls, I think future
research particularly needs to consult the following texts in order to
appreciate better the intellectual dimension of the novels:
a
a
a
a
a
a

Paine's The Rights ofMan.
Epictetus· Encheiridion and The Discourses.
Aurelius' Meditations [to Himself].
Plato's Republic.
Whitman's Leaves of Grass.
Emerson's essays, particularly 'The American
Scholar' and 'Self-Reliance'.
a Hume's Treatise on Human Nature and An Enquiry
into Human Understanding, particularly the issues
of induction, customs and habits.

With this in mind, whatever aspect of the novels they discuss,
future readers of Furphy need to pay close attention to the following
set of interrelated ideas:
299.

a eudatmonta.

a rationalism and ignorance.
a induction (particularly in terms of tautegoric and
categoric "knowledge").
a customary and habitual conclusions in ways of
seeing and responding to life.
a intertextuality and recontextuality.
a authorship and roleplay.
a natural rights and civil rights.
a the ethics of artistic representation.
a obseivant reading and truth-embellishment.
a censorship.
a the relationship between personal and national
identity.
a the theocy of the controlling alternatives.
a social architecture.
Although I have tried to place them in a coherent sequence,
no idea holds greater value than another. The value of each idea is
shaped by others in the list, and the whole gets its value from the
unifying consciousness of Tom Collins, as well as the core ideas of
uplifting and upbuilding that are his concern. Furthermore, these
ideas gtve value to the statement, "Such is life", because they provide
the background for meaning. Furphy may state in his 1903 review
that 'the studied inconsecutiveness of the "memoirs" is made to
mask coincidence and cross-purposes, sometimes too intricate'
(1969: 130), but this should not be taken as advocating an absolute
freedom in interpretation. This makes reading Furphy more
complicated, and it is, as some have argued, Furphy's downfall to
make such demands on his readers. But this does not detract from
the fact that an obseivant reader must be a methodical reader who
reads to think within a supplied frame of reference, namely the ideas
in the list, the socio-historical context, Furphy's belief in an
Australian literature, his passion for certain key works in the
Western tradition, and a concern with an enlightened uplifting and
upbuilding of Australia. To ignore these things will only devalue
Furphy's concerns, leading to some untenable conclusions in regards
to Tom Collins, as has been the case in the past.
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